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2. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space
- Author:
- Nicholas Eftimiades
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America
3. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine
4. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience
- Author:
- Amelie Theussen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States
5. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
- Topic:
- Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
6. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations
- Author:
- Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Germany
7. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism
- Author:
- Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Arctic
8. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?
- Author:
- Margarita Zavadskaya
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
9. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal
- Author:
- Jussi Lassila
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
- Topic:
- Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
10. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership
- Author:
- Henrik Larsen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
11. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea
12. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa
- Author:
- Joshua Meservey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America
13. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)
- Author:
- Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
14. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine
- Author:
- Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine
15. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world
- Author:
- Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
16. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
17. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
18. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda
- Author:
- Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
19. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn
- Author:
- Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark
20. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy
- Author:
- Kristi Raik
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eurasia
21. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace
- Author:
- Dmytro Dubov
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
22. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea
- Author:
- Bill Combes
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea
23. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power
- Author:
- Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
24. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’
- Author:
- Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
25. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik
- Author:
- András Rácz
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Germany
26. German strengths and weaknesses in the Russo-Ukrainian war
- Author:
- Emmanuel Comte
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- The Russian attack on Ukraine has activated a series of tropes about the international balance of power in Europe. Most mainstream opinion outlets have published criticisms of Germany for supposedly being dependent on Russia and threatening the European security system by hesitating when decisive action is required. The following points serve to reintroduce some facts into the conversation. The current war in Ukraine is primarily the result of German-Russian rivalry. The war is a case of an established power, Russia, miscalculating in its efforts to prevent a rising power, Germany, from absorbing a nation within its sphere of cooperation: Ukraine. Germany’s strategy has been subtle, seeking to manage through economic interdependence an international conflict predicated upon balance of power considerations. Since circa 1900, Turkey has also played a key role in the German security system in the Black Sea region. With the benefit of hindsight, Germany’s strategy has been the most appropriate to the situation, given that Russia has been completely isolated while Germany is surrounded by allies. Germany’s problems today are not in its Russian policy, but rather in self-defeating ideologies which include the “Green” movement and economic statism.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany
27. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine
- Author:
- Liana Fix and Steven Keil
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
28. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action
- Author:
- Cédric Philibert
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
29. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?
- Author:
- Katarzyna Zysk
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and North America
30. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North
- Author:
- Elizabeth Buchanan
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America
31. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank
- Author:
- Marc Ozawa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
32. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After
- Author:
- Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
33. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
34. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine
- Author:
- Erwin van Veen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
35. If Russia Uses Migration as a Weapon, Europeans Should Respond In Kind
- Author:
- Alia Fakhry, Roderick Parkes, and András Rácz
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Around 442,000 people have so far fled Ukraine – not just to the EU, but also to neighbors like Moldova. This is a humanitarian issue, and should not be conflated with “migrant instrumentalization” (MI), whereby a state pushes people across a border to coerce the EU to change position. Yet Russia is likely to employ MI in this way, especially if it moves deep into Western Ukraine. Drawing on an in-depth study, we show how the EU can meet this specific threat.
- Topic:
- Security, Migration, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Ukraine
36. Sea Change for Europe’s Security Order: Three Future Scenarios
- Author:
- Christian Mölling, Tyson Barker, David Hagebölling, Afra Herr, and Kai Kornhuber
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The war of aggression that Russia launched against Ukraine in February has destroyed the European security order. The German government has defined this moment as a sea change (Zeitenwende) for its foreign and security policy. It still must envisage and shape a new order. Key factors are whether Europe will be united in strategic policy areas, and how Russia will position itself.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe
37. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran
- Author:
- Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine
38. NATO’s Tunnel Vision
- Author:
- George Beebe
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Despite Russia’s violent rejection of a NATO-centric Europe, the United States should still pursue its vision of a continent that will one day be “peaceful, whole, and free.” The alternative is a blood-soaked division of the continent, constantly prone to escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. The United States needs to adopt a different approach to achieving its vision, as follows: • The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine’s independence as a neutral state outside NATO. • If Europe is to be whole, NATO cannot serve as its overarching security arm. NATO should focus on defense of its existing members, not expanding its ranks or operating out of area, including against China. • Over time, our goal should be evolution toward a U.N. Security Council-type arrangement in Europe that includes both NATO and non-NATO members. The price of admission for Russia must be good faith compliance with the terms of a settlement in Ukraine. • If Europe is to be free, we must recognize that a stable security environment in Europe is a prerequisite for the ex-Soviet states gradually becoming more liberal. The best means of ensuring that Europe is free is by revitalizing democracy within the West itself.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
39. The Ukraine Example: Circumstances Matter for Effective Security Assistance
- Author:
- Ethan Kessler
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- US aid would not have been nearly as effective without Ukraine’s efforts to improve its military prior to the 2022 Russian invasion. US security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion in February 2022 has been substantial, but was not sufficient to guarantee Ukraine’s initial military success in the war. Data reveals that US security assistance to Ukraine, which mainly consisted of nonproliferation-related aid before 2014, increased after Russia’s invasion of Crimea that year. However, Ukraine’s failures against Russia in Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine were largely due to an undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained Ukrainian military. Ukraine’s focus on remedying these problems, along with increased combat experience, principally drove Ukrainian military improvements by 2022. These internal changes, as well as Russia’s poor military organization and force employment in the first phase of its 2022 invasion, are essential for understanding the contributions of US equipment and weapons to Ukrainian military successes. These lessons are instructive not only for US security assistance to Ukraine, but also for the many other settings where US security assistance is a prominent policy tool.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
40. The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
- Author:
- Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The war in Ukraine could mark a watershed for European security. There has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united around three key ideas. Firstly, they believe it is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally. Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crisis, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular. Europeans disagree on which are the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. The crisis will likely test Europeans’ readiness to defend the European security order.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
41. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia
- Author:
- Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
42. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors
- Author:
- Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa
43. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance
- Author:
- Cori Fleser
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
44. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.
- Author:
- John R. Deni
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden
45. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine
- Author:
- Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
46. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case
- Author:
- Isabella Martin
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
47. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations
- Author:
- Kadri Liik
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
48. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current
- Author:
- Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe
49. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea
- Author:
- Gustav Gressel
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea
50. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it
- Author:
- Marc Franco
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
51. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO
- Author:
- Justyna Gotkowska
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe
52. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe
- Author:
- Iuliia Osmolovska
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
53. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2020-21
- Author:
- M. Patrick Hulme and Tai Ming Cheung
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, is increasingly critical as new and long-standing hotspots— including the Taiwan strait, Korean peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea—become more volatile. The need for confidence-building measures is clear, and a central tool of confidence building is defense transparency. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security, including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, and the major external powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transparency
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, North Korea, Korea, East China, and United States of America
54. Trying to govern the ungovernable: International Law on cyber and information operations in Russian
- Author:
- Asbjørn Thranov and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Russia has proposed an international regime governing the use of cyber and information operations. However, ‘digital sovereignty’ means something very different in Moscow than it does in Washington. In September 2020, the Russian authorities launched a new initiative to regulate the use of cyber and information operations by states. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, introduced the debate by suggesting that Russia and the USA lead the way by signing a bilateral agreement restricting their activities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The two states, so Putin suggested, should establish regular dialogue and set up a ‘hot line’. Putin also proposed a new agreement on cyber and information operations that should ‘exchange guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of the other side, including into electoral processes, inter alia, by means of the ICTs and high-tech methods’. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, added more details. In a statement, he drew a dark picture of the world ‘facing a real cyber pandemic’, pointing to the risk of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the interference by some states in the internal affairs of other states. ‘It is high time’, so he claimed, that the international community agreed on a regime to regulate the use of ICTs. Russia has proceeded to promote the new initiative at the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which has responded with a decision to renew the mandate of the open-ended working group on the security and use of ICTs in 2021-2025.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
55. Nuclear submarines and central heating: What Russia wants in the Arctic
- Author:
- Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- A survey of current Russian strategies and military thinking about the Arctic points to clear separate military and development goals. Leading Russian military commentators usually include both in their analyses, often highlighting the softer development aspect of security. Moreover, much of the military writing identifies broad possibilities for international co-operation in the Arctic. Key findings Russian military commentators usually insist that all relevant actors need to act with care to avoid a deterioration of the situation in the Arctic. Russian military writing contains a strong focus on the development of the Russian Arctic. Russian military writing identifies broad possibilities for co-operation in both the military and civilian fields.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, International Organization, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, and Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Arctic
56. Russian energy and grand strategy
- Author:
- Jakub M. Godzimirski
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This Policy Brief presents the most recent data on the performance of the Russian energy sector and discusses its strategic importance in the current setting.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, and Grand Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
57. The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies
- Author:
- Mitvim
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US, Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, and Foreign Policy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Mediterranean
58. A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Yun
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- A joint statement by the United States and North Korea in June 2018 declared that the two countries were committed to building “a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Such a peace regime will ultimately require the engagement and cooperation of not just North Korea and the United States, but also South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. This report outlines the perspectives and interests of each of these countries as well as the diplomatic, security, and economic components necessary for a comprehensive peace.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Diplomacy, Economy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America
59. The Butterfly Effect: Why does Eastern Europe matter to Japan?
- Author:
- Daisiuke Kitade
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Long gone are the days when Eastern Europe was Russia’s exclusive backyard. The last decade has witnessed the rapid expansion of political and economic ties between powers from the Middle East and Asia and East European states. While much of the analysis on the rise of these powers is usually focused on China and its One Belt One Road march across the post-Soviet world, the role of other Asian powers remains underexplored. Whereas China’s penetration of the region has been in the spotlight, Japan’s charm offensive to rekindle diplomatic, political and economic ties with Eastern Europe has tended to be overlooked. In the last five years, Japan has opened three new embassies in the region (in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova), Japan’s prime minster has paid the first official visit to Ukraine in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries and the Japanese foreign minister travelled to all three South Caucasus republics. More recently, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic Japan pledged to provide the flu drug Avigan to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine free of charge. All this raises the question why, despite such a great geographical distance, Eastern Europe matters to Japan? The aim of this Brief is threefold. Firstly, to outline the place of Eastern Europe in Japan’s foreign policy and shed light on the drivers shaping Tokyo’s approach. Secondly, to assess Japan’s economic presence as well as the amount of development aid it has provided to East European states. Thirdly, to reveal similarities between Japan’s and the EU’s strategies in this region and ultimately, to identify areas of cooperative synergy.
- Topic:
- Security, Development, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade, and Development Aid
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, and Asia
60. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations
- Author:
- Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus
61. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union
- Author:
- Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
62. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad
- Author:
- David Carment
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
- Abstract:
- After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America
63. Sino-Russian Cooperation in Outer Space: Taking Off?
- Author:
- Richard Weitz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- China and Russia are the two most influential space players besides the United States. Whereas in the past NASA was Moscow’s partner of choice, many influential Russians now look to China as their main future partner. Sino-Russian cooperation regarding global positioning and navigation satellites, space exploration, and space security has been growing and will likely continue.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
64. Taking stock: Where are geopolitics headed in the COVID-19 era?
- Author:
- Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic is a strategic shock, and its almost immediate, damaging effects on the global economy constitute a secondary disruption to global order. Additional secondary strategic shocks (e.g., in the developing world) are looming. Together, these developments pose arguably the greatest threat to the global order since World War II. In the aftermath of that conflict, the United States and its allies established a rules-based international system that has guaranteed freedom, peace, and prosperity for decades. If the United States and its allies do not act effectively, the pandemic could upend this order. This issue brief considers the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it considers the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it examines how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlights uncertainties ahead, and provides recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Economy, Business, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, South Asia, Eurasia, India, Taiwan, Asia, North America, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
65. Russia’s exotic nuclear weapons and implications for the United States and NATO
- Author:
- Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five new nuclear-capable, strategic weapons systems. These systems include a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine drone. What does Russia have to gain from developing these novel and exotic nuclear weapons? And what should the United States and NATO do about it? This new Atlantic Council issue brief, Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO, answers these questions. Informed by a workshop convened by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Los Alamos National Laboratory, authors Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti evaluate the potential utility, motivations, and consequences of these new systems. Among other conclusions, the most significant may be that great-power competition has returned, and with it, the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Power, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
66. Final Week Cybersecurity Considerations: Top Takeaways
- Author:
- Belfer Center
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- This election has already faced threats from cyber adversaries seeking to influence its outcome. The joint CISA-FBI alert confirming Russian state-sponsored activity targeting government networks on October 22 builds on other advisories around potential cyberattacks on election systems ahead of the election, including advisories of DDOS attacks against election infrastructure. Making unplanned or last-minute changes ahead of election day can introduce serious risks, especially given the short window to test changes. Here are some considerations as you work to address and prepare to counter potential cyber threats.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States of America
67. Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?
- Author:
- Julie Wilhelmsen
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Proxy War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia
68. Measuring Russia’s attention to Europe and the world
- Author:
- Kristian Lundby Gjerde
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Based on a mapping of mentions of country names in more than 30,000 Russian official speeches, press conferences, meeting transcripts, and official statements, this brief provides insights into changes to Russia’s engagement with the world during the 21st century. Without disentangling the subtleties of relations – such as their security, economic, or cultural dimensions and their benign or adversarial features – this approach allows the brief to sketch answers to questions that would otherwise be left to guesswork.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Economics, and Culture
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eurasia
69. The End of German Ostpolitik: What a Change in Germany’s Russia Strategy Might Look Like
- Author:
- Stefan Meister
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have hit a new low after the attempted poisoning of Alexei Navalny and the Kremlin’s continued support for Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, despite massive electoral fraud in that country. A new Russia policy in Berlin will require a paradigm shift, using incentives and leverage to improve Germany’s negotiating position with Moscow. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project should be under intense scrutiny. If Moscow shows itself unwilling to cooperate, construction should be stopped.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Leadership, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Libya, Germany, and Syria
70. Russia’s Militia Groups and their Use at Home and Abroad
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- What makes the militia milieu so unique and important for understanding today’s Russia is that it finds itself at the intersection of state institutions, patronage mechanisms, criminal structures, and grassroots illiberal activism. Abroad, the Kremlin plays through it one of its major “hybrid warfare” cards, outsourcing activities traditionally conducted by intelligence entities and allowing for plausible deniability. The militia realm thus seems destined to play a growing role in Russia’s law-enforcement, military and intelligence culture both at home and abroad. Marlene Laruelle is Research Professor and Associate Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University (Washington DC) and Co-Director of PONARS-Eurasia. She has been Associate Research Fellow at Ifri’s Russia/NIS Center since January 2019.
- Topic:
- Security, Nationalism, Military Affairs, and Ideology
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
71. Cyber-Security: The Threats from Russia and the Middle East
- Author:
- Ferry de Kerckhove
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
- Abstract:
- The art of war has changed considerably since the end of the Second World War. In the last 15 years, the centre of gravity has slowly shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The West is increasingly being destabilized. Hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks have become increasingly effective alternatives to both hard and soft power. Russia is a major player in this domain; so is Iran. Other players are joining the fray, most of them hostile to the West, such as Iran and Russia’s client states. The barriers between civilian and military are fading quickly. All-out war now happens in a space that’s invisible to the naked eye. Not only is such warfare threatening us, but it also has consequences we have barely begun to assess. The divide between good and bad is blurring. Marshall McLuhan said the medium is the message. Today, the medium and the message are an undecipherable continuum where evil and lies coexist with truth and goodwill. Technological prowess increases vulnerability, but technology is also at the heart of corresponding systems of security. Thus, we have fully entered a new arms race where deterrence comes from the other side knowing what you don’t want him to discover, but what you want him to fear. Voltaire said: “If you wish to speak to me, let us start by defining the meaning of our words.” In this day and age, this mantra is particularly applicable to the definition of contemporary threats as well as of the targets, or even who is in the sights of Russian and Middle Eastern leaders. “Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. In effect, cyberspace can be thought of as the interconnection of human beings through computers and telecommunication, without regard to physical geography.” Consequently, “(c)ybersecurity is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from digital attacks. These cyberattacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information; extorting money from users; or interrupting normal business processes. Implementing effective cybersecurity measures is particularly challenging today because there are more devices than people, and attackers are becoming more innovative.” Discussions focus on whether Russia or China is the heavyweight in terms of threat. Some argue that China is more subtle while Russia is more of a rogue. But it is undeniable that China’s attempt to change the fundamental paradigm of international relations, while using and hopefully subduing the existing international order’s mechanisms to its advantage, represents a holistic approach and is thus more threatening to the world if it even partly succeeds. Indeed, the planet’s centre of gravity is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific and that means the global threat comes from China. If we needed a reminder, in 2014 Chinese hackers stole the personal information of more than 22 million people connected to U.S. security clearance processes. Not bad for five years ago!
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, and Middle East
72. Executive Summary: Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior Russia Strategic Initiative-Workshop 3 March 18-19, 2019
- Author:
- Graeme P. Herd
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- The “Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior” Workshop #3 brought together twenty-five academics and practitioners from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Belarus to discuss strategic issues concerning Russian behavior and policy. This workshop is one in a series of semi-annual events that is hosted by the Marshall Center, funded by USEUCOM’s Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI) office, and is supported by RAND. The workshop ran for two days and consisted of short presentations followed by more lengthy discussions. The international research team examined a variety of topics, including Russia’s strategic behavior in the Arctic as well as in the Nordic-Baltic region, Ukraine, and Syria; Russian engagement with Belarus, Turkey, and Afghanistan; sub-institutional cultures; the impact of U.S.-Chinese strategic competition on Russian strategic behavior; sanctions, and Putin’s relationship with Russia’s elite.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
73. Inside the Russian Digital Domain: Plug in, plug out
- Author:
- Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The digital domain is an arena of opportunity for Russia in which to attempt to achieve its various objectives. However, it is also a source of threat, as it contains the possibility of attacks on Russia’s digital infrastructure, including the ability to send a relatively uninterrupted flow of information to the public. The continued development of artificial intelligence has the potential to upset the system, and Russia, which will trail the leading states within this field, is still in the early phases of formulating a response to this challenge. Recommendations ■ Remember that the digital domain in Russia is seen not only as an arena of opportunity, but also as a source of threat to the state (or rather to the regime). ■ Be prepared for Russia to think creatively to minimize the gap separating it from the world’s leaders in the development of AI. ■ Be prepared for Russia to work for an international regime restricting the use of AI for military purposes.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
74. The risks of being an ally
- Author:
- Jakub M. Godzimirski
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- States join security alliances to increase their level of security vis-à-vis neighbours that may pose a threat. The deterrence logic that was the main rationale for joining NATO in 1949 still represents the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy. However, belonging to a military alliance can also pose challenges. This policy brief focuses on some possible negative spillover effects that could emerge from being member of a military alliance. The focus here is on current challenges within NATO, and the possible implications for Norway. First, we present a broader conceptual framework. What are the internal and external challenges facing NATO? How do NATO and its members deal with them? We then proceed to the implications for Norway. Due to structural factors that shape relations in Norway’s strategic environment – including the location of Russian strategic bases close to the border, and the clear asymmetry in capabilities – negative developments in other regions and theatres may influence Norwegian security directly. We argue that, in order to minimize the likelihood of negative trends spilling over to Norway’s strategic neighbourhood, it is important to communicate the special features of this neighbourhood clearly to other members of the alliance. Further, to facilitate intra-alliance trust and cohesion, Norway should also emphasize NATO’s internal, shared value-base, in order to make the alliance better prepared to meet external security challenges.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
75. Why Americans Should Care About Russian Hacking
- Author:
- Michael Fuchs, Carolyn Kenney, Anna Perina, and Francesca Van Doorn
- Publication Date:
- 02-2017
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election was an attack on the American people, threatening the integrity and legitimacy of the democratic process, as well as the outcome of the election. And yet, the Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian activity in the election found that this was but the most recent and aggressive expression to date of a longstanding Russian desire to sow chaos and instability in the United States. Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election should be a wake-up call to every American about the diverse ways in which Russian malicious cyberactivity could affect every aspect of their lives.1 The so-called information warfare campaign ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the election is part-and-parcel of a longstanding and multi-faceted Russian intelligence strategy that “blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyberactivity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’” in order to cripple its adversaries.2 The election is not the first time Russian cyberactors have been successful. Over the past decade, Russian hacking groups—many of which are backed by the government—have successfully deployed a technology-based strategy to infiltrate, tamper with, and steal sensitive information across government, military, banking, and communications systems in the United States and Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Election Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
76. The Russian Reality Check on Turkey's Gas Hub Hopes
- Author:
- Morena Skalamera
- Publication Date:
- 01-2016
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- On Nov 24, 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet after it veered into its airspace for 17 seconds. On December 13, a Russian ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean Sea. Bilateral tensions, with overt military dimensions, have seemed to quickly replace the goodwill that characterized relations only a year ago. Over the past few weeks, experts and observers have debated whether this incident will jeopardize deep Turkish-Russian energy cooperation—and whether newfound tensions between Moscow and Ankara will thwart Turkey’s ambition to transform itself into an energy hub. A closer look suggests grounds for both optimism and pessimism. Given the deep interests of both parties in continuing energy cooperation, and the mutual nature of the dependency, tensions over Syria are unlikely to adversely impact energy cooperation in a fundamental way. Turkey, however, is unlikely to realize its vision of an energy hub—not because of Russia, but because of a combination of domestic and other geopolitical factors.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, Geopolitics, Gas, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Turkey
77. Azerbaijan’s Risky Game between Russia and the West
- Author:
- Kamran Ismayilov and Konrad Zasztowt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2015
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Azerbaijan recently had to face a wave of criticism from the European institutions (the OSCE and the European Parliament) due to its government’s undemocratic practices. In response, Baku accused its European partners of Islamophobia and declared the suspension of parliamentary cooperation in the framework of the EU’s Euronest. The Azerbaijani ruling elite also blames the West of supporting a “fifth column” in Azerbaijan (meaning civil society organisations) as well as of giving political support to its arch-enemy Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time authorities in Baku are displaying their developing political partnership with Russia. This paper examines the consequences of the crisis in relations between the EU and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement for the prospects for EU-Azerbaijan energy projects and regional security in the South Caucasus.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Civil Society, Politics, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Azerbaijan
78. Arab League Summit Report
- Author:
- Omar Sheira and Muhammed Ammash
- Publication Date:
- 04-2015
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
- Abstract:
- The 26th Arab League Summit, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, came amidst a series of divisive crises in the Middle East and North African region: in Yemen, a Saudi Arabian-led coalition initiated a campaign of airstrikes to counter the advance of the Houthi rebellion; in Libya, a multiparty civil war continues between rival governments and Islamist-oriented groups; in Syria, the civil war enters its fifth year, prolonging the conflict and adding more parties; and in Iraq, the government leads an offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to regain territory which was seized by the group in the Summer of 2014. Meanwhile, Iran also has an alleged role in the crises in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, which was referenced during the Summit. In addition to these issues, the agenda of the Arab League Summit also aimed to monitor the implementation of past recommendations, express support for Palestine and Somalia, and discuss ways to combat extremist groups.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, and Arab Countries
79. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Monumental Mistake by the Obama Administration or a New Beginning?
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 07-2015
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will be scrutinized by diplomats, military experts and politicians for months and years to come. Statesmen and politicians will interpret the deal differently and each will vie to use the argument which suites the audience and the domestic base she/he represents. However, the psychological, economic, political, and military implications of the deal on the United States, Europe and many Middle Eastern countries will be monumental. The deal will impact the balance of power in the Middle East and will change its dynamics forever, change the dynamics of the energy markets in Europe, Thus creating tension between Russia and Europe, and will ignite a fierce security debate between Democrats and Republicans in the United States on the culture of regime change and the use of force. The deal will bring the subject of regime change to the political forefront in the US and will raise a serious question on whether the use of force is the only effective mechanism to change the behavior of states in order to achieve favorable outcomes. Both Republicans and Democrats used force as a tool for regime change, however the Obama administration is a advocating for new means: diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Regime Change, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany
80. Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf
- Author:
- James Andrew Lewis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The Gulf has become a flashpoint for cyber conflict. Cyberspace has become an arena for covert struggle, with the United States, Israel and other nations on one side, and Iran and Russia on the other. Iran has far outpaced the GCC states in developing its cyber capabilities, both for monitoring internal dissent and deploying hackers to disrupt or attack foreign targets. Several such attacks over the past two years were likely either directed or permitted by Iranian state authorities. Even if Iran holds back from offensive actions as nuclear talks progress, the growth in Iranian capabilities remains a potential security threat for other Gulf states. The GCC countries have begun to develop their defensive capabilities, but they will need to expand their defenses and collaborate more effectively to deter future threats.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia
81. Terrorism and Sport: Dangers for the XXII Olympic Winter Games in Sochi
- Author:
- Kacper Rękawek
- Publication Date:
- 01-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Terrorists constantly seek the spotlight and attacking major sporting events constitutes a seemingly perfect springboard for global notoriety. As the XXII Olympic Winter Games in Sochi are nearing, the global public is understandably concerned about the July 2013 North Caucasian jihadi threats to either disrupt the Games or prevent them altogether. Are the recent Volgograd bombings all the terrorists could muster in anticipation of the Olympics or is there more to come? It is worth analysing some of the options the Caucasus Emirate might be considering in relation to their stated intent to disrupt or force the cancellation of the Olympics. All of the options are derived from information on previous terrorist attacks on other sporting events that could provide clues for counter-terrorism authorities in Russia and neighbouring countries to use when securing these Olympics.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, International Organization, Terrorism, and Insurgency
- Political Geography:
- Russia
82. Sochi: games with frontiers
- Author:
- Gerald Stang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Russia is often seen as a land of extremes – and the narratives for this month's Winter Olympics in Sochi reflect that view. From the record-length 65,000 km Olympic torch run (which included trips to outer space, the north pole and the bottom of the world's deepest lake) to the incredible $51 billion price tag and the Ian Flemingesque threat of attacks from black widow terrorists, the Sochi games have a distinctly Russian flavour. The Kremlin appears to have envisioned the games as a national triumph, not unlike the 2008 Beijing Olympics, with organisational, architectural and sporting successes that could unite the country. However, with global headlines dominated by stories of corruption, human rights abuses, anti-gay laws and the very real threat of terrorist attacks, one might be forgiven for wondering whether the Russian government regrets its decision to bid for the games.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Political Violence, Islam, and Insurgency
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
83. Divided Stands the Visegrad? The V4 have been united towards the Ukraine crisis but remain split concerning Russia
- Author:
- András Rácz
- Publication Date:
- 06-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The destabilization of Ukraine and the possible escalation of the crisis have presented a direct security risk to the Visegrad countries - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary - particularly concerning military security, the potential interruption of energy transit, and the possible influx of refugees. These factors have forced the Visegrad states to show unprecedented unity and activism in addressing the crisis. However, regarding the possibility of sanctioning Russia, the Visegrad Group is unable to take a joint position. The main reason for this is that Russia does not pose a direct military threat to the region. Consequently the individual policies of the Visegrad countries towards Russia are defined by a constellation of geopolitical concerns, normative motivations, business interests and domestic political ambitions, which are decidedly different in all four cases. Domestic political motivations, such as the will to increase domestic legitimacy, and concerns over the economic effects of sanctions, obviously influence the foreign policy actions of the Visegrad governments. However, Viktor Orbán of Hungary was the only one to break the Visegrad solidarity on Ukraine with his domestically-motivated remarks in May 2014 and demanding autonomy for Hungarians living in the Trans-Carpathian region. As most normative, business and domestic political motivations are of a lasting strategic nature, it is highly likely that the general incoherence of the Visegrad region regarding Russia will prevail.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, and International Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Poland
84. Russian thinking in the Ukraine crisis: From drawing a line of defence to seeing a threat to national security
- Author:
- Katri Pynnöniemi
- Publication Date:
- 09-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Three articles written by Russian foreign policy analyst Sergei Karaganov and published at the turning points of the Ukraine conflict shed light on how the reasoning on Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine has evolved amid the conflict. The meaning of the conflict, as explained in the first essay, is that Russia is drawing a line of defence against Western interference in its sphere of interest. In the second essay, the assertion that with the Crimean operation Russia has forced the West to put an end to the Cold War, is reconfigured into a choice that Russia needs to make between the Western or non-Western path. Finally, in an essay written after the downing of flight MH17, it is argued that without de-escalation the situation in Donbass will become a threat to Russian national security. The evolution of the argumentation shows that some sort of 'reality check' has occurred in the vicinity of the general line. However, while the dangers inherent in the conflict are recognized, Karaganov fails to acknowledge Russia's active involvement in the conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, and Cold War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
85. The consensus on Mali and international conflict management in a multipolar world
- Author:
- Xenia Avezov and Timo Smit
- Publication Date:
- 09-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The transition towards multipolarity in the international system has concerned many observers in recent years. They fear'an era of disorder and greatly diminished multilateralism owing to miscalculation, uncertainty and distrust between the new and established powers'. This is based partly on the assumption that multipolarity will create competition rather than cooperation as international actors promote or object to intervention in conflicts based on their own geostrategic, economic or political interests.
- Topic:
- Security and United Nations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, and Syria
86. Trends in international arms transfers, 2013
- Author:
- Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2009–13 was 14 per cent higher than in 2004–2008 (see figure 1). The five biggest exporters in 2009–13 were the United States, Russia, Germany, China and France and the five biggest importers were India, China, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, War, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, India, Paris, France, Germany, and Saudi Arabia
87. An Economic Strategy to Save Ukraine
- Author:
- Anders Åslund
- Publication Date:
- 11-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- Ukraine has experienced a year of unprecedented political, economic, and military turmoil. The combination of Russian military aggression in the east and a legacy of destructive policies leading to pervasive corruption has plunged the country into an existential crisis. The West, meanwhile, has been largely paralyzed with uncertainty over how to assist Ukraine without reviving Cold War hostilities. Yet all is not lost for Ukraine. A tenuous ceasefire, along with the successful elections of President Petro Poroshenko in May and a new parliament in October offer an opportunity for economic reform. If the current ceasefire in the east holds, Ukraine has a great opportunity to break out of its vicious circle of economic underperformance. Yet, the window of opportunity is likely to be brief. The new government will have to act fast and hard on many fronts to succeed.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Economics, and Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
88. Indian perspectives on the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea
- Author:
- Varun Sahni
- Publication Date:
- 06-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
- Abstract:
- The statement by India's national security adviser on March 6th 2014 referring to "legitimate" Russian interest in Ukraine was unsurprisingly criticised in the West, but appreciated in Russia. Most observers missed other important elements in the statement: reference to Ukraine's internal issues; recognition that both Russian and other interests were involved; and emphasis on a peaceful settlement, reconciliation and negotiation. Debate on the Ukrainian crisis has been largely absent in India due to preoccupation with national elections, widespread consensus that Russia is a dependable "friend of India", and sneaking admiration of President Putin for his "decisiveness" in promoting Russia's interests and open defiance of the West. While China and Pakistan have deployed historical/ethno-cultural arguments to dispute Indian sovereignty over territories that India considers its own, India has consistently rejected claims to alter the territorial status quo on grounds of kinship across sovereign borders.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, and Territorial Disputes
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, India, and Asia
89. After Ukraine – NATO should stay vigilant on the Middle East
- Author:
- Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Leading up to the NATO Summit in September, the crisis in Ukraine has vindicated some NATO members' fears of Russia. This could cause NATO to revert to a narrow focus on Article 5 defense. Yet, other issues still pose threats and NATO should remain vigilant towards security challenges from the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East
90. Turkish-Iranian Rapprochement and the Future of European and Asian Energy
- Author:
- Pinar Dost-Niyego and Orhan Taner
- Publication Date:
- 04-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The recent events in Ukraine have revived the question of European dependence on Russian natural gas. The security of Europe's natural gas supply has been a consistently important issue in Russian-European Union (EU) relations. Russia provided 34 percent of EU gas in 2012, and Russian policies can have a direct impact on EU supplies. After the West-Russian confrontation over Ukraine, a lot has been said about the 'US shale gas revolution' and the possibilities of the United States becoming an energy exporter for future European energy needs. Although US energy independence seems to promise new perspectives for future European energy security, as well as for the balance of power in the Middle East, this is not for this decade. We cannot expect that the European Union would be able to cut off all of its energy relations with Russia, but we can foresee–or at least agree–that the European Union should diversify its natural gas supplies.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Energy Policy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Asia
91. Germany’s Policy towards Russia: New Wine in an Old Wineskin
- Author:
- Ryszarda Formuszewicz
- Publication Date:
- 04-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The tougher tone in Germany’s policy towards Russia reflects changes in Berlin’s perception of the eastern giant and in its own self-perception as a power willing to play a more active international role. This readiness for leadership could cement Germany’s status as a key international player whilst handing it the influence necessary to secure its own primary economic interests vis-à-vis Russia. However, it will also require Germany to critically address the long-standing premises of its policy towards Russia, and its appetite to overturn old assumptions remains limited. Lessons drawn by Germany now, in particular with regards to the causes of the Ukraine crisis, will prevail as a guideline for its Russia policy, and as such will also be decisive in the prospects for Polish–German cooperation.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Germany
92. Bumps on Russia’s Road to the Eurasian Economic Union: Postponed Integration, Costly Enlargement and Delayed International Recognition
- Author:
- Stanislav Secrieru
- Publication Date:
- 07-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Eurasian integration has been formally elevated to a new level. On 29 May, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed in Astana the founding treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union. However, problems related to integration, enlargement and international cooperation with the EEU indicate the effort is far from a point of no return. Despite the upbeat mood in Moscow, integration remains weak and selective, and in several important fields has been shelved until 2025. At the same time, the enlargement process has encountered security-related obstacles and triggered additional costs for Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe