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1. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

2. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

3. Primer: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Visit to the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While Ukraine, Gaza, and climate change will feature heavily on the agenda during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington, DC, the most important and enduring issue between the two countries is progressing AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) as the key ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) contemporary alliance initiative. If the AUKUS arrangement stalls and fails to have a meaningful impact on the strategic and military balance of power, then America’s regional allies and partners will lose faith that a reinvigorated American-led alliance system can serve as a check on Chinese power. America’s slow progress to reform the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is an immense frustration for Australian and American proponents of AUKUS. However, concerns regarding inadequate investment in the American military industrial base are reasonable and legitimate. Australian defense policy is underfunded and lacks urgency despite defense analysts’ assessment that the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating. Australian underperformance will increase skepticism of AUKUS in both countries. Both countries need to undertake much more detailed scenario planning and commit to the agreed sharing of burdens and responsibilities to deter or defeat China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

4. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

5. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Avoid a Sequester and Fully Fund a Preeminent Military

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Kennedy Lee
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In early summer 2023, President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling and avert a government default. While compromise is necessary, the deal included caps on overall spending at fiscal 2022 levels and made no exception for national defense. The United States is in the beginning of a tumultuous time: a new cold war with China and Russia. Washington ought to be moving with a great sense of urgency and national purpose to rebuild its defense industrial base (DIB), modernize its nuclear forces to meet the dynamic threats, grow the US Navy, and upgrade critical space systems, among other things. The caps on military spending undermine America’s ability to support its immediate interests in Ukraine and limit its capacity to deter future aggression and expansion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), further violence by China’s junior partner Russia, and rogue action by the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. The debt deal caps US military spending at $886 billion, which may initially appear to be a raise, but effectively flattens the Pentagon budget over the next two years. The dollar amount is 3.2 percent higher than last year’s request and will rise by 1 percent next year for a total of $895 billion in fiscal year 2025. But when accounting for inflation, the cap amounts to a significant cut in real terms over last year’s budget. The projected figures suggest that US defense spending could fall below 3 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since the 1990s’ “peace dividend.” The budget that the Pentagon submitted for this year should be $23 billion higher just to keep pace with the current rate of inflation. This is before factoring in the budget increases necessary to keep up with the evolving threat environment, including an ongoing land war in Europe and a Chinese Communist Party with revanchist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Raising the stakes, the deal also included a provision that triggers an automatic sequester against the budget, including the military: an indiscriminate 1 percent cut if the House and Senate fail to pass 12 annual spending bills by midnight on New Year’s Eve. The military has only now begun to recover from the effects of the sequester that occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Another one now, at a time of acute and immediate threats from multiple adversaries, could have catastrophic effects. Congress would be wise either to urgently amend the bill or to prioritize the imperative of avoiding a second sequester over all other political matters. Then Congress should pass supplemental funding measures to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) has the resources it needs to address the significant shortfalls that already exist and that the Obama-era sequestration only exacerbated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

9. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:
Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. US global security partnerships in the Biden era: Twilight or regeneration?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Guarantee-based alliances underpinned US grand strategy during the Cold War, but policies designed for the War on Drugs (WOD) after the 1990s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 2000s, and counter-piracy operations in the 2010s have led US policymakers to increasingly rely on ad hoc security partnerships. Looser partnerships facilitate cooperation that is quick to reform and redistribute, benefiting the US when reacting to urgent risks. When the necessity for cooperation diminishes, partnerships allow for prompt “exit options”. Guided by a narrowing set of strategic priorities under President Biden, the US partnership network is undergoing some downsizing. As part of a wider effort to challenge the US-led international order, Russia and China seek to reduce US opportunities to renew security partnerships. Ever closer US and NATO partnerships with Finland and Sweden have bucked an otherwise weakening global trend in recent years. Russia’s escalated aggression in Ukraine has caused Finland and Sweden to seek policy change from partnership-based security policies to NATO membership and stronger deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

11. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and Turkey’s reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the context of Turkey’s wider strategic interests

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
With the signing of the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Turkey dropped its initial objection to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, but has since argued that the conditions agreed in the MoU have not yet been fulfilled. In addition to requiring Sweden and Finland to take a more vigorous stance regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its extension in Syria, Turkey has used Nordic NATO applications as a tool to raise these issues on NATO’s agenda, pressuring the US in particular for a change in its Syria policy. Turkey’s reservations need to be conceptualized within its determined search for strategic autonomy, increased room for manoeuvre, and an ideological decoupling from the West. Turkey’s strategic interests have increasingly diverged from the rest of the alliance, likely leading to a more permanent intra-alliance opposition position in the coming years, part of which are the ongoing trilateral talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and North America

12. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:
Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

13. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:
Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

14. Protecting NATO’s security community

Author:
Alexandra Gheciu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Following Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, numerous Western policy-makers and analysts have interpreted the Alliance’s cohesiveness and prompt response as evidence of its value in protecting the transatlantic community of liberal-democracy. NA- TO’s Allies, the argument goes, have clearly demon- strated their shared determination to protect allied ter- ritory and core liberal-democratic values, re-affirming the Alliance’s unshaken commitment to the principle of collective defence. But can this momentum be sus- tained? While the Ukraine crisis has triggered initial prac- tices of unity, it has also highlighted – and rendered more complex – difficult questions, tensions and nor- mative dilemmas for NATO. This policy brief exam- ines some of the key challenges that NATO is likely to face in protecting the transatlantic security commu- nity in the unstable, post-February 2022 environment. What is particularly important to understand is that some of those challenges concern key norms and val- ues around which NATO defines itself. There are no simple answers to the political questions facing the security community – but there are steps that can be taken to put the Allies in a stronger position to ad- dress them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

15. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

16. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

17. The Dos and Don'ts of Strategy Making

Author:
Marina Henke
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Strategic Concept is NATO’s most import- ant document after the Washington Treaty. It identifies the foundational elements of the Al- liance: it defines NATO’s strategic goals, the key risks and threats the Alliance faces, and designs a strategy of how to overcome those challenges. Since its in- ception, NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts. The latest one was published in 2010. Given the ex- traordinary events of the last decade if not months, including Russian aggression in Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive posturing in the Asia Pacific, a new NATO Strategic Concept is urgently needed and will be presented at the 2022 Madrid Summit. In this context, it is worth asking: how do we design good strategy? What are the main building blocks of strat- egy? How can NATO most efficiently integrate the variety of tools at its disposal into a coherent, cohe- sive whole? Practitioners and academics have over the years identified best practices in strategy design along with some common mistakes.1 This Policy Brief sum- marizes their most important findings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

18. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and North America

19. NATO and human security

Author:
Mary Kaldor
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The August 2021 Afghan debacle offers NATO a moment for serious reflection about its role in the world. Some are drawing the conclusion that NATO should not engage in out-of-area opera- tions in the future and should instead focus on its core function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory from at- tack by foreign states, while dealing with the terrorist threat through long distance strikes using drones. But NATO members should draw a different conclusion, namely that in this globalised interconnected world, no one is safe from the complex combination of dangers that include war and violence, climate disasters, forced migration, pandemics or extreme poverty. It is no lon- ger possible, if it ever was, to insulate one part of the world from what happens elsewhere. What is needed is not retrenchment but rethinking and redirecting of NATO’s role. In this Policy Brief, I put forward the idea of a global strategy based on human security. Human security is understood as the security of individuals and the com- munities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. Human security offers an alternative way to address “forever wars” whether we are talking about conflicts in different parts of the world, the so-called war on terror, or the geo-political competition with Russia and China. Human security implies that the security of Afghans or Chinese is just as important as the security of Americans or Europe- ans.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

20. Achieving a Safer U.S. Nuclear Posture

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• U.S. nuclear posture is on a dangerous path that imperils national security and expends far too many resources. It is not a rational response to external threats but is driven primarily by domestic factors including a hubristic strategy of nuclear supremacy, partisan politics, and entrenched arms lobbies with formidable influence in the Pentagon and Congress. • A safer nuclear policy entails, among other steps, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third, to about 1,000, taking nuclear-armed missiles off hair-trigger alert, embracing no first use or sole purpose doctrines, and requiring an additional senior official to authorize launch. Pacts such as AUKUS that encourage the spread of nuclear weapons technology must also be rethought. • If implemented, these policies will greatly reduce risk while maintaining deterrence; they will also lead to significant savings in the national security budget. A majority of independent experts believe that U.S. national security objectives can be met at far lower levels and with a safer nuclear posture, saving hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades. • Many of these recommendations can be implemented even if the Biden administration’s upcoming Nuclear Posture Review proves disappointing. The president retains substantial policy and budgetary options for reducing the risk of nuclear war and the cost of nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America