Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Middle East

201. Data-Driven Strategy Development for Children’s Play in the City

Author:: Bora İyiat
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:: When we consider which areas in the city children use to explore, socialize and play, the first ones coming to mind are school gardens, parks, green areas and playgrounds that are reserved for them with the intent to support their development. These areas which have an important place in the daily urban life of children are designed and planned by local governments. All urban and green spaces, including playgrounds which are areas created especially for children in the city, should be based on spatial planning and quality factors that include children’s needs and preferences. And planning requires the use of data.
Topic:: Governance, Children, Urban, Sustainability, Data, and Urban Planning
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

202. COVID-19 and Data-Driven Urban Resilience Policies

Author:: Bahadir Keşan and Ayşe Yetiş Bayraktar
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:: The process of COVID-19 pandemic has once again revealed the significance of urban resilience in the face of sudden crises. As the pandemic process has taken longer, urban life has been seriously affected in economic, social and environmental terms; local governments have also begun to develop new policies to restructure the cities so as to adapt to the changes faced. In this brief, Strategy Development Directors of Sultanbeyli and Maltepe Municipalities share their collaboration experience for data driven urban resilience policies during the pandemic.
Topic:: Governance, Sustainability, Pandemic, Resilience, COVID-19, and Urban Planning
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

203. Work and Gender in Turkey’s Export-Oriented Agriculture: The Case of Sweet Cherries

Author:: Nil Alt
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:: Situated within this global agri-food context, the purpose of this policy note is to examine the production process for the most prominent high value fruit grown in Turkey, the sweet cherry. This will serve to make problems embedded in relations of production visible. Based on my ethnographic fieldwork of the export-driven sweet cherry sector, conducted between 2018 and 2021 in three different production sites, I will make some suggestions to inform more democratic and equitable social policies.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Labor Issues, Women, Exports, and Equity
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

204. The Arab Spring: A Decade Later

Author:: Mario Stefanov
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: This year marks the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring. Suicide of an unemployed young man in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 has enticed the protesters to take to the streets and it has triggered and open rebellion against Tunisian autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali - who on 14 a decade later, it can be stated with certainty that the revolutions of the Arab Spring were not successful. These revolutions have not ushered in neither modernization nor democratization of the Arab countries, which was the revolutions declared objective. To the contrary, even Tunisia, a country said to have had a successful revolution, had also replaced one dictatorship with another. Effects of the violent upheavals of January 2011 boarded on plane and fled to Saudi Arabia, escaping in front of the revolutionary chaos. Successful toppling of Ben Ali has set off a string of uprising in the Arab countries that are today known as the Arab Spring. Nowadays, the Arab Spring in other Arab countries include strengthening od forces of Islamist extremism, conflicts on ethnic, religious and sectarian divisions, civil wars, total economic destruction of the most of the Arab countries caught by the revolutionary wave, dissolution of formerly strong Arab states, and triggering the waves of migrations that still flow toward Europe. A decade after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions the question of their real source remains unanswered, as well as the question to which extent these revolutions were stirred by internal forces in the Arab States of the Middle East and North Africa, or influenced by the factors from the outside. The question whether the revolutions of the Arabs Spring were just an acute geopolitical incident or a part of a long- term process, also remains unanswered. The tenth anniversary is an opportunity to reflect upon and analyze the facts and indications that manifest whom these revolutions benefited, and whom they harmed.
Topic:: Social Movement, Democracy, Arab Spring, Protests, Revolution, and Modernization
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

205. America’s “Forever War” and the End of the Washington-led Unipolar World

Author:: Darren Spinck
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: America’s retreat from Afghanistan culminated in the country falling back into control of the Taliban, the very group that provided safe- haven for al-Qaeda prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. America suffered immeasurable pain and costs from this jihadist attack on US soil, made possible by intelligence failures, evolved for the “Global War on Terror.” Twenty years later, Washington still has not learned from pre-9/11 mistakes. Prior to America’s complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, US intelligence was unable to convince the White House of the Afghan government’s fragility and the Taliban’s intentions. Radical Islamists in Afghanistan capitalized on policymaking which did not recognize the emerging Islamist threat towards America. Al-Qaeda’s September 11 tactical victory begat a series of foreign policy blunders in Afghanistan as strategies missteps again, celebrating another victory over America when the Taliban flag rose over the Afghan presidential palace on September 11, 2021.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

206. The US policy in Iraq

Author:: Srush H.A. Khoshnaw
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report is a summary of a policy debate held at MERI on Wednesday, 24 November 2021, attended by a selection of policy makers, politicians and academics. Discussions focused on the current US Administration’s priorities and its policies in the wider Middle East, Iraq and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

207. Iraq’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

Author:: Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Four years after the military defeat of the so-called Islamic State, pre-existing conditions associated with the risk of violent extremism continue unabated in Iraq. The current national strategy to counter violent extremism needs a comprehensive revision to include the context, needs and realities of the country’s different regions.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

208. Preventing Violent Extremism in the Balkans and the MENA

Author:: Morten Boas
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Strengthening societal resilience is considered vital for the prevention of violent extremism. This, however, requires a nuanced approach and comprehensive review of past policies. PREVEX is a European Union funded project, implemented by a consortium of 15 international research centres in Europe, MENA region and the Balkans. MERI is our partner in Iraq.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

209. Initial Biden Administration Policy Steps to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking

Author:: Mitvim
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: This document presents recommendations for initial policy steps that the Biden Administration can take to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. It describes the current state of play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as Biden takes office, identifies nine key goals for the new administration in advancing peacemaking, and outlines concrete policy steps for their implementation. These are the goals outlined in the document: (1) Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (2) Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership; (3) Emphasizing US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement; (4) Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines; (5) Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package; (6) Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process; (7) Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide; (8) Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in civil society; (9) Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

210. Initial Biden Administration Policy Steps to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking

Author:: Kamal Ali-Hassan, Ehud Eiran, Nimrod Goren, Merav Kahana-Dagan, Roee Kibrik, Lior Lehrs, Gabriel Mitchell, Elie Podeh, Ksenia Svetlova, Nadav Tamir, and Yonatan Touval
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: This document summarizes recommendations for initial policy steps that the Biden Administration could take to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. It identifies nine key goals for the new administration and outlines concrete policy steps for their implementation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Peace, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

211. Addressing Needs, Promoting Peace: A Proposal for an International Incentives Package for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Author:: Lior Lehrs, Moien Odeh, Nimrod Goren, and Huda Abu Arqoub
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: peace processes and have the potential to contribute to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. A team of Israeli and Palestinian policy experts developed a joint proposal for an international package of incentives for peace. The proposal defines the central needs of the parties that the incentives package must address, focusing on security, recognition and legitimacy, religious rights, economic prosperity and domestic needs. It examines which international actors can be relevant in addressing those needs and should be part of an international incentives package, elaborating on the potential role of the US, the EU, and the Arab and the Muslim world. The proposal also discusses when and how a package of incentives should be introduced and delivered, and what should be the international mechanism required to promote it.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, European Union, Peace, and Incentives
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

212. Morocco and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Author:: Einat Levi, Roee Kibrik, and Nimrod Goren
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: By dint of its position in the Arab and Muslim arena, Morocco is strongly committed to the Palestinian issue and the safeguarding of Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites. Throughout its history, Morocco has served at times as a mediator between Israel and the Arab world and mobilized to help Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking within the framework of the Oslo process. Morocco has adopted a largely neutral foreign policy as a state seeking stability in the Middle East and North Africa and willing to help mediate regional conflicts. These efforts are notable in both the Palestinian arena and in the broader Middle Eastern and North African one. Israel takes a positive view of ties with Morocco, backed by the support of the large Moroccan Jewish diaspora living in Israel. Palestinian views of Morocco’s policy are mixed. Along with a positive perception based on recognition of Morocco’s commitment to the Palestinian issue, measured criticism is also being heard over its decision to advance normalization with Israel. Attitudes toward the normalization process are complex, including both criticism and support for the move. Morocco cannot set in motion and orchestrate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but it can help by providing conciliation and mediation and broad legitimacy for a consensual arrangement on Jerusalem’s holy sites.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Peace, and Normalization
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Morocco

213. Tensions in Jerusalem: Initial Commentaries by Mitvim Institute Experts

Author:: Lior Lehrs, Nimrod Goren, Ido Zelkovitz, Nadav Tamir, and Merav Kahana-Dagan
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: The latest events in Jerusalem – at Muslim holy sites, the Damascus Gate and the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood – have brought tensions in the city to new heights and affect Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians and Arab states. This document compiles initial commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts. Dr. Lior Lehrs explains that restoring calm in Jerusalem requires dealing with structural problems and foresees a role for President Biden in such a process; Former MK Ksenia Svetlova argues that the violence stems from government neglect and could exacerbate tensions with Jordan; Dr. Nimrod Goren argues that the escalation in Jerusalem should convince the political left to demand diplomatic portfolios in the emerging government; Dr. Ido Zelkovitz believes that the Palestinian Authority and Hamas are supporting the Jerusalem protests and that Hamas hopes to emerge from them with the upper hand; Former diplomat Nadav Tamir points to violations of human rights and the status quo as the cause of the current round of violence.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, Displacement, Violence, Hamas, and PLO
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jerusalem, and Arab Countries

214. Opportunities and Challenges for Israel-UAE Economic Cooperation

Author:: Katie Wachsberger
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: Israeli-Emirati economic ties have been developing continuously since the 1990s, setting the stage for the recent Abraham Accords and the partnerships that have begun to flourish as a result. Since the signing of the Accords and the abolishment of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) boycott laws against Israel, many opportunities have presented themselves for both countries to benefit from the new trade partnership, in realms such as investment, tourism, real estate, and education. However, there are many cultural, structural, and political challenges that remain. This paper delineates the economic relationship as it existed before the signing of the Accords in terms of private sector security collaboration, technological partnerships, and the export of various goods, noting the opportunities that present themselves with the establishment of direct and legal ties. It then explores the various obstacles that have proven themselves problematic thus far, and goes on to investigate challenges that Israeli businesses will face when attempting to scale regionally, especially in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and UAE

215. Uncertain prospects for sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries

Author:: Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Among the best-known sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-owned or controlled investment vehicles—are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises all the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This Policy Brief compares the GCC SWFs with each other and with other funds in terms of their transparency and accountability on the fifth SWF scoreboard, available here. Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC’s SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Government, Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:: Middle East and Gulf Nations

216. Economic crisis in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:: Marek Dabrowski and Marta Dominguez-Jimenez
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In the 2010s, the economic situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) deteriorated as a result of lower oil and other commodity prices, a new round of domestic political instability, continuous intra-regional conflicts, stalled economic and governance reforms and, finally, the COVID-19 pandemic. The growth of real GDP, which slowed after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, further decelerated in the second half of the 2010s and became negative in 2020 as result of the COVID-19 shock. Fiscal balances have deteriorated, even in the oil-exporting countries, and public debt has grown rapidly. MENA countries continue to face numerous long-term socio-economic and institutional challenges including high unemployment (especially youth unemployment), low female labour-market participation rates, the poor quality of education, costly and ineffective public sectors, high military and security spending, high energy subsidies and trade protectionism. Only comprehensive long-term reform programmes can address these challenges. The European Union is MENA’s second largest trading partner after the region itself, and is one of two main sources of foreign direct investment and a major aid donor. However, given the critical importance of the MENA region to its own security and stability, the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution and in supporting economic and political transformation of the region is insufficient and should be intensified. The EU should also update and upgrade its existing association agreements with the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, including their free trade provisions.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Governance, European Union, Trade, COVID-19, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

217. Providing security in Iraq - what do Iraqis think?

Author:: Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Denmark

218. Making women count, not just counting women: Creating a more effective security sector in Iraq requires increased inclusiveness

Author:: Maria-Louise Clausen and Ekatherina Zhukova
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: A priority for NATO Mission Iraq is to further the Women, Peace and Security agenda as one of the mission’s activities. This effort should focus on raising awareness of the operational benefits of equal opportunities and diversity and not just counting the number of women involved. RECOMMENDATIONS: Formulate a clear mandate for WPS functions in the mission that positions the WPS agenda as an integral element of NMI’s other activities. Support awareness-raising programmes and initiatives to transform social norms, including patriarchal gender norms and institutional socio-political constraints on female participation. Support the transparent qualifications-based recruitment and employment of women and prioritize the focus on inclusive work environments, both mentally and physically. Incorporate intersectional and masculinity perspectives in the work on WPS to avoid creating an image of WPS as a foreign-backed agenda that is only of, by and for elite women.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Women, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

219. The Ahvas Protests Are the minorities' demonstrations a reflection of a crisis in Tehran?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 15, Khuzestan in South West Iran witnessed a range of protests against the disintegrating economic and living conditions in the country, particularly the lack of water within the province, which was called ‘water protests’ or ‘thirst protests’, This was extended to other Iranian cities outside Khuzestan. The protesters' demands evolved to demand the overthrow of the regime itself raising slogans of ‘Death to Khamenei’.
Topic:: Economics, Water, Minorities, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

220. Persistent Challenges The future of the US presence in Iraq following the fourth round of the strategic dialogue

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: At the conclusion of the fourth round of the strategic dialogue between Baghdad and Washington, US President Joe Biden and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi signed an agreement officially ending the US combat mission in Iraq by the end of 2021, more than 18 years after US forces entered Iraq. In return, Baghdad confirmed Iraq's commitment to protecting the international coalition personnel, who provide advisory and training assistance. According to the statements of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the fourth round of the strategic dialogue between the two countries will be the last. Hence, the understandings that took place between the two sides will form the general framework governing the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

221. Limited Rapprochement: Prospects for Turkish-Israeli Convergence of Interests

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Turkey’s endeavor to improve its relations with Israel were evidenced in its recent official contacts with Israel. Most recently, on July 12, 2021, Israeli President Issac Herzog and Turksih President Recep Tayyib Erdogan held a phone call, followed by official contacts between ministers and officials from both countries. The contacts are perceived as a Turkish attempt to overcome years of strained relations between the two countries.
Topic:: International Relations, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Israel

222. Multilayered Challenges: Why are foreign oil companies planning to leave Iraq?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Numerous foreign oil companies have recently announced plans to sell their shares in several major oil fields in Iraq, as part of measures that may negatively impact Iraqi oil production. There are multiple explanations for this step, including unstable security and political conditions as well as Iraq's failure to pay foreign companies their dues for operating the fields, in addition to the growing Chinese influence in the oil sector.
Topic:: Security, Oil, and Business
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, and Middle East

223. The New Rules of the Game: Unfolding the targeting of an Israeli oil tanker in the Arabian Sea

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Friday, July 30, Iran targeted the Mercer Street oil tanker in the Northern Arabian Sea off the Omani port of Duqm, which was on its way from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Fujairah in the UAE, killing two crew members: a British and a Romanian. The Israeli ship was attacked by one or more drones. The attack came in two waves. The first wave was the bombing of the tanker with missiles carried by a normal drone. As the damage was limited, a larger suicide attack was launched on the dormitories of the ship's crew, with the aim of causing casualties, which actually resulted in the deaths of a British and a Romanian. The oil tanker belongs to the London-based Zodiac Maritime company, which is part of the Zodiac company owned by Israeli businessman Eyal Ofer. This is the second attack within the month of July, as the first one took place on July 3, targeting Csav Tyndall, which is also owned by Eyal Ofer.
Topic:: Oil, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Trade
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Persian Gulf

224. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

225. The Attack on Karaj: Analysis of the attack on an Iranian atomic energy agency facility

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The ‘shadow war’ between Iran and Israel continues. The sabotage operations remain, evident in the attacks on Natanz, the most famous uranium enrichment facility in Iran in July 2020 and in April 202, and assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Tehran. This is in addition to the mutual targeting of ships in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea between the two sides.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Violence, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

226. Possible Polarization: The repercussions of the Beirut port blast investigation on the Lebanese political scene

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The investigations into the Beirut port blast, which took place in August 2020, witnessed significant developments recently. The judicial investigator, Judge Tariq Bitar, issued a series of rulings starting on July 2, stipulating the investigation of former ministers, current representatives as well as security and military leaders, with a demand to lift the immunity of some for the purpose of conducting investigations with them.
Topic:: Corruption, Politics, Leadership, Polarization, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Beirut

227. A Constant Deadlock: Failure of Initiatives to Resolve the Current Tunisian Political Crisis

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In early July 2021, a number of political parties and civil society organizations formed what is known as the Referendum Front, calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister and the Parliament, as well as conducting early elections. Meanwhile, the Ennahda government called for the formation of a political government headed by Al-Mashishi, which reflects the attempts of the concerned parties to resolve the current crisis. Such conflicting statements coincided with the Fitch announcing on July 8, 2021 reducing Tunisia’s sovereign rating from “B” to “B-” with further negative prospects. This is the ninth reduction since 2011. The Governor of the Central Bank emphasized that the reduction is caused by political instability and politicians hindering subsidy and wages reform.
Topic:: Referendum, Political Crisis, Parliamentarism, and Ennahda Party
Political Geography:: Middle East and Tunisia

228. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

229. Variant Requirements: Discovering the recent policies of the MENA countries regarding nationality and citizenship

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The political and technical dimensions of granting or revoking nationality have recently escalated in several countries of the region. This is associated with a number of motives relevant to enhancing the state’s global position, as reflected in the UAE granting nationality to competent scientists, doctors, intellectuals, specialists and talented individuals, to encourage the flow of investment into the country. The Jordanian government adopted the same approach to improve the internal economic conditions. The Algerian government justified this course to confront terrorist operations and irregular migration that caused tensions in the relations with the EU countries. Furthermore, the Sudanese transitional government withdrew the Sudanese nationality by naturalization, especially from Syrians, as some were obtained through illegal procedures. Israel also passed the Law of Return this March in an attempt to enhance the demographic structure of the country.
Topic:: Government, European Union, Citizenship, and Nationality
Political Geography:: Sudan, Middle East, Israel, Algeria, North Africa, Syria, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates

230. Multifaceted Challenges: The political dimension of the physicians’ crises in the region

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Although the difficulties’ health personnel face, are quite similar to those of workers in other fields, the political dimensions of physicians ’crises in the region have increased remarkably. Medical doctors are kidnapped in some hotbeds of several Arab armed conflicts to provide treatment for some Militia members, in addition to their indirect involvement in military confrontations in Northeastern Syria through Turkey. Moreover, there is a gap between the medical syndicate and the political authorities regarding the actual number of COVID-19 cases, which was quite evident in Turkey. Medical doctors in some states of the region suffer from delayed payment of their salaries as a result of the decline in oil prices as well as the decline in the financial budgets of their countries. This leads to what is known as the ‘brain drain’, in addition to their contracting diseases such as the coronavirus due to their presence on the front lines confronting the epidemic with short medical supplies. The lives of medical doctors in some countries are endangered, as they get exposed to repeated attacks by community members due to the absence of adequate security measures. The crises of medical doctors in the region are by no means a recent phenomenon, but their features evolve according to different regional conditions and the emergence of transnational epidemics. The Middle East reflects a variety of crises that physicians are exposed to, particularly in hotbeds of tension.
Topic:: Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Syria

231. The Concurrent Approach: Is Iran changing its policy regarding the nuclear deal?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, has proposed the possibility of settling disputes over the nuclear deal by adopting the ‘simultaneous’ approach, meaning that Iran will once again comply to the deal in return for US lifting sanctions imposed on it. On February 2, during his interview with CNN network, Zarif responded to the question by Christian Amanpour, about whether Iran is still demanding that the US act first, saying that the necessary steps can be synchronized. He also suggested the EU mediate to settle the disputes and remove any obstacles against Washington's return to the agreement. This may imply that Iran made early concessions in its position, regarding the adherence to strict conditions, similar to: the US returning to the agreement first, lifting sanctions and providing compensation for the losses incurred. However, these may not be major concessions impacting the general attitudes of the Iranian leadership, nor may they necessarily indicate Iran's intention to make significant changes in its policy regarding the nuclear deal. To be precise, this new approach announced by Zarif may simply be a tactical change in the Iranian policy aiming to enhance the access to understandings and to avoid early problems with the US administration, at a time when Iran appears to be in dire need of lifting US sanctions.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

232. Judicial Independence in Afghanistan: Legal Framework and Practical Challenges

Author:: Shoaib Timory
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:: In a government with a separation of powers, independence is an indispensable feature of the judiciary. An independent judiciary gives credibility to political systems and is also the force behind reinforcing democracy and the rule of law. This watching brief briefly maps out the existing legal framework that ensures the independence of the judicial branch in Afghanistan and the reasons for the weak utilis ation of this feature which puts the judiciary in an uneven position compared to the other two branches of government. Moreover, the watching brief presents a set of recommendations for the enhancement of judicial independence in the country.
Topic:: Democracy, Rule of Law, Judiciary, and Independence
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

233. A new momentum for EU-Turkey cooperation on migration

Author:: Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief considers how to move forward with the (financial element of the) EU-Turkey statement agreed in 2016, under which the first tranche of 3 billion euros will end mid-2021. In order not to reverse the progress achieved and to continue the work on improving the resilience of the 4.1 million refugees in Turkey, there is an urgent need for the European Union and Turkey to agree on a new financial framework. One that builds on the current, generally successful framework – the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) – but which would divide the burden between Turkey and the EU more equally. Both blocs would, moreover, do well to look into the possibilities of extending the area of cooperation to Idlib. In that area, which is currently under Turkey’s military control, almost three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently lack adequate shelter and essentials, which could potentially lead to various displacement scenarios. Neither of those decisions will be easy and will require serious support from all EU member states, but the fact is Turkey remains essential in pursuing the EU’s core interest: preventing another refugee flow into Europe.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Borders
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

234. Whose Long Arm? Challenges to Understanding Turkish Diaspora Politics

Author:: Christopher Houtkamp and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This Clingendael policy brief seeks to explain visible manifestations of Turkish politics in European cities. Why does Turkish politics lead to unrest in Rotterdam and Berlin and what institutional mechanisms facilitate this? The brief highlights various drivers, institutional manifestations and historical changes, but also points out that there are a number of uncertainties and questions about the motivations for, and modus operandi of, Turkey’s influence in European societies. These questions are all the more relevant as European policy-makers increasingly seek to take measures in order to curb this. The main argument developed in this brief is that effective policy ‘at home’ (in Europe) will require better knowledge of socio-political developments ‘abroad’ (in Turkey). The first and second parts of this brief, therefore, show how the drivers of Turkish influence on the diaspora have changed over time. The third section highlights how present-day diaspora politics is institutionally anchored in Western Europe. Most of the practical examples in this brief are drawn from the Dutch context, but the dynamics will be familiar to those observing this phenomenon in other Western European countries.
Topic:: Politics, Diaspora, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

235. Fruitless cherry picking?: EU engagement with the Syrian opposition (Etilaf)

Author:: Lars Hauch
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the EU’s engagement and relationship with Syria’s main political opposition umbrella, the Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), which was founded in late 2012. It discusses the EU’s engagement strategies with the Etilaf and their impact on its development in the context of the Syrian conflict. The brief highlights that the EU did not substantiate the international legitimacy it granted the organisation early on during the conflict with policies that would have allowed it to expand its domestic legitimacy and capabilities. This policy contributed to developments in which the Etilaf rapidly lost its original potential. While the Etilaf today faces a range of structural and operational challenges that need to be addressed, the brief nevertheless recommends EU institutions and Member States to increase their support for the Etilaf and the Interim Government linked with it, if a number of conditions can be met. Such support will help maintain and develop these bodies into a viable centre of political opposition to the Assad regime. Practically speaking, this objective can be pursued by piloting conditional EU support to areas of northwestern and northern Syria that are nominally under the control of the Interim Government. It also requires building a partnership with Turkey to jointly support local Syrian administration(s) in the same areas.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Conflict, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, and Opposition
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Syria

236. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

237. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Libya

Author:: Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The strategic objectives of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in 2019–2020 in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were geopolitical (establishing an entry point into Africa in addition to Somalia), geo-economical (related to gas exploration in the Mediterranean) and commercial (facilitating repayment of outstanding business debts and enabling future profits). The deeper drivers of Ankara’s intervention include a mix of more assertive nationalism based on a hegemonic conception of Turkey’s ‘near abroad’, a perceived need to counter the military campaign of the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s to conquer Tripolitania, and Turkey’s exclusion from Mediterranean gas politics. Ankara’s intervention and its institutionalisation proved effective in counterbalancing the LNA and its international backers – chiefly Russia and the UAE, but also France and Egypt – and produced a more stable political situation in the process. While Turkey has achieved its short- to medium-term objectives and is likely to retain a substantial permanent military, commercial and political presence in Libya, it also created tensions with the EU and US as well as antagonizing the LNA’s international backers. In brief, an improvement in Turkey’s geostrategic position might have come at the cost of its regional strategic relations.
Topic:: Politics, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Libya

238. The Egyptian-Jordanian-Iraqi triangle: Reviving an Arab axis in changed circumstances

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Egyptian, Iraqi, and Jordanian leaderships continue to seek enhanced cooperation among them, as if reviving the Arab alliance that they had formed in the past, in order to overcome unfavourable changes in the regional environment.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Arab Countries, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Egypt, and Jordan

239. Biden-Erdogan meeting: cautious rapprochement amid still thorny disputes

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: As long as Turkey pursues its regional ambitions, any understandings with the US and the West will necessarily have a hard ceiling. However, Ankara seems to be pursuing a more conciliatory policy in the region and in its relations with the West for both economic and strategic reasons.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Rapprochement, Strategic Interests, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

240. The Suez Canal crisis: A strategic corridor beset by competitors

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Ever Given incident showed Egyptians that the centrality of the Suez Canal is not necessarily a fact of nature. If Egypt does not take action to maintain the canal and make it more attractive, it could give competitors the opportunity to make their projects for alternative routes a reality.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economy, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Middle East, Egypt, and Suez

241. The Washington-Ankara alliance: Recurrent crises or durable partnership

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: An imminent crisis between the Biden administration and Ankara is anticipated due to circumstantial differences and structural shifts in the balance of power, but the mutual interests of the two parties may push them to agree on new foundations for a sustainable partnership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Alliance, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

242. Sustained Counterterrorism Efforts Remain Key to Preventing Attacks in Jordan

Author:: Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat. Last year’s abnormally low terrorist activity in Jordan could be interpreted as an indication that the threat of ISIS in the country has diminished significantly. Unfortunately, this is not the case; while there are several explanations for the low occurrence of terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2020, none of them point to a future in which ISIS does not continue to pose a threat to Jordanian security. On the contrary, the decrease in ISIS activity in Jordan last year was primarily a result of effective counterterrorism efforts, not the special circumstances of the pandemic or any other factor. Accordingly, Jordanian anti-terror institutions should not relax their guard. Rather, they should capitalize on their successes, expanding cooperation with their partners and enhancing their resources in combatting extremism. Jordanian security forces should be especially concerned with activities along their borders. There have been several recent international and UN reports that confirmed the rising activities of terrorist groups in countries that border Jordan. Iraq in particular has seen a recent rise in terrorist attacks, including two suicide bombings in Baghdad on January 21, 2021 that killed 32 people and injured 110 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. In turn, ISIS's mounting activities in Iraq have led to increased terrorist activity in the Badia al-Sham region and the Jordanian Syrian-Iraqi border triangle, where terrorist militants move in small, highly mobile groups. This increase in activity has prompted Jordanian security forces to strengthen their presence on the borders with Iraq and Syria. Following a Russian air campaign in the Badia region in late February, in which Russian planes launched at least 130 air strikes in one day against terrorist groups in the area, Jordan started to strengthen and tightened its security presence on the borders to prevent infiltration of ISIS elements into Jordan. Russian strikes were especially targeted at ISIS, which extends between the governorates of Homs and Deir al-Zour at the border with Iraq.
Topic:: Security, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

243. In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Observers of the decade-long Syria war understand the indispensable role Tehran has played in ensuring the Assad regime’s survival. But they may be less familiar with its stunning breadth—or its historical roots. The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s, when the shah was still in power in Iran and then president Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the marginalized Alawite sect, sought religious legitimacy to lead his majority-Muslim country. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Lately, Tehran’s relationship with Damascus can be described as one of strategic dominance. In this deeply researched Policy Note, analyst Oula Alrifai, a former Syrian asylee, lays bare the extent of Iranian infiltration of Syrian religious and socioeconomic life. She details the spread of Twelver Shia ideology through seminaries, congregation halls, and academic institutions, while demonstrating Iran’s massive economic clout in Syria through initiatives such as the Marota City housing project. For Washington, only a determined effort to blunt Iranian influence can help deliver much-deserved peace for the Syrian people and enduring stability for the region.
Topic:: Religion, History, Authoritarianism, Ideology, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Syria

244. Defining a Realistic Policy Toward Erdogan's Turkey: Advice for the Biden Administration

Author:: Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: U.S. concerns center on Turkey’s democratic backslide and deepening ties between Erdogan and Putin—but the Turkish president also wants to develop a rapport with Joe Biden and fortify his country’s weakened economy. In the seventh in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Soner Cagaptay offers guidelines for reinforcing the strained U.S.-Turkey relationship. Principal causes for unease involve U.S. concerns about Turkey’s democratic backslide and deepening ties between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, particularly Ankara’s decision to purchase the S-400 missile defense system from Moscow. Yet Erdogan also wants to develop a rapport with President Biden and fortify his country’s weakened economy. Further, Ankara and Washington can find many areas for tactical cooperation in places such as Syria, Libya, and China’s Xinjiang province, where the government is carrying out a genocide against the Muslim Uyghur population “Erdogan needs to reverse the current dynamic by advancing the narrative that he is getting along just fine with Washington,” the author explains. “Thus, in this early phase of the U.S. administration, Biden would appear to have a brief window of leverage over his Turkish counterpart.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

245. Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. After a decade of civil war in Syria, the core antagonist remains the Assad regime, which in 2011 ruthlessly suppressed peaceful protestors and has since tortured and executed tens of thousands of detainees. The regime also bears responsibility for fostering the growth of the Islamic State, in part by releasing Syrian jihadists at the start of the war. Yet even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on Assad’s culpability, they also face a highly complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. In this Policy Note, expert Aaron Zelin details how the world’s counterterrorism and Great Power challenges converge in Syria, and how they must be addressed holistically. To this end, he proposes policies on the diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, economic, and military fronts that can calm the fears of U.S. allies such as Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, and perhaps inspire a more robust opposition, backed by a diverse set of local and diaspora activists.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Syrian War, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

246. The 2021 Iranian Presidential Election A Preliminary Assessment

Author:: Albert B. Wolf
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Whoever wins, the result will intimate deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future. The Washington Institute has been sponsoring a series of discussions about sudden succession in the Middle East. Each session focuses on scenarios that might unfold if a specific ruler or leader departed the scene tomorrow. Questions include these: Would the sudden change lead to different policies? Would it affect the stability of the respective countries involved, or the region as a whole? What would be the impact on U.S. interests? Would the manner of a leader’s departure make a difference? The discussions also probe how the U.S. government might adjust to the new situation or influence outcomes. This essay, thirteenth in the series, assesses the situation in Iran, where a June election will determine the successor to President Hassan Rouhani. An IRGC-backed candidate such as Majlis speaker Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf or former defense minister Hossein Dehghan could ultimately prevail—but a history of election surprises in the Islamic Republic suggests no outcome is certain. Whoever wins, the result will offer clues about deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future.
Topic:: International Relations, Government, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

247. Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with Israel

Author:: Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Areas for especially timely U.S.-Israel cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. In the fifth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock assess the multifaceted strengths of the U.S.-Israel partnership and its prospects for growth under the Biden administration. Areas for especially timely cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. Israel’s recent normalization deals with several Arab states only further widen the horizon. “Israel is a world-class innovator in technologies that will be critical to meeting future challenges, including artificial intelligence, information technology, and cybersecurity; sustainable water, food, and energy solutions; and high-tech medicine,” explain the authors. “All these areas are supportive of America’s foreign policy priorities.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

248. The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks: Openings and Obstacles

Author:: Dennis Ross
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A reimagined approach to Iran nuclear talks could extend the country’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen American alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. In the first in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining policy challenges across the Middle East, esteemed diplomat and policymaker Dennis Ross provides an innovative approach to reengaging Iran in nuclear diplomacy. His ideas have the potential to extend Iran’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen U.S. alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. Ross explains: “If regime change is not a realistic or advisable goal, the objective must be one of changing the Islamic Republic’s behavior. While this would be difficult, history shows that the regime will make tactical adjustments with strategic consequences when it considers the price of its policies to be too high.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

249. Turkish-Egyptian Relations after Erdoğan’s Sacrifice of the Muslim Brotherhood

Author:: Maged Atef
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Turkey is making overtures for rapprochement with Egypt. How will Sisi respond? In a surprising development, Turkey-based media channels opposed to the Egyptian regime announced the suspension of all political programs attacking President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and his regime, based on directives from the Turkish government. Supporters of the Egyptian regime met the news with happiness and approval, counting it as a victory for Sisi. Yet the Egyptian regime itself refrained from showing enthusiasm towards this paradigm shift, contenting itself with a remark by Minister of Information Osama Heikal in which the minister said the move represented a “good gesture from Turkey.” Meanwhile, Egyptian Islamists residing in Turkey were struck by concerns that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could be contemplating handing them over to Cairo. Looking ahead, despite the importance of Erdogan’s gesture, any response from Sisi is still unclear
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Egypt

250. NATO in Iraq: Not a Surge

Author:: Michael Knights, Pierre Morcos, and Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: NATO stands ready to increase its commitment in a slow and steady manner consistent with Baghdad’s needs, but careful communication will be crucial, as will a more strategic discussion on how to combine different assistance efforts. On February 18, NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg announced a decision to increase the size of NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) from 500 personnel to as many as 4,000. Although he noted that such deployments would be “conditions-based,” “incremental,” and subject to Baghdad’s authorization, the troop numbers were the only element of his announcement widely reported inside Iraq, resulting in swift political pressure on the government to explain the seemingly steep increase. In fact, there is no imminent NATO “surge” planned in Iraq, but rather a greater openness and general intent to gradually provide more advisors capable of assisting local authorities with security sector reform (SSR). When handled appropriately and combined with other efforts, this initiative can create good opportunities for quiet, persistent security cooperation that helps strengthen the Iraqi state, evolve multinational military relations beyond the campaign against the Islamic State (IS), and spread the burden of support more broadly among U.S. allies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Reform
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

251. Kidnapping and Extortion in Regime-Controlled Syria

Author:: Kenneth R. Rosen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Interviews reveal how Syrian officials are extorting their people. It is sometimes difficult to conceptualize what the dire situation of Syria’s economy means for those who live there. Some 100 tankers of fuel flow across Lebanon’s border into Syria, but the persistent lack of gas limits families' ability to heat their homes, which, in regime-held areas, already face large-scale electricity blackouts that last for hours. Likewise, hot water is a commodity afforded only to those with financial means and connections, and it is a luxury to take a hot shower in many parts of Syria. Meanwhile, on Facebook, a UNHCR tarp is for sale and women are selling their hair to feed their families—just two examples of the type of entrepreneurship needed to weather abounding hardships in a country that has known only war for the last decade. Over the summer, the Syrian pound collapsed as U.S. sanctions continue to deter international support for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has likewise furthered the collapse of the country’s economic infrastructure. As Syrians search for means of generating income, officials employed by the regime have gained access to funds through extortion. A common form of this extortion is the forced detention of individuals whose families must then bribe officials for either visitation rights or the release of their loved ones. A report from January underscores the scale of such extortion operations, which have remained a staple in regime tactics for years, though they are especially prevalent now given the country’s ongoing war and collapsed economy. The report—produced by the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison—surveyed more than 1,200 prisoners and families. Respondents said that bribes rose as high as nearly $3 million at one jail, though the range varied. Visitation or release fees were usually a few thousand dollars or less, but bribes would be increased for families living outside of Syria, averaging about $30,000. The report underscored how these payments—far greater than the average public sector annual salary of roughly $150 per month, according to Qassioun, a Syrian newspaper —could feed the country’s security apparatus and the regime through guards, judges, military personnel, and middlemen who facilitate the negotiations. “The Syrian Arab Army is the primary party that is responsible for these types of arrests,” says to the report.
Topic:: Crime, Economy, Syrian War, and Abductions
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

252. Investing in Jordan Through Support for Social Enterprises

Author:: Lilian Tauber
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By committing to long-term investments in Jordan’s communities through support for social enterprises, the United States can contribute to the country’s stability and economic growth. In Jordan, one of the United States’ most reliable allies in the Middle East, economic volatility is a major threat to stability and has led to recurrent protests since 2011. High youth unemployment rates and a large refugee population contribute to its economic woes and political tensions, all of which are now exacerbated in the Covid-19 pandemic. The United States can support Jordan’s recovery from the pandemic through long-term investment in social entrepreneurship. The country’s entrepreneurship ecosystem is in a developing stage, with most resources focused on short-term funding and training, so a shift in U.S. aid to longer-term support can make a significant difference. Increasing funds and providing multi-year mentorship and operational support to select social enterprises (SEs) will allow them to become powerful forces for positive change and civic engagement in their communities.
Topic:: Development, Foreign Aid, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:: Middle East, Jordan, and United States of America

253. After Sparking the Arab Spring, Is Tunisia Still a Success Story?

Author:: Chiraz Arbi and Maurizio Geri
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Gridlock and economic stagnation are testing the Arab world's only functioning democracy. On January 14, 2021, Tunisia celebrated the 10th anniversary of the end of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, the result of a revolution that led to a firm commitment to a process of democratization in the country. And while the revolution has meant significant change and positive development for Tunisian democracy, the Tunisian people are currently losing faith in the direction of their government as Tunisia’s democratic institutions are struggling to endure parliamentary gridlock and economic malaise—as evidenced by the recent street protests over the past few days. Consecutive Riots and demonstrations in the Capital and in several cities across the country came to defy the government’s nationwide lockdown and curfew due to Covid-19 and to symbolize the youth’s overall disenchantment. While the Prime Minister assured that this anger was “legitimate”, protests were faced by police violence and led to more than 600 arrests of protestors aged between 14 and 25.
Topic:: Democracy, Economy, and Arab Spring
Political Geography:: Middle East and Tunisia

254. Collective Memory of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Surveying Egyptians a Decade After

Author:: Hazem Albassam and Coline Ferrant
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A recent poll gauges Egyptians' lasting impressions of their chapter in the Arab Spring. In 2011, after just eighteen days, from January 25 to February 11, the Egyptian public overthrew the 30-year-long dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. A decade afterwards, we sought to have Egyptians reflect on the collective memory of those days. What fueled the revolution? Was it successful? Did it lose its way? Attempts to explain the Revolution in public discourse point to inequality, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, and corruption. Reflecting on these indicators, we compare them to Egyptians’ own recollections through the analysis of an exploratory survey conducted in November 2020.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Arab Spring, Memory, and Revolution
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

255. Focussing European Cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa on Social Contracts

Author:: Mark Furness and Markus Loewe
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: 2021 is proving to be a key year for cooperation between Europe and its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As the European Union (EU) launches its new multiannual budget, the COVID-19 pandemic has demanded a rethink of the political, economic and social priorities that the EU and its member states should pursue with MENA countries. Europe’s potential for positive influence on state–society relations in MENA countries has yet to be realised. The latest European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) South Communication, published in February 2021, promises a “new agenda” for cooperation with MENA countries. It does not, however, address conflicts between its own objectives, especially between liberal–democratic political and economic reforms, accountable government and respect for human rights on the one hand, and restrictive trade practices, migration management and security cooperation on the other. Furthermore, there is little bilateral policy coordination among EU member states. Focussing cooperation on social contracts would help overcome such conflicts, which are inherent in cooperation targeting short- to medium-term goals, such as migration management, resilience and private investment. In authoritarian contexts, these measures tend to strengthen the state at the expense of society, and thereby increase prospects for conflict, rather than the stability they promise. The social contract perspective is long-term. Social contracts rely on the state’s delivery of the “3 Ps”: protection (of citizens), provision (of economic and social services) and participation (in decision-making). The social contract provides an analytical tool and a set of organising principles for joint EU and member state priorities and activities. The social contract lens shows how the 3 Ps work together as a framework for social cohesion, peaceful relations and political stability. In practical terms, its use would help improve the effectiveness, coherence and coordination of EU and member state cooperation with MENA countries. Some EU member states prefer to focus on trade and economic cooperation, some on political reform and human rights, and others on migration management. If all take a more long-term perspective, they will realise that sustainable social contracts in MENA countries are good for all of their aims. All European actions should support reforms in MENA countries that aim to make social contracts more acceptable to the contracting parties – governments and social groups. Ideally, such reforms result from negotiations of social contracts between parties on equal terms. In practice, how¬ever, the negotiation power of social groups is often limited – one reason why Europe should ensure that its programmes strengthen societies at least as much as governments. This paper discusses four key cooperation areas which are potential drivers of change for social contracts: • Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction; • Post-COVID-19 recovery: health and social protection; • Participation at local, regional and national levels; and • Mutually beneficial migration and mobility. The EU and its member states, by working together on the 3 Ps in these four areas, can influence positive change in the MENA region.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, COVID-19, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

256. From the Barcelona Process to the Programme for the Mediterranean, a fragile partnership with the Pierre MIREL European Union

Author:: Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: In Barcelona in 1995, the European Union and its southern partners[1] committed to making the Mediterranean basin an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, ensuring “peace, stability and prosperity.” Twenty-five years later, the southern shore of the Mediterranean faces immense challenges: governance, corruption, migration, terrorism, security, environment and climate, in addition to conflicts, geopolitical competition and external interference. This is the bitter assessment of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission[2] in their Communication on a new programme for the Mediterranean. The civil wars in Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Libya cannot, of course, be used to describe the EU's policy since 1995 as a failure. This would imply that the EU's policy has played a role that was not possible given the underlying forces at play in these regions. However, this policy has not lived up to the hopes it first raised. The Union has taken a succession of initiatives over the past twenty-five years, but the 'partnerships', 'privileged status' and other 'strategic agreements' have not been able to mask the shortcomings and lack of financial resources. Will the new programme, presented as 'ambitious and innovative', be able to respond to the challenges set?
Topic:: European Union, Partnerships, Arab Spring, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

257. Development Cooperation with Conflict-Affected MENA Countries: Refocussing on the Social Contract

Author:: Mark Furness and Annabelle Houdret
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: State–society relations are in flux across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings. The protests and revolts that swept the region in 2011 arose from widespread rejection of the post-independence Arab social contracts. These were based on redistribution of rents from natural resources and other forms of transfers and subsidies, as “compensation” for acquiescence to political and economic authoritarianism. In several MENA countries, including Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, but also in Algeria, Lebanon and Palestine, the old social contracts have been destroyed by civil conflicts and internationally sponsored wars, which in some cases predated the 2011 uprisings. Since broken social contracts are at the root of conflict in the MENA region, supporting new social contracts should be the core objective of development cooperation with the region’s most conflict-affected countries. But “post-conflict reconstruction” often ignores the fact that conflicts do not end with peace agreements, and conflict-affected societies need more than reconstructed infrastructure, institutional capacity and private sector investment if they are to avoid violence in the future. Development agencies term this kind of cooperation “resilience”: promoting political, economic, social and environmental stability, rather than risking uncontrollable, revolutionary transformation. However, resilience has often provided cover for short-term measures aimed at preserving the position of particular actors and systems. Development cooperation needs to get beyond reconstruction and resilience approaches that often fail to foster the long-term stability they promise. By focussing on the social contract, development cooperation with conflict-affected countries can provide a crucial link between peacebuilding, reconstruction and longer-term socioeconomic and political development. It can thereby contribute not only to short-term, but also to long-term, sustainable stability. Using the social contract as an analytical lens can increase understanding not only of what donors should avoid doing, but also where they should concentrate their engagement during transitions from civil war. Practical examples from challenging contexts in the MENA region suggest that donors can make positive contributions in support of new social contracts when backing (a) stakeholder dialogues, (b) governance and reforms, and (c) socioeconomic inclusion. In Libya, the socioeconomic dialogue process has brought stakeholders together to outline a new economic vision for the country. The Municipal Development Programme in Palestine focusses on improving the accountability and delivery of local institutions. The Moroccan Economic, Social and Environmental Council provides an example of a process that engages previously marginalised groups. These programmes are all examples of targeted efforts to build cooperation among the groups that make up MENA societies. They aim to broaden decision-making processes, and to increase the impact of specific measures with the ultimate objective of improving state–society relations. They could be adapted for other fragile contexts, with external support. In backing more of these kinds of activities, donors could make stronger contributions to sustainable, long-term peace- and state-building processes in conflict-affected MENA countries.
Topic:: Development, Natural Resources, Conflict, Peace, and Social Contract
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria

258. Analysis of the Turkish Services Industry and Korea-Turkey Cooperation

Author:: Cheol-Won Lee, Hyun Jean Lee, Mahmut Tekçe, and Burcu Düzgün Öncel
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Investment between Korea and Turkey came into effect in August 2018. This article focuses on the construction sector and the cultural contents sector to seek possible cooperative measures between the two countries.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Culture, Economy, Investment, and Industry
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

259. The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies

Author:: Mitvim
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US, Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Mediterranean

260. Afghan Women’s Views on Violent Extremism and Aspirations to a Peacemaking Role

Author:: Haseeb Humayoon and Mustafa Basij-Rasikh
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Recent efforts at settling the decades-long conflict in Afghanistan have featured an increasingly vibrant and visible display of women’s activism. Even with the support of the government and its international partners, Afghan women still face tremendous challenges to realizing their aspirations for a role in peacemaking. Based on extensive interviews throughout Afghanistan, this report attempts to better understand the changing public role of Afghan women today and their contributions to peacebuilding and ending violence.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Violent Extremism, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

261. Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach

Author:: Martha Crenshaw
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The 2011 civil war in Syria attracted thousands of fighters from at least seventy countries to join the Islamic State. Al-Shabaab carried out large-scale attacks on civilian targets in Uganda and Kenya as retribution for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In this report, Martha Crenshaw considers the extent to which civil war and foreign military intervention function as a rationale for transnational terrorism, and how understanding the connections between terrorism, civil war, and weak governance can help the United States and its allies mount an appropriate response.
Topic:: Terrorism, War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, Transnational Actors, Peace, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:: Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Middle East, Syria, Somalia, and United States of America

262. Attracting SESAME Users’ Community to the Technical Dimensions of CBRN Activities, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

Author:: Marc Finaud and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: SESAME, which stands for Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East, is a large-scale techno-scientific project that was established under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and is set up according to the model of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva. This multilateral endeavour, located in Jordan, brings together experts and researchers from the Mediterranean/Middle East, including from countries that do not have diplomatic relations (e.g. Israel and Iran, Cyprus and Turkey). It is conceived primarily as a project combining research capacity-building with vital peacebuilding efforts. In principle, these efforts may include the manifold technical and cooperative dimensions of anti-terrorist activities related to weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN), and also to disarmament and non-proliferation. The country where SESAME is located – Jordan – has been heavily involved in the fight against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS). This Policy Forum issue deals with the genesis of SESAME, and then describes its functioning, achievements, and potential benefits; the challenges it faces, especially funding; and its peacebuilding element. The SESAME project can be improved in concrete ways by meeting two peacebuilding-related criteria: firstly, by living up to its claim of being a contribution to rapprochement between the peoples of this conflict-torn region, whose security is affected by national rivalries or violent non-state actors; and, secondly, by providing inputs for the users’ community without adversely affecting that community’s predominant focus on research. This Policy Forum aims at acquainting especially young scientists with the technical and cooperative dimensions of SESAME’s CBRN-related counter-terrorist activities, as well as its disarmament and non-proliferation measures. Such scientists can make use particularly of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programmes and of the nearby Amman-based academic and educational infrastructure.
Topic:: Science and Technology, United Nations, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:: Middle East and Jordan

263. Greece and Israeli-Turkish relations

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This essay by Dr. George Tzogopoulos, focuses on the multidimensional nature of Greek-Israeli relations. The understanding of the depth of these relations can explain why the two countries – along with Cyprus – are interested in coming closer. On the other hand, the effort of Israel and Turkey to normalize bilateral ties – already under way since 2016 – is a logical development that deserves attention. However, it is not related to the future evolution of Greek-Israeli collaboration. The evolution of Greek-Israeli relations in the last decade and trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus summits outline the common interest of the three countries to enrich their cooperation. Israel and Turkey have started since 2016 to normalize their relations. This is an ongoing process that has evolved in a period during which Greece, Israel and Cyprus charted a joint course in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey are expected to find a modus vivendi by agreeing on some issues and disagreeing on others. A potential Turkish-Israeli collaboration against Iran in Syria might pave the way for new synergies between Israel and Turkey. This is a highly controversial and complicated matter that entails risks for Ankara.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Syria

264. Preparing for a Looming Water Crisis: Lessons Learned from COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa Countries

Author:: Jamal Saghir and Yasmina El Amine
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University
Abstract:: The challenge of water security is growing globally. Achieving and sustaining water security, in both developed and developing countries, is likely to increase in complexity and priority as climate change intensifies, but also as the demands of economic growth increase. For most MENA countries that were already facing water security and major social, health and economic challenges before COVID-19, this additional pressure is particularly excruciating. Like COVID-19 and climate change, water scarcity in MENA is a global problem that requires collective action. There is no more urgent time to address the MENA’s water crisis than now, when people are constantly being reminded to use water to combat the spread of the virus. The Arab world appears to have averted significant health impacts from COVID-19, possibly shielding to a certain extent its health sector, however other sectors are at risk of collapsing, as the region is on the brink of an even more devastating water crisis. Drawing on countries’ responses to the outbreak and on unique traits and issues typical to the region, this policy paper discusses COVID –19 and the MENA and explores lessons learnt from the pandemic, in light of the upcoming water crisis in the MENA. It examines the issues of inequality and regional cooperation. It argues that fostering innovation for resilience is crucial in the absence of strong institutional response or capacity of governments, while also tackling critical ways to address and prepare for increasing water scarcity in the region. Finally, the paper provides policy recommendations that represent fundamental requirements for sustainable water development in the MENA countries.
Topic:: Development, Water, Crisis Management, Sustainability, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

265. Infrastructures and Power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:: Silvia Clombo and Eduard Soler I Lecha
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Geopolitics is back. A more aggressive great power competition and the disruptive effects of new technologies have given new impetus to the analysis of the impact of geography on political decisions. Over the last decade, the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have experienced profound and far-reaching social, political and economic transformations that have contributed to unprecedented levels of volatility and uncertainty. Some of these shifts have reshaped many of the traditional features of the geopolitical order in place in the region for decades, while others might have the potential to do so in the near future. Increased competition among regional actors but also new stakes by emerging global powers are redefining the contours of regional geopolitics and the way in which this region relates to broader global trends. Infrastructures is one of the areas where the effects of those global and regional dynamics are more visible and this is why a good grasp of the geopolitics of infrastructures can help us understand the broader geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and North Africa better. This is the main goal of this Joint Policy Study that ultimately aims to fill a gap in the scholarly work on the Mediterranean and the MENA region by delving into issues of geopolitical competition, conflict and cooperation from the point of view of the use of strategic infrastructures. This exercise continues and complements other collective endeavours, namely the MENARA project, which have sought to make sense of the acceleration of changes in the region since 2011 and have analysed them as a continuation of pre-existing trends and as part of larger transformations at a global scale. The geopolitical relevance of infrastructures is nothing new, as evidenced by the centuries-old competition for control of some strategic passageways such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Tiran or the Suez Canal. While acknowledging some constant features, our analysis also takes into consideration the impact of new trends at the global and regional levels. Moreover, while the study of infrastructures has been a key feature in classical geopolitics, there are aspects often associated with critical geopolitics – the geopolitics of cooperation and the relevance of actors other than states such as transnational corporations, cities or civil society groups to provide a few examples that stand at the core of our analytical approach to the topic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

266. Gone Without a Trace: Syria’s Detained, Abducted, and Forcibly Disappeared

Author:: Hanny Megally and Elena Naughton
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: In most cases, to be imprisoned in Syria is to disappear. Tens of thousands of people, if not more, have been unlawfully taken prisoner or held incommunicado in the context of the Syrian conflict. This policy paper examines the dark reality of detentions in Syria, its impact on those who are detained and their families, and recommends a set of urgent steps that should be taken to assist families in obtaining information about the whereabouts of their loved ones, gaining access to them, and achieving their prompt release. While most parties to the Syrian conflict are complicit in carrying out arbitrary and incommunicado detentions, including both state and non-state actors, the vast majority of detention-related violations since 2011 have been carried out by the Syrian state. The policy paper – a joint project of ICTJ and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University – draws from a variety of sources, including the authoring organizations’ longstanding work on Syria and engagement with Syrian victims, as well as inputs from interviews and an expert roundtable in The Hague, Netherlands, in October 2019. The paper looks in depth at the main government security agencies responsible for arrests and detentions in Syria and shows how the regime weaponizes the law to criminalize political activity, to maintain absolute control over the Syrian population, and to justify arrests and detentions of peaceful demonstrators, political opponents, and human rights activists, all behind a facade of legality. It shows how, at every level, the system works in contravention of fundamental principles of human rights law designed to protect individuals from unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty, including rights guaranteed in the international declarations and conventions to which Syria is a party. The paper provides additional information about nonstate actors who over the course of the conflict are known to have abducted and detained not only opposing armed forces, including Syrian army, but many civilians. From there, the paper goes on to examine the harsh realities facing families of those who have been detained, abducted, and forcibly disappeared in Syria and what must be done to begin addressing the rights of these victims, which have been so seriously violated. It looks at four primary areas of action that must be considered urgent for Syrians: (1) official acknowledgment of detentions and the disclosure of information about the whereabouts and fate of the forcibly disappeared and abducted; (2) detainee releases; (3) access to detention facilities by monitoring groups; and (4) addressing the consequences of enforced disappearance on families. The paper concludes with comprehensive recommendations for what can and should be done, now and in the future by the Syrian regime and other parties to the conflict, as well as the international community. On an urgent basis, it recommends among other things the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained as well as vulnerable prisoners such as the sick, women, the elderly, children, and the disabled; unimpeded access by the International Committee of the Red Cross to all places of detention; and the sharing of lists specifying the status and location of detainees held by the Syrian government and other nonstate actors. In the long-term, it proposes creating among other things an independent mechanism for reviewing the remaining cases of detention, safe centers where families can request information about the fate of their loved ones, and rehabilitation programs where released individuals can access psychosocial and other vital services. These and other critical steps are a matter of extreme urgency, as the paper makes plain, if there is to be any possibility of lasting peace in Syria.
Topic:: Reform, Youth, Criminal Justice, Memory, Institutions, Justice, Engagement, Gender, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

267. Dead at the Root: Systemic Dysfunction and the Failure of Reform in Lebanon

Author:: Nour El Bejjani Noureddine and Anna Myriam Roccatello
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: Lebanon is in crisis and its people are tired of decades of endemic corruption, mismanagement, and impunity and of moving from one disaster to the next without making any progress on long-awaited reforms. They have been left with a local currency that is rapidly declining in value, thus eroding their savings and livelihoods. The massive explosion in the capital on August 4, 2020, was only the latest tragedy, the result of decades of systemic dysfunction that perpetuates injustice for victims of all types of human rights violations in Lebanon and inflicts enduring harms on Lebanese society. During the 15-year civil war (1975–1990), more than 150,000 people died, 300,000 were injured or disabled, more than one million were displaced, and more than 17,000 went missing. Although the 1990 Ta’if Agreement effectively ended the armed conflict, it failed to address the human rights abuses committed during the war, a shortcoming that has also meant a failure to uphold victims’ rights. Rather than curbing sectarianism, one of the root causes of the war, the agreement strengthened it by establishing a system of power sharing among the different warring factions along sectarian lines. Today, nearly half of Lebanon’s population is living below the poverty line, with limited services and high economic insecurity. Since the war, the elite class in Lebanon has consistently blamed the country’s dysfunction on others, including neighboring countries and the international community, which have interfered in different ways in the politics and finances of the country. That narrative is no longer sufficient. It is clear that the problems Lebanon is facing today have deep-rooted causes that were never addressed at the end of the war. People will continue to find themselves victims of a corrupt and unjust system until that system is uprooted entirely, and a new, more just, equal, inclusive, and nonsectarian structure is set up in its place.
Topic:: Corruption, Reform, Criminal Justice, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

268. Renewing transatlantic strategy on Iran

Author:: Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The election of former Vice President Joe Biden in the United States presents the prospect of major changes in US foreign policy, especially toward Iran. These changes cannot begin to be implemented until after Inauguration Day in January of the new year, while an urgent need exists for other players to bridge the gap. None are better suited to this task than the US’s closest allies in Europe which have already played a significant role in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Britain, France and Germany – the E-3 – and the European Union have also worked tirelessly to keep the JCPOA alive in the face of the unilateral US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, the imposition of draconian sanctions by the Trump administration and escalating tensions in the Middle East. A new report by Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah presents a series of recommendations for the E-3 and the EU to preserve the JCPOA, promote regional peace and development and boost people-to-people contacts with Iran in concert with the new US administration. Taken together, these steps would amount to a renewed transatlantic diplomatic agenda through which the United States and European allies can stabilize the nuclear file and then build on the resulting diplomatic momentum to address other concerns with Iran.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

269. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:: Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus

270. 2020 Country Brief: Saudi Arabia and its role in Yemen

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a close security and economic partner of the United States for most of the Kingdom’s history. But the United States cannot ignore Saudi Arabia’s gruesome acts and abuses, nor allow them to be swept under the rug. The two countries have critical differences on a number of key issues, including those related to terrorism, human rights, and regional security threats. Two particular actions taken by Saudi Arabia have caused Congress to revisit the US-Saudi relationship: Saudi-led military operations in Yemen that have killed thousands of innocent civilians and left millions on the brink of starvation; and The 2018 brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi—a Saudi citizen and US resident—carried out by the Saudi government in Istanbul, Turkey. In the face of Saudi Arabia’s dangerous and destabilizing behavior, President Trump has doubled down on his support for the Kingdom and defied bipartisan congressional opposition to continue to sell arms to the Saudi government. Instead of permitting President Trump to allow autocrats and dictators to operate with impunity and commit acts of unimaginable horror, Congress must reassert its foreign policy decision-making power, impose targeted consequences on the Kingdom for its actions, and withdraw support for Saudi-led military operations in Yemen.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Human Rights Violations
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

271. Challenges and opportunities for conflict resolution with Salafi jihadi armed groups

Author:: Veronique Dudouet and Karin Göldner-Ebenthal
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Berghof Foundation
Abstract:: This policy brief highlights recommendations for evidence-based policy making on pathways to conflict de-escalation with Salafi jihadi armed groups. It proposes a more nuanced public discussion of the topic. This brief draws mainly on the research report “Dialogue with Salafi jihadi armed groups: Challenges and opportunities for conflict de-escalation” which concludes a two-year research project based on case studies in Somalia, Syria and Mali.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Islam, Religion, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, Syria, Somalia, and Mali

272. From Bad To Worse? The Impact(s) of Covid-19 On Conflict Dynamics

Author:: Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In December 2019, when the novel strain of coronavirus first hit the headlines, 12 countries in the world were experiencing organised violence on an extensive scale, with more than 100 incidents of violence and attacks against civilians recorded in that month. To most of these countries, the virus seemed a distant threat at the time. Yet, a few months and over 7 million recorded Covid-19 cases later, it has evolved from a distant threat to a stark reality. The global crisis – which has unleashed an emergency in the world’s public health, political, and economic systems simultaneously – has subjected even the most stable societies to unprecedented disruption. In conflict-affected countries, i.e. countries with ongoing conflicts or a high risk of relapse into conflict, and countries emerging from conflicts, the pandemic has added another layer on top of often multiple existing layers of crisis. Against the backdrop of expert warnings over the particular vulnerabilities of conflict-affected countries to Covid-19, this Brief analyses key emerging dynamics and repercussions in conflict-affected countries in general, and in five countries in particular: Colombia, Libya, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. The focus here is especially on conflicts and countries previously covered by our Conflict Series, so as to build on already accumulated analysis. The Brief identifies three main ways in which the global crisis impacts conflict-affected countries. First, the pandemic itself risks exacerbating inequalities and further burdening already vulnerable groups within conflict-affected societies. Second, local and external conflict parties are quick to capitalise on various opportunities arising from the policy responses to the crisis which also complicate peace and crisis management efforts. Third, the economic fallout puts severe strain on already weak state institutions and undermines governance outcomes (thus increasing the risk of conflict). Of these three dimensions, the policy responses and distraction created by the pandemic have thus far had the most significant repercussions for conflict dynamics, unfortunately often for the worse. The global scale of the crisis and its continuing evolution complicate efforts to seize momentum for peace and set the pandemic apart from previous catastrophic/disruptive events, such as the tsunami in 2004, that in some cases led to a positive shift in local conflict dynamics. The Brief is structured as follows: the main text analyses the emerging trends catalysed by the pandemic crisis in conflict-affected contexts, while the case study boxes discuss the unfolding processes in specific countries. The last section discusses the policy options for preventing further escalatory repercussions.
Topic:: War, Inequality, Conflict, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Asia, South America, North Africa, North America, and Africa

273. Deciphering China in the Middle East

Author:: Erzsébet N. Rózsa
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: It is commonly perceived that the engagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Middle East is driven primarily by economic interests, and that it prefers to steer clear of the conflicts in the region as much as possible. Its landmark ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), launched in 2013 as a global infrastructure development strategy, contributes to this perception. This notion, however, overlooks the larger context of China’s engagement, both historical and contemporary. China’s new activism in the Middle East reflects the evolution of Chinese foreign policy thinking, in line with the country’s rise as an economic superpower. Its original choice of partners in the region was influenced by ideological considerations and a shared anti-colonial and anti-imperialist narrative. But its transformation into an economic powerhouse has inevitably altered its priorities and influence in the Middle East. Its economic penetration of the region is reflected in the set of cooperation agreements that it has concluded with the regional states as well as in subregional cooperation formats, e. g. the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum. The PRC’s increasing engagement in the Middle East may well be driven by its need for resources to fuel its economic growth; however, there is inevitably a political dimension too, due not only to the fact that China has a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and seeks to project the image of a ‘responsible’ superpower but also because of the need to protect its investments and commercial interests in the region. China’s growing influence in the Middle East may generally be positively received, or even welcomed; however, the countries of the region have very different perspectives and often conflicting interests in the way they relate to the PRC. This Brief analyses these perspectives taking into account China’s recent initiatives in the region at a time of growing rivalry between the US and China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

274. The EU's Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime: Upholding a taboo under attack

Author:: Clara Portela and Erica Moret
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Marking a worrying turn for international policymakers, the use of chemical weapons has increased in recent years in spite of the robust disarmament regime seeking to curb their use. In October 2018, the EU adopted a sanctions regime against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The 2018 sanctions regime constitutes the EU’s first coercive instrument against chemical weapons. Even though the EU had previously employed sanctions to halt nuclear proliferation, in accordance with its 2003 Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), it had never applied sanctions to chemical weapons activities. Also, previous EU non-proliferation sanctions had taken place against the background of a pre-existing mandate agreed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both Pyongyang and Tehran had been under UN sanctions before Brussels enacted its own restrictions. By contrast, the EU sanctions regime against chemical weapons is not based on a UNSC mandate. Finally, the sanctions regime takes the form of a ‘horizontal’ or thematic list, in contrast to classical sanctions regimes that address specific country crises. The chemical weapons sanctions regime was only the second thematic sanctions regime ever adopted by the EU after the UNSC-inspired 2001 terrorism list. It was the first in a series of EU autonomous horizontal regimes adopted in close sequence: a sanctions regime against cyberattacks was agreed in 2019, and another against human rights violations is currently under preparation. The sanctions regime against chemical weapons is also exceptional in that it originated in the European Council, rather than in a working group of the Council of the European Union. When the sanctions regime was first adopted, it was accompanied by a blacklist addressing two vastly different uses of chemical weapons: it combined three individuals and one entity involved in chemical attacks on civilians in the Syrian war with the two suspects in the assassination attempt on a former Russian military intelligence officer and his daughter in Salisbury in the United Kingdom. A second round of designations in January 2019 followed a similar pattern. What accounts for this unusual combination of targets? What compelled the EU to agree on this novel form of sanctions regime? And what objectives is the EU pursuing with it? The present Brief situates the EU sanctions regime in the context of the recent attacks in Syria and the UK and international efforts employed to limit the proliferation and use of chemical arsenals. It then explores why sanctions are emerging as a supplementary policy tool in tackling this shifting security challenge. A fourth section analyses the implications for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before the final section concludes with recommendations for further action.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, European Union, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, and North Africa

275. Beyond Yemen's Militiadoms: Restarting from local agency

Author:: Eleanore Ardemagni
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The crisis in Yemen epitomises the complexity of contemporary intra-state conflicts: rather than a simple, binary war, the situation is characterised by various layers of conflict with multiple state, hybrid, non-state actors and foreign state powers playing active roles. Analysts and policymakers need to be aware of this complexity in order to grasp the drivers and implications of this war, and identify possible avenues for conflict resolution. Yemen matters a lot for the strategic interests of the EU: its Western waters are the southern frontier of the Mediterranean Sea. But Yemen has also become an arena of strategic competition for the Gulf and Middle Eastern state powers, who have constructed or taken over control of ports, military bases and airports along its coasts and islands as a springboard for projection in the Western Indian Ocean. Finally, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), established in 2009 and based in Yemen, remains one of the most entrenched and resilient jihadi networks in terms of local ties and political adaptability. This Conflict Series Brief analyses the intertwined layers of conflict in Yemen and their implications for war resolution efforts. The local-foreign nexus between Yemini and external actors needs to be disentangled to separate domestic drivers and the regional and/or sectarian dimensions of the conflict. Competing ‘militiadoms’ are on the rise, thus transforming the traditional Yemeni pattern of hybrid security governance into a multiple security governance scenario. The Brief examines the Yemeni crisis in all its complexity, focusing on existing and emerging dynamics. Interference by foreign state powers is both a cause and a consequence of the protracted conflict, while the potential for peace must be sought at local level. This approach will help to identify strategies for mitigating and possibly resolving the crisis.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

276. Promoting European strategic sovereignty in the southern neighbourhood

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Anthony Dworkin
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Events in the Middle East and North Africa strongly affect Europe, but other global and regional powers are determining the course of events in the region. Europe’s interests include migration, counter-terrorism, and open trade routes, but its larger goal should be to promote greater stability in the region. To achieve greater sovereignty, Europe needs to push back against rival powers, build leverage in armed conflicts, and be more effective in supporting reform. The EU should work towards greater European unity in the region, including through the use of flexible and open coalitions of member states.
Topic:: Sovereignty, European Union, Marginalization, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

277. The end of Oslo: A new European strategy on Israel-Palestine

Author:: Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: European policy this year saw significant wins in Israel-Palestine: helping to block Donald Trump’s ‘peace’ plan and to avoid Israel’s de jure annexation of Palestinian territory. But Europe is failing to fundamentally challenge the worsening situation on the ground, which is storing up future instability and threatens European interests. The Oslo process is exhausted and a viable two-state outcome is slipping out of reach. Instead of its rigid focus on the Oslo peace process, the EU should craft a new peacemaking paradigm based on equality and deoccupation. The absence of a two-state solution will mean Israel ensuring equal rights for Palestinians in one democratic state. The EU should also deter Israeli settlement activity and push Palestinians towards political renewal as prerequisites for a future resolution of the conflict.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Inequality, Oslo Accords, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

278. Considering the "Zero Option"

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The strategic importance of the Middle East has declined, but Washington has so far inadequately adjusted. Diversification of energy sources and reduction in external threats to the region make the Middle East less important to U.S. interests.
Topic:: Cold War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: United States and Middle East

279. Sanctions and the End of Trans-Atlanticism: Iran, Russia, and the Unintended Division of the West

Author:: Rawi Abdelal and Aurélie Bros
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the United States and other Western states, especially the European Union, since the end of the Cold War. But the systematic use of this instrument may produce unintended and somewhat paradoxical geopolitical consequences. The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in the field of energy are particularly illustrative of this phenomenon.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Secondary Sanctions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

280. As Israel’s Kingmaker Gets Off the Fence, Gantz Gets a Boost

Author:: David Makovksy
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Although Benny Gantz’s party lost the head-to-head battle, Avigdor Liberman’s favorable influence on the coalition math has left the general in a stronger position—and taken some diplomatic weight off the Trump administration’s shoulders. Israel’s third round of elections last week seemed inconclusive at first, but the deadlock may now be broken. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did better this time than in September’s round two, but his gains were insufficient to form a new government. Potential kingmaker Avigdor Liberman jettisoned his previous idea of getting the two top parties to join forces; instead, personal antipathy and policy differences have led him to definitely state that he will not join any government Netanyahu leads. Thus, while centrist Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz may have options to shape a new government, Netanyahu has no pathway on his own. In theory, the center-left bloc has the requisite number of seats for a bare majority in the 120-member Knesset, since anti-Netanyahu forces won 62 seats. In reality, the situation is more complex.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, and Elections
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

281. Ceasefire or Escalation in Libya?

Author:: Ben Fishman
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: After the fall of Sirte, Erdogan and Putin’s desired ceasefire can only be achieved with Washington’s support. Over the past week, regional and European actors have increased their diplomatic activity around Libya in response to intensifying violence in the nine-month-old civil war. On January 8, less than a week after the Turkish parliament approved sending forces to support the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin met in Istanbul and called for a Libya ceasefire to begin on January 12. Whether or not Moscow and Ankara manage to pause the violence temporarily, their growing influence in Libya represents an epic failure of Western attempts to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The longer-term effort to jumpstart Libya’s political transition requires a wider international effort at peace and reconciliation—something Russia and Turkey can support but not lead. Putin and Erdogan seemed to acknowledge that fact at their summit, endorsing a long-planned multilateral conference in Berlin aimed at recommitting all relevant actors to support an end to hostilities and respect the UN Security Council’s mandatory but widely ignored arms embargo. Even assuming Putin is serious and withdraws Russian mercenaries from the frontlines, a full, lasting ceasefire cannot transpire until the other actors who support Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) agree to withdraw their equipment and personnel for a fixed period while negotiations are launched—especially the United Arab Emirates, which provides the LNA with critical air superiority. At the same time, Turkey would have to take commensurate de-escalatory steps of its own. The United States is the only actor that holds enough weight with all the foreign parties to bring about an authentic ceasefire. Despite being consumed with crises in Iran and Iraq, Washington should expend the diplomatic effort required to pursue durable stability in Libya before the country slips further toward endemic chaos.
Topic:: Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and United States of America

282. Challenges Await Oman’s New Sultan as Mourning Period Ends

Author:: Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Sultan Haitham will now be free to put his own stamp on the country's government and foreign policy, and a recent dust-up on the Yemeni border could provide the first indicator of his approach. On February 20, Oman will begin its next era in earnest. The new sultan, Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, was officially sworn in on January 11, but he has remained quiet and mostly out of sight during the forty-day mourning period that followed the death of his cousin, Sultan Qaboos. Now that this period is drawing to a close, he is free to put his stamp on Omani policy. Notably, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will lead the first international delegation to see Sultan Haitham in the post-mourning period. When the meeting was first scheduled, the secretary likely saw it as a chance to get to know the new leader, and also as a symbolic visit to make up for sending such a low-level delegation to offer condolences. Yet the two may have more to talk about now. Earlier this week, a flare-up occurred between Saudi forces and Omani-backed locals in the Yemeni border province of al-Mahra. The confrontation may be Sultan Haitham’s first regional test, and identifying the actors who help him get through it could help Washington discern future power centers within Oman’s often opaque government.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Government
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, Oman, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

283. Continuity vs. Overreach in the Trump Peace Plan (Part 1): Borders and Jerusalem

Author:: David Makovsky
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: If the latest U.S. effort winds up backing the Palestinians into a territorial corner from the outset, then Washington may not be able to move the process any closer to direct negotiations. The newly released U.S. peace plan marks a very significant shift in favor of the current Israeli government’s view, especially when compared to three past U.S. initiatives: (1) the Clinton Parameters of December 2000, (2) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “Annapolis Process” of 2007-2008, and (3) Secretary of State John Kerry’s 2013-2014 initiative. The message is clear: the Trump administration will no longer keep sweetening the deal with every Palestinian refusal, a criticism some have aimed at previous U.S. efforts. Yet the new plan raises worrisome questions of its own. Will its provisions prove so disadvantageous to the proposed Palestinian state that they cannot serve as the basis for further negotiations? And would such overreach enable Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to sway Arab states who have signaled that they want to give the proposal a chance, convincing them to oppose it instead? If so, the plan may wind up perpetuating the current diplomatic impasse and setting the stage for a one-state reality that runs counter to Israel’s identity as a Jewish, democratic state. This two-part PolicyWatch will address these questions by examining how the Trump plan compares to past U.S. initiatives when it comes to the conflict’s five core final-status issues. Part 1 focuses on two of these issues: borders and Jerusalem. Part 2 examines security, refugees, and narrative issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Borders, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

284. Continuity vs. Overreach in the Trump Peace Plan (Part 2): Security, Refugees, and Narratives

Author:: Ghaith al-Omari
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By granting Israel much more say over the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state and its ability to absorb refugees, the document may undermine the administration’s ability to build an international coalition behind its policies. President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan was presented as a departure from previous approaches—a notion that invited praise from its supporters (who saw it as a recognition of reality) and criticism from its opponents (who saw it as an abandonment of valued principles). The plan does in fact diverge from past efforts in fundamental respects, yet there are also some areas of continuity, and ultimately, the extent to which it gains traction will be subject to many different political and diplomatic variables. Even so, the initial substance of the plan document itself will play a large part in determining how it is viewed by various stakeholders, especially those passages that veer away from the traditional path on core issues. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch assessed what the plan says about two such issues: borders and Jerusalem. This second installment discusses security, refugee, and narrative issues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Refugees, and Peace
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

285. Centering Iraq Policy on Human Rights and Fair Elections Michael Knights

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The surest way to counter Iran’s malign influence is to proactively focus on human rights issues that the new prime minister can actually affect, such as organizing free elections and preventing further violence against protestors. On February 1, a plurality of Iraqi parliamentary factions gave President Barham Salih the go-ahead to nominate Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the new prime minister-designate. The mild-mannered Shia Islamist nominee will now attempt to form and ratify his cabinet in the next thirty days. As he does so, political blocs will probably rally behind him while limiting his mandate to organizing early elections next year, having struggled through a long and fractious process to replace resigned prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi. For the first time since the dramatic events of the past two months, Iraqis and U.S. policymakers alike can catch their breath and consider their medium-term options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

286. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:: Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

287. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout

Author:: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement. Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran. In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian cost.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Displacement, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

288. Iranian Succession and the Impact of Soleimani’s Death

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process. Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying, steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Topic:: Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

289. Making the Most of the Berlin Conference on Libya

Author:: Ben Fishman and Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: If the latest conference is to succeed, the principal actors stoking the civil war must endorse a genuine ceasefire and a return to Libyan internal dialogue. On January 19, international leaders will convene in Berlin to discuss a way out of the nine-month civil war between the so-called “Libyan National Army” led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The Germans led several months of preparatory efforts at the request of UN envoy Ghassan Salame, but had been reluctant to choose a specific date until they were assured that the event stood a reasonable chance of producing practical steps to improve the situation on the ground and jumpstart the UN’s stalled negotiation efforts between the LNA and GNA. Chancellor Angela Merkel finally took that step after several key developments unfolded earlier this month, including a January 8 ceasefire proposal by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Putin’s subsequent failed attempt to have each side sign a more permanent ceasefire agreement in Moscow on January 13 (the GNA signed but Haftar balked, though most of the fighting has paused for the moment). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been averse to engage on Libya during his tenure, but he is expected to attend the Berlin conference alongside National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. Accordingly, the event gives the United States a chance to play a much-needed role on several fronts: namely, pressuring the foreign actors who have perpetuated the war and violated the arms embargo; working with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia to codify a ceasefire at the UN Security Council; and backing Salame’s efforts to reinvigorate the Libyan national dialogue, which Haftar preempted by attacking Tripoli last April despite European support to Salame. Since 2011, Libya has struggled to establish a legitimate transitional government despite three national elections and the creation of at least four legislative bodies. Challenges to the 2014 election results eventually led to rival governments in the east and west, and the division solidified when Haftar started the first civil war with support from his allies Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. That war halted in 2015, but several years’ worth of domestic and international efforts failed to bring Sarraj and Haftar to an enduring resolution.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Civil War, United Nations, Conflict, Negotiation, and Conference
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, Germany, North Africa, United Arab Emirates, Berlin, and United States of America

290. Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other

Author:: David Pollock
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A host of crucial multilateral interests are baked into the U.S. presence, from keeping the Islamic State down, to protecting vulnerable regional allies, to preventing Iran from taking Iraq's oil revenues. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani has brought the tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations to a boil, with militia factions strong-arming a parliamentary resolution on American troop withdrawal and various European allies contemplating departures of their own. Before they sign the divorce papers, however, officials in Baghdad and Washington should consider the many reasons why staying together is best for both them and the Middle East.
Topic:: Oil, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Jordan, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

291. How Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Message Framing Primed Its Members to Become Recruits for the Islamic State

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By the time IS came to the fore in Iraq and Syria, many of its themes and activities were already second nature to Tunisian jihadis who had heard similar messaging at home. There are a number of reasons why Tunisians joined the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. One underappreciated aspect of this is the way Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s (AST) messaging primed members of the group and others in society that were exposed to, attended, or followed online AST activities and events. In my new book, Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad, I describe this process, which I will examine in brief here. In particular, I will explore AST’s motivational framing, which “functions as prods to action.” The major themes AST crafted in its narrative were related to brotherhood, the defense of Islam, the creation of an Islamic state, and “remaining” as an entity.
Topic:: Islam, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia

292. Iran’s Supreme Leader Responds to the Soleimani Assassination

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Khamenei and other regime officials have been quick to swear revenge, but for now they may focus more on stoking patriotic and militaristic sentiment at home. A few hours after Iran confirmed that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani had been killed in Iraq, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a statement describing those who shed his blood as “the most wretched of humankind.” Calling Soleimani the international symbol of “resistance,” he then announced three days of public mourning in Iran. He also declared that “severe revenge awaits the criminals” who killed Soleimani—an act that the United States had claimed credit for by the time he spoke. Other highranking officials echoed this sentiment, including President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, and Defense Minister Amir Hatami, who explicitly promised “revenge” on “all those” involved in the assassination. Despite this rhetoric, however, and despite Soleimani’s unmatched role in carrying out Iran’s regional policy of adventurism and asymmetric warfare, the regime may avoid major, immediate retaliation if it sees such a move as too costly or as a potential trigger for serious military conflict with the United States. On January 1, amid escalating tensions in Iraq but before Soleimani’s assassination, Khamenei stated, “We would not take the country to war...but if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.” In response to President Trump’s assertion that Iran played a role in the December 31 riot at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Khamenei told listeners he had two messages for Washington: “First, how dare you! This has nothing to do with Iran. Second, you should be reasonable and understand what is the main cause for these problems. But of course they are not [reasonable].”
Topic:: Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

293. Hezbollah Has a New Strategy to Survive Lebanon’s Financial Crisis

Author:: Hanin Ghaddar
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Unless Washington and its allies respond to the protestors’ legitimate demands for reform, the group will survive through measures such as expanding its smuggling activity, promoting its financial institutions, and selectively scapegoating corrupt politicians. When IMF officials visited Lebanon late last month amid its accelerating economic freefall, many wondered whether these developments might alter the behavior of Hezbollah, the designated terrorist group that has a deep financial stake in the country’s public and private sectors. During a previous funding crisis—the increase in U.S. sanctions against the group’s chief underwriter, Iran—the “Party of God” and its foreign sponsors formulated a new strategy to evade these measures and create alternative sources of funding. Such sources allowed Hezbollah to make further inroads into government agencies following the 2018 parliamentary elections. For example, the group’s leaders insisted on controlling the Health Ministry, which commands Lebanon’s fourth-largest budget at $338 million per year; they also gained more access to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Agriculture Ministry, and the Ministry of Energy and Water, whose assistance was used to fund their affiliated projects and businesses. That worked until Lebanon’s own economy began its current nosedive. Unemployment has hit a record high of 40 percent, and the lira has slumped by about 60 percent on the parallel market, hiking inflation. Officially pegged to the dollar, the currency has plummeted 40 percent on the black market as local banks ration dollars necessary for imports of food, medicine, and other essential goods. Meanwhile, Lebanon has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world (over 150 percent) and may not be able to pay $1.2 billion in Eurobonds this month. As with the Iran sanctions, however, Hezbollah has a strategy to survive this domestic pressure, at least in the near term.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Debt, Politics, Protests, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and United States of America

294. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

295. New Khamenei Speech Underlines the Importance of Popular Support for the Regime

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Instead of focusing on Iran's missile retaliation or future threats, the Supreme Leader used his latest speech to extoll the virtues of public unity behind the regime’s revolutionary goals. On January 8, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his first public speech since the U.S. assassination of Qasem Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian missile strike on Iraqi bases housing American forces. As part of an address that touched on regional solidarity against the United States and other notable subjects, he spent considerable time claiming that Soleimani symbolized the Iranian people’s continued commitment to the revolution. In doing so, he indicated that popular support for the regime remains a crucial objective for Iran’s leaders, perhaps more so than issuing or acting on further military threats.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Domestic Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

296. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 2): Regime Culpability and Resiliency

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as their lack of transparency worsens the public health crisis, the Supreme Leader and other officials have systematically gutted any civil society elements capable of organizing substantial opposition to such policies. Iran’s ongoing coronavirus epidemic has left the people with less reason than ever to trust the information and directives issued by their leaders. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discussed the clergy’s role in aggravating this problem, but the state’s mistakes and deceptions have been legion as well. They include scandalous discrepancies between official reports after a period of denial that the virus had entered the country; a health system that was unprepared to deal with such a disease promptly and properly; and official resistance to implementing internationally recommended precautionary measures, such as canceling flights from China and quarantining the center of the outbreak. These decisions have sown widespread confusion about facts and fictions related to the virus, the most effective medically proven ways to control it, and the degree to which it is spreading throughout the country. As a result, an already restive population has become increasingly panicked about the future and angry at the state. Yet can the coronavirus actually bring down the regime? The harsh reality is that the state has left little space for opposition to organize around health issues, or any issues for that matter. Instead, it has sought to confuse the people and redirect their anger toward external enemies, even as its own policies contribute to the crisis.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Health, Public Health, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

297. The White House Peace Plan Meeting: U.S. Goals, Israeli Repercussions

Author:: David Makovsky
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Whether they reveal a detailed plan or merely preview an aspirational document, U.S. officials still need to clarify their goals at a time when elections are looming and Palestinian participation seems highly unlikely. In a dramatic move, President Trump has announced that Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his leading rival, Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz, will visit the White House on January 28 to be briefed on the administration’s long-awaited Middle East peace plan. Trump told reporters that the plan would likely be released before the summit. Predictably, no invitation was extended to the Palestinian Authority, which severed relations with Washington after the U.S. embassy was moved to Jerusalem in 2017.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, Peace, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

298. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 1): Clerical Factors

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The clergy’s ambitions for global Shia revolution made the city of Qom uniquely vulnerable to the disease, and their resistance to modern medical science weakened the state’s ability to combat its spread. On February 19, two days before the Iranian government officially announced the arrival of coronavirus, an infected businessman who had recently returned from China to Qom passed away. The location and timing of his death illustrate how the Shia holy city and the religious leaders and institutions who call it home have played an outsize role in the disease’s disproportionately rapid spread inside Iran compared to other countries. How did this situation come to pass, and what does it say about the current state of the clerical establishment, its relationship with the regime, and its alienation from large swaths of Iranian society? (Part 2 of this PolicyWatch discusses the regime's role in the outbreak and its resiliency to such crises.)
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Health, Religion, Shia, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America

299. Syria’s Economic Crisis Sparks Rare Protests in Regime Territory

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Besides highlighting Assad’s financial mismanagement, the recent unrest gives the international community a genuine opportunity to push for transition while bolstering the more prosperous local administration in the northeast. Since mid-January, shop owners, government employees, students, and even children have been gathering in the streets of various Syrian communities to express their frustration with the Assad regime’s economic policies and untruths. Although the protests remain small for now, the fact that they have persistently carried on in the middle of regime-controlled territory highlights Bashar al-Assad’s potential vulnerability on these issues. In Suwayda, a Druze-majority province in the south, residents have protested the sharp drop in the value of the Syrian pound/lira and the deteriorating economic situation in general. In the central-western town of Salamiya, protestors were seen chanting “we want to live.” And in the Suwayda town of Shahba, demonstrators raised loaves of bread in the air while openly criticizing Bouthaina Shaaban, Assad’s political and media advisor. The latter protest was partly spurred by a recent interview on the pro-Assad television network al-Mayadeen, where Shaaban not only claimed that the country’s current economy is “fifty times better than what it was in 2011,” but also declared that “Syrians are self-sufficient in everything.” In response, protestors sarcastically noted that her comments referred to her own household’s economy, not Syria’s. Elsewhere, former agriculture minister Nour al-Din Manna described Shaaban’s remarks about the war-torn country as “hard to believe,” and a closer look at the country’s finances supports this disbelief.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Syrian War, and Currency
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

300. Who Is Esmail Qaani, the New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?

Author:: Ali Alfoneh
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Given the IRGC’s recent restructuring, the Qods Force will likely see more continuity than change under Qaani, though his bureaucratic background is a far cry from Soleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership. On January 3, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani as chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, just hours after his predecessor, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a U.S. drone strike. The new commander’s background and military activities are not nearly as well known as Soleimani’s, so taking a closer look at them can help determine whether and how the IRGC’s main extraterritorial branch might change under his leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

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