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Begin New Search Political Geography Iraq Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

41. NATO in Iraq: Not a Surge

Author:
Michael Knights, Pierre Morcos, and Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
NATO stands ready to increase its commitment in a slow and steady manner consistent with Baghdad’s needs, but careful communication will be crucial, as will a more strategic discussion on how to combine different assistance efforts. On February 18, NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg announced a decision to increase the size of NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) from 500 personnel to as many as 4,000. Although he noted that such deployments would be “conditions-based,” “incremental,” and subject to Baghdad’s authorization, the troop numbers were the only element of his announcement widely reported inside Iraq, resulting in swift political pressure on the government to explain the seemingly steep increase. In fact, there is no imminent NATO “surge” planned in Iraq, but rather a greater openness and general intent to gradually provide more advisors capable of assisting local authorities with security sector reform (SSR). When handled appropriately and combined with other efforts, this initiative can create good opportunities for quiet, persistent security cooperation that helps strengthen the Iraqi state, evolve multinational military relations beyond the campaign against the Islamic State (IS), and spread the burden of support more broadly among U.S. allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Reform
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

42. Development Cooperation with Conflict-Affected MENA Countries: Refocussing on the Social Contract

Author:
Mark Furness and Annabelle Houdret
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
State–society relations are in flux across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings. The protests and revolts that swept the region in 2011 arose from widespread rejection of the post-independence Arab social contracts. These were based on redistribution of rents from natural resources and other forms of transfers and subsidies, as “compensation” for acquiescence to political and economic authoritarianism. In several MENA countries, including Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, but also in Algeria, Lebanon and Palestine, the old social contracts have been destroyed by civil conflicts and internationally sponsored wars, which in some cases predated the 2011 uprisings. Since broken social contracts are at the root of conflict in the MENA region, supporting new social contracts should be the core objective of development cooperation with the region’s most conflict-affected countries. But “post-conflict reconstruction” often ignores the fact that conflicts do not end with peace agreements, and conflict-affected societies need more than reconstructed infrastructure, institutional capacity and private sector investment if they are to avoid violence in the future. Development agencies term this kind of cooperation “resilience”: promoting political, economic, social and environmental stability, rather than risking uncontrollable, revolutionary transformation. However, resilience has often provided cover for short-term measures aimed at preserving the position of particular actors and systems. Development cooperation needs to get beyond reconstruction and resilience approaches that often fail to foster the long-term stability they promise. By focussing on the social contract, development cooperation with conflict-affected countries can provide a crucial link between peacebuilding, reconstruction and longer-term socioeconomic and political development. It can thereby contribute not only to short-term, but also to long-term, sustainable stability. Using the social contract as an analytical lens can increase understanding not only of what donors should avoid doing, but also where they should concentrate their engagement during transitions from civil war. Practical examples from challenging contexts in the MENA region suggest that donors can make positive contributions in support of new social contracts when backing (a) stakeholder dialogues, (b) governance and reforms, and (c) socioeconomic inclusion. In Libya, the socioeconomic dialogue process has brought stakeholders together to outline a new economic vision for the country. The Municipal Development Programme in Palestine focusses on improving the accountability and delivery of local institutions. The Moroccan Economic, Social and Environmental Council provides an example of a process that engages previously marginalised groups. These programmes are all examples of targeted efforts to build cooperation among the groups that make up MENA societies. They aim to broaden decision-making processes, and to increase the impact of specific measures with the ultimate objective of improving state–society relations. They could be adapted for other fragile contexts, with external support. In backing more of these kinds of activities, donors could make stronger contributions to sustainable, long-term peace- and state-building processes in conflict-affected MENA countries.
Topic:
Development, Natural Resources, Conflict, Peace, and Social Contract
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria

43. Centering Iraq Policy on Human Rights and Fair Elections Michael Knights

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The surest way to counter Iran’s malign influence is to proactively focus on human rights issues that the new prime minister can actually affect, such as organizing free elections and preventing further violence against protestors. On February 1, a plurality of Iraqi parliamentary factions gave President Barham Salih the go-ahead to nominate Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the new prime minister-designate. The mild-mannered Shia Islamist nominee will now attempt to form and ratify his cabinet in the next thirty days. As he does so, political blocs will probably rally behind him while limiting his mandate to organizing early elections next year, having struggled through a long and fractious process to replace resigned prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi. For the first time since the dramatic events of the past two months, Iraqis and U.S. policymakers alike can catch their breath and consider their medium-term options.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

44. Iranian Succession and the Impact of Soleimani’s Death

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process. Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying, steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

45. Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A host of crucial multilateral interests are baked into the U.S. presence, from keeping the Islamic State down, to protecting vulnerable regional allies, to preventing Iran from taking Iraq's oil revenues. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani has brought the tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations to a boil, with militia factions strong-arming a parliamentary resolution on American troop withdrawal and various European allies contemplating departures of their own. Before they sign the divorce papers, however, officials in Baghdad and Washington should consider the many reasons why staying together is best for both them and the Middle East.
Topic:
Oil, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Jordan, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

46. Iran’s Supreme Leader Responds to the Soleimani Assassination

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Khamenei and other regime officials have been quick to swear revenge, but for now they may focus more on stoking patriotic and militaristic sentiment at home. A few hours after Iran confirmed that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani had been killed in Iraq, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a statement describing those who shed his blood as “the most wretched of humankind.” Calling Soleimani the international symbol of “resistance,” he then announced three days of public mourning in Iran. He also declared that “severe revenge awaits the criminals” who killed Soleimani—an act that the United States had claimed credit for by the time he spoke. Other highranking officials echoed this sentiment, including President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, and Defense Minister Amir Hatami, who explicitly promised “revenge” on “all those” involved in the assassination. Despite this rhetoric, however, and despite Soleimani’s unmatched role in carrying out Iran’s regional policy of adventurism and asymmetric warfare, the regime may avoid major, immediate retaliation if it sees such a move as too costly or as a potential trigger for serious military conflict with the United States. On January 1, amid escalating tensions in Iraq but before Soleimani’s assassination, Khamenei stated, “We would not take the country to war...but if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.” In response to President Trump’s assertion that Iran played a role in the December 31 riot at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Khamenei told listeners he had two messages for Washington: “First, how dare you! This has nothing to do with Iran. Second, you should be reasonable and understand what is the main cause for these problems. But of course they are not [reasonable].”
Topic:
Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

47. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

48. Latest Battle for Idlib Could Send Another Wave of Refugees to Europe

Author:
Fabrice Balanche
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Various displacement scenarios may unfold as the fighting escalates, each carrying a high risk of negative humanitarian and economic consequences even if the parties live up to their promises. The battle for Idlib province, the last stronghold of Syrian rebel forces, is heating up again. As Turkish troops clash with Assad regime forces and displaced civilians continue piling up along the border, various foreign and domestic players are considering moves that could send hundreds of thousands of refugees to other parts of Syria, northern Iraq, or Europe.
Topic:
Refugees, Displacement, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Idlib

49. U.S. Do’s and Don’ts in Iraq

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To ensure that new protests, new sanctions, and new political leadership wind up helping rather than hindering Iraqi sovereignty, Washington must handle upcoming developments with great care. In the coming weeks, Iraq’s parliament may appoint a replacement for Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi. This is a very positive development, since the country’s sundry Iranian-backed militias would like nothing better than to keep the discredited leader under their thumb as an open-ended caretaker premier following his November resignation. In contrast, a new leader with a new mandate could get the government moving again, pass a budget, bring the criminals responsible for killing protestors to justice, and assuage angry protestors by making visible preparations for early, free, and fair elections—thereby remedying the results of the widely disparaged 2018 vote. Such is the political space that has opened up since the deaths of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis earlier this month. For the United States, the challenge is how to support these changes without disrupting positive local dynamics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sovereignty, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

50. The Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Government’s Sinjar Agreement: Consequences for U.S., Turkish, and Iranian Influence and Rebel Rivalries

Author:
Rami Jameel
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 9, the Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed the “Sinjar Agreement” to normalize the situation in the war-torn district of Sinjar in northern Iraq. The agreement stated that only Iraqi federal forces should operate in Sinjar and all other armed groups must leave the town. It also gave the KRG a say on establishing a new local government, including appointing a new mayor, and planning and running reconstruction efforts in Sinjar, including related budgetary matters (Rudaw, October 10).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Kurds, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

51. The Status of Erbil-Baghdad Relations

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In Iraq, politics is personal, and the politics of Baghdad-Erbil relations is no exception. Improvements and deteriorations in this relationship have largely been dictated by interpersonal dynamics, such as the rapport and mutual confidence between leaders. In May 2020, the Kurdistan Region’s major political parties played an unusually decisive role in having Mustafa Al-Kadhimi selected as the Prime Minister (PM) of Iraq. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan declared their support for his designation before he was officially nominated by the Iraqi President, Barham Salih. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leaders knew Al-Kadhimi personally and had enjoyed good working relations with him when he was the chief of intelligence. Importantly, they believed that demonstrating early support was a worthwhile investment that could help to extend the period of tension-free engagement between Erbil and Baghdad, similar to what they experienced with Al-Kadhimi’s predecessor, Adil Abdul Mahdi. After a period of frozen relations that followed the Kurdish referendum for independence in September 2017, Erbil-Baghdad relations regained a degree of normality in the run up to the 2018 elections and were further bolstered by the appointment of Adil Abdul Mahdi, a personal friend and close associate of many KRG leaders. In 2019, Baghdad agreed to send Erbil 12.67% of the federal budget; in return, the KRG agreed to offer Baghdad 250,000 barrels of exported oil per day. For various reasons, the KRG never delivered the oil or its revenue, and the Shia political parties exerted unbearable pressure on the PM to cut the KRG from the national budget altogether. Nevertheless, Abdul Mahdi’s government continued to send the Kurdistan Region its share of the budget. Negotiations continued, and both sides eventually reached a comprehensive agreement to resolve the revenue issues from the KRG’s oil sales and border crossing customs. These negotiations, as well as the implementation of previous agreements, were suspended upon the resignation of Abdul Mahdi’s government at the end of November 2019. Nevertheless, budgetary payments to the KRG, minus the calculated revenue from the agreed KRG oil exports, continued until April 2020 (total IQD 454b, c. $278m). Unexpectedly though, in the final few weeks of his premiership, Abdul Mahdi ordered the finance ministryto halt the delivery of the KRG’s public-sector salary payments.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Local
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

52. Immanent Conflict without Immanent War

Author:
Helle Malmvig and Jakob Dreyer
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
• Denmark should focus its attention on the border region between Iraq and Syria, which presents a high risk of insurgency, and is where the main Danish military contingency has been deployed since 2015. • Given the likely partial US withdrawal from Iraq, NATO and European governments should prepare for taking on new tasks and responsibilities. • The US-led coalition should allow and prepare SDF to negotiate alternative political/security arrangements, as SDF may have difficulty sustaining its presence in Syria.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Fragile States, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

53. Waiting for blowback: The Kurdish question and Turkey’s new regional militarism

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Recent Turkish interventions in parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself, look like pushing various Kurdish armed forces and political groupings towards ‘defeat’ via a concerted regional strategy that combines battlefield action with repression and co-optation. But the ‘anti-terrorist’ frame and tactics that Ankara uses in a bid to solve its Kurdish problem feature many sticks and no compromises to improve Kurdish collective minority rights. It is likely that this approach will inhibit peaceful resistance and fail to reduce support for armed groups like the PKK and PYD despite their own authoritarian practices. Moreover, Turkey’s new regional militarism risks escalating conflict across the Middle East because of the complex international and transnational contexts in which Ankara’s interventions take place.
Topic:
International Affairs, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

54. States within the state: Kadhimi’s challenge is to bring Shia militias under control

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The security crisis facing the Kadhimi government and the Iraqi state is a major obstacle to stability and economic development in Iraq, representing a significant drain on the country’s resources and capacities.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, Governance, Economic Development, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

55. The New Arab Uprisings: How the 2019 trajectory differs from the 2011 legacy? (Part 1)

Author:
Peter Bartu
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
In 2019,the Middle East seems beset by conflict, chaotic politics and dysfunctional economies.However, the mood of the people in Algeria,Sudan,Lebanon and Iraq is more defiant.Not since 2011 have we seen such public demonstrations for accountability and an end to corruption,war and foreign meddling.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Arab Spring, Conflict, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Sudan, Middle East, Algeria, Arab Countries, and Lebanon

56. Iran's successful transnational network: Iranian foreign policy utilizes partners

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In Western and Middle Eastern capitals there is growing concern over the growth of Iran’s transnational network. In the last decade, Iran has exploited the weaknesses of other states to expand its influence through relationships with state and non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but what characterizes this network? Key take-aways: The group of state and non-state actors referred to as proxies of Iran is diverse, and important nuances are lost by approaching them all solely as proxies. Whereas sectarian affinity plays a role, Iran’s ability to portray itself as anti-imperialist and as fighting oppression transcends sectarian boundaries. Iran’s transnational network is multifaceted, pragmatic and diverse, as each relationship reflects each member’s capabilities, history and importance to Iran.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

57. Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces

Author:
Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In this detailed Policy Focus, meant as a primer for Iraqi and international agencies, leading scholars examine the current status of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces. Hastily raised when the Islamic State was knocking at the gates of Baghdad, the state-backed Iraqi militia network al-Hashd al-Shabi has swollen into a 160,000-strong armed force with an annual budget exceeding $2 billion. But more than five years after its formation, the Hashd -- also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces -- still lacks defined roles and has largely fallen under the sway of Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed factions. Now that Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis are no longer on the scene, observers are asking what comes next for the Hashd. In this highly detailed Policy Focus, meant as a primer for Iraqi and international agencies, analysts Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi lay out the PMF’s current status, offering a novel look at its functions, structure, and activities as a military institution. The study identifies achievable security-sector reforms while exploring longer-term options around which consensus must first be built. Although demobilization is not a realistic goal in the near term, Iraq and its partners can take practical steps to honor Hashd units for their sacrifices while also containing them in the interests of national sovereignty and stability.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Militias, and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

58. The Rise of Kata’ib Hezbollah’s Hegemonic ‘Resistance’

Author:
Hamdi Malik
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Iraq-based Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is diligently and meticulously working to achieve hegemony among Iran-backed 'resistance' militias in Iraq. The group is positioning itself as the 'true resistance' faction and obliging other Iran-backed groups to follow its lead. In order to achieve this goal, KH is operating on military and non-military fronts. KH is stepping up its non-military vigilante activities, drawing heavily on its youth movements that have been developing in the past decade. These organizations serve to promote the most radical version of the anti-U.S. Shia Islamist ideology promulgated by the ‘axis of resistance’, and they work to squash opposing views in Iraqi society. These efforts work in tandem with the group’s military front, where KH has managed to lead attacks against U.S. interests following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. While details of KH’s military wing have been covered in my piece “ The Still Growing Threat of Iran’s Chosen Proxy in Iraq’’ and Michael Knights’s Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq,” it is worth examining the group’s growing non-military activities as well.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violence, Militias, and Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH)
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

59. Washington’s Stance on Syria and Iraq and The Widening Rift with Kurds in Iran

Author:
Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Over the last four years, Kurds in Iran have watched Kurdish communities in Syria and Iraq continue to suffer losses at the hands of hostile forces, disoriented by the turbulent shifts in Washington’s decision-making. It once seemed that the United States would support change in Iran beneficial to the country’s Kurds, but now a series of decisions by American leadership in Syria and Iraq have left many Kurdish political leaders in Iran afraid and discontented with U.S. policy in the region. Two moments during the Trump presidency particularly have soured and confused perceptions of the United States among Kurds in Iran. First, Iranian Kurds watched as the Trump administration allowed Shia militias hostile to Iraqi Kurds to take the city of Kirkuk in October 2017. Two years later, Kurds watched again as the Trump administration allowed the Turkish forces to invade northeastern Syria, driving local Kurds to flee their homes. These two moments pushed Iranian Kurds to doubt Washington’s potential contributions to the improvement of Kurdish rights in Iran. There now exists a political rift between U.S. and Iranian Kurdish leadership that may force Iranian Kurds to re-think their diplomatic position. Unfortunately for both groups, it seems that no one will benefit from such a rift—except for the Iranian government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Minorities
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and United States of America

60. Navigating a Growing Chinese Influence in Iraqi Kurdistan

Author:
Sardar Aziz
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When I moved into new accommodations in the centre of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, the lift announcements in the apartment tower were in Chinese, followed by Kurdish, Arabic and English. This multilingualism was surprising but positive; it was a clear sign of the dawn of a new era. If in the past, Kurdish was the local language, Arabic regional, and English global, the addition of Chinese signified the plurality of global language and, potentially, of global power. These days, there is a regional focus on Iran’s newly announced 25 year deal with China, which has resulted in a lot of noise both inside and outside Iran. It is not surprising that Sino–Iranian relations are continuing to develop as both countries are hoping for a different world order. Though not so scrutinized, Iraq has seen its own growing ties with China, with the two countries having signed a number of agreements last year. Former Iraqi PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi, once a Maoist himself, stated in his visit to Beijing ‘we belong to Asia and we want to be a part of its emergence.’ The large Iraqi delegation accompanying him—as told to me by one member of the delegation—all noted and admired what they saw as China’s shift from a poor country to a global power. The deal agreed upon during that meeting, in remaining secret, has created fertile ground for conspiracy and speculations inside Iraq.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, Asia, and Kurdistan