Search

Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography Global Focus Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Governing Outer Space – legal issues mounting at the final frontier

Author:
Hjalte Osborn Frandsen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In 2022, the private space firm SpaceX successfully launched 61 rockets, adding hundreds of satellites to its burgeoning, globe-spanning mega-constellation. SpaceX´s Starlink-project now comprises more than 3,000 satellites. For comparison, the European Space Agency launched six rockets in 2022 and operates less than 50 satellites in total. In the span of a few years, private space companies have dethroned nation states as the dominant actors in outer space. Today the vast majority of satellites are owned and controlled by commercial companies. During the first months of the Russian assault on Ukraine, several commercial space companies stepped in to provide vital satellite images and space-based Internet in support of the Ukrainian defense. This exemplifies the three currently dominant trends of human space activities: expansion, securitization and privatization. The global space industry is undergoing the most fundamental and swift changes since the original space race ended when Neil Armstrong placed the first boot marks on the moon in 1969. The rapid changes raise a number of serious governance issues in areas such as national security, environmental protection and the rule of law in outer space. Denmark, Europe and the international community at large all have an acute interest in insisting on space being a global commons in which conduct can and should be regulated to benefit all of humanity – not just a few profit-seeking billionaire-owned space companies. Developments in the space industry are fast and accelerating. As with other global governance issues, like climate and cyber issues, achieving global accord on new regulations for space activities will be difficult and time-consuming, so prudent policymakers should get started right away.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Law, and Space
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Climate change and security: Preparing for different impacts

Author:
Emma Hakala
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
As the disastrous impacts of climate change are already visible, the need to respond to them becomes increasingly urgent. Yet there is still a lack of understanding about the comprehensive security impacts of climate change. Climate security impacts tend to be complex as they often take shape through chains of compounded effects. This makes them difficult to fully comprehend, and in the absence of adequate situational awareness, policy responses are likely to fall short. The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of climate security by providing concrete illustrations of potential direct, cascading and transition impacts. Impacts like forest fires, a heatwave in Europe and increased wind energy production all challenge Finland’s security in various ways, such as threatening human health and livelihoods, fuelling political polarisation and creating new supply chain risks. Strategic foresight, international cooperation and well-planned climate policy can help to counteract climate risks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Indispensable: NATO’s Framework Nations Concept beyond Madrid

Author:
Sean Monaghan and Ed Arnold
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
s NATO’s leaders gather in Madrid this month to unveil the alliance’s eighth strategic concept at a crucial time for European security, they should take inspiration from earlier concepts. In 2014, NATO launched its Framework Nations Concept at the Wales summit to enhance collective defense through multinational cooperation. The idea is built on the basic principles established in NATO’s first strategic concept in 1949. Beyond Madrid, allied leaders should agree to develop the Framework Nations Concept in three ways
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Balancing Conventional and Hybrid Threats in (Future) State Competition

Author:
Pieter Balcaen and Bernard Siman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much attention has been drawn in latest years to the increasing challenges posed by ‘hybrid threats’, and the question how to deter them. The events in Ukraine have prompted NATO allies to accelerate the expansion of their military capabilities to deter further Russian aggression, resulting in an increased political will to reinforce conventional deterrence. While we are certainly in favour of strengthening a long neglected defence, this paper aims to point out some pitfalls in policymaking, associated with the blindly adapting of the (future) force generation process to the events in Ukraine. The course of the conflict, and the consequences that stem from it should prompt us to reflect more thoroughly on the security challenges Western countries are most likely to face.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Hybrid Threats, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Are Gender Inclusive Militaries Better at Integrating Disruptive Technologies?

Author:
Shira Eini Pindyck
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Recent advances in big data and analytics, cyber security, automation, and artificial intelligence can make critical contributions to the demonstration of power on the international stage. New technologies not only offer militaries the ability to conduct operations with greater effectiveness but also reduce the potential human cost of operations. In an increasingly digitized world, organizations that do not adopt and leverage these advances can become inefficient and even fall by the wayside. Yet, despite the immense promise of emerging technologies, many organizations struggle to integrate and utilize them. This is true in both the military and business sectors. For business organizations, a failure to adopt and use novel technologies may threaten profits and even their survival. For militaries, where soldiers’ lives are on the line, the consequences can be even more severe. Why is the integration of new technologies often so difficult? This policy brief highlights an important and overlooked reason, namely how gender policy can affect resistance to organizational change. Gender policy reform requires organizations to invest resources in the recruitment and retainment of an inclusive workforce, and therefore demands that organizations be flexible and resilient. Flexibility and resilience are also required to integrate disruptive innovations. Rather than trying to chain a new technology to old systems of ascension and reward, organizations that want to advance technologically must rethink their incentive systems and work hard to restructure entrenched hierarchies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Protecting the environment in times of armed conflict

Author:
Finn Stepputat and Jairo Munive
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Armed conflicts cause immense immediate harm to the people affected by them. Therefore, it seems only natural to focus exclusively on the human consequences, downplaying the environmental harm caused by armed conflicts. And although, in some cases, degraded environment and depleted resources like water or fertile soil can be at the root of armed conflict, the environment is frequently a ’silent victim’. However, conflicts can and do cause long-term damage to the environment, whether directly or incidentally, harming people’s health and livelihoods. Attacks and explosive remnants can cause water and soil contamination, or release pollutants into the air. The war in Ukraine, for example, has caused damage to internationally protected wetlands, national parks, and biospheres, and threatens to damage nuclear power plants. During recent fighting in Gaza, incendiary artillery shells set fire to hundreds of tons of toxic pesticides, fertilizers, chemicals, and other farming materials, causing groundwater contamination. Armed conflict can also result in further indirect environmental degradation. When people flee to camps or cities, the need for food and traditional cooking fuels such as firewood and charcoal can contribute to deforestation and resource depletion. Furthermore, armed conflict occupies government capacities. Environmental protection is not always high on states’ agendas, and they may themselves be involved in the unregulated exploitation of natural resources to sustain armed conflict. But all things being equal, armed conflict risks reducing states’ capacity for protecting the environment, controlling the exploitation of natural resources, and managing forcibly displaced populations during and after conflict. A case in point is Libya, a country affected by long-term armed conflict, where oil spills from ill-maintained power plants, oil fields and offshore installations have resulted in widespread pollution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Environment, United Nations, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. NATO 2030 and the out-of-area conundrum

Author:
Gorana Grgic
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Over the recent years, the Indo-Pacific has grad- uated from being a geostrategic term reserved for a relatively niche community of analysts to an almost ubiquitous, albeit still fuzzy concept that in generous interpretation could capture as much as five continents. The fact that policymakers around the world are paying greater attention to the region is no doubt a reflection of the impact security and econom- ic developments in this realm have on the rest of the world, and which are by and large a direct consequence, or a by-product of, China’s growing power and asser- tiveness. Thus, a number of NATO Allies have been adjusting their approaches to the region, its key players, and potential Allies and partners. This shift in strategic attention has coincided with a growing foreign policy consensus in the United States and allied states towards ending the “forever wars” in the Greater Middle East, and ceasing the so-called era of out-of-area (OOA) missions by NATO. The Alli- ance has been deemed to have strayed from its orig- inal mission of deterring and defending against Rus- sian aggression in Eastern Europe, which became even more apparent following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Yet, as more NATO member states look towards re- sponding to challenges emanating from the Indo-Pa- cific, the prospects of future OOA operations in this region are becoming likelier than at any point in the post-Cold War era. This in turn leads to a slew of ques- tions around the conceptualisation and execution of potential OOA operations in the Indo-Pacific. At pres- ent, the institutional leadership is adamant: “(T)here is no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea”,1 while some of the major and middle powers in the Alliance are far from foreclosing that option. This Policy Brief first sketches out the strategic vision of those member states that have articulated Indo-Pa- cific strategies, after which it turns to the concept of OOA driven by new strategic imperatives. It concludes by proposing a framework of assessment for the pros- pects of coordination and cooperation among NATO Allies in the Indo-Pacific, and offers some preliminary thoughts on the near- to medium-run OOA activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. The Impact of COVID-19 on CSDP: Forging Opportunity out of Crisis?

Author:
Tobias Pietz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Covid-19 pandemic began to sweep through the world in the early months of 2020, no country or international organisation had contingency plans in place to deal with a crisis that could occur anywhere and affect everybody simultaneously. In the case of the missions and operations deployed under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Covid-19 had a severe impact, including on Brussels-based personnel and structures, early on. In hindsight, it is easy to criticise the first three months of crisis management at the CSDP structures in Brussels as well as what operations and missions did in the field. However, the unique and novel challenge of this pandemic must never be lost sight of in any assessment of CSDP performance. The pandemic and its effect on the CSDP revealed some crucial challenges faced by EU missions and their operational and planning structures. This Brief tries to shed light on the impact that Covid-19 has had on the CSDP and points to some lessons which can be drawn from the experiences of dealing with the pandemic crisis so far.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Securing the Heavens: How can space support the EU's Strategic Compass?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It may be customary to begin an analysis on space by referencing famous sci-fi productions such as Star Trek. Yet terms such as ‘final frontier’ or ‘to boldly go where no man has gone before’ are outdated. Today, space is used for countless civil and military applications and it is an increasingly contested and congested political and technological arena. While it is true that space is not yet home to photon torpedoes or deflector shields, reality is starting to catch up with the sci-fi world. Consider that the United States took the decision in December 2019 to create a ‘Space Force’ and in September 2020 France created an ‘Air and Space Force’, which followed on from the creation of a Space Command in 2019. Germany too took the decision in September 2020 to create an ‘Air and Space Operations Centre’. A month later, NATO created its first-ever Space Centre in Germany and in 2021 it was decided that France would host the new NATO Centre for Excellence in military space. Additionally, other EU countries such as Italy have established space-defence capacities and on 8 March 2021 France started its first-ever military space exercise, Aster X 2021.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. The Quantum Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada

Author:
Eric Miller
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
he world is on the cusp of a revolution in quantum technologies. Countries and private investors around the world are deploying hundreds of millions of dollars to advance research and develop quantum technologies for defence and commercial applications. This interest is driven by what quantum technologies can do relative to their “classical” counterparts. Quantum technologies function by harnessing the key characteristics of the theory of quantum mechanics, including superposition, entanglement and uncertainty. The resulting technologies are expected to be diverse and far reaching. For example, quantum computers are expected to overcome most “public key encryption” systems, presaging a radical change in cybersecurity. Given its aptitude for navigating complexity, quantum tools are expected to shave years off the time to market for medicines. Secure, efficient communications among drones and other autonomous vehicles will underpin safety and operational effectiveness in the crowded skies of the future. Of course, these nearer terms examples will be joined by applications barely yet imagined as the technology matures.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Quantum Computers, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Canada and Global Focus

11. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

12. Small States can Take Small but Important Steps to Improve UN Peacekeeping: Action needed for peacekeeping in distress

Author:
Louise Riis Andersen and Richard Gowan
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
UN peacekeeping is in need of change. Missions struggle to fulfil ambitious mandates in hostile environments. To improve performance and regain global trust, the UN needs tangible support and engagement from its member states, including smaller states with specialized military capabilities. RECOMMENDATIONS Smaller member states can contribute to UN peacekeeping operations by: ■ offering critical enablers (intelligence expertise, tactical air transport, medical services) and working with larger troop contributors to enhance their capacity in these areas. ■ developing guidance materials, technological tools and additional training for troop contributors, e.g. on medical support, prevention of sexual abuse and data analysis. ■ if aid donors, triangulate with the UN and the World Bank to identify projects to sustain security in countries where UN forces are drawing down.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Global Focus

13. Climate change and peace in international operations: Ways forward for Denmark’s Ministry of Defence

Author:
Jessica Larsen and Mikkel Funder
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Climate change is increasingly being raised as a security concern. How should Denmark’s Ministry of Defence approach the issue in its international operations and collaboration, and what are other security actors doing? RECOMMENDATIONS: Denmark’s Ministry of Defence should: Draw up a clear and demarcated mandate for the Danish armed services’ climate role in international operations in close collaboration with civilian actors. Team up with like-minded international partners to develop joint approaches under already existing multilateral frameworks. Identify specific tasks where the armed forces can contribute on the ground, such as disaster support, capacity development and alignment with civilian actors in the field of Environmental Peacebuilding.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Climate Change, Armed Forces, and Peace
Political Geography:
Denmark and Global Focus

14. The pandemic and the military: towards total defence?

Author:
Antonio Missiroli and Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out in December 2019 in the Chinese city of Wuhan and quickly spread across the globe, will have a lasting impact on worldwide economic, political and strategic developments. Some observers question whether the different approaches by nations to the pandemic may benefit or hinder global economic competition. Others worry that some states may exploit the pandemic as a pretext to curtail individual freedoms. Still others note the emergence of an outright "battle of narratives" on the origins of the virus and the correct approach to bringing it under control, adding fuel to an already lingering "systemic" contest.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Asia and Global Focus

15. NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities

Author:
Ion A. Iftimie
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, cyberspace was recognized as an operational domain in which NATO military forces must be able to maneuver as effectively as they do on land, at sea and in the air. Since then, Allies have conducted several successful offensive cyber operations against non-state adversaries, such as Daesh. Due to technological transformations in recent years, cyber is no longer viewed by NATO and its member states only as a hybrid threat, but also as a weapon in its own right and as a force multiplier in current military operations. Over the next two decades, NATO will look for new ways to integrate cyber weapons (or offensive cyber capabilities) into its operations and missions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Non State Actors, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Global Focus

16. Stress Tests: An insight into crisis scenarios, simulations and exercises

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Until the arrival of General Norman Schwarzkopf to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in November 1988, American war planners assumed that the US’ biggest threat in the Middle East would come from a Soviet invasion of Iran. The Soviet Union had been a net exporter of oil until the late 1960s, but in order to meet its own growing industrial and energy demands Moscow looked increasingly to the Middle East and countries such as Iran to bolster its oil reserves. Based on his own reading, however, Schwarzkopf turned this planning assumption on its head and with CENTCOM he worked on a wargame based on an intra-regional conflict between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia rather than a Soviet invasion. Apart from the precise details about potential US fatalities (Schwarzkopf and his team believed the US would suffer more casualties than it actually did), the general and his wargamers were right: Iraq eventually invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990 and Operation Desert Storm was over before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Schwarzkopf’s wargame had been prophetic in preparing the US military for war with Iraq. Of course, the history of wargaming and scenario planning does not always mirror the success achieved by Schwarzkopf. Companies such as Shell that are famed for their in-house scenario planning departments do have notable periods of success, but the company’s ‘futures branch’ was nearly shut down three times in almost 50 years of scenario planning at the firm because Shell’s leaders saw little value in its work. In some cases, sound scenario planning and the assessments they lead to are not taken seriously enough: for example, vulnerability assessments of the Fukushima nuclear plant showed that there was a risk from natural disasters such as tsunamis but the consequences of these assessments were downplayed. Most of the time, however, crisis scenario planning unfortunately emerges in the wake of a major crisis such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US or the global financial crisis of 2007.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus