Search

Begin New Search Topic Economics Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief

11. Quo Vadis, Belarus?

Author:
Zoran Meter
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Year 2021 was one of the most turbulent for Belarus since its independence after the collapse of the USSR. In the West Belarus is sometimes called the “European North the global economic crisis in 2008 without too many problems and internal turmoil. Belarus has also successfully overcome problems with its neighbor the Russian Federation caused by Korea” and its longtime president Alexander Lukashenko, whom the West no longer recognizes, is dubbed “Europe’s Last Dictator.” Although this country is still to a large extent dug in its communist past, it has overcome disputes related to the content and dynamics of the implementation of the establishment of a Federal State between Belarus and Russia to which they previously committed.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Leadership, Dictatorship, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

12. EU carbon border adjustment mechanism faces many challenges

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Megan Hogan, and Jisun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the evolving EU Emissions Trading System and EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and explains objections within Europe and from major trading countries likely to be affected by the proposed CBAM import levies. While EU officials have sought to ensure that the CBAM is consistent with obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), key aspects of the CBAM could violate WTO rules and are likely to be contested, taking years to play out. Meanwhile, several other countries will adopt new carbon-inspired border restrictions, adding to global trade frictions. Major carbon-emitting countries, therefore, need to act cooperatively instead of unilaterally to both advance the fight against climate change and update the rules-based global trading system. Two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from nontraded activities, such as road transport, electricity generation, and home and office heating. Countries can curb emissions in these activities, while developing guidelines for carbon abatement in traded sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

13. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

14. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

15. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

16. Biden and Belarus: A strategy for the new administration

Author:
Anders Åslund, Melinda Haring, John Herbst, and Alexander Vershbow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
United States President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has an historic opportunity to bring Europe together and reverse the tide of dictatorship by building an international coalition to support democracy in Belarus. In 2020, Belarusians unexpectedly called Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s legitimacy into question in the country’s August presidential election. Lukashenka brazenly rigged the results, claiming that he took 80 percent of the vote, but neither the United States nor the European Union (EU) recognizes his victory. A months-long protest movement has coalesced that demands new elections under the supervision of the international community. Recent years have seen no better chance for US leadership to facilitate lasting positive change in Europe than the crisis in Belarus. But how to secure democratic change in Belarus is not simple given internal resistance and Moscow’s determination to prevent another “color revolution.” Lukashenka is likely finished, unable to restore any authority or legitimacy. But he is seeking to hang on despite Moscow’s efforts to arrange a pliable replacement who would preserve Minsk’s pro-Russian orientation. Managing Moscow’s efforts to prevent an aroused citizenry from choosing their own leader is no easy task. Russia remains the key geopolitical player in Belarus, often plays the long game, and may be willing to countenance military options that the United States cannot. Perhaps the key fact is that Belarusians have made it amply clear that they want accountable leaders that they can choose and dismiss for themselves. More than thirty thousand peaceful protesters have been detained since August, more than three hundred and fifty police officers have defected, and ordinary Belarusians are no longer afraid to voice their opposition to the regime. Kremlin support for the ongoing repression risks turning the Belarusian people—historically friendly toward Russia—in a pro-European direction. These changes in Belarus are something that Moscow cannot ignore, and the United States and its allies must nourish and strengthen them in consistent ways that avoid and deter a Kremlin overreaction. Biden, with his long experience promoting US values and interests and his determination to strengthen transatlantic relations, is ideally situated to promote clear support for the people of Belarus that does not directly challenge Moscow’s security interests.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

17. Transatlantic Paralysis: The US-EU Trade Policy Stalemate and the European Union’s Democratic Deficit

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
What is often labeled the democratic deficit in governance of the European Union (EU) is not a a flaw or bug in its architecture, it is a design feature. From its earliest days in the Second World War’s chaotic aftermath, European integration “was essentially an elite project, pursued at a distance from the daily concerns of the national populations in Western Europe.” Also formed as a response to the economic disintegration following the Depression and World War Two, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was similarly removed from national or populist politics. It too was an elite, top-down initiative designed to embed nations in a system of international rules largely articulated by technical experts, enforced by a form of international courts, and far removed from national and populist politics. Many of the intellectual proponents of both supranational institutions, from the Austrian School of economics, the ordoliberals emerging in early-20th century Germany, to the London School of Economics indeed shared a distrust of American-style democracy, let alone the various parliamentary democracies whose failure led to the disasters of the 1930s and 1940s. Over the last fifty years, the institutions put in place after World War II have been perfected and have, to a certain extent, ossified. Many of the difficulties in achieving greater US-EU economic coordination in the 21st century have their origins in the institutional design and the subsequent early implementation of early European Community rules during the post-war period. A brief overview of the history of European integration, and the political thinking behind it, helps explain the current paralysis in contemporary transatlantic cooperation, including in a joint approach to the challenge of Chinese mercantilism and its growing international reach.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Democracy, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. Decoupling Europe

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Steffen Gans, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Alexander Sandkamp
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerability of international value chains in the face of global shocks. This has triggered a political discussion regarding a possible reshoring of vulnerable supply chains back home. The aim is to reduce dependencies on foreign suppliers and thus improve crisis resilience of the domestic economy. The debate is also rooted in the growing dependence on Asian suppliers and the colliding political and ideological systems between China and the West. Unilateral decoupling of the EU from China (a doubling of trade costs) would reduce real income in the EU on average by 0.8 percent. In terms of GDP in 2019, this equals a permanent loss in real income of 131.4 bn EUR. Should China retaliate, real income would fall by 1.0 percent (170.3 bn EUR). With its extremely interconnected economy, real income in Germany would even decline by 1.4 percent (48.4 bn EUR). China would also lose from such a trade war, with real income declining by 1.3 percent. Should the EU increase its trade barriers against all its non-European trading partners, real income in the Union would fall by 3.5 percent or 584.3 bn EUR in case of a unilateral increase and by 5.3 percent or 873.1 bn EUR in case the rest of the world responds by also raising trade barriers.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Economic Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Europe

19. Europe’s invisible divides: How covid-19 is polarising European politics

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The lived experience of the covid-19 pandemic has split Europe just as the euro and refugee crises did, with the south and the east feeling much more badly affected than the north and the west. Some people were affected directly by illness, some only experienced economic consequences, while others feel untouched by covid-19. The economic victims are more likely than others to say that restrictions have been too severe, and they tend to be more sceptical about their governments’ intentions behind lockdowns. Europeans are divided over what they believe to be governments’ motivations behind restrictions: the Trustful have faith in governments; the Suspicious believe rulers want to cover up failings; the Accusers think governments are trying to increase their control over people. Splits are appearing between those who believe that, in the context of the pandemic, the biggest threat to their freedom comes from governments, on the one hand, and those who fear the behaviour of their fellow citizens, on the other. There is a major generational divide, with the young more likely than the old to blame governments for the ongoing impact; the young also feel more badly affected. Poland, Germany, and France could each be emerging as archetypes for post-pandemic politics.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Refugees, Crisis Management, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Poland, and Germany

20. Measured response: How to design a European instrument against economic coercion

Author:
Jonathan Hackenbroich and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europe is at ever greater risk of economic coercion from other powers. To protect itself, the EU could adopt a new anti-coercion instrument (ACI) to allow it to impose economic countermeasures. The ACI needs to enable countermeasures that are both effective and credible; if it does not, this could carry more risks than benefits. These countermeasures could include: trade and investment restrictions; export controls and divestment in certain sectors; and restrictions on access to EU public procurement markets. The EU should also include a flexibility mechanism for countermeasures against those forms of economic coercion the ACI cannot cover explicitly. The ACI should be a de-politicisation tool. It must be used only as last resort and should include an effective de-escalation mechanism to trigger dialogue and negotiations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, European Union, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe