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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief

1. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

2. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:
Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

4. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

5. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

6. From “Forward ­Presence” to ­“Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen ­NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania

Author:
Aylin Matlé
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the ­Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a ­scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Germany

7. German Defense Spending: A Repeat of the Past Instead of a New Era

Author:
Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sören Hellmonds
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The historic aspiration of Germany’s Zeitenwende – the new era in its foreign and security policy – will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

8. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

9. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

10. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

11. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Military Command and Control

Author:
Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

13. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

14. French Nuclear Policy

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and France

15. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP

Author:
Timo Smit
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

16. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:
Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

18. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

19. Patchwork procurement? How to bridge parallel initiatives in EU joint defence procurement

Author:
Cédric Lombaerts and Lucrezia Sala
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU’s defence-industrial base was conceived during peacetime and, because of the ensuing market fragmentation, does not seem fit for purpose to deal with wartime. In an attempt to remedy this, the EU launched several parallel joint defence procurement initiatives (EDIRPA, EDIP, the three-track approach under the European Peace Facility). Between these initiatives, it is easy to lose sight of the forest in the trees of joint procurement. How do these parallel tracks of procurement tie in together? Are they not fragmenting collaborative procurement efforts even further? This CEPS Policy Brief sheds clarity on the interplay between these initiatives and suggests four pragmatic paths towards an overarching joint defence procurement framework while playing into the most salient deadlocks in joint defence procurement today.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe

20. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:
Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

21. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:
Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

23. Protecting NATO’s security community

Author:
Alexandra Gheciu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Following Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, numerous Western policy-makers and analysts have interpreted the Alliance’s cohesiveness and prompt response as evidence of its value in protecting the transatlantic community of liberal-democracy. NA- TO’s Allies, the argument goes, have clearly demon- strated their shared determination to protect allied ter- ritory and core liberal-democratic values, re-affirming the Alliance’s unshaken commitment to the principle of collective defence. But can this momentum be sus- tained? While the Ukraine crisis has triggered initial prac- tices of unity, it has also highlighted – and rendered more complex – difficult questions, tensions and nor- mative dilemmas for NATO. This policy brief exam- ines some of the key challenges that NATO is likely to face in protecting the transatlantic security commu- nity in the unstable, post-February 2022 environment. What is particularly important to understand is that some of those challenges concern key norms and val- ues around which NATO defines itself. There are no simple answers to the political questions facing the security community – but there are steps that can be taken to put the Allies in a stronger position to ad- dress them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

24. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

25. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

26. The Dos and Don'ts of Strategy Making

Author:
Marina Henke
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Strategic Concept is NATO’s most import- ant document after the Washington Treaty. It identifies the foundational elements of the Al- liance: it defines NATO’s strategic goals, the key risks and threats the Alliance faces, and designs a strategy of how to overcome those challenges. Since its in- ception, NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts. The latest one was published in 2010. Given the ex- traordinary events of the last decade if not months, including Russian aggression in Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive posturing in the Asia Pacific, a new NATO Strategic Concept is urgently needed and will be presented at the 2022 Madrid Summit. In this context, it is worth asking: how do we design good strategy? What are the main building blocks of strat- egy? How can NATO most efficiently integrate the variety of tools at its disposal into a coherent, cohe- sive whole? Practitioners and academics have over the years identified best practices in strategy design along with some common mistakes.1 This Policy Brief sum- marizes their most important findings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

27. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and North America

28. NATO and human security

Author:
Mary Kaldor
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The August 2021 Afghan debacle offers NATO a moment for serious reflection about its role in the world. Some are drawing the conclusion that NATO should not engage in out-of-area opera- tions in the future and should instead focus on its core function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory from at- tack by foreign states, while dealing with the terrorist threat through long distance strikes using drones. But NATO members should draw a different conclusion, namely that in this globalised interconnected world, no one is safe from the complex combination of dangers that include war and violence, climate disasters, forced migration, pandemics or extreme poverty. It is no lon- ger possible, if it ever was, to insulate one part of the world from what happens elsewhere. What is needed is not retrenchment but rethinking and redirecting of NATO’s role. In this Policy Brief, I put forward the idea of a global strategy based on human security. Human security is understood as the security of individuals and the com- munities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. Human security offers an alternative way to address “forever wars” whether we are talking about conflicts in different parts of the world, the so-called war on terror, or the geo-political competition with Russia and China. Human security implies that the security of Afghans or Chinese is just as important as the security of Americans or Europe- ans.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

29. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

30. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. Conflict in Two Theaters? European Misperceptions about the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Elisabeth Suh
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is being heralded as a moment of strategic clarity for Europe about the return of revisionist power politics. While the immediate neighborhood remains the main concern, European strategists are worried about a second source of risk: violent revisionism in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has already shifted its center of strategic gravity to the Pacific, but conflicts brewing there also require a European response.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Political stability, Conflict, Violence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

32. The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine could mark a watershed for European security. There has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united around three key ideas. Firstly, they believe it is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally. Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crisis, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular. Europeans disagree on which are the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. The crisis will likely test Europeans’ readiness to defend the European security order.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

34. Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence

Author:
Hanna Shelest
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression in 2022 holds valuable lessons for the EU and its member states. Since 2014, Ukraine has transformed its armed forces, mobilised a network of reservists, and coordinated military and civilian defence agencies to prioritise cross-society resilience to crises. It has done so by adopting NATO best practices and through a unique movement of volunteers who help fund the war effort. The Ukrainian armed forces have also found innovative ways to use new technologies in mounting an asymmetric response to their much larger adversary. EU member states can learn from Ukraine’s experiences, but this should be a two-way street – with European countries continuing to supply weapons and provide training to Ukraine, and gaining real-world wartime insights in return.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

35. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

36. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. EU Defence After Ukraine: France’s Presidency

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The third brief considers France’s 2022 Presidency of the Council of the EU, a presidency whose term was dominated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and whose successes in EU defence matters were somewhat overshadowed by President Macron’s high-profile attempts to broker peace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Peace, Emmanuel Macron, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and France

38. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

39. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

40. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first brief in a new series “Russia’s War in Ukraine” discusses Russia’s war aims. These are not limited to the destruction of Ukraine’s statehood, or even of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and language, but include altering Europe’s security architecture by undermining NATO and the European Union. Kalev Stoicescu, Research Fellow at the ICDS, also examines Russia’s extensive preparations domestically and abroad (versus Ukraine, the West, and China), and evaluates where Russia’s assumptions were right and wrong, as proved by the course of events after 24 February 2022. Stoicescu concludes that Vladimir Putin’s regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an appetite for future adventures. The risks are thus far from over.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Organization, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

42. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

43. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:
Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

44. Why Belgium Needs a Cyber Command

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 19 October 2022, the Belgian Ministry of Defence declared the Initial Operating Capability of its new Cyber Command. Responding to the trend of states seeking competitive advantages in a new operational domain – as illustrated by several high-profile cyber-attacks on Belgian State institutions – the choice for developing a new instrument of statecraft has been made. This Egmont Policy Brief outlines the growing importance of developing cyber defence capabilities, discusses the organisational set-up for this Cyber Command, and finally zooms in on the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

45. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?

Author:
Bruno Angelet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

46. Keeping the OSCE Alive

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
From September to December 2022 Belgium is chairing the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. Whilst political gridlock has plagued the organisation before, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine has now plunged the OSCE in an existential crisis. This bodes badly for the European security architecture and the multilateral rules-based order in general. This Egmont Policy brief reviews the risk of a full breakdown in the functioning of the OSCE, analyses the multiple reasons for keeping the organization alive, and discusses several avenues by means of which the Belgian chairpersonship can contribute to such an outcome. Irrespective of the way in which the Russian-Ukraine war eventually concludes, the OSCE provides a unique framework for managing the post-war aftermath and reconstituting a novel arms control regime over the longer term.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

47. The New Force Model: NATO's European Army

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
At the June 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders gave the green light to transition to a New Force Model (NFM) in the course of 2023. The avowed aim is to create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness (as opposed to some 40,000 today), and to pre-assign these to specific defence plans. This is very ambitious (as well it should be), all the more so because these will mostly be European troops. Is NATO building a European army? The rationale behind the NFM is that to be able to respond to all eventualities, the NATO military commander, SACEUR, requires a better view of the available forces, and their state of readiness, beyond the 40,000 currently on rotation at any one time in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Hence the NFM provides for the organisation of forces in three tiers: 100,000 troops in tier 1 should be available within 10 days; 200,000 more in tier 2 within 10 to 30 days. Adding to the existing scheme of pre-deployed battlegroups in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, some additional tier 1 and 2 forces will be pre-deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, on a rotational basis, but probably not substantially so. More importantly, NATO aims for all tier 1 and 2 troops to be assigned to specific geographic defence plans for which they can then train. Tier 3, finally, provides for at least 500,000 troops more within one to six months.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

48. A European Defence Summit in May 2022: From Compass to Capabilities

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
By launching a war against Ukraine, right on the borders of the European Union, Russia has unleashed the strongest push to strengthen Europe’s defence since the end of the Cold War. Only its initial, 2014 invasion of Ukraine came close to having such effect. NATO has activated its defence plans and deployed forces on the borders with Russia. Just about every state in Europe has announced increased defence spending. And the EU finalised its Strategic Compass, its first ever defence strategy, with a much increased sense of urgency and purpose. The role of the EU in linking up national announcements and NATO targets is crucial, in fact, by providing a framework to align the efforts of the EU Member States, and by ensuring that the EU’s own indispensable targets are incorporated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

49. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

50. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:
Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

51. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and Turkey’s reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the context of Turkey’s wider strategic interests

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
With the signing of the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Turkey dropped its initial objection to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, but has since argued that the conditions agreed in the MoU have not yet been fulfilled. In addition to requiring Sweden and Finland to take a more vigorous stance regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its extension in Syria, Turkey has used Nordic NATO applications as a tool to raise these issues on NATO’s agenda, pressuring the US in particular for a change in its Syria policy. Turkey’s reservations need to be conceptualized within its determined search for strategic autonomy, increased room for manoeuvre, and an ideological decoupling from the West. Turkey’s strategic interests have increasingly diverged from the rest of the alliance, likely leading to a more permanent intra-alliance opposition position in the coming years, part of which are the ongoing trilateral talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and North America

52. The EU’s Strategic Compass

Author:
Steven Blockmans, Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, and Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Taking their fate into their own hands, EU heads of state and government endorsed the Strategic Compass on 24 March 2022, a roadmap for becoming a stronger security and defence actor. The shared threat assessment, a first in the history of the EU, is a positive development. Rewritten over the last month to emphasise the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Strategic Compass reveals a newfound consensus among EU Member States on the danger Russia poses, but also a lack of strategic foresight. This raises the question of whether the final document might contain shortcomings regarding the threat posed by China and the importance of the Indo-Pacific. As such, the document essentially characterises the EU’s security and defence actorness as that of a regional – not a global – power. Divided into four baskets, ‘Act’, ‘Secure’, ‘Invest’, and ‘Partner’, the Strategic Compass appears at times bogged down in policy details rather than answering the tough questions that might reveal an overarching vision for EU security and defence. However, if the measures outlined in the document are reinforced by more effective implementation and duly complemented by NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept, then the EU may yet appear more credible in the eyes of others and ultimately, the Strategic Compass will have been ink well spent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe

53. The Five ‘I’s of EU defence: Inclusive integration for effective investment, innovation and institutions

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
At the crossroads of industrial policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union’s (EU) defence initiatives are accelerating with the political backing of both the EU institutions and key Member States. Russia’s war in Ukraine has played a seminal role in the introduction of taboo-breaking proposals to strengthen EU defence capabilities. In order to be effective, the EU must adopt the mantra of ‘inclusive integration’, recognising that increased cooperation amongst Member States, candidate countries, and like-minded partners makes the Union stronger. Policy actions under this mantra should thus aim to complete the regulatory framework of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, continue providing the right incentives for joint capabilities development, address the needs of Member State armed forces, maintain the EU’s technological cutting edge and guarantee continued political momentum.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Investment, Institutions, Innovation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

54. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:
Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

55. Pugwash note on present dangers

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
The present global situation is very dangerous. Not since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis have we had such a dangerous environment. But while the Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days, the present situation has continued for over 100 days since February 2022.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

56. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

57. Transforming European Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Colin Wall, and Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense. Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

58. “Don’t Bank on the Bombs” New European Standards Affecting the Defense Industry

Author:
Amélie Ferey and Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has underlined the need to upgrade the European armed forces, the urgency of the fight against climate change—as illustrated by reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—requires the political mobilization of the European Union (EU) to carry out the transition to climate neutrality. The EU has therefore established guidelines for ambitious action in these two areas. Via its Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, it intends to contribute to world stability with the support of a permanent and viable defense tool. Via its 2018 green finance plan, the European Commission aims to redirect financial flows toward sustainable activities and thus facilitate the 480 billion euros (€) of additional annual investments which will be necessary if it is to achieve its environmental objectives by 2030. The tension between these two objectives— strengthening European defense on the one hand and promoting sustainable finance on the other—was made manifest in lively discussions regarding the integration of the defense sector into European taxonomy projects and the expansion of the Ecolabel. These proposals led to concerns among companies of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), wary of the perceived threat to their funding.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Industry, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

59. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

60. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:
Cori Fleser
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

62. Engaging the Pacific Islands is no longer about the why, but about the how

Author:
Marie Jourdain and Charles Lichfield
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the past year, US and European engagement in the South Pacific has noticeably accelerated. Wooing these islands away from Chinese influence is clearly a priority but there are many dimensions to this. The “Blue Pacific” is more than a consortium of scattered islands. They see themselves as large ocean states, which collectively make up the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. While they are important as we game out Taiwan scenarios, the peoples of the South Pacific want their region to remain immune from “great-power games.” This calls for a subtle Transatlantic strategy emphasizing partnership. This report acknowledges the mistakes of past engagement strategies, which didn’t approach the region as a coherent whole, lacked sustained and continuous effort, and always came second to other priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

63. Open strategic autonomy in European defence: what countries must do

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has resulted in wide support for strengthening European defence capabilities. At the same time, the debate on whether to rely on NATO or to seek European strategic autonomy in the area of security and defence has withered away. There is wide recognition in Europe that both the EU and NATO are key actors in response to Russia’s armed aggression and violation of international law, agreements and norms. While the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture, the role of the EU in security and defence is growing. Better European capabilities will allow the EU to act on its own when needed – more in particular in areas and countries outside the Union – and simultaneously support NATO to defend its territory. Nevertheless, the question has to be asked how European defence capabilities can best be strengthened. In recent years, the European Commission has taken various initiatives to promote cross-border defence cooperation. These efforts have been further expanded after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The steps taken by Berlaymont are bold and most welcome, but the member states are in the driving seat: they continue to deliver the military forces that are needed to secure Europe’s interests. Defence policy and planning provides the basis for allocating money to investment programmes and the acquisition of military equipment. The procurement of military equipment is still primarily conducted on a national basis instead of collaboratively with European partner countries. This Policy Brief assesses the scope for a closer coordination and synchronisation of the defence policies, planning and investment of the European countries in order to contribute to open strategic autonomy. First, the author provides an overview of the recent EU initiatives and how these relate to the efforts of the member states. Next, the question of what the member states should do to increase cross-border defence cooperation in terms of decision-making, budget cycles and defence planning will be addressed. The subsequent section assesses how the hurdles to moving from national to multinational defence planning and investment can best be overcome. The final section points to the way forward, including suggestions on the specific role that the Netherlands can play in enhancing European collaboration in defence programmes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

64. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

65. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

66. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

67. The US in NATO: adapting the Alliance to new strategic priorities

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the June 2021 NATO Summit, Allies agreed that “[we] will engage China with a view to de- fending the security interests of the Alliance”, as “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based inter- national order and to areas relevant to Alliance securi- ty”. For Washington, it was a win to have NATO, the cornerstone of the United States’ network of alliances, acknowledge the challenge posed by China and expand the Alliance’s predominantly transatlantic focus. During his visit to Europe in Spring 2021, President Biden signalled that “America was back” with a clear vision for NATO and that he was seeking European partners’ support. The US President’s recommitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is premised on the expectation that NATO address the country’s current and future strategic concerns, in a security and geopolitical environment that has dramatically changed these last twenty years. China, technological competi- tion, climate change, and hybrid threats and their desta- bilizing effects on NATO member states’ political co- hesion, are now at the core of the US strategic agenda. These priorities redefine NATO’s purpose. In this con- text, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, to be presented in 2022, aims at addressing these very changes, espe- cially as the Alliance enters the post-Afghanistan era. The US objectives vis-à-vis NATO are threefold. In the short term, the Biden administration seeks to re- engage with NATO as part of a larger effort to work with Allies around the world. US public opinion is clearly supportive of the Alliance across political affiliations, despite the politicization of the debate under the Trump administration. In the longer term, NATO will remain relevant to the US, only if it contributes to the strategic competition against China. This can take different forms and re- quire moving beyond two decades of out-of-area oper- ations to tackle challenges of a broad nature, especially in the cyber and techno- logical realms. Finally, the US aims to continue work on struc- tural issues within the Alliance, such as bur- den-sharing and political cohesion, whilst devel- oping a new partnership agenda that better fits its priorities. To sum up, NATO will remain a “global alliance” shaped by the US global strategic priorities, and will continue to strengthen its engagement with “global partners” as the increasingly complex security environment requires transregional approaches.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

68. European allies and the forthcoming NATO strategic concept

Author:
Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept will primarily serve the purpose of adapting the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to 21st century realities. This includes an updated threat analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci- etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the considerable changes European security underwent since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con- cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative security approach to Russia. The new text will also be the first post-Trump administration document, one elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate- gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes heated debates on European security, particularly on the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a consensus on this concept and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need for a stronger, and in many ways more independent Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however, most of these developments are structural in nature, and have persisted for some time.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

69. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

70. Measured response: How to design a European instrument against economic coercion

Author:
Jonathan Hackenbroich and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europe is at ever greater risk of economic coercion from other powers. To protect itself, the EU could adopt a new anti-coercion instrument (ACI) to allow it to impose economic countermeasures. The ACI needs to enable countermeasures that are both effective and credible; if it does not, this could carry more risks than benefits. These countermeasures could include: trade and investment restrictions; export controls and divestment in certain sectors; and restrictions on access to EU public procurement markets. The EU should also include a flexibility mechanism for countermeasures against those forms of economic coercion the ACI cannot cover explicitly. The ACI should be a de-politicisation tool. It must be used only as last resort and should include an effective de-escalation mechanism to trigger dialogue and negotiations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, European Union, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe

71. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

72. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

73. Expanding the Reach of the Special Forces with a Gender-Mixed Deep Development Capability (DDC): Identifying Challenges and Lessons Learned

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Driven by the need to adapt to a changing security environment, the Belgian Special Forces Group has developed a new gender- mixed capability in 2020, including female soldiers in the operational detachment of the unit for the first time. This brief examines the development and implementation of the project and identifies challenges for future similar capacities. It points to the need for clarification of tasks and employment conditions, while attracting male candidates is necessary to maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have been successful and the creation of the capability is a first step in the direction to diversify the composition of the Special Forces, a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a complex security context.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Gender Issues, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

74. Toward a meaningful metric: replacing NATO’s 2% defence spending target

Author:
Leonard August Schuette
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The confluence of Joe Biden’s election to the White House, the likely ramifications of the pandemic for defence budgets, and unfolding EU and NATO strategic reflection processes offers a window of opportunity to replace NATO’s flawed 2% defence spending target. Europeans should credibly propose an output- oriented metric to reconstitute the transatlantic bargain on burden-sharing.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

75. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

76. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

77. The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, must generate immediate action. The best way of ensuring that is to prepare new capability initiatives and, potentially, new operational engagements now, so that they can be launched simultaneously with the Strategic Compass. In that light, “the development of an initial-entry force as a pool of Member State forces that train and exercise together and are made available to the EU” (as summarised in an EEAS working paper), is one of the most promising ideas on the table. How to make it work?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

78. Seven Steps to European Defence, Transatlantic Equilibrium, and Global Europe

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Panta rhei – everything flows (Heraclitus). Once again, geopolitics is in transition, and a new crossroads is being approached. While we already knew that global leadership is beyond any single country, now it appears to be beyond even any single continent – beyond an alliance of two continents even. This means that the old strategic truth, that the power that has Europe on its side has the potential to dominate the world, no longer holds. Europe no longer is the kingmaker. And that changes a lot, for the EU, the US, and the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

79. Readiness as a Mission: Implications for Belgian Defence

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Readiness reflects the ability of the armed forces to accomplish their assigned tasks in time. Like many European counterparts, Belgian Defence disposes of some high readiness assets, but is lacking in readiness overall. This impacts its contribution to collective defence and its wider ability to support societal resilience. This Egmont Security Policy Brief explains the concept of readiness as a question of resource management and applies this to the ongoing defence review. Treating readiness as a meta- mission implies not only balancing the budgetary input parameters – investing in personnel, training, equipment and maintenance simultaneously – but also taking a selective approach towards operational engagement. Doing so will enable the force to regenerate as rapidly as possible, and boost Belgium’s ability to act both at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

80. #NATO2030: America’s Transatlantic Agenda

Author:
Robertas Sapronas
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy stood in stark contrast to the long-standing broad commitments that have traditionally underpinned relations between the US and its allies. It is no surprise that Joe Biden’s victory was met with sighs of relief in many NATO capitals. In the fifth of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Robertas Šapronas examines the challenges facing the Biden Administration in its efforts to rebuild the transatlantic relationship and America’s leadership of NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

81. #NATO2030: Addressing the Burden-Sharing Challenge

Author:
Kristīne Rudzīte-Stejskala
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO routinely measures and compares the national defence inputs and outputs of its members to assess how they share the burden of collective defence. It has always been apparent that by comparison with the US, Europe needs to do more, but NATO’s burden-sharing discussion is stuck on tired arguments about simple spending measures. In the sixth of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Kristīne Rudzīte-Stejskala of the Ministry of Defence of Latvia describes NATO’s burden-sharing debate and offers some new approaches.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

82. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO

Author:
Justyna Gotkowska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

83. #NATO2030: Towards a NATO China Strategy

Author:
Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s search for a common, cohesive strategy towards China is among the challenges most likely to reveal deep fractures between the positions of the Allies. In the second of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs examines the Allies’ public statements on China to find the common ground that might form the backbone of a NATO Strategy for China, and the differences between them that still need to be addressed.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

84. #NATO2030: NATO’s Force Structure and Posture

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The forces and capabilities that will be available for NATO operations in 2030 have, to a great extent, already been decided through the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is now up to individual Allies to deliver on their commitments. In the third of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Martin Hurt of the ICDS looks at how NATO’s force structure and posture have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and outlines the challenges of the further modernisation necessary if NATO is to keep pace with an evolving security environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

85. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:
Andris Banka
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

86. Central European Security: History and Geography Matter

Author:
Marcin Zaborowski
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The post-Cold War enlargements have changed the Alliance, its geopolitics and the definition of its purpose, which is no longer limited to deterring against threats to Allies’ territory. Enlarge- ments have also redefined the security and defence policies of the new member states, by transforming their armed forces, civil military relationships and im- pacting their defence industries. The states that joined NATO since 1989 are usually categorized as Central Europe or Central and East- ern Europe. Within this Central European realm of new member states, one can distinguish between the North-East, the Centre, the South-East, and the West- ern Balkans. All states in these groupings were com- munist prior to the end of the Cold War. Today, with the Cold War fast becoming a faded memory, Central Europeans tend to define their security needs with in- creasing divergence, with major repercussions on their defence policies, in spite of their belonging to the same Alliance. This Policy Brief maps out Central Europe by identifying groups of states in the region and looking at defence policy divergences. It focuses on a number of indicators, such as defence spending, acquisition of defence equipment and attitudes towards hosting for- eign NATO troops on their soil.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

87. The Strategic Argument for a Political NATO

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 1949 Washington Treaty is a remarkably brief document consisting of a preamble and 14 articles. The Treaty describes only the po- litical commitments and obligations of the signato- ries. It does not articulate a requirement for NATO members to spend a certain amount of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense nor does it specify the military capabilities that a NATO member must possess to defend the Alliance. From 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was the singular locus of geopolitical discus- sion between North America and Europe. These were not easy discussions, yet the Alliance weathered strident policy and geopolitical policy differences. NATO also endured its members temporarily ceasing to be democracies due to military coups or concern about Communist influence on NATO governments. With a political body standing on the shoulders of a credible military deterrence, Allies were able to deploy creative problem-solving skills to bridge political dif- ferences, such as the policy innovation of deterrence and détente, while pursuing other, quieter methods, such as the temporary suspension of sharing sensitive intelligence from compromised NATO governments. Unfortunately, NATO’s centrality as a political forum greatly diminished after the Cold War as the Alliance reduced its political consultations in a less demanding geopolitical environment. Despite occa- sional interruptions of intense political discussion re- lated to conflict in the Balkans and the September 11th attacks, US retrenchment, combined with Europe’s inward focus, minimized NATO as a political forum. NATO was increasingly consumed by tactical decisions on out-of-area operations and transatlantic policy divisions over the Iraq War which fueled both Europe’s desire for greater autonomy and America’s questioning of the military utility of its Allies. NATO leaders substituted tactical – albeit important – military decisions regard- ing troop contributions, placement, and caveats as a substitute for political discussion. This political drift has now become so great that NATO members have begun to withhold support for the defensive planning of other Allies and new disputes between NATO members have the potential to escalate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

88. The Global Dimensions of NATO's Future Posture

Author:
Michael Clarke
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO has always been an important player in global politics. It is in the nature of the Alli- ance that its essential military missions were always carefully defined and its geographical boundar- ies strictly set by the collective defence commitments among its members. Nevertheless, NATO’s role as a politico-military institution among the great powers of the Cold War ensured it would always be global- ly significant. It could not have been otherwise. This remains as much the case – though now in different ways – as we consider the international environment taking shape for the 2030s. In this new environment the unavoidable global responsibilities of being a regional military alliance can be summarised in three ways; looking at NATO’s role in helping western powers defend their wider interests in the multi-polar world; helping meet the pseudo-ideological challenges posed by the rise of autocracies; and contributing to issues of the “global commons”.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

89. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:
Olivier Roy
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

90. Net Assessment: "Competition Is For Losers"

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Under the guidance of the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in 2020 NATO embarked on a reflection process aimed at equipping the Alliance for the challenges of 2030.1 Composed of several parts, actors and phases, the process ul- timately aims to make NATO more relevant in the years ahead when technological disruption, climate change, competition among Great Powers and vio- lent non-state actors will pose new and major threats. Ideas, proposals, and recommendations are coming in from within and from outside the Alliance. Inter- estingly, among the recommendations, several voices have called for NATO to expand its net assessment capabilities.2 For most observers, even in the security and defence world, net assessment is an esoteric word. While many may have heard of Andrew Marshall and the US Department of Defense’s Office of Net As- sessment, most would probably struggle to define the term. This Policy Brief provides a short introduction to the topic: what is net assessment, how and why has it emerged, how reliable is it and how could NATO use it?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

91. Providing security in Iraq - what do Iraqis think?

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Denmark

92. Small states’ security strategies need an international energy dimension: What can be learned from the Danish Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe negotiations?

Author:
Trine Villumsen Berling
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. RECOMMENDATIONS: Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Baltic States

93. European strategic autonomy: From misconceived to useful concept what can we learn from the Northern outlook?

Author:
Christine Nissen and Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ is girdled by myths and resistance. These common misconceptions can be overcome by member states to strengthen the EU in the face of today’s challenging security environment. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ways forward for the concept of strategic autonomy: Level of ambition: strategic autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself but as a means to protect and promote common values and interests across strategically important EU policy areas. Geography: strategic autonomy should enable the EU to undertake activities, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood. Policy scope: strategic autonomy should encompass the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy, and not just defence.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

94. The Governance of the European Defence Fund

Author:
Sarah Brichet, Hugo Chouarbi, Marie Dénoue, Valérian Frossard, Armony Laurent, Nicolas Libert, Anne-Flore Magnuszewski, Pauline Maillard, and Juliette Rolin
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The launch of the European Defence Fund is a true step forward. Its objective is to facilitate the emergence of a European defence industrial and technological base through cooperation between European industrialists and thus reduce European "capability bottlenecks" in the field of military equipment while attempting to increase the Union's "strategic autonomy". With a budget of €7 billion under the EU's new multi-annual budget, a new Directorate General, DG DEFIS, will be responsible for its management, under the supervision of the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton. At the heart of European institutional and conceptual transformations, its operation and management are of particular importance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Governance, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe

95. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

96. European defence: Specialisation by capability groups

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In many professions specialisation is regarded as a virtue. In a hospital the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the nurse have specialised skills. Together they engage in teamwork to cure patients. Yet, when it comes to defence, specialisation has a negative connotation. Contrary to the hospital’s operating theatre, dependency on each other’s armed forces is regarded as a serious, if not unacceptable risk, as a country has to be able to defend itself without relying on capabilities to be provided by other states. In reality, however, interdependence is a fact: European countries have relied on the nuclear deterrent of the United States since the 1950s and with regard to conventional forces, no single European country can provide all necessary capabilities. The question is how European interdependence can be made more effective. The answer must partly lie in specialisation. This Policy Brief addresses specialisation in security and defence from the perspective of the ‘Team Europe’ approach of distributing tasks and operating with varying coalitions of European countries in order to make the EU (and in this case also NATO) more effective. It presents a model of structuring European armed forces in specialised groups – an idea that has been proposed in a Clingendael report published earlier this year. First, the Policy Brief lays out the playing field by explaining the model of European capability groups. Next, several options for European capability groups will be proposed. It concludes with listing the implications for the Netherlands.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Specialization
Political Geography:
Europe

97. EU defence projects: Balancing Member States, money and management

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
European Defence Union (EDU) initiatives are proceeding at full steam ahead with the political backing of both the EU institutions and key Member States. The fourth wave of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects is but a recent example of such, with the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) set to dole out its first tranche of European Defence Fund (EDF) appropriations in the coming months. Alongside this, the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) annual defence data report has highlighted the progress made in EU-wide defence expenditure, despite the economic fallout from Covid-19. The framework guiding the consolidation of a dynamic and integrated European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), however, requires some fine-tuning. If EDU initiatives are to incentivise more inclusive and better funded projects essential to remedying the shortfalls identified by the EDA’s Capability Development Priorities (CDPs), reducing the number of systems operated at EU level, and enhancing interoperability, then several key proposals outlined in this paper should be considered.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Money, Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

98. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

99. Greenland obviously has its own defense policy

Author:
Sara Olsvig and Urik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Historically, Danish decisions have not always put Greenlandic interests first. Although defense policy is formally under Danish jurisdiction, decisions only have the legitimacy necessary if Greenland participates in the decision-making processes. Because in Greenland, military activities and installations interfere intimately with civic society. Increased rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic produces challenging issues for the constitutional community consisting of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland must make the role they each want to play in the international community clear and rethink the responsibilities and coordination procedures of the community. Otherwise, Greenland and Denmark risk contributing to increased tension in the Arctic – and Greenland risks missing out on potential gains from the growing attention from the great powers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Greenland

100. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus