Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

1. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

3. Into the Blue Pacific: Why the EU Should Help Island Nations Address Climate Change and Maritime Insecurity

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Hanna Gers
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The ‘Blue Pacific’ is a vast region in the South Pacific, encompassing 30 million square kilometers, three million inhabitants and 14 nations. Its consists of thousands of islands threatened by climate change – a concern aggravated by geopolitical competition. The EU can help mitigate these challenges through capacity-building for climate adaptation and maritime security and regional consolidation. This overlaps with European strategic interests, including establishing itself as a trusted outside power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Pacific Islands

4. From “Forward ­Presence” to ­“Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen ­NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania

Author:
Aylin Matlé
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the ­Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a ­scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Germany

5. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action

Author:
Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

6. German Defense Spending: A Repeat of the Past Instead of a New Era

Author:
Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sören Hellmonds
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The historic aspiration of Germany’s Zeitenwende – the new era in its foreign and security policy – will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

7. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

8. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:
Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

9. Protecting the EU’s Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Germany’s Opportunity to Transform Vulnerability into Mutual Resilience

Author:
Jannik Hartmann
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Submarine cables handle over 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic, making them essential for everything from finance to foreign affairs. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and increased Russian naval activity brought greater awareness of how European – and German – interconnectedness also brings vulnerability. The urgency of tackling this threat offers Germany an opportunity to take a structural and joined-up approach that shows it can act as a “team power.”
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

10. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:
Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

11. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

12. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

13. Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has so far weathered the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023. We assess the demand reduction needed if the 90 percent storage target is to be achieved. Our assessment takes into account EU imports, exports to refill gas storage facilities in Ukraine and Moldova, the weather and the situation in power markets, where gas demand is highly dependent on non-gas energy sources. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13 percent lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023. Two variables will determine how easily the target can be met: 1) liquified natural gas (LNG) supply, and 2) the nature of demand reductions. Plans for rapid deployment of regasification units will alleviate concerns over LNG import infrastructure capacity. However, the EU will continue to compete internationally for LNG cargoes, and will remain vulnerable to global dynamics. Strong economic growth in China, for example, could further tighten markets. The way demand is reduced will determine the economic consequences. So far, large reductions in industrial gas demand have not been accompanied by dramatic drops in industrial output, suggesting good substitution options. However, hardly any gas was saved in the power sector last year, because of weak nuclear and hydro output. The return of French nuclear output will therefore be a huge positive. Finally, households have reduced gas demand, partly driven by warmer than usual weather. Record numbers of heat pumps were deployed in 2022, suggesting the start of a structural shift away from gas demand for heating. Policy should support a continued structural shift away from gas. This involves enabling rapid deployment of renewables and the accompanying grid infrastructure, energy-efficiency measures, help for households that want to switch to cleaner heating, and collaboration with industry to accelerate adoption of new low-carbon production methods.
Topic:
Security, Gas, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

14. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

15. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

16. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

17. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

19. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

20. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

21. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union

Author:
Simone Bunse
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

23. The Arctic is Hot: Addressing the Social and Environmental Implications

Author:
Emilie Broek
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic is becoming more hotly contested and attracting new developments. The European Union (EU) is one actor that is turning to the Arctic to achieve its climate, energy, space-related and security goals. However, this increased interest can result in negative social and environmental local implications if not properly planned for and considered. This SIPRI Policy Brief provides an overview of the EU’s focus on the Arctic, with a particular focus on Kiruna, and the importance of human-centred and precautionary approaches.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Space, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

24. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP

Author:
Timo Smit
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

25. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

26. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:
Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

28. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security

Author:
Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean

29. Renewable relations: A strategic approach to European energy cooperation with the Gulf states

Author:
Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine prompted a frenzy of energy deals between EU member states and countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but their implementation is slow. The EU needs a new approach to energy cooperation with states in the Middle East and North Africa that serves both its energy security imperative and its climate goals. The Gulf monarchies represent a good test case for such an approach, due to their green ambitions, abundant resources, and significance to the fight against climate change. Political and ideological differences are currently the greatest obstacle to long-term, strategic energy cooperation between the regions. But this year’s COP28 in Dubai is an opportunity for both sides to focus on practical ways to accelerate the green transition. Europeans should emphasise four promising areas of energy cooperation with the GCC states: energy efficiency and electrification, renewable energy, and the circular carbon economy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Decarbonization, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

30. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

31. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions

Author:
Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

32. The European Political Community from Paris to Chisinau: an idea taking shape?

Author:
Florent Marciacq, Denis Cenusa, and Ioannis Armakolas
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The European Political Community (EPC), an idea put forward by President Macron of France, echoing a similar proposal made by former Italian PM Enrico Letta, was launched and gained traction in response to the challenge posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine. The imperative of focusing on security and forming a common front against Russian aggression served as a key rationale for expanding the EPC beyond a value-based community of like-minded democratic states. The first EPC Summit was held in Prague in October 2022. A successful gathering of 44 states, including countries with still-strong ties to Russia, it gave the sense that a common pan-European front was gradually forming against Moscow. Seven priority areas were identified: energy security, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, youth, migration, regional cooperation in the Caucasus and Black Sea area, and resilience funding. The second Summit took place on 1st June 2023 near Chisinau, the capital of the Republic of Moldova, a small landlocked state in Eastern Europe which only recently achieved candidate status for EU accession. The Summit was a strong signal of support for Moldova’s efforts to consolidate its escape from Russia’s stranglehold, but also for its neighbour, embattled Ukraine. Discussions in Chisinau addressed energy security, transport networks and connectivity, cybersecurity and the integrity of critical infrastructure. Strategic cooperation was another prominent topic. Leaders reiterated the importance of restoring peace by providing increased military support to Ukraine, but also combating hybrid threats in Moldova through the recently launched EU Partnership Mission (EUPAM). At present, the EPC format seems to be pursuing two separate agendas: structuring the EU’s relations with its neighbours, and rallying the European family against Russia. Articulating and balancing these objectives properly will not be easy, and would seem to require the removal of stumbling blocks and a clarification of the level of institutionalisation at which the EPC would be required to operate. Thus, as the EPC Summit moves next to Spain and then to the United Kingdom, there is still no comprehensive consensus as to what the overall purpose of the EPC is, and whether and to what extent it should be institutionalised, which is to say endowed with a secretariat, separate funding and a certain degree of functional autonomy. A number of influential countries, including France and the U.K., see the EPC’s greatest advantage as residing in its informality and lack of institutionalisation. However, it could be argued that for the EPC’s strategic engagement in security, energy and connectivity to be successful, some level of institutionalisation and greater involvement by the EU will be required. At the same time, for the EPC to maintain its added value, it will need to preserve significant pockets of informality and flexibility of process.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, European Union, Energy, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe

33. How the EU and US can advance the green transition along with energy and resource security

Author:
Annika Hedberg and Olga Khakova
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The benefits of enhanced transatlantic cooperation on the green agenda are immense — and waiting to be seized. At the Ministerial Meeting in Sweden in May, the EU and US reiterated their commitment for collaboration. While progress on the EU-US Trade & Technology Council’s (TTC) green agenda has been slow, it is now time to implement this commitment. This Policy Brief provides recommendations for the TTC for turning shared principles into joint action, with a focus on the following three areas: 1. Aligning climate and sustainability ambitions with security and geoeconomic goals; 2. Building on the power of technologies and developing common standards for the green transition and energy and resource security; 3. Ensuring access to resources needed for the green transition. In conclusion, the Paper calls for the TTC to assist the EU and the US in stepping up their joint efforts in addressing environmental challenges as well as enhancing climate action, resource and energy security through trade and technology solutions. It recognises the role the platform should play in opening the transatlantic market for products and services needed to accelerate the green transition.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, European Union, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

34. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

35. Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermeulen
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has led policymakers to re-prioritise the European security architecture and the EU’s neighbourhood, including a positive reassessment of NATO’s role as a reliable security provider. As the transatlantic relationship and the Indo-Pacific are inherently intertwined, this once again highlights the imperative of the EU making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. This presents the EU with an opportunity to project its values, interests and power, though hampered at present by political infighting and the mushrooming of conflicts in and around Europe. Still, the time has come for the EU to assess how it should adjust its approach to Indo-Pacific security. How can the EU effectively strike a balance in security and defence cooperation with partners to uphold key principles of international law and order without endorsing the idea that ‘might makes right’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, International Law, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

36. What should the EU do about violent extremism?

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Despite a recent spike in concern about a resurgence in great power conflict, addressing terrorism and violent extremism has driven the foreign policy debate in the collective West for the better part of two decades since 9/11. In the European Union, these concerns most prominently emerged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) that identified terrorism and “violent religious extremism” originating in the EU’s neighbourhood and caused by weak institutions, conflict, and state failure as a primary concern. The crux of the matter, however, is how this increased attention translates in policy terms. In other words, is the EU’s chosen CT-P/CVE policy mix balanced and fit for purpose? First, the EU’s CT-P/CVE action can hardly be framed according to a binary security versus democracy logic because of the significant emphasis placed by the EU on socio-economic development to address the structural causes of violent extremism. Second, despite the EU’s developmental focus, the language of good governance and peacebuilding, as well as funding for these areas, are key elements missing from the EU’s engagement. In order to remedy the many upstream and downstream diplomatic trade-offs that EU policymakers face in tackling violent extremism, the EU must begin to frame CT-P/CVE as part of its wider endeavour to support sustainable peace. It can do this by formulating an EU Agenda for Peace that once again underlines the EU’s commitment to promoting inclusive governance, community resilience, and social justice.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe

37. Playing the Long Game in the South China Sea

Author:
Andrew Mantong
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the South China Sea (SCS), as indeed the wider Indo-Pacific, the EU is facing a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. In the SCS, China has been able to create physical realities in defiance of international law by constructing artificial islands in the attempt to sustain its claims to the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos as well as expand its military projection deep into international waters. The US is still the predominant security player in the Indo-Pacific, but its military presence has an increasingly hard time shoring up American power in the SCS. The security dilemma between the great powers is threatening rules-based multilateralism, which runs deep in the veins of the EU and to a great extent defines its international posture.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Law, European Union, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

38. Gas and Energy Security in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Guntram Wolff and Alexandra Gritz
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s weaponization of gas supplies caused a shock to the energy security of Central and Eastern Europe. Countries responded by increasing alternative gas supplies and LNG import capacity. Gas flows shifted from the east-west axis to west-east and north-south axes. In the short term, the usage of coal is rising; in the longer term, renewable and nuclear energy. Mitigating the effects of this shock requires the EU to prioritize policies that foster the integrity and security of its energy market.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Germany, and Central Europe

39. European sovereignty, strategic autonomy, Europe as a power: what reality for the European Union and what future?

Author:
Bruno Dupré
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
France has not held the presidency of the Council of the European Union for thirteen years. It has held it since 1 January 2022 for a period of six months. This provides an opportunity for the French Head of State to give his vision of geopolitical issues. It also provides an opportunity to explain the concepts of European sovereignty, power, autonomy and strategic responsibility. France, with Germany and the support of the institutions, has played an essential - albeit contested - role in promoting a more political Europe over the past five years (Sorbonne speech in 2017). The aim of this article is to assess five years – in terms of where we are from an economic, foreign policy and security point of view and to analyse the steps taken by the European Union to become a fullfledged player on the international scene.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

40. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

41. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:
Cori Fleser
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

43. Engaging the Pacific Islands is no longer about the why, but about the how

Author:
Marie Jourdain and Charles Lichfield
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the past year, US and European engagement in the South Pacific has noticeably accelerated. Wooing these islands away from Chinese influence is clearly a priority but there are many dimensions to this. The “Blue Pacific” is more than a consortium of scattered islands. They see themselves as large ocean states, which collectively make up the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. While they are important as we game out Taiwan scenarios, the peoples of the South Pacific want their region to remain immune from “great-power games.” This calls for a subtle Transatlantic strategy emphasizing partnership. This report acknowledges the mistakes of past engagement strategies, which didn’t approach the region as a coherent whole, lacked sustained and continuous effort, and always came second to other priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

44. Enlarging and deepening: giving substance to the European Political Community

Author:
Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Daniela Schwarzer, and Shahin Vallée
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz have stressed the geopolitical emergency of re-designing the European Union’s relationship with its neighbourhood. Both acknowledge that EU enlargement is necessary, but also emphasise that profound EU institutional reform is required beforehand, though deepening and widening the EU are complex processes that veto players could block. The geopolitical challenges mean it is in the critical interest of the EU to bring stability to its neighbourhood by ensuring geopolitical alignment with the EU, limiting the blackmailing power of external, authoritarian states, supporting more resilient democracies and strengthening the rule of law. Meanwhile, the EU’s neighbours are seeking a political space in which challenges to collective security and stability can be addressed and concrete policies decided. Given the urgency, it is not enough to rely on lengthy EU accession processes. A ‘European Political Community’ (EPC), which will have its first summit on 6 October 2022, could act both as a bridge to an eventual larger EU and as a framework for continental-scale partnership. Leaders should use the summit to start the building of a platform that can combine political dialogue with policy delivery in a quick and flexible way, and will thus structure more impactfully the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood. The EPC could start as a soft law agreement between states and the EU. It would work with existing institutions as far as possible, while aiming at more effective decision-making than currently in the EU. For instance it could function without vetoes and could work in geopolitically relevant areas that are not yet EU competences. An ambitious EPC would provide financial resources for deeper cooperation on energy and climate, security and defence, and economic and social convergence. The EPC would not be, and should not be, regarded as a substitute for EU accession, but should be designed in such a way that it can work as an accelerator. For countries not seeking to join the EU, it would provide an ongoing framework that sustains structured cooperation with the EU.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Governance, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

45. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

47. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

49. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

50. Transforming European Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Colin Wall, and Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense. Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe