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2. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility
- Author:
- Aline Bartenstein
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Italy
3. Can the EU still wrest the Balkans from their blighted history?
- Author:
- Jean Bizet and Fabrice Hugot
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- It is perhaps necessary, first of all, to recall why the name "Western Balkans" is still used to describe this peninsula in south-eastern Europe, why this imprecise geographical concept is preferred to any other name. To answer this question is to recognise from the outset the difficult fate suffered by this part of Europe: if we prefer to speak of the Balkans, it is quite simply because only geography is stable in this region.
- Topic:
- European Union, History, Geography, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Balkans
4. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
5. Europe as a power: now or never
- Author:
- Jean-Paul Palomeros
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- One year already, one year of misfortune for the Ukrainian people, one year of blind violence, of sirens’ blasts, of terror, of exile for some, even of deportation, of grief for many families. One year of systematic destruction of Ukraine's industry, its infrastructure, its energy production centres, part of its agricultural resources, of its economy. One year of oppression in the occupied territories, torture, war crimes, indoctrination, Russification. However, this appraisal is not exhaustive, it cannot take into account the destructuring of Ukrainian society, the reality and the extent of the sacrifices of a young generation of Ukrainians who are paying with their lives for their visceral attachment to their country and its values. But it must be stressed and repeated, for the Ukrainian people and their army it has been a year of struggle, of fierce, often heroic resistance, of resilience, of will to defend a free, democratic Ukraine and to restore its sovereignty.
- Topic:
- Crisis Management, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
6. Gender equality in Europe: a still imperfect model in the world
- Author:
- Stefanie Buzmaniuk
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- In a world where women's rights are once again being challenged from all quarters, Europe remains the place where women live best. Within the Union, however, there have been some setbacks, difficulties persist, and progress is still required in the political, economic and social fields to achieve true gender equality.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, European Union, Women, Inequality, and Gender
- Political Geography:
- Europe
7. Rule of law: the uncertain gamble on conditionality
- Author:
- Eric Maurice
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- Will 2023 be the year when Hungary and Poland join the ranks of Member States that respect the values of the European Union? Nothing is less certain because, in Budapest as in Warsaw, the reforms demanded by the Union have not yet been implemented. In early February Polish president Andrzej Duda, referred a law which was supposed to bring an end to disciplinary abuses against judges to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian government has still not completed reforms to make public procurement more transparent and to strengthen the fight against corruption. The fact that these measures are being discussed indicates however that the balance of power has changed. 2022 was a pivotal year in the European Union's efforts to combat breaches of the rule of law in its Member States. For the first time, a range of new and old tools, specific or not, structural or conjunctural, were used to try to reverse the trend that has been developing for several years, mainly in Hungary and Poland, of undermining the independence of the judiciary, systems of checks and balances, and certain rights that are considered fundamental.
- Topic:
- European Union, Rule of Law, Judiciary, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Poland, Romania, and Hungary
8. A return to grace for nuclear power in European public opinion? Some elements of a rapid paradigm shift
- Author:
- Mathieu Brugidou and Jérémy Bouillet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The health crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, and perhaps above all the war in Ukraine, together with increasingly outspoken Chinese and/or American interventionism, have largely contributed to "breaking European energy taboos"[1] towards more collective and coordinated approaches. This is undeniable in the field of energy: if certain mechanisms such as the general cap on gas prices have not been adopted, some measures, which were hard to imagine at European level until recently, have now been ratified, such as joint gas purchases, shared objectives for reducing energy demand, the obligation to store energy, etc.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Nuclear Power, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
9. Judging Putin
- Author:
- Arnaud De Nanteuil
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
- Topic:
- International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
10. Digital Sovereignty: For a Schuman Data Plan
- Author:
- Arno Pons
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- On 9 January, the European Commission launched the first cooperation and monitoring cycle for the achievement of the European Union’s digital decade by 2030. If, in the digital field, Europe faces issues of sovereignty, it is because it has left the sector open for over twenty years to the American Tech giants, who have imposed a game whose rules that have never been understood here. Either because these rules were inaccessible to the European Union (Moore and Metcalfe laws), or because we accepted that there were no rules of the game (code is law).
- Topic:
- Markets, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Law, European Union, Data, European Commission, and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- Europe
11. The Élysée Treaty, FrancoGerman reconciliation and European integration: myth and reality
- Author:
- Hartmut Marhold
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- “During General de Gaulle's visit last week, I thought often of you, the man who, with his proposal to create the European Coal and Steel Community, laid the foundations of the friendship which would henceforth bind our two countries so closely together. I always think of our cooperation with great appreciation. I feel the need, especially in the present circumstances, to express this gratitude to you[1],” wrote the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, on 10 September 1962 to former French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Konrad Adenauer was anxious to set things straight and avoid the creation of a myth. For him, Franco-German reconciliation, at the service of European integration, began on 9 May 1950 with the “Schuman Declaration”. It was not going to start with the Treaty in progress, the future Elysée Treaty. Robert Schuman, in his "Testimony on Adenauer", confirms this: "When in May 1950, the French government offered to the European nations to sit down, without discrimination between victorious and defeated countries, with equal rights and obligations, for a work of joint cooperation guaranteed by mutual control, this truly political revolution required Franco-German reconciliation. Even before consulting our friends and allies, we asked Chancellor Adenauer. If he had said no, Europe and European integration could not have existed. Our expectations were not disappointed[2].” Three years earlier, at a solemn ceremony, Konrad Adenauer had already had the opportunity to address Robert Schuman in front of a Franco-German audience, emphasising that it was he, Schuman, who had "definitively put an end to the Franco-German history full of atrocities thereby creating a lasting friendship between the two peoples". He said: "You, Mr Schuman, took the initiative for this great work and began to build it. That is why we are deeply grateful to you.” The Chancellor concluded by insisting that "it was Monsieur Schuman who laid the foundations for a good and lasting understanding between France and Germany and for a European future, that Europe owed its survival to his action[3].”
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, History, and Regional Integration
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, and Germany
12. Higher Renewable Energy Targets in Germany: How Will the Industry Benefit?
- Author:
- Gilles Lepesant
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- “Deutschland – Einstieg in die Deindustrialisierung?” – “Germany, the beginning of deindustrialisation?” asked the German economic newspaper Handelsblatt in the context of the spike in energy prices that has put at risk thousands of companies across Germany in 2022. Whereas some sectors such as steel, glass and chemicals have been seriously hit, the manufacturing industries operating in the areas linked to the energy transition (such as renewable energies and hydrogen production) should benefit from decisions taken to reach climate neutrality. Will the German industry benefit from the ambitious commitments agreed by the new coalition? The boom and bust of the solar sector in 2011 are a reminder that a strong internal demand does not necessarily translate into strong and resilient supply chains on the national territory. In the context of generous support schemes, several companies emerged in the 2000s benefiting from the strong demand for solar panels before being overwhelmed by Asian competitors. Nowadays, more than 90% of solar panels are imported from China. The level of ambition of the Federal government for the Energiewende has dramatically increased with the new coalition elected in 2021, the share of renewables to be reached in the power mix by 2030 being set at 80% (against 47% in 2022). The German wind industry has however been affected by a slowdown of the expansion of capacities, several rounds of onshore wind and solar auctions being in 2022 undersubscribed. The added value of the Energiewende in terms of job creation has been ambivalent so far. The country’s current industrial geography might be partly reshaped with the efforts made by northern and eastern States to deploy renewables and green hydrogen at large scale. Stakes are high for southern Germany since new spatial patterns are emerging in the automotive sector too. While Chinese competition in the solar and wind manufacturing sectors is tough, the Inflation Reduction Act has reinvigorated discussions around a stronger industrial policy.
- Topic:
- European Union, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Hydrogen, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
13. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation
- Author:
- Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France
14. Food Systems in the Pacific: Addressing Challenges in Cooperation with Europe
- Author:
- Celine Pajon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- More frequent climate disasters, rising sea levels, the economic fallout of Covid-19 lockdowns, border closures, supply chain constraints, and the global impact of the war in Ukraine have aggravated the challenge of maintaining sustainable and resilient food systems for Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Food systems in PICs are of great importance due to their impact on the health and well-being of Pacific peoples, local livelihoods, and national economies. Between 50 and 70% of Pacific people depend on agriculture and fishing activities for their livelihoods. The Pacific is home to extensive crop biodiversity, and Pacific countries are developing unique value chains for markets and international supply. However, they also face unique challenges in realizing equitable benefits in the global food system. Additionally, the Pacific needs to tackle issues like malnutrition and non-communicable diseases. Urgent global and local action is needed to manage climate change and other risks and ensure resilient food systems. Europeans are also confronted with the global food crisis and are actively working with their Pacific partners to find and fund solutions to address current and future risks by investing in local sustainable food systems. This Briefing explains the complex issues at stake regarding food systems in PICs and explores ways to address these challenges, both at the local level and in cooperation with Europeans. This Briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar "Food Security in Times of Crisis: Connecting the Pacific and Europe," organized by the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri)'s Pacific Islands Program in partnership with the Pacific Community (SPC) on December 8, 2022. Contributions from panelists will, therefore, be highlighted.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Food, and Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe, European Union, Oceania, and Pacific Islands
15. Imagining Beyond the Imaginary. The Use of Red Teaming and Serious Games in Anticipation and Foresight
- Author:
- Héloïse Fayet and Amélie Ferey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking. In September 2022, The New York Times revealed that the successful Ukrainian offensive on Kharkiv had been prepared in a series of wargames conducted that summer. Given this success, further wargames have been undertaken with a view to a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring. This rise in the popularity of wargames, which come in various forms, is due to their ability to immerse participants in a situation, helping them to become aware of their strategic and tactical blind spots and to identify their own vulnerabilities by putting themselves in the enemy’s position. The ability to anticipate crises and foresee conflicts is essential in order to maintain the initiative and ultimately win out. Thus, the aim of defense foresight is to understand the different forms future wars might take (asymmetric, hybrid, high intensity), the weapons systems that may be employed (drones, high-velocity missiles), and the factors that could trigger them. The use of wargames or scenario analyses to facilitate anticipation and foresight goes hand in hand with changes in the relationship between military and political leaders and civilians, who no longer hesitate to hold the former to account when they have failed to foresee a crisis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck thus refers to the paradox of a society that is keen to predict the future because of its aversion to risk and the fact that it is now much more difficult to foresee what might happen in the short term due to very rapid technological developments. The modern world generates both risks and progress, and the inability to foresee strategic ruptures carries significant political costs, which explains why politicians set so much store in anticipation and foresight. The initiatives launched by Florence Parly after being appointed French minister of the armed forces in 2017 included promoting experimentation in new cognitive tools. Beyond the issue of technology, the aim was to rethink information management within the ministry in order to make it more agile and cross-cutting. In addition to a significant budget allocated to innovation in the 2019–2025 Military Programming Law, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has drawn inspiration from methods often originating in other organizational cultures, such as start-ups and the private sector, in order to improve its creativity and accelerate its adoption of digital technology.
- Topic:
- War Games, Military, and Anticipation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, North America, and United States of America
16. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership
- Author:
- Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe
17. Why the proposed Brussels buyers club to procure critical minerals is a bad idea
- Author:
- Cullen Hendrix
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- Concerned about critical mineral supply chains and its own strategic vulnerabilities, the European Union is advancing a buyers club to procure minerals critical to the clean energy transition, such as bauxite, cobalt, lithium, and nickel. The European Union is deeply dependent on imports of both raw and processed critical minerals and materials and thus highly exposed to global price volatility. The door appears to be open for the United States or other EU trading partners and like-minded countries to join this club. Decarbonization is not the only impetus behind the proposed Brussels buyers club. Both the European Union and United States view China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains as a national security issue, because these minerals are key inputs to modern military technology. Hendrix agrees that supply chains for critical minerals desperately need widening to meet projected global demand and tackle climate change mitigation, but he warns that a purchasers club would not be a step in the right direction. A buyers club would be prone to free riding, set up distributive conflicts within the European Union, and reduce the share of climate mitigation benefits accruing to critical mineral–producing countries, many of which are developing and middle-income economies.
- Topic:
- Economics, National Security, European Union, Supply Chains, and Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
18. The international tax agreement of 2021: Why it’s needed, what it does, and what comes next?
- Author:
- Kimberly Clausing
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- In 2021, more than 135 jurisdictions agreed on transformative new international tax rules that would establish a minimum tax rate of 15 percent on multinational corporate income regardless of where it was reported. In December 2022, the European Union unanimously moved forward to implement this minimum tax, and other countries, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, are also either implementing the tax or taking substantial steps toward implementation. In tandem, the United States should also reform its international tax system and adopt a stronger minimum tax. While the future of the international agreement is uncertain, it has important implications for the ability of governments worldwide to create tax systems that are administrable, fair, and efficient. The agreement also demonstrates important guiding principles for the future of multilateral cooperation on global collective action problems, including efforts to protect public health from future pandemics, address nuclear proliferation, and resolve territorial conflicts. US progress on international tax reform would enhance much needed international cooperation on these issues.
- Topic:
- Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, European Union, and Tax Systems
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
19. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?
- Author:
- Jeffrey J. Schott
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
20. Harnessing allied space capabilities
- Author:
- Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
21. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space
- Author:
- Nicholas Eftimiades
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America
22. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes
- Author:
- Tiffany Vora
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
23. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements
- Author:
- Matthias Bauer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
- Topic:
- Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe
24. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness
- Author:
- Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
25. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy
- Author:
- David Henig
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
- Topic:
- Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
26. Reforming Standard Essential Patents: Trade, Specialisation, and International Jurisprudence
- Author:
- Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- The European Commission is considering a radical overhaul of the system governing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). A leaked proposal suggests that the Commission wants to take control over the registration of SEPs, take efforts to regulate their essentiality, and intervene in negotiations over royalty rates if parties do not come to an agreement. The underlying assumption is that such a system will benefit SEP implementers and the European economy, and that the common holders of SEPs will be cut down a size or two. The logic behind this policy is that, since there are more SEP implementers than holders, any change in favour of implementers will have a net positive effect on the EU economy. However, this is doubtful. The EU is a R&D powerhouse for many of the technologies protected under SEPs and since most of the global production of the goods using these technologies is done outside Europe, the EU is a net exporter of innovation and a receiver of revenues from the licensing of these technologies. Using data on trade, specialisation, and market revenues, this paper comes to a different conclusion: the EU economy is likely to be a net loser if the balance between holders and implementers is changed. Moreover, there is a general and fundamental interest for Europe to preserve a system of standards and SEPs that allows it to punch above its weight in international policies and practices in standards and patents.
- Topic:
- Reform, European Union, Trade, Patents, Specialization, European Commission, and Jurisprudence
- Political Geography:
- Europe
27. Trade and Competitiveness: Putting the Firm at the Centre of the Analysis
- Author:
- Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- The European Commission published its communication for the long-term competitiveness of the EU. Trade and Open Strategic Autonomy were among the selected policy areas that will drive EU competitiveness in the future and trade with the rest of the world as a share of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the selected indicator to measure progress. This Policy Brief proposes a new set of indicators that complement this and similar indicators that focus on the value of trade. Using the Trade by Enterprise Characteristics (TEC) database, this paper produces indicators that measure the number of exporters, non-EU suppliers, non-EU customers, and foreign companies. By putting the firm at the centre of the analysis, these indicators offer insights that complement policy-makers’ views on trade and competitiveness.
- Topic:
- European Union, GDP, Trade, Strategic Autonomy, European Commission, Economic Competition, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
28. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas
- Author:
- Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
- Topic:
- European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
29. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
30. Adjusting to the energy shock: the right policies for European industry
- Author:
- Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future. In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU. First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly. Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue. Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage. Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, European Union, Value Chains, Energy, and Green Economy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
31. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union
- Author:
- Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
- Topic:
- Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
32. The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero
- Author:
- Alexander Lehmann and Catarina Martins
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- European Union governments have for some years issued green bonds that raise funds for climate-related spending. These bonds have been received well in capital markets but because they promise a certain use of proceeds, they complicate budget management and may not match investors’ claims of having an impact on national climate policies. Public commitments made by major investors and asset owners suggest that limiting climate transition risks and the assessment of the alignment of sovereigns with net-zero targets will now become key determinants of portfolio allocation. Yield differentials in bond markets are already beginning to reflect transition risks that arise from the inadequate pursuit by issuers of climate targets. Unlike standard green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) create a link between performance (outcome) indicators and the financial terms of the bonds. SLBs have grown rapidly in importance in private markets and are now being assessed by sovereign issuers. We show that sovereign SLBs could help incentivise climate policies in EU countries, and accelerate emission reductions. They would be an effective tool for signalling commitment. A common EU framework for issuance by EU countries would enhance capital market integration and the transparency of national policies, and would limit climate transition risks in EU capital markets more broadly.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Finance, Carbon Emissions, and Sovereign Bonds
- Political Geography:
- Europe
33. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act
- Author:
- David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
- Topic:
- Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Europe
34. Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023
- Author:
- Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The European Union has so far weathered the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023. We assess the demand reduction needed if the 90 percent storage target is to be achieved. Our assessment takes into account EU imports, exports to refill gas storage facilities in Ukraine and Moldova, the weather and the situation in power markets, where gas demand is highly dependent on non-gas energy sources. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13 percent lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023. Two variables will determine how easily the target can be met: 1) liquified natural gas (LNG) supply, and 2) the nature of demand reductions. Plans for rapid deployment of regasification units will alleviate concerns over LNG import infrastructure capacity. However, the EU will continue to compete internationally for LNG cargoes, and will remain vulnerable to global dynamics. Strong economic growth in China, for example, could further tighten markets. The way demand is reduced will determine the economic consequences. So far, large reductions in industrial gas demand have not been accompanied by dramatic drops in industrial output, suggesting good substitution options. However, hardly any gas was saved in the power sector last year, because of weak nuclear and hydro output. The return of French nuclear output will therefore be a huge positive. Finally, households have reduced gas demand, partly driven by warmer than usual weather. Record numbers of heat pumps were deployed in 2022, suggesting the start of a structural shift away from gas demand for heating. Policy should support a continued structural shift away from gas. This involves enabling rapid deployment of renewables and the accompanying grid infrastructure, energy-efficiency measures, help for households that want to switch to cleaner heating, and collaboration with industry to accelerate adoption of new low-carbon production methods.
- Topic:
- Security, Gas, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
35. The Long‐Run Effects of Immigration: Evidence across a Barrier to Refugee Settlement
- Author:
- Antonio Ciccone and Jan Nimczik
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Some 280 million people around the world are first‐generation immigrants; in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries, first‐generation immigrants make up around 14 percent of the population. The economic effects of immigration have become better understood in recent decades. A new focus of research on the effects of immigration is its long‐run impact on productivity, wages, and income. We contribute to this research by examining the long‐run economic effects of the arrival of refugees in what would become West Germany after the end of World War II (WWII) in 1945. This period was characterized by one of the largest population movements in modern times. Between 1945 and 1949, millions of people from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and eastern parts of prewar Germany were displaced westward. When the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was founded in 1949, these refugees made up around 15 percent of the country’s population.
- Topic:
- History, Immigration, Refugees, Resettlement, and World War II
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, Germany, and United States of America
36. The Economic Effects of the English Parliamentary Enclosures
- Author:
- Leander Heldring, James A. Robinson, and Sebastian Vollmer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- In 1808, the English agriculturist Arthur Young stumbled on something interesting. He noticed that the adjacent Cambridgeshire parishes of Childersley and Hardwicke in England had startlingly different economic outcomes, even though they were divided only by a hedgerow. In Hardwicke, wheat yields were 16 bushels per acre, whereas in Childersley, on the other side of the hedgerow, they were 24 bushels per acre—50 percent higher. What could explain the difference? It wasn’t economic fundamentals, because Childersley consisted of similar soil. Rather, Young attributed the difference to the fact that the land in Hardwicke remained in “common field” while the land in Childersley was enclosed.
- Topic:
- Agriculture, History, Economy, Enclosure, and Parliament
- Political Geography:
- Europe and England
37. The Vagaries of the Sea: Evidence on the Real Effects of Money from Maritime Disasters in the Spanish Empire
- Author:
- Adam Brzezinski, Yao Chen, Felix Ward, and Nuno Palma
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- The Columbian voyage of 1492 marked the beginning of three centuries in which vast amounts of monetary silver were shipped from America to Spain. During that time, Spain’s money supply was subjected to the vagaries of the sea. Maritime disasters that resulted in the loss of silver‐laden ships gave rise to random contractions in the amount of money that arrived in Spain. We studied these maritime disasters to obtain estimates of the causal effects of changes in the money supply on economic output and prices.
- Topic:
- Imperialism, History, Economy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Spain
38. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine
39. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition
- Author:
- Guido Torres
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America
40. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience
- Author:
- Amelie Theussen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States
41. Free Association and the United Nations
- Author:
- Rachael Johnstone
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Since 1945, most States, on achieving independence, seek admission to the United Nations. This is a shortcut to international recognition on the world stage and secures their statehood against future challenge. Although in theory States do not require formal recognition from other States to come into existence, it is desirable. Rather than seeking recognition and/or expensive diplomatic relations with dozens of other States, admission to the UN puts to bed any doubts about the nation’s existence as a State once and for all. Membership is available to States in Free Association (FA States). UN Members each hold a seat on the General Assembly with an equal vote (irrespective of population or economy). The General Assembly controls the UN budget and elects Member States to other major UN bodies (e.g., ECOSOC, Human Rights Council and Security Council). Membership of these bodies allows States to influence UN focus and policy. A small, new Member State may not desire or have the capacity to seek a seat on these bodies directly, but it can engage in “vote-trading” to promote its interests within the broader system. The General Assembly is also a crucial diplomatic forum in which Member States build trust and alliances with one another.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, United Nations, History, and Free Association
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Denmark
42. Climate resilience and Cook Islands' relationship of Free Association with Aotearoa / New Zealand
- Author:
- David J. Kilcullen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- On 1 January 2020, the Cook Islands was removed from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s List of Official Development Assistance (ODA) Recipients. Having been assessed as a “high-income status country”, this re-classification rendered the Cook Islands ineligible for OECD development assistance. It was unfortunate timing. The Covid-19 pandemic hit a few months later and caused a significant contraction in the tourism sector on which the Cook Islands is economically dependent. The result was, by the government’s own description, a “severe recession” with a total contraction of -21.6% of GDP in 2020/ 2021. Thus, only months after being recognized as having a sufficiently high income as to no longer warrant OECD development-assistance, the Cook Islands lost nearly a quarter of its GDP. This was especially significant for a country that is particularly susceptible to climate change and weather-related hazards. The Cook Islands is made up of 15 coral atolls and volcanic islands. Over 90% of the residents of the 12 inhabited islands live within one kilometer of a coastline. In addition, its already modest population of just under 15,000 people is rapidly decreasing (down from approximately 17,500 in 2016), undermining social and economic resilience to shocks. Despite notable economic growth in the years preceding Covid-19, greater infrastructure and other investment remains essential to brace the country for future climate-related changes. A question thus arises as to the benefits of Free Association in circumstances where the former colony faces crises.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, History, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Denmark, New Zealand, and Cook Islands
43. The European Political Community: Putting politics first?
- Author:
- Fabrizio Tassinari
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The European Political Community (EPC) was launched in Prague on October 6th of 2022 in the presence of 44 European heads of state and government, including all 27 Member States of the EU, as well as governments of neighbouring European countries, most notably the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Turkey. The initiative came in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its stated aims was to address the shortcomings of the European institutional architecture. While the project is a direct emanation of the French government, its objectives, perspectives and potential as an intergovernmental forum for political and strategic discussions about the future of Europe remain unexplored. The gathering has already planned three future summits (in Chișinău, Moldova; Granada, Spain and the United Kingdom) but it is as yet unclear if and how the new format can contribute to the wider European security architecture in light of the war, ongoing NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden and the EU’s opt-out referendum in Denmark. This brief aims to spell out three questions surrounding the evolution of the EPC across three key dimensions that concerns its possible institutional, policy and power-related contribution to the wider European constellation.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Denmark
44. Diplomacy of Neglect: Assessing the European Union’s engagement in the Sudanese Crisis
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The European Union aims to strengthen its involvement in the Sudanese crisis. This was recently evident when Brussels welcomed a delegation of Sudanese political leaders on July 27, 2023. This effort aims to establish an active European role in the endeavors to settle the Sudanese crisis.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, European Union, Conflict, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Sudan
45. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
46. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
- Topic:
- Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
47. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East
48. Gas for Survival: Tackling reasons behind the Italian PM's efforts to promote relations with Libya
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Italian PM Giorgia Meloni visited Libya on January 28, where she met with Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, PM of the outgoing government of national unity. The two leaders signed a new gas deal which has proved controversial.
- Topic:
- Migration, Gas, Energy, and Government of National Unity (GNU)
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Libya, and Italy
49. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy
- Author:
- Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
- Topic:
- NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
50. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
51. Russia’s War Economy
- Author:
- András Rácz, Ole Spillner, and Guntram Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia’s economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Economy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
52. Into the Blue Pacific: Why the EU Should Help Island Nations Address Climate Change and Maritime Insecurity
- Author:
- Elisabeth Suh and Hanna Gers
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The ‘Blue Pacific’ is a vast region in the South Pacific, encompassing 30 million square kilometers, three million inhabitants and 14 nations. Its consists of thousands of islands threatened by climate change – a concern aggravated by geopolitical competition. The EU can help mitigate these challenges through capacity-building for climate adaptation and maritime security and regional consolidation. This overlaps with European strategic interests, including establishing itself as a trusted outside power.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Pacific Islands
53. Mobilizing Social Media Influencers: A European Approach to Oversight and Accountability
- Author:
- Paloma Muñoz Quick
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- To build a robust information space that is resilient toward the dangers of mis- and disinformation, European policy-makers must recognize the role of influencers and their messages. The EU’s Digital Services Act aims to establish accountability and transparency in online platforms. It includes civil society as an essential component of achieving that goal. Through collaborating with independent platform councils and promoting radical transparency, influencers can contribute to combating disinformation and ensuring that public values are upheld in online governance.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Social Media, Accountability, and Oversight
- Political Geography:
- Europe
54. From “Forward Presence” to “Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania
- Author:
- Aylin Matlé
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Lithuania, and Germany
55. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action
- Author:
- Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
56. German Defense Spending: A Repeat of the Past Instead of a New Era
- Author:
- Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sören Hellmonds
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The historic aspiration of Germany’s Zeitenwende – the new era in its foreign and security policy – will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Budget, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
57. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations
- Author:
- Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Germany
58. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option
- Author:
- Benjamin Tallis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European security in the long term.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
59. Decisive but Forgotten: Germany’s Missing Technological Zeitenwende
- Author:
- Tim Rühlig and Bjorn Fägersten
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The digital technology transformation is a largely overlooked dimension of Zeitenwende. However, preserving national security, safeguarding core values enshrined in technology, ensuring access to critical technologies, and maintaining competitiveness need to be a policy priorities for Germany and Europe. All of these are integral elements of autonomy and sovereignty in a world increasingly characterized by great power rivalry. The looming policy decisions, however, will have divergent outcomes depending on the prevailing political paradigms.
- Topic:
- National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
60. Protecting the EU’s Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Germany’s Opportunity to Transform Vulnerability into Mutual Resilience
- Author:
- Jannik Hartmann
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Submarine cables handle over 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic, making them essential for everything from finance to foreign affairs. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and increased Russian naval activity brought greater awareness of how European – and German – interconnectedness also brings vulnerability. The urgency of tackling this threat offers Germany an opportunity to take a structural and joined-up approach that shows it can act as a “team power.”
- Topic:
- Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
61. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure
- Author:
- Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia
62. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, and Americas
63. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?
- Author:
- Zachary Paikin
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
64. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead
- Author:
- Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
65. The Future of European Security
- Author:
- Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
- Topic:
- European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
66. A New Horizon in U.S. Trade Policy: Key Developments and Questions for the Biden Administration
- Author:
- Trevor Sutton and Mike Williams
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- This issue brief examines some of the key trade initiatives pursued by the Biden administration to date. It then sets out key questions facing U.S. trade policy in a global environment defined by volatility and renewed ambition to tackle the great challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, inequality, and great power competition.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Inequality, Economy, Trade Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Americas
67. US-EU climate change industrial policy: Pulling in different directions for cooperation, competition, and compromise
- Author:
- Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The United States and the European Union agree on prioritizing policies to address climate change, which includes securing supply chains for components essential to low-carbon technology. Despite this agreement, their policies to address climate change and low-carbon technology could foster competition. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) reflects the competitive advantage of the US to draw in the best talents, capabilities, and resources from outside sources. This leads to a disconnect between the industrial policy benefits of the IRA within the US and the potential competitive impact the IRA has on US relationships with allies. The EU’s policies are shaped by the bloc’s desire to respond to external actors—including China and Russia—while protecting the common market and building up its internal capability to ensure security of supply. This is complicated by individual member-state objectives. The 2024 US presidential election could bring change: A Republican administration might not share the EU’s outlook on climate change, the need for government intervention, or even the close transatlantic relationship seen during the Biden administration.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, and United States of America
68. The geoeconomics of the hydrogen era: Towards a new global energy architecture
- Author:
- Timo Behr
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Clean hydrogen is crucial for ensuring the transition to a carbon-neutral economy, and large quantities of it will be needed in the future. The transition from a hydrocarbon to a hydrogen economy will have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. Due to its unique properties, hydrogen will not become the “new oil”. While oil and gas have encouraged a concentration of power – in the hands of producer countries, major oil companies, and around strategic choke points – hydrogen will favour a dispersion of power. The transition to a hydrogen economy will see strong competition over technologies, raw materials, and regulatory standards. Hydrogen has the potential to make the world energy trading system more balanced, more democratic, and less prone to price fluctuations, but it could equally lead to fragmentation, inadvertently contributing to current geopolitical divisions. For the EU and Finland, the transition towards a hydrogen economy presents both challenges and opportunities. Concerted action and active diplomacy will be needed to prevent Europe from being overtaken by others and slipping into new dependencies.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Governance, Hydrogen, Energy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Finland
69. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience
- Author:
- Markus Holmgren
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Finland
70. Outlining EU-Turkey relations: The impacts of the Ukraine war and Turkey’s crucial elections
- Author:
- Toni Alaranta
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Turkey-EU relations are affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine and its consequences for the EU’s place in the world. Another major factor is Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections held in May, which are defining the prospects for the country’s democratic future and its foreign policy. The second round of the presidential election took place on 28 May. The re-election of President Erdoğan indicates that the unilateral foreign policy and strained relationship with the West is likely to continue, although there is a chance of a short-term burst of cooperation due to Turkey’s economic troubles. There are increasingly divergent views about Turkey in the West, and the EU’s future relationship with Turkey needs to accommodate these different conceptualizations of the country as a state actor. The EU needs to be flexible in the coming months and to find ways to engage with Turkey in a more fruitful manner, irrespective of the election results.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Turkey
71. EU reform is back on the agenda: The many drivers of the new debate on treaty change
- Author:
- Steffen Müller
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Institutional reform is back on the European Union’s agenda, with the European Parliament, the Commission and large member states like Germany and France all supporting changes to the way the EU operates. While opening the EU treaties is not without political risk and there is still no consensus on doing so among member states, this momentum for reform is unlikely to wane in the near future. There are several reasons for the new reform drive. In particular, reforms are intended to strengthen the EU’s democratic credibility, to prevent institutional erosion in a time of permanent crisis, to make the EU more resilient to blockades by individual governments, and to lay the groundwork for the accession of new member states. While some of the proposed changes could be achieved without treaty change, the number and variety of issues at stake entails the risk of getting bogged down in parallel debates and missing opportunities for package deals. The most efficient way to deal with the EU’s reform needs would therefore be the launch of a treaty convention.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe
72. Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
- Author:
- Marco Siddi
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The European Commission has published numerous policy documents concerning the European Green Deal and the energy transition since 2019. Several have an important foreign policy component. Following the Covid-19 crisis and especially Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the discourse and policy objectives of these documents have taken a ‘geopolitical turn’, meaning that the EU’s security, interests and cooperation with Western allies have become more prominent than before. The REPowerEU plan, the new External Energy Strategy and the Green Deal Industrial Plan exemplify this shift by combining green and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s geopolitical turn in external energy politics involves several risks. Third countries could perceive some policies as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘green colonialism’. Domestically, some business actors dislike restrictions on imports of critical raw materials and green technology from abroad, whereas additional mining in the EU may not be compatible with biodiversity and environmental protection. At the same time, ‘offshoring’ mining outside the EU may transfer the ecological consequences to contexts with laxer regulation.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, European Commission, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
73. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition
- Author:
- Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
- Topic:
- European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
74. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism
- Author:
- Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Arctic
75. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?
- Author:
- Margarita Zavadskaya
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
76. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal
- Author:
- Jussi Lassila
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
- Topic:
- Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
77. Centre-right parties in Germany and Sweden: Challenges and strategies in a changing political landscape
- Author:
- Sanna Salo and Tuomas Iso-Markku
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Centre-right parties have played a central role in stabilising European party politics and advancing European integration, but the increased fragmentation of party systems and the rise of the radical right present serious challenges to them. The way that centre-right parties respond has important implications for domestic and EU politics alike. Many European centre-right parties have become divided on their political profile and programme, debating between leaning towards the progressive-liberal or the conservative-authoritarian end of the political spectrum. In Germany, the rise of the radical-right AfD has fuelled disagreements within the CDU/CSU and generated demands to sharpen its profile. However, this has thus far not led to major changes to the CDU/CSU’s platform, as it is also challenged from the political centre by the SPD and the Greens. In Sweden, the Moderates have clearly reshaped their political agenda in the last decade, focusing on immigration and law-and-order issues, as well as adopting positions and rhetoric reminiscent of the SD. This shift culminated in the formation of a Moderate-led coalition government supported by the SD in late 2022.
- Topic:
- Politics, European Union, and Political Parties
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Germany, and Sweden
78. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe
- Author:
- Lauri Tahtinen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America
79. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa
- Author:
- Kristin Adeoti
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Estonia
80. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
- Topic:
- Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
81. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?
- Author:
- Steven Blockmans
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
82. British Nuclear Policy
- Author:
- Peter Watkins
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia
83. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region
- Author:
- Iro Särkkä
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
84. Military Command and Control
- Author:
- Gintaras Bagdonas
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
85. NATO’s new Defence Plans
- Author:
- Mārtiņš Vargulis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States
86. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership
- Author:
- Henrik Larsen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
87. Defence Spending
- Author:
- Margarita Šešelgytė
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
- Topic:
- NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
88. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?
- Author:
- Tato Kvamladze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
89. French Nuclear Policy
- Author:
- Jean-Louis Lozier
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and France
90. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation
- Author:
- N. Lill
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
- Topic:
- Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Italy
91. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union
- Author:
- Simone Bunse
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Europe
92. The Arctic is Hot: Addressing the Social and Environmental Implications
- Author:
- Emilie Broek
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The Arctic is becoming more hotly contested and attracting new developments. The European Union (EU) is one actor that is turning to the Arctic to achieve its climate, energy, space-related and security goals. However, this increased interest can result in negative social and environmental local implications if not properly planned for and considered. This SIPRI Policy Brief provides an overview of the EU’s focus on the Arctic, with a particular focus on Kiruna, and the importance of human-centred and precautionary approaches.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Space, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Arctic
93. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP
- Author:
- Timo Smit
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe
94. The Fourteen Facts about US Aid to Ukraine
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Since Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years, Russian troops have ravaged Ukraine’s cities, raped its women, and stolen its children. Russian missiles and Iranian drones strike Ukrainian cities daily, often hitting civilian targets. Russia is the aggressor. Ukraine is the victim. For Americans who believe in respect for national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine is natural. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the resources required to give them a fighting chance. Meanwhile, Russia is among America’s top geopolitical adversaries. As former Secretary of State and Hudson Distinguished Fellow Mike Pompeo said last week, a Russian victory “would be felt well beyond Ukraine’s borders, including by strengthening a Russia-China-Iran alliance that aims to weaken the US and our allies across the globe.” As Congress debates additional support for Ukraine, detractors will spread false and misleading information. It is important to understand the facts.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America
95. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative
- Author:
- Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
96. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
97. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia
98. Seven Ways to Deepen NATO-Ukraine Relations at the Vilnius Summit
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- NATO will hold a major summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, from July 11 to 12, and Ukraine will undoubtedly be a top agenda item. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently said that the summit should present “a clear plan on when and how Ukraine will enter [NATO].” Meanwhile, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that “there is no alternative to Ukraine's accession to NATO.” With expectations high, NATO leaders and policymakers need to start developing a plan to keep Ukraine on the path to eventual membership while deepening NATO-Ukraine relations. With some creative thinking and political will, the summit could serve NATO’s interests and meet the Ukrainian government’s reasonable and understandable expectations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
99. Winning in Ukraine Is Critically Important for Deterring a War in Taiwan
- Author:
- John P. Walters
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Below are remarks by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters during a debate over whether winning in Ukraine is important for deterring a war in Taiwan. To view the debate, click here. I support the judgment of the commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, who was recently asked by Senator Roger Wicker, “There’s some people who feel our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific. . . . What do you say?” Adm. Aquilino replied, “Senator I do not . . . I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.” Why is Adm. Aquilino correct in linking the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of Communist Chinese aggression to our support for Ukraine? First, US victory in Ukraine is essential for generating support for Taiwan at home. Winning in Ukraine will help generate the domestic resolve to fight for Taiwan. If we pull back from Ukraine, however, the US will strengthen those isolationists who pit baby formula against defense spending. Success creates a slipstream of confidence, which the country is currently lacking after our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. A victory in Ukraine can restore confidence in our ability to win wars—at home and abroad.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
100. Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters to Americans
- Author:
- Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Ukraine aid is a good investment for the US. The United States has given Ukraine $43.7 billion in military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion last year. This is about 5 percent of America’s fiscal year 2023 defense budget, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. Ukraine is degrading one of America’s two major adversaries. Ukraine has destroyed more than 11,350 pieces of Russian military equipment, including 2,164 main battle tanks, 2,566 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 pieces of towed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 84 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and 12 naval ships—all without shedding a single drop of US blood. President Zelensky: “Ukraine never asked American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us.” Ukraine matters to the US economy. In 2021, Europe accounted for $3.19 trillion of foreign capital investment in the US (out of a total of $4.98 trillion). In 2022, 45 out of 50 states—including the largest single-state economy, California—exported more goods to Europe than to China. Ukraine shapes global commodities markets. Ukraine ranks in the top ten in the production of corn, wheat, barley, sunflower, sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and canola. It has reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals in the world, including titanium, iron, lithium, coal, and other energy deposits. At present, Russia occupies Ukrainian territory containing at least $12.4 trillion worth of raw materials.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and North America