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Begin New Search Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years

671. Lithuania, China and EU lawfare to counter economic coercion

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Without any formal notification, China recently declined customs clearances for shipments from Lithuanian firms in the pharmaceutical, electronics, and food sectors, and warned multinationals of secondary sanctions if they did not sever their ties with Lithuania. These covert actions were taken in response to Lithuania’s invitation to Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims as its own territory, to open a ‘representative office’ in Vilnius. No other country has ever found itself at the receiving end of such intense and politically motivated Chinese economic pressure. These actions on the part of the PRC are politically explosive because it raises serious questions about the international conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If it can simply wipe a country off its trade book, a state belonging to the EU’s customs territory no less, then what does it mean to be a member of the WTO, or a signatory to any other number of international agreements? And, given the lamentable state the WTO is in: could the European Commission’s newly proposed anti-coercion instrument bring any solace to Lithuania and the EU?
Topic:
Law, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Lithuania

672. EU defence projects: Balancing Member States, money and management

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
European Defence Union (EDU) initiatives are proceeding at full steam ahead with the political backing of both the EU institutions and key Member States. The fourth wave of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects is but a recent example of such, with the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) set to dole out its first tranche of European Defence Fund (EDF) appropriations in the coming months. Alongside this, the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) annual defence data report has highlighted the progress made in EU-wide defence expenditure, despite the economic fallout from Covid-19. The framework guiding the consolidation of a dynamic and integrated European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), however, requires some fine-tuning. If EDU initiatives are to incentivise more inclusive and better funded projects essential to remedying the shortfalls identified by the EDA’s Capability Development Priorities (CDPs), reducing the number of systems operated at EU level, and enhancing interoperability, then several key proposals outlined in this paper should be considered.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Money, Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

673. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition

Author:
Raimondo Lanza
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Italy’s new far-right government has been widely perceived as the potential weak spot of the anti-Kremlin European front following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: traditionally pro-Putin politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi are back in power. Yet, after Mario Draghi’s hawkish Euro-Atlantic government fell in July and Giorgia Meloni was looking forward to a probable victory, she immediately sided with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in a firm condemnation of Russia. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition Download 0.66 Mo Key takeways: Italy’s good relations with Putin’s Russia have not been the prerogative of a specific party. Political, economic and energy ties developed significantly with center-left and center-right governments alike. In line with most far-right parties in the EU, Salvini’s Northern League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy developed an appreciation for Putin’s neo-conservative regime while criticizing the EU and NATO for damaging Italy’s entente with Moscow. A potential reconciliation with Moscow goes against Italy’s national interest at this point. Russia accounts for only 1.5% of Italy’s exports against its Western partners’80%. Besides, the EU’s interconnected gas market requires a coordinated plan to overcome the energy crisis. Finally, the reconquest of Kherson by Ukraine in November makes support for the Kremlin political suicide. Meloni’s sudden pro-NATO shift has taken much of her electorate by surprise, while support for Ukraine is low in the country. Coalition allies Salvini and Berlusconi are ready to take advantage of this gap to weaken Meloni’s leadership. This is typical of Italy’s fragile parliamentary democracy. To avoid further disappointing her electorate, Meloni is rapidly satisfying other demands of theirs, on issues such as migration, family values and tax policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Right-Wing Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

674. The impact of EU sanctions on Belarus will be limited

Author:
Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The current Belarusian crisis was set off by a disputed presidential election on 9 August 2020, which gave Alexander Lukashenko his sixth term in office. Once again, the EU’s capacity for leadership was put to the test. When faced with the escalating post-election crisis in Belarus, the EU acted relatively fast, and after at­tempts to establish a dialogue failed, first sanctions followed in October 2020. The sanctions policy sent a signal to the Belarusian regime that EU member states can reach a common agreement. However, according to regional experts, the sanctions should have been broader and implemented earlier to show support for Belarusian society. Tougher sanctions were introduced when a Ryanair flight was forced to land in Minsk in May 2021. The extended sanctions package that followed increased the targeting of financial assets and state companies that are important contributors to the Belarusian state’s budget. Broader personal and sectoral sanctions hit Belarusian national industry and Alexander Lukas­henko’s immediate political circles. In response, he has engineered a migration crisis on the EU’s external border in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia that is destabili­sing the security situation in the region. The effectiveness of the new sanctions remains limited, as even those high state officials who have been targeted generally do not travel extensively or hold assets abroad. Moreover, while some of the sectoral sanctions are particularly aggravating to, for example, Belarusian transportation and logistics sectors (e.g., banning air carriers such as Belavia), they have sometimes targeted companies that do not have very strong trading links with the West, but that cooperate extensively with Russia (e.g., the production of ma­chines for exports to the east). There are also nume­rous loopholes in the sanction’s regime (e.g., exceptions made for imports of potash fertilizers) that undermine its effectiveness and have been blamed on certain lobby groups in Europe connected to businesses that trade with the Belarusian regime. Furthermore, loopholes seem to have been left in place intentionally to leave room for future dialogue with Belarus.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

675. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

676. Greenland obviously has its own defense policy

Author:
Sara Olsvig and Urik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Historically, Danish decisions have not always put Greenlandic interests first. Although defense policy is formally under Danish jurisdiction, decisions only have the legitimacy necessary if Greenland participates in the decision-making processes. Because in Greenland, military activities and installations interfere intimately with civic society. Increased rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic produces challenging issues for the constitutional community consisting of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland must make the role they each want to play in the international community clear and rethink the responsibilities and coordination procedures of the community. Otherwise, Greenland and Denmark risk contributing to increased tension in the Arctic – and Greenland risks missing out on potential gains from the growing attention from the great powers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Greenland

677. Global rivalry in the Red Sea: A ‘Geopolitical’ European Union should encourage cooperation in the Red Sea region

Author:
Fabrizzio Tassinari and Mehari Taddele Maru
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Geopolitical competition in Africa is here to stay, and the question for the EU is not if but how to position itself in this global competition. In the case of the Red Sea region, the EU should support regional initiatives to build effective regional maritime governance and promote global public goods such as maritime security and the blue economy. Under the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission has branded itself a ‘Geopolitical Commission’. With regard to geopolitics, the Red Sea has for years been seen as a primary focus of action, a point the European Council stressed in July 2021, when it identified the region as a ‘geostrategic priority’. In 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, finding that there was ‘renewed geopolitical competition on both shores of the Red Sea’. The EU further stressed that ‘at stake are the preservation of the security of the Bab el Mandeb maritime route through which a significant proportion of trade to and from Europe passes; the harnessing of irregular migration flows; the containment of terrorist threats; and the prevention of instability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood’.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, International Organization, Governance, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Red Sea

678. The Treaty of Aachen, 2019: Opportunities to Strengthen French–German Cooperation on Sustainable Development

Author:
Laura-Theresa Krüger and Julie Vaillé
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
On 22 January 2019, France and Germany signed the Aachen Treaty. Therein, 56 years after the Elysée Treaty, re-emphasising their support for multilateralism, sustainable development and development cooperation. Despite the ambitions expressed in this document, the signing of the Treaty calls for reflection: to what extent does this type of agreement indeed lead to joint operational approaches and have a real impact on French–German cooperation? To answer this question, this Briefing Paper analyses the obstacles to a closer French–German cooperation in the field of sustainable international development. It focuses on how these commitments are put into practice at the level of political coordination and project implementation. The analysis is based on about 20 interviews with representatives of French and German ministries, development agencies and think tanks. It finds that things get most complicated at the level of political coordination. Three main obstacles are identified: slightly diverging strategic visions; an incompatibility between institutional structures concerning the degree of specialisation and the mandates of the ministries responsible for steering aid, as well as the degree to which development agencies are involved in strategic decision-making; and cultural particularities regarding communication and time management. Five recommendations are proposed: 1. Protect what has been achieved: the alignment between France and Germany at the political and project implementation levels is an asset in an international context where the focus on national interests is increasing. Such cooperation should thus continue to be supported and reinforced. 2. Channel the political momentum to the working level: in order to reinforce their coordination, the two countries could establish a solid and regular follow-up mechanism for each commitment, detailing joint actions, shared objectives and milestones. 3. Promote mutual knowledge and trust: personnel exchange between the departments, as well as deep dive sessions on the two countries’ activities and strategies would allow increased understanding of each other. 4. Share best practices: a balanced and respectful French–German collaboration could be encouraged by the sharing of practices for which one country is more advanced or better positioned than the other (such as the French interministerial coordination or the German project evaluation and monitoring procedures). 5. Act jointly or divide the work: in the run-up to each joint Franco-German action, make a deliberate and conscious decision whether the two countries have an interest to act jointly or to divide the work. This decision would allow maximisation of the impact, either by specialising or by working together.
Topic:
Development, Treaties and Agreements, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

679. Europe under US Monetary Hegemony: How the COVID-19 Pandemic Will Undermine a 100-Year-Old Relationship

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This policy study is based on the newly released book, Europe’s Century of Crises under Dollar Hegemony: A Dialogue on the Global Tyranny of Unsound Money, by Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot, published by Palgrave Macmillan. One hundred years ago, the United States emerged from the First World War and its immediate aftermath, including the Spanish flu pandemic, as the global monetary hegemon, exercising immense power over the Old Continent. This new power quickly became the source of huge instability in Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. After World War II, the Bretton Woods system set new contours for US monetary hegemony, ultimately resulting in the great economic crisis of 1973–75. This woeful history continues to the present day: Dollar hegemony has not been a force for good. It could have been different. The United States and Europe would both have gained from a US hegemony based on sound money principle. Instead, the guiding characteristic of US monetary power has been inflation, especially around election time. According to the doctrine made notorious by Treasury Secretary John Connally, who served under President Nixon, “the dollar is our currency but your problem.” The US monetary regime’s further lurch toward fundamental unsoundness during the COVID-19 pandemic is not getting the new century of US monetary hegemony off to a new start. The “known unknown” is whether forces will emerge in Europe that will again challenge US inflationary dominance, as occurred under Germany’s leadership in the 1970s. Could high inflation in the post-pandemic US economy cause US monetary hegemony over Europe to crumble?
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, History, Monetary Policy, Hegemony, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

680. Brexit: An Assessment of Zambia- UK Trade & Investment Relations

Author:
Shimukunki Manchishi and Mwanda Phiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Following the Brexit referendum held in the UK in 2016 that resulted in a majority vote to leave the EU, there has been speculation and uncertainty surrounding the likely impact of Brexit on trade relations between the UK and developing countries such as Zambia. With Brexit, comes the exit of the UK from the EU, its customs union as well as the single market. Consequently, this implies that Zambia’s trade with the UK will no longer be under the ambit of the EU Everything But Arms (EBA) trade agreement which grants Zambian products other than arms, duty-free and quota-free market access to the UK. Naturally, this brings about questions of the likely impact of Brexit on trade relations between Zambia and the UK which thus far, has been determined collectively under the framework of the EU since the UK’s accession to the EU customs union. In this policy paper, we provide a contextual analysis of the same. From this, we deduce that a ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’ Brexit is not likely to adversely impact the UK’s trade with Zambia. This is on condition that the UK’s own unilateral preference scheme comes into place and in time, to replicate the EU-EBA scheme with no disruption to traders. On the Investment front, although the UK has been Zambia’s fourth-largest source country for FDI inflows over the period 2010-2017, investments have been waning. Brexit has the potential to turn things around as the UK seeks to increase investments in other jurisdictions outside of the EU. With the UK now envisioning to become the largest G7 investor in Africa by 2022, there is a high probability that Brexit could lead to a positive investment crowding in effect, provided Zambia becomes a more attractive investment destination.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Brexit, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and Zambia