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2. ASEAN's medium- to long-term trade strategies and the direction of RoK-ASEAN cooperation
- Author:
- Sungil Kwak, Seungjin Cho, Jaewan Cheong, Jaeho Lee, Mingeum Shin, Nayoun Park, and So Eun Kim
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- In recent years, the U.S.-China hegemony competition has intensified, dividing the world into two blocs. ASEAN has long culti-vated its position on the international stage by maintaining a certain distance between the United States and China. In that sense, ASEAN is the best partner for Korea to ef-fectively respond to the divided world. Therefore, this study seeks the directions of cooperation with ASEAN in supply chain, digital trade, climate change response, and health and development cooperation in line with changes in the international order.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and ASEAN
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
3. Network and Text Analysis on Digital Trade Agreements
- Author:
- Kyu Yub Lee, Cheon-Kee Lee, Won Seok Choi, Jyun-Hyun Eom, and Unjung Whang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- We use the Trade Agreements Provisions on Electronic Commerce and Data and their corresponding texts to undertake network and text analysis on trade agreements with digital trade chapters to identify which countries are important in the network and how similar or different their texts of digital trade chapters are. centrality values reflect which countries are influential in the network, while values of similarity assess the level of similarity between the texts of digital trade chapters concluded by these countries. Centrality and similarity are complementary in assessing the relative positions of countries in the network, where the number of linkages between countries is significant in centrality and the quality of digital trade chapters is critical in similarity. We interpret this to mean that a country with a high degree of centrality is likely to be a rule-promoter in the network, whereas a country with a high degree of similarity is likely to be a rule-maker. The brief highlights three key findings from network and text analysis of digital trade agreements: (1) The U.S. has been the best rule-maker but not the best rule-promoter, whereas Singapore has been the best rule-promoter but not the best rule-maker. (2) China is a rule-maker, but to a weaker extent than the U.S., and Korea is a rule-promoter, although it is less active than Singapore. (3) Japan and Australia have served as both rule-makers and rule-promoters. Identification of countries’ relative positions in the network of digital trade agreements would be useful at the start of talks on digital trade policy.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and United States of America
4. China's Green Transition Policies and Its Implications for Korea
- Author:
- Won Seok Choi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- In China, carbon emissions from the energy and heat producing sector account for 53.4% of total emissions, with industry (28.6%) and transportation (8.9%) being the main carbon emission sectors. Therefore, various green transition policies in energy, industry and transportation are being pursued in Chinese cities. In Chinese cities, the promotion of rooftop-distributed photovoltaic power generation, among renewable energy sources, is evaluated to be capable of intensive development, reducing power peak load, and inducing residents to consume green energy. Policies are being implemented in urban industries to reduce pollution and carbon emissions, increase energy use efficiency, improve resource use levels, and improve green manufacturing systems. In the transportation sector, China's policies to reduce emissions, expand the supply of new energy vehicles, and strengthen green transportation technology are representative. Consequently, this study summarizes the policy implications, areas of Korea-China cooperation, and risk factors of China's green transition promotion plan for its Chinese cities.
- Topic:
- Transportation, Industry, Carbon Emissions, Energy, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
5. Strategies of Multinational Companies Entering China in the Era of U.S.-China Competition and Implications for Korea
- Author:
- Sang Baek Hyun, Ji Young Moon, Min-suk Park, Jonghyuk Oh, and Yunmi Oh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- With the integration of resources and markets around the world sparked by the trend of globalization, multinational companies have continued to grow at a rapid pace. In particular, global manufacturers have maintained their competitiveness by distributing resources more efficiently while establishing a global value chain with China as their main production hub. However, measures taken by the U.S. to block China’s access to technology and supply chains in some high-tech industries have prompted discussions on reorganization of the global supply chain, placing these multinational companies in an uncertain situation concerning their operations in China. At a time when competition between the U.S. and China is intensifying, it is necessary to look at the response strategies of global companies that have entered China and seek effective countermeasures for Korean companies.
- Topic:
- Economics, Multinational Corporations, Manufacturing, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
6. Why the proposed Brussels buyers club to procure critical minerals is a bad idea
- Author:
- Cullen Hendrix
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- Concerned about critical mineral supply chains and its own strategic vulnerabilities, the European Union is advancing a buyers club to procure minerals critical to the clean energy transition, such as bauxite, cobalt, lithium, and nickel. The European Union is deeply dependent on imports of both raw and processed critical minerals and materials and thus highly exposed to global price volatility. The door appears to be open for the United States or other EU trading partners and like-minded countries to join this club. Decarbonization is not the only impetus behind the proposed Brussels buyers club. Both the European Union and United States view China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains as a national security issue, because these minerals are key inputs to modern military technology. Hendrix agrees that supply chains for critical minerals desperately need widening to meet projected global demand and tackle climate change mitigation, but he warns that a purchasers club would not be a step in the right direction. A buyers club would be prone to free riding, set up distributive conflicts within the European Union, and reduce the share of climate mitigation benefits accruing to critical mineral–producing countries, many of which are developing and middle-income economies.
- Topic:
- Economics, National Security, European Union, Supply Chains, and Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
7. Will China's impending overhaul of its financial regulatory system make a difference?
- Author:
- Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Véron
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Abstract:
- China's reshuffle of its financial supervisory architecture announced in March, like previous changes, appears incremental rather than radical. It will not, however, resolve the main challenge hobbling China’s financial system, which is not linked to specific choices of supervisory architecture but rather to the unfinished transition from a state-directed to a market-based financial system and the way the Chinese Communist Party's pervasive role creates obstacles to good corporate governance of individual financial firms and to the independence of supervisory authorities. Too often, political authorities and sometimes the supervisors themselves intervene directly in financial firms’ decisions to allocate capital and credit, occasionally resulting in failures of risk control and risk management. The authors argue that Chinese reformers should aim at a clearer and more rigorous division of responsibilities, in which financial firms manage financial opportunities and risks, and supervisors are exclusively focused on their respective public policy mandates.
- Topic:
- Economics, Regulation, Finance, and Corporate Governance
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
8. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa
- Author:
- Dale Aluf
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa
9. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes
- Author:
- Tiffany Vora
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
10. China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources
- Author:
- Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent. In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively. The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.
- Topic:
- Natural Resources, Economy, Business, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Inclusion
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa
11. Potential and Pitfalls for African Industrialization in Chinese-built Standard Gauge Railways
- Author:
- Yunnan Chen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
- Abstract:
- Railway development has been a key feature of transport infrastructure investments in several African economies, with several new standard gauge railways (SGR) built in the last ten years in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Kenya. These planned projects have also entailed substantial Chinese involvement through construction contractors, in financing, and in the operations and management, becoming part of the wider Chinese discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They also have significant potential in supporting the industrialization plans of African states, and in some cases, have been explicitly linked to plans for a green transformation. This brief draws from case studies across Africa with a focus on Ethiopia, to highlight the significant potential of railway investments as a low-cost, low-carbon transport for green industrialization, but also its pitfalls and challenges as an infrastructure for governance, and local technology transfer.
- Topic:
- Development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Industrialization, and Railways
- Political Geography:
- China and Africa
12. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
13. Will China’s new financial regulatory reform be enough to meet the challenges?
- Author:
- Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Veron
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Effective financial supervision plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and a healthy financial system. China’s leadership has made financial risk a core priority, and in reforms approved in March 2023, it reassigned regulatory responsibilities, creating a new supervisory body that will take over some responsibilities from the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, and the securities regulator. The aim is that a change to the financial supervisory architecture (who does what in financial supervision) will make China’s system more effective and stable. In this policy brief, we argue that this incremental reform will not solve the core issues China faces in financial supervisory effectiveness. We provide an overview of China’s large and complex financial system, including its largely state-owned banks (some of which are the largest in the world by assets), securities markets and other financial intermediaries. Traditional divisions between different types of activities and institutions have been blurred by the rise of large financial conglomerates, risk-transfer techniques and internet-based finance. Reforms in 2018 to China’s supervisory architecture did not eliminate perceived shortcomings, including failures to effectively regulate financial conglomerates, fintech and regional banks. We then survey global benchmarks against which China’s financial supervisory architecture can be compared, including the United States and European Union. China’s supervisory system is already more streamlined, at least on paper, than either of these most comparable global counterparts. Like them, China’s system does not correspond exactly to any of the three textbook archetypes of supervision: sectoral, twin-peaks or integrated supervision. Ultimately, the effectiveness of China’s financial supervisory architecture suffers from excessive state intervention in the financial system through other channels, including through the unique and pervasive influence of the communist party, which hampers supervisory independence and makes it difficult to establish accountability for regulatory failures. While the recently announced reform may improve coordination across supervisory bodies, coordination within the new quasi-integrated supervisor, across central departments, and between them and local branches, will remain a challenge.
- Topic:
- Reform, Regulation, Finance, and Financial Stability
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
14. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade
- Author:
- Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
- Topic:
- National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment
- Author:
- Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Pacific
16. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine
17. Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China
- Author:
- Zichong Chen and Daniel Jacob
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions released its first publication in May 2023: a research brief titled “Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China.” The Initiative is one of five interdisciplinary research clusters funded by the Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability at Harvard University. The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements collaborates in the implementation of the Initiative. The brief summarizes research by Professor Daniel Jacob and postdoctoral fellow Zichong Chen, atmospheric scientists at Harvard University, with their colleagues. Jacob and Chen use high-resolution data from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI), onboard a satellite launched in 2017, to estimate national and sectoral methane emissions more accurately than has been possible in the past. They draw upon atmospheric transport models to invert the satellite observations of methane concentrations, using advanced statistical methods, and infer emissions quantities and locations from the observed atmospheric concentrations. This method has yielded generally higher estimates of emissions than in previous reports, including in the case of China. Future methane-initiative briefs will address similar research the authors and their colleagues are conducting in the United States, Latin America, North Africa, and other countries and regions. An accurate picture of aggregate and sector-level methane emissions is important to better target mitigation policies. It is hoped that the results of the research described here and in subsequent briefs will advance national efforts and international collaboration aimed at reducing methane emissions. The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions seeks meaningful and sustained progress in global methane-emissions reductions through research and effective engagement with policymakers in government and key stakeholders in business, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. Reduced methane emissions can significantly reduce, in the near term, the magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts. The Initiative’s objectives span the full range of disciplines and topics associated with this challenge. Among its objectives are to build on scientific research on measurement and attribution of emissions; understand legal, regulatory, and political opportunities and constraints to methane-emissions reductions in the United States; design policies that might best contribute to methane emissions reduction; work effectively through existing international venues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and define roles that business and international and multilateral organizations can play in this effort.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Methane, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
18. Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance
- Author:
- Calvin Heng and Eyck Freymann
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The strategic interests of Asian countries in the Arctic continue to grow despite the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have their eye on Russia’s Arctic energy resources, and China is further seeking to leverage Russian weakness to expand its operational presence in the Arctic Ocean. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are less prominent in Arctic regional institutions, yet they have distinctive interests in Arctic science, governance, and resources and are resuming dialogue about Arctic matters amongst themselves. This policy brief reviews the key differences in how Asian states are approaching the Arctic through a survey of their strategic documents, public statements, and diplomatic and commercial activities.
- Topic:
- Governance, Multilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Asia, South Korea, Singapore, and Arctic
19. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours
- Author:
- Yang Jiang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
20. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
- Topic:
- Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
21. Second Meeting in Beijing: China-Facilitated Iran-Saudi diplomatic reconciliation efforts amid US apprehensions
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- On April 6, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, signed a joint statement in Beijing announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which follows a tripartite agreement signed under China's auspices on March 10.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Reconciliation, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
22. Intertwined Interest: What’s behind China-Ivory Coast strengthened relations?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The diplomatic relation between China and Ivory Coast spans over more than four decades. Both sides have strengthened their relations in recent years as China looks to cement its presence in Africa.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Ivory Coast
23. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action
- Author:
- Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
24. Competition Versus Exclusion in U.S.–China Relations: A Choice Between Stability and Conflict
- Author:
- Jake Werner
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration’s China policy is pulling in two different directions, but the tension is not widely recognized because every antagonistic measure aimed at China is filed under the heading of competition. As a result, Washington’s debate on China loses the crucial distinction between “competition” — a kind of connection with the potential to be carried on in healthy ways — and “exclusion,” an attempt to sever connection that necessarily leads to conflict if the domain is significant. Biden’s exclusion policies focus on cutting China out of the principal growth sectors in the global economy and the most lucrative and strategically important markets. Administration officials think their approach is sensible and moderate compared to more extreme voices in Washington calling for exclusion in all realms. Even so, the Biden approach is highly destabilizing because both countries consider the targeted areas vital to the future of global authority and economic prosperity, and because the attempt to trap China in a position of permanent subordination represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of China’s leaders. Healthy competition requires a shared stake in the future. In earlier periods, despite sharp tensions and mutual suspicions suffusing the relationship, U.S.–China ties were stabilized first by the joint project of containing Soviet power and then by a shared commitment to market–led globalization. Now that leaders on both sides are disenchanted with key facets of globalization, the two countries are caught in an escalatory cycle of exclusion and retaliation that risks hardening zero–sum pressures in the global system into a permanent structure of hostility. In such a scenario, each country would organize its own society and international partners to undermine the other, dramatically increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The warning signs are already clear on both sides, as each increasingly interprets every action on the other side as part of a conspiracy to achieve domination. Notwithstanding widespread complacency about the risks of conflict after a tentative diplomatic opening in recent months, the rise of securitized thinking in both countries is steadily building institutional and ideological momentum for confrontation that can only be broken by a new and inclusive direction for the relationship.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
25. Common Good Diplomacy: A Framework for Stable U.S.–China Relations
- Author:
- Jake Werner
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- One curious feature of the emerging U.S.–China conflict is that each side claims to be defending the existing international order against the threat the other poses to it. Hidden beneath this seemingly irreconcilable dispute is a crucial truth: both the United States and China are status quo powers, sharing a deep interest in a stable global security environment and an open global economy. At the same time, both countries are pursuing urgently needed reforms to a global system increasingly defined by zero–sum pressures. Yet both are prone to exclusionary impulses that threaten to ruin the possibility of a shared reform agenda and instead throw the world into conflict. Working with China to revitalize the international order would not only prevent such a conflict, it would also establish the conditions for healthy forms of both competition and cooperation in the U.S.–China relationship. But how can U.S. leaders pursue such a project without simply giving a pass to China’s sometimes undesirable behavior? The focus should be diplomacy to frame an inclusive global system, focusing on actions that would reduce zero–sum constraints. In the three key realms of global authority and security, the global economy, and climate change, China is currently engaged in counterproductive moves that exacerbate existing tensions but is also pursuing promising reforms that could expand the scope for positive–sum outcomes. Rather than seeking to counter every Chinese initiative, U.S. leaders should carefully distinguish between beneficial and damaging outcomes, affirming and building on China’s constructive proposals and managing differences through negotiation rather than polemics and confrontation. Some potentially fruitful areas for cooperation include joint action to limit climate change, development in the Global South, revising the global guidelines for economic statecraft, and reforming international institutions to create a more open and inclusive world order. Pursuing cooperative efforts in such areas would both create direct benefits and improve U.S. credibility as a responsible leader of the world order rather than simply a rival of China. It would also open space to pursue competition within a rules–based order rather than risk a slide into destructive zero–sum conflict.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
26. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition
- Author:
- Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
- Topic:
- European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
27. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation
- Author:
- N. Lill
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
- Topic:
- Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Italy
28. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- John Lee
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
29. The “Odious” Legacy of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: The Case of Angola
- Author:
- Rafael Marques de Morais and Thomas J. Duesterberg
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Within days of taking office, China’s new foreign minister, Qin Gang, was on a plane to his country’s main African client: Angola. Landing in Luanda on January 12, Qin Gang was ostensibly bringing a gift—a $250 million loan to help Angola expand high-speed broadband. Some gifts, however, are not what they seem, and some of the recent financial gifts from Chinese sources have been toxic. Soon after Qin visited Angola, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to three African countries but skipped Angola, possibly because of its checkered history with Chinese development assistance. The case of Angola raises questions about the extent and nature of Chinese loans and infrastructure aid to a growing number of African nations, as well as the consequences of such loans on those countries’ relations with the US.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, Trade, Development Assistance, and Loans
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Angola, and United States of America
30. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China
- Author:
- Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia
31. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses
- Author:
- Ellen Bork
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
32. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East
- Author:
- Yair Albeck
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
- Political Geography:
- China and Middle East
33. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa
- Author:
- Joshua Meservey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America
34. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security
- Author:
- Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean
35. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world
- Author:
- Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
36. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions
- Author:
- Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
- Topic:
- Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
37. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption
- Author:
- Josh Rudolph
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus
38. Forging European Unity on China: The Case of Hungarian Dissent
- Author:
- Ties Dams
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- EU Member states can be divided on China, even on issues such as human rights. Often singled out as an agent of division is the Hungarian government of prime minister Viktor Orbán. Hungarian dissent begs the question: how can the EU move forward on China given Hungary’s strategy of obstructive dissent? European cooperation ought not wait for unanimity, nor should it rely on value-politics: member states should play the power game to circumvent or break lingering impasses. Member States should support setting up a 27+1 Forum as the main platform for European China-policy, form a leading group tackling strategic corruption and corrosive capital, and initiative a track 1.5 dialogue on China with Germany and the Visegrád Countries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Hungary
39. Ukraine: Toward a Prolonged War of Attrition Fuelling Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Russia and China no longer need to play by the rules of the Euro-American international order. It is therefore likely that in this uncertain period of flux, the major four powers will vie to win friends and allies, giving second-tier powers like Turkey and India more influence if they can ably manage their foreign relations and avoid unnecessary alignment with any of the four major powers.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
40. Economic Equidistance is Not an Option: Germany and the US-Chinese Geo-Economic Conflict
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Intensifying US-Chinese rivalry will increase pressure on Germany to support a more hawkish US geo-economic policy. The new German government should give Washington support in as far as US policies seek to create an economic level playing field vis-à-vis China. Given its dependence on international trade and investment, Germany should seek to resist a broader politicization of international economic relations.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Germany, and United States of America
41. Japan's "Economic Security" Measures
- Author:
- Didi Kirsten Tatlow and Afra Herr
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Japan and Germany face an acute dilemma. China, a key trading partner for both nations, uses political warfare and economic statecraft to advance its interests. Like Germany, Japan has a strong SME economy and auto industry, and has dependencies on China. Yet Japan faces more risk due to its geographical proximity to China and territorial disputes. As global tensions grow, Japan is responding robustly by building economic security. Germany, together with the EU and other like-minded partners, should do the same.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Politics, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, and Germany
42. Promoting the Euro – Countering Secondary Sanctions: Germany Should Push to Complete Monetary Union
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- US-Chinese rivalry will increasingly play out in the geo-economic realm. The use of secondary sanctions – especially secondary dollar sanctions – negatively affects German economic interests. The new German government should therefore intensify efforts to promote the euro as an international currency coequal to the dollar in addition to lending its qualified support to EU anti-coercion policies.
- Topic:
- Economics, Sanctions, European Union, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
43. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
- Topic:
- NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America
44. China’s Global Vision Vacuum: An Opportunity and Challenge for Europe
- Author:
- Tim Rühlig
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- China seems to strive to redefine the global order around sovereignty and a strong state. Yet is China engaging in a constitutive process shaped by the global economy; or is it an imperial power pursuing national sovereignty at any cost? In the West, there are very different answers to this question. This ambiguity is not by design but rather indicates that China lacks a coherent vision for the world. If the EU is to exploit this, it needs to understand why.
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, Economy, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
45. Ending Primacy to End U.S. Wars
- Author:
- Daniel Bessner
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- • If America’s decision-makers are to learn from the Iraq War (2003–11), they must recognize it not as an aberration or an isolated mistake, but as a direct consequence of the U.S. search for primacy in the Middle East. The Iraq War was overdetermined in that tensions between the U.S. and Iraq were rooted fundamentally in Iraq’s perceived challenge to U.S. regional dominance. Consequently, in the “unipolar moment,” a U.S. effort to change the regime in Baghdad was bound to occur after some spark, such as the September 11 attacks, set it in motion. • Today, a similar desire to sustain dominance in Asia places the U.S. on a collision course with China. To avoid war with China, policy elites must reconceive their commitment to primacy and recognize that the United States will not be able to dictate terms in its relations with others in an emergent multipolar world. • Some competition between the United States and China is probably inevitable. But this competition does not present an existential threat to the U.S. and therefore must not be allowed to prevent necessary cooperation to address the major threats of the 21st century: inequality, population movements, pandemics, and climate change.
- Topic:
- War, History, Hegemony, Military Intervention, and Gulf War
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, and United States of America
46. The Folly of Pushing South Korea Toward a China Containment Strategy
- Author:
- Jessica J. Lee and Sarang Shidore
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The narrow victory of conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the recent South Korean presidential election comes against the backdrop of an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, now compounded by the Ukraine crisis. Washington would like South Korea to play a security role in its Indo-Pacific strategy — a strategy that effectively aims to contain China. However, South Korean elites (and the general public) are deeply ambivalent and internally divided on the question of containing China. Pushing South Korea — a robust democracy with major elite divisions — toward containing Beijing risks negative consequences for the United States. These include a reduction in U.S. influence in South Korea, erosion of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, a less-effective South Korean presence in the region, and, in the long run, the potential of South Korean neutrality with respect to China. To avoid these negative outcomes for the United States, Washington should: • Avoid pressuring South Korea to join its China-containment strategy, • Refrain from including Seoul in emerging, non-inclusive, bloc-like structures of U.S. allies in Asia, • Consider pulling back on its intended new Terminal High Altitude Area Defense deployments until a greater consensus is reached within South Korea on the issue, • See South Korea’s role as a bridge and an opportunity to stabilize Washington’s own relationship with Beijing. For example, both South Korea and China could be included in non-traditional security activities of the Quad such as infrastructure and climate change, and • More generally, demilitarize the Quad and open it to wider participation for strengthening U.S. influence in Asia, rather than see it as a zero-sum vehicle for containing China.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Containment, and Quad Alliance
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
47. Development Competition is Heating Up: China’s Global Development Initiative and the G7 Partnership for Infrastructure and Global Alliance on Food Security
- Author:
- Sarah Cliffe and Karina Gerlach
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- Economic development issues are becoming increasingly geopolitical, as the form and importance of today’s agreement in Turkey on grain exports between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates. While today’s crucial agreement and the war of food security narratives between Russia and the West rightly grab the latest headlines, outside of the media spotlight development competition is also heating up between China and the West.
- Topic:
- Development, Infrastructure, Food Security, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Turkey, and Ukraine
48. Memo on an "Economic Article 5" to Counter Authoritarian Coercion
- Author:
- Ivo H. Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- The world's democracies need a way to fight back against coercive economic actions by authoritarian governments, argue Ivo Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Increasingly, authoritarian countries are using economic coercion against democracies. In recent years, China’s economic coercion of Lithuania and Australia stands out as a prominent example. Russia uses economic levers to achieve geopolitical aims, notably by weaponizing its natural resources. The aim of such coercion is to bend the will of democratic countries. This is a test for the free world. In response, we propose an Economic Article 5 among democracies to counter authoritarian coercion.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Economy, Business, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
49. Health of nations: How Europe can fight future pandemics
- Author:
- Anthony Dworkin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- As the crisis phase of covid-19 recedes, there is a chance to improve international cooperation on global health – but also a danger that competing reform proposals will lead to inaction. The EU can best support reform of pandemic preparedness and response if it takes account of the concerns of different global powers. The union should combine a push for reform of and increased funding for the WHO with support for a new fund for health emergencies, overseen by a representative group of countries. The EU should promote a new global compact on health, matching countries’ commitment to surveillance and reporting of pathogens with support for stronger healthcare systems and greater equity in the allocation of countermeasures. The EU-Africa relationship offers a chance to pioneer such an approach, but the EU will need to go further in this than it has so far. The EU should promote African vaccine manufacturing, including by pressing European pharmaceutical companies to transfer knowledge and technology to Africa.
- Topic:
- Health, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, and United States of America
50. Let a thousand contacts bloom: How China competes for influence in Bulgaria
- Author:
- Vladimir Shopov
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- China is a geopolitical latecomer to Bulgaria, having traditionally shown more interest in other countries in south-eastern Europe. Beijing has long struggled to gain influence in Bulgaria due to the country’s EU membership and entrenched interests in sectors such as infrastructure and energy. China has responded to this challenge by adopting a multi-track strategy of engagement with state and non-state actors at the national and subnational levels. Beijing has significantly expanded its subnational cooperation with Bulgaria in areas such as culture, education, agriculture, research, public procurement, and e-governance. China has focused on strengthening its frameworks of cooperation and building relationships with local elites to circumvent national policies. China’s growing presence in Bulgaria has concerning implications in areas such as technology transfers, agriculture, research, ‘smart city’ and governance projects, control of critical infrastructure, and public procurement.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Bulgaria
51. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East
- Author:
- Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
52. Byting back: The EU’s digital alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean
- Author:
- Carla Hobbs and José I. Torreblanca
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- China’s and Russia’s growing presence in Latin America and the Caribbean undermines democracy and Western influence in the region, along with the international rules-based order. The EU is responding to this threat by attempting to strengthen its relationships with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The bloc is attempting to build on their affinity for European values and rights, as well their preference for sustainable and inclusive development. Cooperation on digital technologies should be a priority in the effort, given the region’s need for greater connectivity. The Spanish presidency of the EU should lead the formation of a Digital Alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean at a summit scheduled for 2023. The EU can make this alliance work by focusing on connectivity investments, cyber-security, and rights to support Latin American countries’ digital transitions. The alliance will also require a long-term vision within the EU, commitments from member states, leadership by several Latin American countries, and public-private investment partnerships.
- Topic:
- European Union, Democracy, Alliance, and Digital Policy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Latin America
53. Beijing Winter Olympics 2022: Sports, Law, and Policies
- Author:
- Tim Harcourt, Deborah Healey, Keiji Kawai, and Yang Pei
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics were hosted amid the Covid-19 pandemic and surrounded by concerns and controversies. This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 3 February 2022 to examine four aspects of the Beijing Olympics: boycotts, COVID- 19 control, law reform, and the economics of the Olympics.
- Topic:
- Economics, Reform, Sports, Conflict, Olympics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
54. For a new European growth strategy
- Author:
- Nicolas Goetzmann
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The early 1990s saw the demise of the Soviet bloc, erasing more than forty years of competition with the United States: the rest of the decade witnessed the economic emergence of the People's Republic of China and the formal advent of the euro area as the economic powerhouse of the European Union. Two decades later, according to data published by the IMF, almost 60% of the world economy is now shared between these three dominant economic areas, the United States, China and the European Union, reshaping the face of the competition for global power.
- Topic:
- European Union, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, and IMF
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
55. US-China Roundtable on Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage
- Author:
- David B. Sandalow, Sally Qiu, and Zhiyuan Fan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- On November 17, 2021, New York time/November 18, 2021, Beijing time, the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and Energy Foundation-China convened an online roundtable on carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) in the United States and China. Scholars, industry officials and policy makers exchanged information and ideas concerning CCUS development in each country. Participants discussed the role of CCUS in achieving net zero emissions, focusing on three topics in particular: CCUS costs, strategies for utilization of carbon dioxide (CO2) and CCUS policies. This report summarizes key points made by participants at the roundtable, which was held under the Chatham House Rule.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
56. Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System
- Author:
- Barry Eichengreen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and a coalition of cooperating countries imposed harsh financial sanctions on the Russian government, corporations, and individuals.1 These sanctions bar Russian banks from using SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) to facilitate cross-border payments, prohibit banks from doing most forms of business with Russian entities, and freeze assets held abroad by the Central Bank of Russia in the form of treasury securities and bank deposits. These developments have led Russia, as well as other countries contemplating whether they might find themselves in the same position, to explore alternatives. Such options could include building a substitute for SWIFT to send instructions regarding cross-border interbank transactions; identifying financial counterparties other than Western banks with which to do international business and platforms other than Western clearinghouses through which to make payment; and finding a vehicle other than the dollar for denominating and executing transactions. Specifically, countries are looking to China, which has large internationally active banks, has created its own clearinghouse for cross-border transactions and is embarked on a campaign to encourage broader international use of its currency, the renminbi.2 This note investigates how far China has gone in creating alternatives to SWIFT, Western banks, and the dollar. It explores whether Russia and other countries might be drawn toward this parallel international financial universe and what economic and political implications this has—for the United States, for its geopolitical rivals, and for global economics and politics. China is making strides in fostering cross-border use of the renminbi and building a renminbi-based interbank payments system that can serve as an alternative to SWIFT and Western clearinghouses. However, these remain somewhat limited alternatives—for the moment. The situation could change faster if lent additional impetus by Western sanctions. Thus, countries such as the United States that employ financial sanctions should prepare for the development of alternative financial arrangements in China and possibly elsewhere. This may mean relying more heavily on nonfinancial measures insofar as financial sanctions eventually become less effective.
- Topic:
- Economics, Sanctions, Finance, Borders, and Banks
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
57. How China’s Human Capital Impacts Its National Competitiveness
- Author:
- Briana Boland, Kevin Dong, Jude Blanchette, and Ryan Haas
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- How will the strengths and weaknesses of China’s human capital impact national competitiveness? China’s efforts to maintain economic growth, strengthen supply chains, develop strategic science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors, and secure a modern military edge hinges on the ability to cultivate and utilize human capital. As the United States and other countries increasingly engage in multidomain competition with China, it is critical to start from a clear-eyed understanding of China’s human capital and Beijing’s strategy for nurturing national talent. Investments in higher education, strategic STEM sectors, and military talent demonstrate key areas in which Beijing is focusing on cultivating human capital. However, China must overcome significant obstacles to innovate as it faces substantial demographic pressures, socio-economic inequalities, and challenges to attracting and retaining top talent both domestically and internationally.
- Topic:
- Economics, Labor Issues, Human Capital, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
58. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective
- Author:
- Luis Simon
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
59. Who Leads China's 5G Technology Ecosystem? A Network Analysis of China's Cooperation on Association Standards
- Author:
- Won Seok Choi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- This study suggests who is leading the ecosystem of China's 5G industry through analysis of the association standard network. Our study finds that the Chinese government think tank is in the most important position in the related network. Our study also suggests that it is important to monitor association standards in China and strengthen the standard cooperation of companies, scholars, and institutes in the Korean ICT industry.
- Topic:
- Government, Science and Technology, Think Tanks, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
60. Analysis of Chinese Response Patterns to Diplomatic Friction and Its Influencing Factors
- Author:
- Jai Chul Heo
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- As China grows into a global power, it is forming a closer relationship with the international community. In the process, the nation is experiencing increasing levels of diplomatic friction, such as confrontation and conflict with other countries, as well as cooperation. Accordingly, this study analyzes China's response to various forms of diplomatic friction, as Korea seeks an effective response to possible friction with China in the future. More specifically, China's response to diplomatic friction was examined through various cases, with the aim of categorizing China’s response measures based on these examples. In addition, this study aims to prepare for possible friction with China in the future by identifying factors that differ in China's response to diplomatic friction.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
61. China's New Trade Strategy amid US-China Confrontation and Implications
- Author:
- Sang Baek Hyun, Wonho Yeon, Suyeob Na, Young Sun Kim, and Yunmi Oh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- In 2021, China has reached the point of entering a new stage of socialist development by declaring the achievement of the goal of building ‘a comprehensive well-off society’. Since the reform and opening up of China, the paradigm of economic and social development is facing the greatest turning point from ‘getting rich first’ to ‘common prosperity’. As the US checks on China intensify during this period of economic transition in China, China is pursuing a new trade strategy to respond to it. In order to understand the changes in the global trade environment in the era of the US-China conflict, it is necessary to understand both the US checks with China and China's trade strategy to respond to them. Most of the recent US-China conflicts are analyzed from the perspective of the US checking in with China, but it is necessary to take a balanced look at what kind of countermeasures China is seeking in order to correctly forecast and prepare for changes in the global trade environment in the future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Global Markets, Trade, and Economic Development
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
62. The Effects of Increased Trade with China and Vietnam on Workers’ Earnings and Job Security in Korea
- Author:
- Kyong Hyun Koo
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- This study empirically demonstrates that changes in trade structure caused by the rise of China and Vietnam over the last 20 years have had a significant impact on the widening of the income and employment stability gap for Korean workers. An important policy goal for Korea, which is heavily reliant on trade, is to ensure that the benefits of trade and openness are distributed evenly to all classes of society while minimizing the harm. In order to achieve the policy goal, the analysis results of this paper show that it is necessary to institutionalize a systematic process for monitoring changes in Korea's trade structure and preparing response policies from a mid- to long-term as well as a short-term perspective. Furthermore, the results indicate that policy efforts are required to identify blind spots where existing trade adjustment assistance policies, employment insurance systems, and vocational training policies do not adequately protect or support workers, and supplement and improve them. More follow-up research is needed to gain a better understanding of the mechanism by which external trade shocks are transmitted to the domestic labor market in order to develop more effective domestic supplementary measures for trade shocks.
- Topic:
- Labor Issues, Employment, Inequality, Economy, Trade, and Wage Income
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia
63. Securing Asia’s Subsea Network U.S. Interests and Strategic Options
- Author:
- Matthew Goodman and Matthew Wayland
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- More than 1 million kilometers of submarine cables traversing the ocean floor, each about as wide as a garden hose, transmit up to 99 percent of international data, underpinning global trade and communication. This vital digital infrastructure faces myriad threats, from earthquakes and typhoons to fishing nets and saboteurs. The United States derives significant advantages from its centrality in Asia’s subsea cables, which contribute up to $169 billion to the U.S. economy annually and could benefit more U.S. workers and businesses as demand for digital products and services grows globally. But realizing those benefits will require the United States to step up its policy engagement on Asia’s cable networks, which are changing with China’s rise, the emergence of new regional hubs, and new transpacific routes designed to reduce risks and increase network resiliency.
- Topic:
- Security, International Trade and Finance, Communications, Maritime, and Commerce
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
64. The Sino-Lithuanian Crisis: Going beyond the Taiwanese Representative Office Issue
- Author:
- Konstantinas Andrijauskas
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The year 2021 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Lithuania. Instead of commemorative events and customary lofty rhetoric, the bilateral relationship rapidly plunged to a level rarely seen in either country’s foreign policies since the end of the Cold War. Sino-Lithuanian relations remain de facto downgraded to the level of chargé d’affaires, Lithuania’s physical embassy in Beijing is empty, while the southernmost Baltic state continues to withstand China’s multidimensional campaign of diplomatic, discursive and, most importantly, economic pressure. The principal cause behind this diplomatic crisis was the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021. This Briefing will argue, however, that there were other important reasons behind the current state of affairs that had been accumulating over the course of two years. The opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in mid-November 2021 triggered an unprecedented diplomatic crisis between the People’s Republic of China and Lithuania. China resorted to massive economic coercion measures to pressure Vilnius, such as the freezing of bilateral trade. European multinational companies also reported that Beijing blocked their exports because of Lithuanian components in their products. In late January 2022, the European Union (EU) launched a case at the World Trade Organization against China over discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania. The current crisis must be understood in the broader context of the degradation of the relations between China and Lithuania, but also the EU, since 2019. As such, this crisis is symptomatic of the developing trend in the relationship between the EU and China.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and WTO
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania
65. What do we know about cyber operations during militarized crises?
- Author:
- Michael Fischerkeller
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The Department of Defense (DoD) will soon kick off the drafting of its cyber strategy and cyber posture review to align US cyber capabilities and operating concepts with the foreign policy objectives of the Joseph Biden-Kamala Harris administration. Given that the administration describes China as the “pacing threat,” debates over the best use of cyber operations and campaigns will likely be framed by US-China interaction in day-to-day competition, and by a potential militarized crisis and war over the status of Taiwan. This essay focuses on how cyber operations employed during militarized crises are likely to impact escalation management. Policymakers may be attracted to the idea that cyber operations could serve as de-escalatory offramps in a crisis. Such expectations should be tempered, if not completely set aside, for two reasons. First, there is no experience with cyber operations employed during a militarized crisis between two nuclear-armed peers. Absent direct experience, all one can rely on is academic research. Yet, secondly, deductive and empirical academic research provides no basis for confidence that cyber operations are either de-escalatory or non-escalatory in the context of militarized crises.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, and Militarization
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
66. When the State Becomes the Only Buyer: Monopsony in China’s Public Procurement of Medical Technology
- Author:
- Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Anna Guildea
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- China’s centralised state procurement policies are moving the Chinese market of medical technologies in a monopsonistic direction. A monopsony means that a single buyer exerts strong power to move the market to its favour by gradually cutting prices and setting terms for producers that are extortionary. It is equivalent to a monopoly – with the only difference being that in a monopsony, it is the single buyer that acts in a market-predatory manner. Ultimately, a monopsonistic market empowers the buyer to capture most of the financial rewards from a contract. Competition gets undermined because a vibrant market also requires competition between buyers and, over time, fewer firms will be able to supply the procured goods at terms that are set by the single buyer. This shift towards monopsony does not happen overnight, it is a process that builds on a number of steps that tilts the balance of power in favour of the buyer. First, there is a concentration of buyers, sometimes down to a single buyer – such as the state. This concentration of buyers acts to extract value from sellers by creating pressure to reduce and converge prices. Buyers in monopsonistic conditions may also add other objectives to their agenda, using their monopsonistic position to abuse the market. For example, political objectives may be in place, which can include discrimination against foreign companies or corruption. Finally, there is a consolidation of the market, with fewer suppliers overall, and a focus on price rather than innovation. Several characteristics of a market could be indicative of a monopsony. One of these indicators is the price. In the case of the Chinese market for medical technology, price reductions have been sustained across medical devices, with price cuts exceeding 90 percent in some medical products. When the buyer’s primary focus is to reduce prices, the risk is that low-quality products will drive out high-quality products. Another indicator is price convergence: the idea that one price should apply to the whole market. Price convergence can be observed as the distance between the average and maximum price reduction offered by companies. The small differences seen in the Chinese procurement of medical technologies for these two indicators indicates that prices are converging downwards. Forcing a convergence of prices breaks with natural market behaviour and overall leads to a market with fewer participants. In a monopsony, the buyer tends to capture the dominant part of the market value of the product, which squeezes the margins of sellers. Over time, this leads to fewer competitors as only a few companies can survive under such conditions. These dynamics have real consequences: the number of winning companies in the procurement of medical technology per one million people in China is substantially lower than in the EU. In addition to a reduced reliance on multiple suppliers, the Chinese centralised state procurement reinforces China’s industrial policy to support Chinese firms growing their domestic market shares to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. These are the consequences of a market that is increasingly taking a monopsonistic form. Public procurement does not have to follow the Chinese recipe of centralised state procurement. There is a substantial body of evidence, research, and studies that recommend specific procurement policies that tackle the monopsonistic tendencies embedded in public procurement markets. These recommendations emphasize the importance of competition without lowering the number of firms in the market, underlining the need for a long-term view on how the market delivers continuous innovation. The danger for China is that monopsony will collapse the future market by making it less attractive for companies to innovate and compete. Chinese centralised state procurement and the move towards monopsony will not go unnoticed. These policies clearly breach basic principles and norms of international exchange, and how governments should behave to avoid a distortion of competition. First, Chinese centralised state procurement favours the Chinese medical technology industry to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. Second, given the low prices achieved in Chinese centralised state procurements, there is a risk that firm’s margins are severely cut, putting a lid on global spending on R&D. The EU and the US should coordinate their policies to counter the monopsonistic tendencies of the Chinese market of medical technologies. Their markets for medical technologies are significantly larger than the Chinese market and Chinese companies rely on the US and the European market to maintain their growth. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) offers a setting to take these discussions forward and agree on policies to counter Chinese market distortions.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, Public Procurement, and Monopsony
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
67. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations
- Author:
- Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
68. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept
- Author:
- Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and North America
69. Global Value Chains, Risk Perception, and Economic Statecraft
- Author:
- Phoebe Moon
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Many countries, including the United States and China, have come to see economic statecraft as superior to armed conflict. Faced with a trading partner’s economic sanctions, some countries try to avoid risk by complying with or ignoring the coercer’s demands, but others retaliate and escalate conflict. In recent years, sanctions have been applied, not only to “rogue” states, but against trading partners. The United States and China, but also Japan, Australia, and Canada, were either the target or purveyor of economic coercion by or against trading partners in the last five years. However, not all resulted in trade wars. When, then, do economic sanctions lead to trade wars? This policy brief examines the ongoing Japan-South Korea trade dispute with a focus on how policymakers’ risk perceptions regarding global value chains (GVCs) can influence when trade wars take shape.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, National Security, Economy, Innovation, Global Value Chains, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
70. Maximizing the Benefits of Trade for Africa
- Author:
- Prince Paa-Kwesi Heto
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- African countries are increasingly integrating into global supply chains (GSC). Yet the linkages between African and foreign firms and the impact of GSC activities on the development prospects of African states is not well understood. This policy brief analyzes GSC trade between the U.S. and China, on the one hand, and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member states on the other. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that SACU states export raw materials with few value-added products, SACU states are actually positioned further up in the supply chain hierarchy. They import intermediate inputs from China and export a substantial volume of intermediate goods to the U.S. rather than to China. Moreover, GSC trade is diversifying the countries’ exports and increasing their industrial capacity, positioning African countries to attract companies moving out of China, whether because of high production costs, supply chain disruptions, U.S. tariffs, or geopolitical tension between the U.S. and China. But SACU states will need to adopt smart policies to upgrade existing supply chains and position themselves to build or attract new GSCs to their region.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, National Security, Innovation, Trade, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
71. Biden and Trade at Year One: The Reign of Polite Protectionism
- Author:
- James Bacchus
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden promised a change from the go‐it‐alone, my‐way‐or‐the‐highway approach to trade policy of Donald Trump. Disappointingly, during the first year of his presidency, Biden has instead largely embraced the failed Trump policy of unilateralism and protectionism in trade. He and his administration have done so politely, without Trump’s bluster and bombast. Yet, the results have been mostly the same: a turn toward more trade protection and managed trade, toward a proposed industrial policy that would add more restrictions on trade, and toward a destructive unilateralism that threatens to continue undermining the multilateral trading system overseen by the World Trade Organization. If Biden continues to pursue this misguided trade policy, American recovery and prosperity are at risk. There is still time—at least three years—for him to end this reign of polite protectionism by framing and pursuing a new trade policy that will benefit all Americans: a policy that will achieve more trade liberalization, stop managed trade, halt trade‐restrictive industrial policy, renew trade multilateralism, and give restored and unflinching support to the international rule of law in trade.
- Topic:
- Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Protectionism, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
72. Policy Experimentation in China: The Political Economy of Policy Learning
- Author:
- Shaoda Wang and David Y. Yang
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Determining what policies to implement and how to implement them is an essential government task. Policy learning is challenging, as policy effectiveness often hinges on the nature of the policy, its implementation, the degree that it is tailored to local conditions, and the efforts and incentives of local politicians to make the policy work.
- Topic:
- Political Economy, Politics, Policy Implementation, and Economic Policy
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
73. China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022
- Author:
- Kevin Rudd
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- In recent years, Xi Jinping has taken China to the “left” politically and economically, but to the “right” with his deeply nationalist narratives at home and a more assertive foreign and security policy abroad. More recently, this has contributed to a slowdown in the Chinese economy and an increase in the level of political and policy reaction against Xi’s anti-market measures. Now, with last month’s Central Economic Work Conference, the Communist Party appears to have now acknowledged a number of Xi’s measures have indeed gone too far, especially as Xi himself seeks to maximize economic stability ahead of his bid for reappointment to another term in office at the 20th Party Congress this November. But whether these corrective measures will be enough to restore economic growth in the short term given the Chinese private sector is now “once bitten, twice shy” is another question altogether. In China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022 – Domestic Political Reaction to China’s Economic Slowdown ASPI President and CEO Kevin Rudd tackles these questions and provides an analysis of how China’s economic challenges are likely to shape its politics and policies in the year ahead.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, and Xi Jinping
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
74. Raising the Curtain on China’s 20th Party Congress: Mechanics, Rules, “Norms,” and the Realities of Power
- Author:
- Christopher K Johnson
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is preparing to convene its 20th Party Congress in late 2022, and the party apparatus is already in full swing making the necessary arrangements for the political conclave, held every five years. President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping had hoped to tread an easy path toward an atypical third term in power, but unexpected events at home and abroad have complicated that trajectory. Xi would like the congress to mark the beginning of what could be a sustained period of strongman rule, making it one of the most consequential party gatherings in decades: Xi has spent his current term laying the groundwork for a major win at the 20th Party Congress. The regime’s key power centers are more beholden to him personally than they were five years ago, and Xi has orchestrated a methodical campaign of highly personalized aggrandization of his position within the leadership by garnering progressively more grandiose ideological laureates, making Xi and his policies very difficult to challenge. Xi’s third-term gambit leaves him in a much stronger position to dictate outcomes than his two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom were preparing to step down from formal office at roughly the same time in their tenure. Xi has rewired the regime’s policymaking ecosystem to deemphasize the formal government bureaucracy, bolstering his ability to steer a course that is favorable to his personal and policy goals. Against this backdrop, this paper reviews the official building blocks that shape what is and is not permissible in CCP politics, as well the mechanics of producing a new top leadership lineup at each party congress, and considers whether these mechanisms might restrict Xi’s freedom of action despite his impressive accrual of personal power atop the CCP hierarchy.
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Norms, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
75. 2022, Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis: Or is it?
- Author:
- Christopher K Johnson
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The year 2022 is proving to be a difficult one for China and for President Xi Jinping. Choices like Xi’s embrace of Russia and the zero-COVID policy have prompted sporadic outbursts from the Chinese public and a backlash abroad. Unsurprisingly, this has spawned speculation that Xi is facing political difficulties at home that could hamstring or even disrupt his plan to remain China’s top leader after the 20th Party Congress later this year. Despite the real challenges Xi and the party have faced in 2022, however, this paper will argue that such narratives rest on a series of faulty assumptions about the impetus for Xi’s consolidation of power, the presence of powerful opposition voices within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system, and the judgment that Xi’s policy approach amounts to a series of blunders that may help his critics as they try to diminish him at the party congress.
- Topic:
- Economy, Domestic Politics, Olympics, Xi Jinping, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
76. China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications
- Author:
- Marco Lyons and Natalia Angel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1 The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
- Political Geography:
- China and United States of America
77. Time to Leave China’s “16+1” Influence Trap
- Author:
- Filip Jirouš
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Last week Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania and quit what used to be known as 16+1, as the Czech Republic and other participating countries become increasingly vocal in their scepticism of the initiative. The 16+1 format, officially known as Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (中国—中东欧 国家合作, Zhongguo-Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), was launched in 2012 as a China-centric initiative incorporating 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In 2019, Greece—which is heavily indebted to China—joined, and the platform was briefly renamed 17+1. While it is officially described as an economic cooperation platform, its real achievements and the PRC’s approach to it show that trade and investment were never its true focus. Rather, the PRC used it as a propaganda and influence tool, wasting CEE diplomatic capacity on activities that only benefited Beijing. The lack of benefits and abundance of risks have recently led several CEE countries to reassess their participation in the 16+1 format. The time has come for the rest of the participating countries to join their Baltic neighbours and ditch this PRC influence vehicle.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Soft Power, Propaganda, and Influence
- Political Geography:
- China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Estonia
78. China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid
- Author:
- Jingdong Yuan, Abhishek Andasu, and Xuwan Ouyang
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- China’s role in foreign aid and, more broadly, in development cooperation on the global stage has grown significantly since it began seven decades ago. Particularly in recent years, through such platforms as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s profile and engagement in global governance in foreign aid and related areas have been further enhanced. China’s ambition is to take a more proactive approach in foreign aid and move towards a model of international development cooperation by linking with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and by including the BRI as a major platform to achieve key development goals. This paper provides a timely analysis of the evolution of China’s foreign aid policy in the past seven decades with a particular focus on the developments since 2000. It discusses China’s development finance to Africa and the major sectors receiving Chinese aid. It also analyses recent trends of Chinese foreign aid and identifies some of the challenges that China faces as it becomes a major player in international development financing.
- Topic:
- Development, Foreign Aid, Infrastructure, Sustainable Development Goals, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
79. Xi Jinping Seeks Stability: The 20th National Congress of the CCP
- Author:
- Bart Dessein, Jasper Roctus, and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The 2,340 odd teacups have been rearranged in their cupboards, and sobriety has returned to the Great Hall of the People. What is the national and international impact of the 20th CCP Congress that was concluded on Saturday, 22 October 2022? Stability is the key word. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the country’s first and major concern was to be recognized as a nation state on an equal par with others in the post-World War II world order. As the Western world recognized the nationalist government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legal government and representative of “China” in the United Nations, the PRC turned to the Soviet Union for support, despite earlier ill-fated cooperation between the Communist Parties of the two countries. On 14 February 1950, Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The disastrous outcome of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward”, however, brought the “friendship” to a premature end.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
80. China between lockdowns and the 20th Party Congress: What can we expect for the EU and globally?
- Author:
- Jan Hoogmartens
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Whether it is aggressive industrial subsidies, the militarization of the South China Sea, human rights violations in Xinjiang or political suppression in Hong Kong, there is a whole litany of foreign policy concerns which are attributed by media and China watchers to the People’s Republic of China. This policy brief will try to make some sense out of these worries by focusing on how current events might shape the outcome of the 20th Party Congress. It will start by assessing China’s track record and examining some of its main policy drivers. Consequently, it will explore what it means for the EU and its companies doing business with China, focusing on supply chains and strategic autonomy. Finally, the policy brief will come to the question whether we do not focus too much on the great power competition between the US and China.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Leadership, Power, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
81. US-China geoeconomic rivalry intensifies: A risk or an opportunity for European companies?
- Author:
- Jana Titievskaia
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- As the US and China balance between the pursuit of strategic security interests and ambitions to attain economic growth, novel sources of risk are emerging for globally active businesses, ranging from sanctions to export controls. The Biden presidency will offer only moderate respite from the escalation of this geoeconomic rivalry, even as US-China trade recovers in the aftermath of the pandemic. In the face of US-China rivalry, the EU and its member states have opted for the third way of “open strategic autonomy”, including a range of trade instruments that will allow the EU to support the competitiveness of its companies more effectively. European companies need to closely monitor their risk exposure in various transmission channels and stay attuned to unexpected opportunities that can materialise in the form of market entry possibilities and the development of new niches.
- Topic:
- Hegemony, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
82. Central Bank Digital Currencies and the implications for the global financial infrastructure: The transformational potential of Russia’s digital rouble and China’s digital renminbi
- Author:
- Maria Shagina
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The launch of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) not only revolutionizes the international financial system, it also represents an opportunity to minimize the exposure to the US dollar transactions and avoid US oversight. China enjoys a first-mover advantage, as it became the first major economy to launch a CBDC. Following in Beijing’s footsteps, Russia is at the forefront of advancing its digital currency project. As US-sanctioned countries, Russia’s and China’s motivation extends beyond transaction costs reduction and financial inclusion: the governments seek to reduce their dependence on the US dollar and mitigate sanctions risks. In the short term, the US dollar’s international status remains unrivalled. No currency is well-positioned to displace the greenback as a reserve currency. In the long term, CBDCs could eliminate the need for third-party intermediaries and allow cross-border transactions that take place outside of the US-led financial system. This would hamper the US’s ability to use sanctions as a geoeconomic tool and oversee their extraterritorial enforcement.
- Topic:
- Finance, Digital Economy, Central Bank, and Banking
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
83. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy
- Author:
- Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
- Topic:
- Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Asia
84. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Successful economic strategy or failed soft-power tool?
- Author:
- Jyrki Kallio
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of China’s efforts to integrate its neighbouring countries into its economic sphere, thus increasing China’s security in its immediate neighbourhood while facing an increasingly hostile international environment due to its rivalry with the US. In reality, the BRI has evolved into an umbrella term for various infrastructure and development projects with no unified object or strategy. The projects should, in principle, increase goodwill towards China, and correspondingly boost its influence, but in practice they are mainly aimed at economic benefit. The results of the BRI, especially as a soft-power tool, are ambiguous. Its ideational basis is thin, consisting mainly of China’s critique towards the “hegemony of the West”. This reduces the BRI to a hollow slogan with little appeal apart from the pragmatic gains. However, the BRI is here to stay for the duration of Xi Jinping’s rule because China’s foreign policy is often driven by prestige. The BRI is enshrined in the Communist Party’s Constitution in order to both add weight to the initiative and to increase the Party’s prestige with its success, modest as it may be.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
85. How to Respond to China’s Growing Influence in the Gulf
- Author:
- Louis Dugit-Gros
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Beijing’s use of intertwined civil and military tools in the Gulf mirrors its activity closer to home, but the West can readily counter this influence by capitalizing on the region’s desire for diversified partnerships. While the Biden administration works to repair ties with Persian Gulf partners in the wake of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, China is getting more attention for its expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region, including recent reports of naval deals and military activity in the Solomon Islands and Cambodia. Some commentators have even criticized the White House for letting its resolve against Moscow supposedly delay the long-awaited “pivot to Asia” sought by three successive U.S. administrations. Yet talk of the “pivot” often oversimplifies the geopolitical situation, in particular by ignoring China’s progress in the Gulf. The pivot theory relies on the assumption that Beijing is mainly ramping up its influence in its own neighborhood. In reality, the Chinese strategy is global, and the methods it applies in the Indo-Pacific are being used in similar fashion elsewhere, including the Gulf. Such activities merit closer attention from the West even if they are not the number-one priority at the moment.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Strategic Competition, Military, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Gulf Nations
86. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After
- Author:
- Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
87. Why China’s Zero Covid Strategy Might Underwrite China’s High-Quality Development and Common Prosperity Agendas – At Home and Away
- Author:
- Lauren Johnston
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- The more than month-long strict ‘Zero-Covid19’ lockdown of Shanghai from April 1, 2022, drew international attention for the fact that one of the world’s richest and most trade-connected cities in the world even could be so shutdown. Economists have expressed fear that the scale of the disruption to China’s middle-class elite and to global supply chains may have lasting negative impacts for China’s economy and globalisation. In a case of making hay while the lockdown sun shines, however, while residents of Shanghai and to some extent also Beijing, have been locked inside, Beijing has been busy announcing some new hukou-related educational and civil administrative reforms. In total contrast to locking Chinese down, these may ultimately and in contrast come to underpin a far more mobile Chinese labour force, a more competitive business environment within China, and even more mobility of Chinese citizens globally. In this way, far from being incongruent with China’s economic development or globalisation, via the parallel hukou-related reforms that took place alongside the distraction of COVID19 lockdowns of early 2022, these may prove to have served to underpin not only China’s ‘high-quality development’ and ‘common prosperity’ agendas, but even the fluidity of the Belt and Road Initiative.
- Topic:
- Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
88. What now for Australia-China relations?
- Author:
- The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- After the May Federal Election, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Australia. What could this change in government mean for future Australia-China relations? At the China Studies Centre event on 3 June, four experts and practitioners in Australia-China relations discussed the bilateral relations over the past few years and the prospects for future political, social and economic interactions.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Australia
89. China’s international higher education environment: change and stasis
- Author:
- The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- It seems that China’s international higher education environment may be changing. This roundtable discussion focuses on the following 4 topics: 1. Several of China’s leading universities have announced their withdrawal from international ranking schemes. How do more China-focussed measures of performance feed into the push for world-class universities. 2. There seems to be a push to discourage Chinese students from going overseas for international education opportunities, as for example in the postponement of US placement exams and continuing concerns about Covid-19 pandemic control. Is this likely to continue, and if so for how long and under what conditions 3. What are the prospects for recruitment of Chinese students to Australian universities. 4. What are the prospects for China’s international cooperation in higher education, both in research and in delivery of joint venture programs and institutions in China. The discussion was chaired and moderated by Anthony Welch of Sydney School of Education and Social Work, the University of Sydney, and the speakers include academic managers and leaders, academics with an interest in international higher education (China’s and more generally), and those with experience of joint venture higher education institutions.
- Topic:
- Education, Higher Education, COVID-19, and Study Abroad
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
90. Post 20th CCP Congress Roundtable
- Author:
- The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China met in Beijing starting 16 October. The last five years since the 19th Congress have seen fairly important changes in the political environment, including the deterioration of relations with the USA, the challenges of dealing with the pandemic, and an economic slowdown. The Congress has adopted the various reports presented and announced the new CCP leadership line-up. On Monday 31st October the China Studies Centre hosted an online Roundtable discussion of the main outcomes of the Congress.
- Topic:
- Governance, Ideology, Transition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
91. In support of a new approach with the Western Balkans: Staged accession with a Pierre MIREL consolidation phase
- Author:
- Pierre Mirel
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- In his “Strasbourg Speech” to the European Parliament on 9 May 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron put forward the idea of a European Political Community, to organise Europe from a broader political perspective than the European Union. He was targeting the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. He nonetheless created a stir in the Western Balkans, even though he made it clear in his press conference that "for the Balkans, the path is already mapped out", by which he meant membership. This concern is understandable given the European perspective they were offered twenty years ago at the European Council of Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, and that many voices are now being raised in favour of granting the new candidates to the East this formal membership status, or even of opening negotiations already. The European Council of 23-24 June will be important for two reasons: what is the European future of the three new candidates? Will Bulgaria lift its veto on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia? Maintaining it would further weaken the credibility of the European Union at a time when China and Russia are making their ambitions clear.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, and European Council
- Political Geography:
- China, Eastern Europe, and Balkans
92. Where is China heading?
- Author:
- Jean-Pierre Cabestan
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- China is ambitious, it is making this known and everyone is beginning to realise it. So much so that today a growing number of observers fear that it will take greater risks to achieve its objectives and fall into the famous "Thucydides' trap"; in short, that it will launch into a war, notably around Taiwan, which would inevitably involve the United States. Isn't its goal to supplant America and become the world's leading power? If, by 2028 or 2030, the Chinese economy were to exceed the US economy in terms of GDP, it is doubtful that it will succeed in removing the US from its pedestal. This is likely to be lower and more contested. But rather than a power transition, the world is witnessing the emergence of new, permanently asymmetrical bipolarity and, no doubt, a new Cold War[1].
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
93. Understanding Hainan Free Trade Port: China's Efforts to Explore High-level Opening-up
- Author:
- Wenfeng Wei
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- On 13 April 2018, upon the 30th anniversary of Hainan province, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced to build Hainan into a free trade port. According to the Master Plan for the Construction of the Hainan Free Trade Port released by the State Council on 1 June 2020, China aims to build this southern island province into a high-level free trade port with global influence by the middle of the century. As China's largest special economic zone, Hainan is expected to become the frontline of China's integration into the global economic system. Noting that the world is facing a new round of major development, changes and adjustment, with protectionism and unilateralism on the rise and economic globalization facing greater headwinds, it was also a strategic decision of Chinese authorities based on the domestic and international landscapes. As such, Hainan Free Trade Port (HNFTP) is more than a regional development initiative, and it has a much bigger role to play in China’s reform and opening endeavors.
- Topic:
- Development, Economics, Special Economic Zones, and Free Trade
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
94. Geopolitical Risk in the Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition and Economic Security
- Author:
- Jai Chul Heo
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- Recently, the intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition, spread of COVID-19 infections, and the Russia-Ukraine war are disrupting the global supply chain and increasing instability in the global economy. The resulting instability in the supply of semiconductors, medicines, food, and energy is leading to an economic downturn, and the U.S., China, Japan, and EU are actively pursuing strategies to strengthen economic security. The key to recent economic security is the U.S.-China strategic competition. Because the United States is re-tightening economic-security links that were loosened in the post-Cold War era to counter China's economic rise. And the concept of recent economic security largely includes the elements of economic statecraft, economic resilience, and building mutual trust.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Economic Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
95. International Spread of Anti-dumping Measures and Diversification of Investigation Methodologies
- Author:
- Moonhee Cho, Cheon-Kee Lee, Min Ji Kang, and Min-chirl Chung
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- As global economic growth has lost momentum due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the tension between U.S. and China, among other developments, concerns about the spread of protectionism are growing. In particular, anti-dumping (AD) measures are more likely to expand in the future in that they are relatively easy to take and have a direct effect on international trade compared to other protectionist trade policies. This study reviews the spread of AD measures and the effects of AD measures on trade. We also pay attention to the fact that AD investigation methodologies are being diversified. Focusing on particular market situation (PMS) and adverse facts available (AFA) provisions, which have been applied in many recent AD investigations on Korean export goods, we analyze the logic of investigation authorities.
- Topic:
- Economic Growth, Trade, COVID-19, and Protectionism
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
96. Recent Marriage and Labor Supply Pattern of Young Chinese Women
- Author:
- Yoon Jae Ro and Jeonghwan Yun
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we examine the impact of a sibling gender on educational attainment, earnings, family formation for a recent cohort of women in China. Family characteristics such as number of siblings, sibling gender composition, and parents’ characteristics may play an important role in children’s life as the presence of a sibling can affect parents’ treatment of the remaining children. Especially male siblings can affect children’s outcome through various pathways as male sibling may pull parental investment of resources away from girls, because boys may be seen as the “higher return” investment (Becker, 1991). We investigate the effect of having a (male) sibling on a daughter by exploiting the change in fertility trend in China induced by the One Child Policy (OCP).
- Topic:
- Economics, Labor Issues, Women, Marriage, Supply, and Gender
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
97. The U.S.-China Battle for Semiconductor Supremacy and Reshaping of Global Supply Chain
- Author:
- Hyung-gon Jeong
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- The realization of digital transformation (DX) and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has led to the development of new technologies in areas such as AI, big data, metaverse, autonomous vehicles, digital currency, and blockchain technology. While these sectors are expected to continue to grow, major countries including the United States and China are fiercely competing to secure a global supply chain for the semiconductor industry. Built on free trade, the global division of production in the semiconductor industry has driven corporate innovation and technology development. However, the trend of technological nationalism and countries’ efforts to build a value chain within their territory are expected to hurt the global semiconductor industry. The ever-deepening hegemony competition between the U.S. and China in the semiconductor industry could have a profound impact not only on the Korean economy but also on a restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain. This study analyzes the supply chain structure and risks of the Korean semiconductor industry, along with U.S. and Chinese policies to foster the semiconductor industry, going on to explore corresponding countermeasures.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
98. Internationalization of the Korean Won in the Light of RMB Internationalization
- Author:
- Hyo Sang Kim, Young Sik Jeong, Ji Young Moon, and Da Young Yang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- While China has risen to become a global superpower with a growing impact on the world economy, its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), has a limited role in the existing international financial system. China has made significant progress and will continue to push for the internationalization of the RMB, which can disrupt the global financial system, dominated by the US dollar. Under such circumstances, Korea must find a new direction for the internationalization of the Korean Won. The internationalization of the Korean won will provide new opportunities for the economy to take a further step through financial advancement.
- Topic:
- Economy, Currency, Internationalization, and Financial Development
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
99. Australia’s Strategic Responses to the US-China Rivalry and Implications to Korea
- Author:
- Ina Choi, Sunhyung Lee, Jaeho Lee, and So Eun Kim
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- As in other Asia-Pacific countries, boosting trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Australia shared concerns over security threats posed by China’s military expansion, but up until the mid-2010s hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia’s recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia’s China policy is an interesting case to explore how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia’s recent foreign policy is also relevant to Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea’s relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study unravels Australia’s strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea's foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Economy, Trade, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
100. The Collapse of One China
- Author:
- Ivan Kanapathy
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America