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301. China’s National Carbon Market: Paradox and Potential

Author:
Cecilia Springer
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
China announced it would launch a national carbon market in 2017, yet this policy is taking years to come into effect. What will it take for a carbon market to work in command-and-control China? This policy brief explores an understudied challenge—emissions accounting—and identifies potential opportunities that have arisen in the first phase of China’s national carbon market.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

302. When the Water Runs Dry: What is to be done with the 1.5 million settlers in the deserts of southwest Afghanistan when their livelihoods fail?

Author:
David Mansfield
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
It was following the fall of the Taliban regime that people began to encroach upon the deserts of south west Afghanistan and claim it as their own. After an initial investment in shallow wells that ran dry, increasing numbers of settlers began to use percussion drills to sink wells into the ground up to 130 metres in depth. Then, with affordable diesel generators and waterpumps imported from Pakistan and China these farmers transformed what was once rocky desert soil into productive agricultural land.
Topic:
Agriculture, Water, Rural, and Land
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

303. China and geopolitical considerations for investment screening in the Netherlands

Author:
Brigitte Dekker, Frans-Paul van der Putten, and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief analyses whether there are grounds for the Dutch government to conduct critical assessments of direct investments, particularly from China, from a geopolitical perspective. The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic warrant continued critical oversight of Chinese foreign investments and screening of such investments. Particularly during the current difficult times for the Dutch economy, there are new opportunities for Chinese investors as a result of increased needs for capital and/or new markets on the part of Dutch companies. This policy brief argues that from a geopolitical perspective there are two grounds for the Dutch government to screen investments: the Netherlands’ need to keep pace with changes in the geopolitical stance of the US and other Western countries towards China; and the risk that the Netherlands and the EU could lose a large part of their capacity for autonomous action in a geopolitical context. Hence there are two criteria that investment screening must fulfill. The first is that it must take account of the security and geopolitical implications of investments in high-tech companies. The second is that it must be aimed at preventing a high degree of strategic dependence on a single operator.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Geopolitics, Economy, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

304. Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU

Author:
Jacopo Maria Pepe
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic fuels technological and geopolitical competition among the great powers, Europe’s relations with China and Russia are facing new challenges and risks. Still, the reconfiguration of power in Eurasia also brings unexpected opportunities for European actors in the area of connectivity. To seize them, the EU needs to reconcile its aspiration to be a globally accepted “normative-regulatory” power with both its limited financial means and its more assertive attitude to geopolitics.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Eurasia

305. Navigating a Growing Chinese Influence in Iraqi Kurdistan

Author:
Sardar Aziz
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When I moved into new accommodations in the centre of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, the lift announcements in the apartment tower were in Chinese, followed by Kurdish, Arabic and English. This multilingualism was surprising but positive; it was a clear sign of the dawn of a new era. If in the past, Kurdish was the local language, Arabic regional, and English global, the addition of Chinese signified the plurality of global language and, potentially, of global power. These days, there is a regional focus on Iran’s newly announced 25 year deal with China, which has resulted in a lot of noise both inside and outside Iran. It is not surprising that Sino–Iranian relations are continuing to develop as both countries are hoping for a different world order. Though not so scrutinized, Iraq has seen its own growing ties with China, with the two countries having signed a number of agreements last year. Former Iraqi PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi, once a Maoist himself, stated in his visit to Beijing ‘we belong to Asia and we want to be a part of its emergence.’ The large Iraqi delegation accompanying him—as told to me by one member of the delegation—all noted and admired what they saw as China’s shift from a poor country to a global power. The deal agreed upon during that meeting, in remaining secret, has created fertile ground for conspiracy and speculations inside Iraq.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, Asia, and Kurdistan

306. With COVID-19, Iran’s Dependence on China Grows

Author:
Kevjin Lim
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Beijing has steadily become Tehran’s economic ventilator, diplomatic prop, and military enabler, and the Iranians need this backstop now more than ever. When the coronavirus spun out of control in Wuhan this January, Iran ignored the example of many other countries and continued to maintain direct flights and open borders with China. Even after President Hassan Rouhani’s government suspended all such flights on January 31, Mahan Air—a company affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—kept flying between Tehran and four first-tier Chinese cities, leading many to allege that the airline was instrumental in introducing or at least exacerbating Iran’s raging epidemic. Whatever the truth behind these allegations, Mahan’s policy is symptomatic of a larger geopolitical reality: Tehran has become profoundly, disproportionately, and perhaps irretrievably dependent on Beijing, despite its own revolutionary opposition to reliance on foreign powers. Where diplomatic and economic sanctions have fallen short, the pandemic has succeeded in isolating the Islamic Republic like never before, compelling it to keep its borders to China open. COVID-19 has also dispelled the notion that Iran’s heavily-sanctioned “resistance economy” still suffices to keep the country solvent. The government has conceded that staying afloat would be impossible if it curtailed cross-border trade, shut down industries, and quarantined entire cities. The crisis is so severe that Iran’s Central Bank has for the first time in decades requested billions of U.S. dollars in assistance from the IMF. Indeed, according to Deputy Health Minister Reza Malekzadeh, whenever his colleagues questioned why China flights continue, bilateral economic relations were among the reasons given. Two days after the government’s ban on such flights, Chinese ambassador Chang Hua tweeted that Mahan CEO Hamid Arabnejad wanted to continue cooperating with Beijing. Neither man specified exactly what this meant, but the implied message to Tehran was clear given China’s resentment of travel bans. Meanwhile, the Iranian Students News Agency, Tabnak, and other domestic media criticized Mahan for prioritizing profit margins over public health.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

307. The US–China trade deal and its impact on China’s key trading partners

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry and Gabriel Felbermayr
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The US–China Economic and Trade Agreement (ETA) entered into force on 14th February 2020, marking a new phase in their protracted trade and geopolitical rivalry. The ETA includes specific targets for increased Chinese imports of US goods and services, amounting to 200 bn USD over 2020 and 2021. The authors show that these purchase commitments can generate substantial trade diversion effects and market share shifts for China’s top trading partners. In manufacturing, Germany is likely to experience the greatest trade diversion effects in a number of industries such as vehicles (-1.28 bn USD), aircraft (-1.59 bn USD) and industrial machinery (-0.72 bn USD). Moreover, developing countries will be hit if China re-directs its imports towards US suppliers. E.g. Brazil could experience a reduction of 4.95 bn USD in soybeans exports to China in 2021 as a result of the ETA.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exports, Trade, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:
United States and China

308. Chinaʹs Startup Ecosystem Policy and Implications

Author:
Sangbaek Hyun, Hyojin Lee, Yunmi Oh, and Koun Cho
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The Chinese government is moving toward a qualitative growth model in the era of “New Normal,” transitioning from the existing quantitative growth model. In line with the transition, since 2015 the Chinese government has been implementing a strategy of “mass entrepreneurship and innovation,” which involves building a startup ecosystem in order to solve youth unemployment and create new growth engines. Thanks to the success story of China’s BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) and these new policies by the Chinese government, the startup entrepreneurship boom in China has grown rapidly, together with an explosive expansion of infrastructure and platforms for startups. To determine whether China’s economy can be transformed into an innovative economy, we need to carefully examine and evaluate China’s strategy and status of developing the startup ecosystem.
Topic:
Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth, Unemployment, and Startup
Political Geography:
China and Asia

309. The Networking Strategy of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy

Author:
Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
China is actively building Network Power in economic and traditional security and non-traditional security areas, while in some cases maximizing its own interests by using the Network Power already formed. In particular, China is building Collective Power at a rapid pace in significant areas. China also actively participated in existing networks and established Positional Power by preoccupying important positions. However, China’s Network Power still seems to have a long way to go in terms of Programming Power to build new systems, unlike Collective or Positional Power. What is notable in the process of analyzing China’s Network Power is that competition between the U.S. and China is fierce over Network Power.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economics, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

310. How Chinese Local Governments are Expanding Foreign Economic Cooperation

Author:
Sanghun Lee, Hongwon Kim, Joohye Kim, Jiwon Choi, and Jaehee Choi
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the Chinese economy becomes more advanced and the internal and external economic environment surrounding China changes, so too does China’s strategy for external openness and economic cooperation. Accordingly, specific policies are diversifying from the past focus on manufacturing and foreign direct investment to services, overseas investment, bilateral and multilateral FTAs, and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). As the central government’s policy stance changes, China’s local governments are also promoting external openness and cooperation based on regional development stages, industrial structure, and regional development policies, reflecting the central government’s strategy. In particular, after the 19th Party Congress, the central government showed a strategic stance expanding external openness. In response, local governments have moved away from the traditional method of cooperation in the manufacturing sector centered on industrial complexes, and in recent years various cooperative methods have been promoted, including regional economic integration, service and investment, the use of FTAs, and innovations in institutions to expand external openness. Along with the shift in China’s foreign economic strategy, the economic cooperation environment surrounding Korea and China is changing as well, including the strengthening of protectionism, structural changes in the Chinese economy, the Korea-China FTA coming into effect, and the launch of follow-up negotiations. Therefore Korea needs to find new strategies and measures for economic cooperation with China, making it time to find new ways to expand cooperation with China’s central and local governments. Against this backdrop, this study aims to analyze the strategies, detailed policies and major cases of China’s central and local governments’ external openness and economic cooperation, and to draw policy implications for strengthening economic cooperation between Korea and China in the future.
Topic:
Government, Foreign Direct Investment, Economy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

311. U.S.-China Technological Rivalry and Its Implications for Korea

Author:
Wonho Yeon
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Recent developments in advanced technology are changing the concept of hegemonic competition. The key feature of technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution is dual-use. Emerging technologies such as 5G, AI, big data, robotics, aerospace, supercomputers, and quantum computer-related technologies can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The more you invest in the development of advanced technologies, the closer you will be to economic and military hegemony. Therefore, it is no wonder that the U.S. harbors great concerns facing the rise of China in these advanced technologies. To estimate and compare the innovation productivity of the U.S. and that of China, this study constructs a structural estimation model in which each country produces international patents using R&D expenditures and R&D researchers. Empirical results have presented novel findings indicating that China’s innovation productivity has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2015. At the same time we can observe that the U.S. has the world’s largest intellectual property surplus and keeps expanding it, while China’s intellectual property deficit has been growing every year. Given the two contradictory facts - China’s high innovation productivity and low intellectual property balance - we can conclude that China is strong at “innovation” but weak at “invention.” Knowing this, the U.S. eventually began to target this vulnerability. This is the U.S.’ Tech-Decoupling strategy. To achieve U.S.-China tech decoupling, the U.S. has been strengthening trade and investment sanctions against China. In specific, the U.S. has been utilizing the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authority Act, and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). In return, China is responding to the U.S. sanctions with the new “Long March” strategy rather than a tit-for-tat strategy. In other words, China has been setting long-term aims and responding to the U.S. sanctions by improving institutional arrangements, refining industrial policies, and developing its own technologies such as “Dual-circulation strategy” and “New Infrastructure Plan.” Ironically, increasing pressure from the U.S. is expected to further strengthen China’s R&D capabilities in advanced technology and accelerate its competitiveness in emerging industries. With the onset of the 4th Industrial Revolution, China is rapidly closing the quality gap and technology gap in major industries where Korea has a comparative advantage. If Korea does not adequately respond to changes, it may be difficult to maintain a comparative advantage over China. Thus, now that U.S.-China tensions are intensifying, Korea is facing a pivotal moment in determining the future path of its economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Investment, Innovation, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

312. Belt and Road Initiatives: China and South Korea's Economic Ties with South Asia and Nepal

Author:
Bama Dev Sigdel
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The main objective of this article is to assess the effect of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in terms of economic interrelations between Asian countries mainly China, Korea, India and Nepal. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of the most ambitious economic strategies in modern times that alters the economic, political and social relationship between Eastern and Western societies. It not only improves transport networks and facilitates trade, but also raises GDP of many economies. For China, BRI manifests its intention to become the next global power through bigger market access and economic opportunities. Although South Asia is less developed economically, it has high strategic utility for the BRI, which has drawn attention from China to deepen its relations in the region. On the other hand, South Korea has also emerged as a soft power in Asia. It has been playing a significant role in Asia by contributing the majority of its aid, i.e., 35 per cent in Asian economies and a major share of its FDI, i.e., 34.1 per cent. With the rapidly increasing growth of South Korea, it also has a growing relationship with ASEAN and other South Asian economies such as India to reduce its dependence on traditional trade allies. Moreover, for least developed economies like Nepal, the BRI can bring improved infrastructure, needed technology, managerial talents and greater connectivity to the world. South Korea can yield higher benefits through its relation with South Asia and especially Nepal through expansion of export and market access, access to cheap workable manpower to cope with its rising aging population, and less dependence on traditional allies through its investment in South Asian region.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, Asia, South Korea, and Nepal

313. Recalibrating US-Africa Policy

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For better or worse, US-Africa policy will not be an urgent priority for the Biden-Harris administration when it takes office in January. Domestic challenges, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and attendant economic crisis, will dominate the administration’s focus from day one. In the realm of foreign affairs, issues ranging from transatlantic relations to East Asian security are likely to command the attention of administration officials during its first months in office. Nevertheless, the day-to-day demands of the executive branch should hopefully not distract the new administration from the many challenges and opportunities Africa presents to US foreign policy. Some of these challenges are already being discussed in Washington, at least in broad terms. China’s continued efforts to build influence across Africa and the expansion of Salafi-jihadi insurgencies in various parts of the continent have been on the radar of US policymakers for several years. However, an exclusive focus on easily identifiable enemies and competitors misses the situation’s big picture and carries significant risks. Many of the impediments to US foreign policy in Africa are rooted in larger structural and ideological issues that Washington has little ability to affect in the short-term. Similarly, a black-and-white view of international politics elides the many ways external interventions impact Africa. For example, several of Washington’s Middle Eastern partners have waged proxy conflicts in East Africa that are detrimental to regional stability and, by extension, US interests. A better approach to US-Africa relations must begin, first and foremost, with a deeper understanding of the continent’s complex politics and its role within the wider international system.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and United States of America

314. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nationalism, Religion, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

315. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

316. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries

Author:
Matt Schrader
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

317. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

318. Masks Off: Chinese Coronavirus Assistance in Europe

Author:
Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus crisis spread across Europe in March, several countries found themselves desperately short of masks, respirators, test kits, and even healthcare staff as they struggled to contain outbreaks. With the EU and the United States initially slow to respond, China stepped into the vacuum. This paper looks at prominent Chinese coronavirus-related donations to Europe between March 12 and April 20, 2020, as well as at the Chinese media coverage and narratives that accompanied them. The prominence of donations was assessed using open-source data on donations from the Chinese authorities or from Fortune 500 or similarly large Chinese companies to European national governments, sister cities, and individual clinics and institutions. Assistance came in many forms and included financial support for the procurement of personal protective equipment, the dispatch of Chinese doctors, free access to cloud-based coronavirus diagnostic tools, and donations of testing kits and ventilators. Three points emerge from this analysis. First, Chinese assistance stretched well beyond the high-profile cases of hard-hit Italy and Spain to countries large and small. During the five-weeks period studied, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and large Chinese companies made 70 prominent donations to 27 countries across Europe. The numbers and distribution of prominent donations of coronavirus-related assistance paint a picture of Beijing’s widespread “mask diplomacy” in which countries’ needs alone were not strictly reflected in the help they received. Coronavirus infection rates alone do not fully explain the variance in Chinese assistance, suggesting that alleviating the health crisis may have been only one of many purposes behind the CCP’s decisions. Second, the donations by Chinese authorities and companies coincided with China’s national and economic interests. China’s state apparatus at the state, province, and city levels made donations, but the majority of prominent ones were from the Chinese private sector and foundations connected to it. However, with the CCP exercising an ever-growing level of control over the private sector, the distinction between public and private donations is not clear-cut and Beijing typically trumpeted both as evidence of its generosity. The perception-shaping potential of the donations is likely to have been one of the main drivers behind Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe. Finally, Chinese donations were accompanied by a sustained communications and diplomatic push aimed at a global audience. The vast majority of the coronavirus assistance to Europe was promoted via all available channels. On state media, embassy websites, and social-media platforms, the authorities used the Chinese donations to Europe to deliver the CCP’s story. The positive messaging was also a way to pivot discourse about the pandemic away from its own failures in the early months of the outbreak. In parallel to the “shared future for mankind” narratives promoted by embassies every time donated medical supplies arrived in Europe, the CCP also showed a harder edge during the pandemic, much to the irritation of many European countries. Furthermore, since the period covered by this paper, Beijing has been doubling down on its newly assertive public diplomacy in Europe and beyond.
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

319. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

320. Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies

Author:
Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In addition to more widely studied tools like cyberattacks and disinformation, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have spent more than $300 million interfering in democratic processes more than 100 times spanning 33 countries over the past decade. The frequency of these financial attacks has accelerated aggressively from two or three annually before 2014 to 15 to 30 in each year since 2016. We call this tool of foreign interference “malign finance,” defined as “the funding of foreign political parties, candidates, campaigns, well-connected elites, or politically influential groups, often through non-transparent structures designed to obfuscate ties to a nation state or its proxies.” A typical case involves a regime-connected operative funneling $1 million to a favored political party, although buying influence in a major national election costs more like $3 million to $15 million. Rather than start our analysis by focusing on any given policy area, we review open-source reporting in 16 languages to identify malign finance cases credibly attributed to foreign governments. Finding that approximately 83 percent of the activity was enabled by legal loopholes, we catalogue the resulting caseload into the seven most exploited policy gaps. Broader than just money flowing through straw donors, shell companies, non-profits, and other conduits, malign finance includes a range of support mechanisms innovated by authoritarian regimes to interfere in democracies, from intangible gifts to media assistance. As such, policy strategies to address these vulnerabilities are not limited to campaign finance reforms, but also include greater transparency requirements around media funding, corporate ownership, campaign contacts with foreign powers, and other issues. In addition to identifying loopholes, our case study informs the scope of our recommended policy solutions, which are meant close off channels for foreign financial interference without infringing upon the speech rights of domestic political spenders or jeopardizing bipartisan support. Each of our recommendations balances these trade-offs differently based on empirical, legal, political, and administrative considerations vetted in consultation with more than 90 current and former executive branch officials, Congressional staffers from both parties, constitutional law scholars, and civil society experts. This report is organized around each of the seven U.S. legal loopholes that need to be closed, starting with the most urgent priorities, plus an eighth chapter on the need for stronger governmental coordination.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Finance, Foreign Interference, and Dark Money
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

321. A Future Internet for Democracies: Contesting China’s Push for Dominance in 5G, 6G, and the Internet of Everything

Author:
Lindsay Gorman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States and its democratic allies are engaged in a contest for the soul of the Future Internet. Conceived as a beacon of free expression with the power to tear down communication barriers across free and unfree societies alike, the Internet today faces significant challenges to its status as the world’s ultimate connector. In creating connectivity and space for democratic speech, it has also enabled new means of authoritarian control and the suppression of human rights through censorship and surveillance. As tensions between democracies and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) heat up over Internet technologies, the prospect of a dichotomous Internet comes more sharply into focus: a democratic Internet where information flows freely and an authoritarian Internet where it is tightly controlled—separated not by an Iron Curtain, but a Silicon one. The Future Internet is deeply enmeshed in the dawning information contest between autocracies and democracies. It is the base layer—the foundation—on which communication takes place and the entry point into narrative and societal influence. How the next generation of Internet technologies are created, defined, governed, and ultimately used will have an outsized impact on this information contest—and the larger geopolitical contest—between democracy and authoritarianism. China’s growing presence in the global telecommunications market—and the threat that reality poses to the United States and its allies—has catalyzed both national security and economic policy interest in fifth-generation cellular network infrastructure (5G). Like 2G, 3G, and 4G before it, the next generation of mobile connectivity promises a step-change in Internet capability and a societal transformation—through the explosion of connected devices across cities, vehicles, factories, and homes. The nascent data-fueled economy 5G Internet will spawn represents a new playing field for nation-state competition in both commercial innovation and systems of governance alike. In this new economy, United States leadership is not assured. China has made a targeted push to lead the world in the emerging technologies of the future—built on future networks and extending to the applications their data will enable: from artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous cars to smart grids and advanced manufacturing. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has by some measures provided the most technical contributions to the 5G standard and last year filed more patents in Europe than any other company. Heavy state subsidies provided by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have increased the competitiveness of Chinese firms in critical technology industries abroad. As the Pentagon’s Innovation Board bluntly put it: “The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world … That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China and Asia

322. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

323. Treasury’s War on Corruption: A U.S. Treasury Department Strategy to Fight Kleptocracy and Root Dirty Money Out of the U.S. Financial System

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The incoming Biden administration has signaled through speeches, articles, and interviews that one of its top policy priorities will be combating corruption and kleptocracy.1 With Russia and China’s increasing usage of strategic corruption and malign finance as geopolitical weapons, and with publics around the world—including in the United States—angry about economic inequality and perceived corruption at home, anti-corruption offers a unique opportunity to unify U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Diplomats and lawmakers agree that cracking down on corruption may be the most viable way to restore American leadership by meeting demands for accountability from citizens all over the world.2 Corruption will be the topic of a dedicated special session of the UN General Assembly in June.3 The issue should get support from leaders at a G7 summit in the U.K. around the same time.4 Fighting corruption will also be one of the three areas for new country commitments at the Summit for Democracy that President-elect Joe Biden plans to host during his first year in office.5 At that summit, the U.S. commitment will be a “presidential policy directive that establishes combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility.”6 Making this U.S. and international anti-corruption campaign a lasting success will require more than words. In the months ahead, while the administration’s top leadership and the nation’s public health and economic experts are focused on ending the pandemic and rebuilding the economy, the U.S. national security and financial enforcement community should get to work laying the groundwork for a raft of powerful anti-corruption executive actions to be announced in time for the Summit for Democracy. Concurrently, U.S. diplomats should leverage those plans to insist that countries attending the summit make similarly hard commitments, setting a high bar for admission.7 Regulatory rulemaking by the U.S. Treasury Department could usher in several landmark reforms that have been recommended for many years by financial enforcers, multilateral standard-setting bodies, and anti-corruption watchdogs. This policy opportunity is possible because the reforms never overcame opposition by special interests during the period before corruption became a leading national security threat roughly five years ago, and then they were generally not prioritized by the Trump administration. The most potent achievable action available would be for Treasury to set rules requiring several types of professional service providers that enable corruption to institute anti-money laundering controls whereby they would have to identify their ultimate customers and start alerting Treasury of suspicious activity, as is required of U.S. banks.8 Of the industries enabling corruption by helping wealthy clients hide money, ten could be regulated immediately by revoking regulatory exemptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, including real estate agents, private equity and hedge funds, sellers of yachts and airplanes, and seven other types of exempted financial institutions.9 Other key enablers would require new regulatory determinations with strong legal and political backing, such as lawyers, accountants, company formation agents, and art dealers. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act, must write stringent regulations to implement the newly mandated beneficial ownership registry, resisting pressure by special interests to water it down. Treasury should also leverage concerns about the recently leaked “FinCEN Files” to work with Congress on a major investment in FinCEN, potentially on the scale of the seven-fold jump in budgetary resources needed by Treasury to implement recent reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).10 Treasury should publish its first-ever National Corruption Risk Assessment about the financial networks of kleptocracies and oligarchs, reviewing case studies and methods to assess vulnerabilities and risk. Treasury should create a cross-border payments database and make financial institutions scrutinize politicians’ accounts more closely. Treasury should continue supporting two policy initiatives that have developed strongly to pressure kleptocracies in the past couple years by internationalizing Global Magnitsky sanctions and collaborating with the International Monetary Fund on corruption engagement. The U.S. Treasury Department is uniquely positioned to roll out these and other policy, regulatory, enforcement, and diplomatic actions in the fight against corruption, because it is the only part of the U.S. government with a foothold in each area of domestic and international finance that will be key to rooting dirty money out of the global financial system and applying pressure on kleptocrats and their oligarch proxies. Many of Treasury’s most highly developed capabilities have grown out of past fights against top national security threats, such as terrorist financing. The two months following the September 11 attacks witnessed one of the most energetic and well-coordinated performances in Treasury Department history. With Treasury not yet organized and coordinated around anti-corruption, achieving anything like past feats would require Treasury to start by establishing a small team devoted exclusively to this new mission. Specifically, the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) should appoint a counselor dedicated to developing and advancing anti-corruption initiatives, from expanding the coverage of the U.S. anti-money laundering regime to prioritizing the threats of strategic corruption and malign finance across Treasury’s policy, intelligence, and enforcement efforts. Some of these projects could bear fruit in 2021, while others need longer-term development of capabilities to find kleptocrats’ money hiding within the financial system and prepare policy options to confiscate, sanction, or reveal it. The TFI anti-corruption counselor, who should be designated as early as possible in the administration, should have a staff of two and a mandate to coordinate with and leverage resources across the four principal TFI offices, while also cooperating with Treasury’s Office of International Affairs. And while the White House National Security Council should lead the overall fight against kleptocracy and corruption, the TFI anti-corruption counselor should serve as Treasury’s senior working-level point of contact for collaboration between Treasury and the rest of the U.S. government, as well as with international partners, civil society, and Congress. Combating corruption and kleptocracy will be one of the top priorities of the Biden administration, and Treasury has the resources to start delivering major results quickly. But to do so it must coordinate throughout the Treasury Department and with external partners to roll out big executive actions in 2021.
Topic:
Corruption, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

324. 2020 Country Brief: China

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
hina is no longer a budding regional hegemon, but a global power seeking to rival the United States on the international stage in economic, military, technological, and diplomatic terms. Further, the country’s actions—such as handling public health issues—have direct consequences for Americans. Moderating China’s growing influence is the foreign policy challenge that will define the future. Yet “America First” policies, in combination with erratic leadership, have placed the United States at a strategic disadvantage in the international arena, providing China the opportunity to fill a leadership void and promote its policies and technologies, while achieving its economic and military ambitions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, Leadership, and Influence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

325. Deciphering China in the Middle East

Author:
Erzsébet N. Rózsa
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It is commonly perceived that the engagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Middle East is driven primarily by economic interests, and that it prefers to steer clear of the conflicts in the region as much as possible. Its landmark ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), launched in 2013 as a global infrastructure development strategy, contributes to this perception. This notion, however, overlooks the larger context of China’s engagement, both historical and contemporary. China’s new activism in the Middle East reflects the evolution of Chinese foreign policy thinking, in line with the country’s rise as an economic superpower. Its original choice of partners in the region was influenced by ideological considerations and a shared anti-colonial and anti-imperialist narrative. But its transformation into an economic powerhouse has inevitably altered its priorities and influence in the Middle East. Its economic penetration of the region is reflected in the set of cooperation agreements that it has concluded with the regional states as well as in subregional cooperation formats, e. g. the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum. The PRC’s increasing engagement in the Middle East may well be driven by its need for resources to fuel its economic growth; however, there is inevitably a political dimension too, due not only to the fact that China has a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and seeks to project the image of a ‘responsible’ superpower but also because of the need to protect its investments and commercial interests in the region. China’s growing influence in the Middle East may generally be positively received, or even welcomed; however, the countries of the region have very different perspectives and often conflicting interests in the way they relate to the PRC. This Brief analyses these perspectives taking into account China’s recent initiatives in the region at a time of growing rivalry between the US and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

326. Stand by Me! The Sino-Russian Normative Partnership in Action

Author:
Alice Ekman, Sinikukka Saari, and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It has become commonplace to describe the relationship between China and Russia as ‘a marriage of convenience’,1 in particular in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, this popular metaphor hides very different – even contradictory – interpretations of the nature and future of the relationship. Perhaps depending on one’s take on arranged marriages, the deepening relationship between these two states is seen as ‘stable and successful’2 and ‘durable’,3 or on the contrary, as a ‘mere’ convenient arrangement doomed to be a temporary solution.4 It seems that fuzzy and often misunderstood marriage allegories bring more confusion than clarity to understanding and explaining complex relations between states. Shared norms and worldview would certainly indicate a steady and long-term arrangement whatever the marriage metaphor used. The Sino-Russian partnership is dense and multidimensional, and it is rooted in shared norms. International norms – the standard of expected state behaviour – reflect the underlying values of the global system, and underpin international cooperation in the political, economic and security-related fields.Sino-Russian normative cooperation aims at redefining and re-interpreting existing international norms in a way that reflects their shared principles, worldviews and threat perceptions – ‘like-mindedness’ as Chinese official communication refers to it.5 Both China and Russia share a conviction that today's international order is unfairly dominated by the US and the West, and that the current international norms and their interpretation reflect Western values that should not be considered universal. They are both convinced that these need to be changed, and that the time is ripe for this. For Beijing and Moscow, a post-Western era of global governance looms on the horizon. This shared reading of the present and predilection for such a future global order has been translated into dynamically evolving normative cooperation between the partners at multilateral level. Two other important and shared convictions are, first, that neither party represents a threat to the other regime’s survival (and even has an interest in supporting the other regime) and, second, that the West would like to see the regime in both China and Russia challenged (and under the right circumstances is ready to contribute to this). The shared worldview and threat perception help to smooth out the differences between the two countries: when their interpretations differ, they show mutual self-restraint and acquiesce rather than go against each other in the name of national interest. This Brief examines the normative dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation – i.e. how the two countries advance their understanding of international rules and norms together in the international arena. It studies how the two countries advance their understanding of appropriate state behaviour internationally in three areas: human rights, non-intervention and cyber-governance. All three issues are united by a common thread – states’ sovereignty – a robust version of which both vigorously defend. As a result, in these three areas, their cooperation is particularly strong and proactive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

327. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:
Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

328. Digital Divide? Transatlantic defence cooperation on Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Simona R. Soare
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, big data, 5G and biotechnology are paving the way towards defence modernisation in a growing number of states, particularly in the US, Russia and China. While AI technologies and their impact have been on the radar of European governments, there has been little scrutiny in Europe of how the evolving US approach to AI affects European defence and the broader transatlantic partnership. At the heart of the US defence modernisation programme is the Artificial Intelligence Strategy unveiled by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2019. What implications does this have for Europe and for transatlantic cooperation? In examining this question this Brief finds that cooperation with the US on the digital modernisation of defence remains a strategic necessity for Europe, but a mix of new and pre-existing dynamics in the relationship risks the emergence of a transatlantic digital divide. The Brief is structured in three parts. The first part explores the key tenets of the DOD AI Strategy. The second part examines challenges to the adoption of AI technologies in the US, many of which are shared by European partners. The third part of the Brief explores the implications of the DOD AI Strategy for European security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

329. Towards Urban Decoupling? China’s smart city ambitions at the time of Covid-19

Author:
Alice Ekman and Cristina de Esperanza Picardo
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The term ‘smart city’ relates to the use of technology to improve urban infrastructure and services, from energy grids to systems for transport/mobility and parking, and includes water treatment, waste management and security aspects, among others. China has made the smart city part of its national development strategy: the concept was endorsed by President Xi Jinping at a national urbanisation convention in 2015, and later explicitly mentioned in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), adopted in March 2016. Since then, the central government has massively encouraged the development of smart cities across Chinese national territory – claiming in January 2019 to have a total of 500 “smart city pilot projects ready or under construction”. It has also urged technology companies to become leaders at a global level, and to reach out to foreign cities in support of their own smart city development. China often promotes its smart cities through existing bilateral and regional frameworks (such as the China-ASEAN Summit or the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum) and in particular under the banner of the ‘Belt & Road Initiative’ (BRI), as well as its derivative, the ‘Digital Silk Road’, which are attracting a significant number of countries. If China is today investing in the smart city industry in a comprehensive way, including mobility and ecological aspects, it first and foremost developed a strong focus on and expertise in the public security dimension. In fact, China’s definition of smart city was initially assimilated to ‘safe city’ and the development of surveillance networks for the state security authorities. It is mainly, but not exclusively, this ‘safe’ dimension of smart cities that a host of Chinese companies are offering to foreign countries and cities – and the one that will be analysed in this Brief. How is China adjusting its safe city ambitions domestically and internationally during the Covid-19 crisis? And what are the challenges raised by China’s recent safe city developments? This Brief identifies two main types: a normative challenge and a geopolitical one. Both of them will potentially lead to an ‘urban decoupling’, with the development of diverging types of cities and urban governance models in the future.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Geopolitics, Cities, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

330. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations

Author:
Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus

331. Remolding China’s ‘Empty’ Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the EU

Author:
Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample scrutiny since its inception in 2013. Practical results could be said to be severely lacking in contrast to the project’s ambitious plans. Chinese engagement abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, but whether this can be classified as the fruits of BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is developing BRI on the go. That gives the EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and remold it into a more desirable form. Because China increasingly sees Europe as BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot more leverage than it commonly assumes.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

332. Climate superpowers: How the EU and China can compete and cooperate for a green future

Author:
Janka Oertel, Jennifer Tollmann, and Byford Tsang
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The broad notion of ‘partnership’ no longer reflects the true complexity of the EU’s interactions with China in tackling the most important global challenge. Instead, as climate action becomes more material to economic interests, Europe and China will both compete and cooperate with each other, against the backdrop of an overarching systemic rivalry. To successfully manage this new reality, the EU and its member states will have to clearly define benchmarks and red lines for credible climate action, to set the framework for cooperation. At the same time, they will need to invest in future competitiveness, especially in the green technology needed to compete for markets, standards, and influence in a low-carbon world.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, European Union, and Interstate Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Europe

333. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union

Author:
Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

334. The United Wa State Army and Burma’s Peace Process

Author:
Bertil Lintner
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The United Wa State Army, a force of some twenty-thousand fighters, is the largest of Burma’s ethnic armed organizations. It is also the best equipped, boasting modern and sophisticated Chinese weaponry, and operates a formidable drug empire in the Golden Triangle region. This report examines the history of the Wa people, the United Wa State Army’s long-standing political and military ties to China, and the Wa’s role in Burma’s fragile peace process.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Burma, and Southeast Asia

335. Chinese investment in Uganda: new impetus for sustainable development?

Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)
Abstract:
Chinese investment is flowing fast into Uganda, and spreading into the agriculture and forestry sectors. The government needs to keep pace with these developments so the benefits can be shared by Ugandans. A new analysis shows that, while the jobs and new businesses created are well received, the working conditions and environmental practices of Chinese companies are often poor. Many people evicted from their land to make way for new projects have not been compensated. To hold Chinese companies to account, government agencies, with support from NGOs, must share information about these investments and introduce stronger regulation — in particular to uphold community rights. In turn, Chinese companies must be more transparent, responsible and legally compliant. With a proactive and accountable strategy for Chinese investment management, Uganda could make major gains for sustainable development.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Business, Accountability, Investment, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, and China

336. A World Dividing: The International Implications of the Sino-American Rift

Author:
Chas W. Freeman Jr.
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Trump administration has declared economic war on China. The United States has raised taxes on Chinese imports to levels not seen since the Smoot–Hawley tariffs of the Great Depression. Over the course of this year, Chinese imports of American goods have decreased by 26.4 percent, while China’s exports to the United States are down 10.7 percent. Washington has embargoed exports to China of a constantly expanding list of high-tech manufactures. It seeks to block Chinese telecommunications companies from third-country markets. The United States has mounted a vigorous campaign to persuade other countries to reject Chinese investments in their infrastructure, notably in the case of 5G telecommunications networks.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Global Political Economy, Trade Wars, International Community, and Exports
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Global Focus

337. The Persecution of the Uighurs and Potential Crimes Against Humanity in China

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
The treatment of Uighurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has increased concerns over the risk of widespread and systematic human rights abuses and violations in China. The government’s approach to combatting religious extremism has resulted in the arbitrary detention of up to one million Uighurs, severe restrictions on religious practice, and pervasive surveillance and control of the entire Muslim population of Xinjiang. A new joint policy brief by the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect asserts that these policies may constitute crimes against humanity under international law. The policy brief provides an overview of China’s response to growing international pressure to halt the persecution of Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang region and offers recommendations on how to comprehensively address these issues.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Islam, Ethnicity, Freedom of Expression, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Atrocities, and Crimes Against Humanity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

338. China’s Social Credit System: A Chimera with Real Claws

Author:
Séverine Arséne
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China's Social Credit System remains a poorly understood combination of rating schemes and blacklists, but the consequences for individuals and businesses are very real. Since the State Council published a “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)”, all administrations and localities in China have been busy figuring out ways to develop social credit systems relevant to their own jurisdiction, while a few corporations have also been experimenting with private social credit ratings, more akin to loyalty schemes, in conjunction with the policy. From this hotchpotch of experimentation, two distinct instruments are taking shape in the so-called public system: first, personal credit ratings managed by localities, and secondly, blacklists of individuals and companies managed by sectorial administrations (the Supreme People’s Court, the Tax Department, Department of Agriculture, etc). Arrangements across administrations and corporate partners enable the implementation of rewards and punishments attached to the blacklists, while personal ratings carry only perks.
Topic:
Governance, Business, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

339. India’s Space Program - International Competition and Evolution

Author:
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
India’s space program has grown and evolved significantly in the last five decades. The program originally focused on developing space assets that provided direct developmental benefits, for example telecommunications and remote sensing satellites that helped both in improving communication facilities and giving direct assistance to India’s farmers. But over time, India has shifted a part of its focus towards space exploration and other high-profile missions that do not have as clear a developmental purpose as earlier. This includes, for example, India’s Mars and Moon exploratory missions. Overall, India has been fairly successful in these efforts and its space program has become a comprehensive one that includes not only a robust launch capacity and very large remote sensing satellite systems, but also a very well rounded scientific and deep space exploratory program.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Space
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

340. Prospects for the New EU Strategy on India: Game Changer or Business as Usual?

Author:
Garima Mohan
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The new European Union (EU) strategy on India marks a major moment of departure in EU-India relations. It reflects three critical shifts: firstly, the EU no longer views India from a “trade lens” only, recognizing its important geopolitical role in maintaining a multipolar Asia. Second, the strategy frames EU-India relations in the context of broader geopolitical developments, primarily the rise of China. Recognition of the China challenge and its impact not only in Europe, but also on the balance of power in Asia, has pushed the EU to change the nature of its partnerships in the region, particularly with India. Finally, the strategy links European security and prosperity to developments in Asia, broadening the scope of EU foreign policy substantially. This paper analyses the new EU strategy on India and highlights areas, which represent a departure from previous strategies. The paper looks specifically at proposals for greater foreign and security cooperation, for securing a rules-based order, increasing regional connectivity, improving trade and investment, and building better coordination on and with India. These proposals are commendable and respond to a long laundry list suggested by experts from both sides over a long time. They also fit well with India’s priorities, namely responding to increasing Chinese political, economic and military presence in South Asia, security in the Indian Ocean, as well as more proactive engagement in regional and global institutions. Finally, the paper suggests ways of taking this forward and ensuring the strategy does not remain a paper tiger in the long arsenal of EU-India declarations. While more dialogues on global and strategic issues is a great idea and will help change perceptions in New Delhi that the EU is not a strategic actor, the EU will have to ensure this is not hindered by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ already overstretched capacities and the 30 existing EU-India dialogues. Focusing on ongoing debates in India and Europe in these dialogues, particularly connectivity projects, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, 5G networks and infrastructure might also open up new avenues of cooperation. Overall the EU-India relationship has witnessed remarkable momentum over the last four years – aided by political will from both sides, the China challenge, friction in transatlantic ties, and common challenges within Europe and India. The new strategy is a good first step to build on this momentum. However, it needs to be translated into action fast.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, and European Union

341. Egypt Takes Another Step Toward China

Author:
Haisam Hassanein
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Port projects and other outreach may help President Sisi check off some of his policy goals, but giving China such a foothold could threaten a number of U.S. interests in the region. On August 5, Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese company Hutchison Ports to establish a Mediterranean container terminal in Abu Qir. President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi himself attended the signing ceremony, where he praised the company’s global reputation in the field and emphasized the importance of executing the project in accordance with the highest international standards. The project is in line with Sisi’s track record of seeking Chinese help to fulfill his ambitious domestic and foreign agenda. Hutchison is one of the world’s leading port networks, operating terminals in twenty-seven countries; in Egypt, it operates the country’s two main commercial ports, Alexandria and El Dekheila. The company’s representatives commended the opportunity for direct investment in Abu Qir and announced that they will be training more than 1,500 Egyptian engineers and other workers for jobs at the terminal. According to them, the facility will be able to handle up to 1 million containers annually once completed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Growth, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, North Africa, Egypt, and United States of America

342. Global E-Commerce Talks Stumble on Data Issues, Privacy, and More

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Zhiyaou (Lucy) Lu
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In early 2019, several important members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) submitted noteworthy proposals in a realm of international commerce that has evolved faster than rules to govern it: e-commerce or digital trade. While countries agree on less controversial subjects like banning unsolicited commercial electronic messages, the three leading WTO members—China, the European Union, and the United States—have big differences in their approaches to more challenging issues: data flows, data localization, privacy invasions by data collectors, transfer of source code, imposition of customs duties and internet taxes, and internet censorship. Their differing viewpoints lead Hufbauer and Lu to conclude that the prospect of reaching a high-level WTO e-commerce agreement is not promising. To reach an agreement, either most of the contentious issues must be dropped or the number of participating countries must be sharply reduced. A WTO accord, even of low ambition, would have value if only to establish basic digital norms on matters such as banning unsolicited commercial messages and protecting online consumers from fraudulent practices. A more ambitious accord covering the controversial issues should be negotiated in bilateral and/or plurilateral/regional pacts rather than in the WTO.
Topic:
Economics, World Trade Organization, Finance, Privacy, and Data
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and European Union

343. US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain

Author:
Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The terms of the US-China trade war change often, but the tariff escalations have inflicted documented economic damage on both countries. Expanding the conflict will only increase the damage and reverberate across the world economy. This Policy Brief uses a computable general equilibrium model of the global economy to analyze three scenarios that could unfold in coming months. The first scenario is the current situation (as of June 2019). Two additional scenarios assume implementation of proposed US tariffs and Chinese responses. The models project the situation after the two countries and the rest of the world adjust across a time horizon of three to five years. For the United States, higher tariffs raise prices and reduce demand for consumers and producers. For China, the tariffs raise the prices of consumer goods but have less direct impact on producers, because the Chinese have exempted some intermediate inputs. US exports and imports decline under all three scenarios. But China can successfully divert its exports away from the United States and escape maximum economic damage.
Topic:
Economics, Global Markets, Finance, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

344. China, Like the US, Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth Through Manufacturing

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China’s development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China’s competitiveness in the most labor-intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value-added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward more consumption as citizens’ incomes have grown. Like Americans, Chinese people are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China’s production, reducing the role of manufacturing, and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This Policy Brief reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China’s long-term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following the pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Economic Growth, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

345. Chinese Investments in the US and EU Are Declining—for Similar Reasons

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
For years China has been one of the world’s most rapidly growing sources of outward foreign direct investment. Since peaking in 2016, however, Chinese outward investments, primarily to the United States but also the European Union, have declined dramatically, especially in response to changes in China’s domestic rules on capital outflows and in the face of rising nationalism in the United States. Concerns about growing Chinese influence in other economies, the ascendant role of an authoritarian government in Beijing, and the possible security implications of Chinese dominance in the high-technology sector have put Chinese outward investments under intense international scrutiny. This Policy Brief analyzes the most recent trends in Chinese investments in the United States and the European Union and reviews recent political and regulatory changes both have adopted toward Chinese inward investments. It also explores the emerging transatlantic difference in the regulatory response to the Chinese information technology firm Huawei. Concerned about national security and as part of the ongoing broader trade friction with China, the United States has cracked down far harder on the company than the European Union.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

346. China, Like the US, Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth Through Manufacturing

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China’s development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China’s competitiveness in the most labor-intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value-added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward more consumption as citizens’ incomes have grown. Like Americans, Chinese people are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China’s production, reducing the role of manufacturing, and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This Policy Brief reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China’s long-term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following the pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

347. The Regional Format 16+1: Early Rusting, Still Alive and Expanding into 17+1

Author:
Rudolf Furst
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
The sub-regional multilateral format of China and 16 post-communist states (16+1) proved that it could last seven years and that it has the potential to absorb new members. Consequently, the European Union is increasingly concerned about its potentially divisive effects on the EU’s unity. The expected economic benefits of 16+1 for the European partners have been scarcely relevant; still, the European states exploit the 16+1 format for strengthening their bilateral agendas with China. Amidst the trade war with China, the US regards China’s rising influence in Central Europe as a political issue. Beijing’s priority in Europe is to calm down the tension with the EU, Germany, and France over the 16+1 platform. However, the accession of Greece to the enlarged format of 17+1 in the recent 16+1 summit in Dubrovnik and the gaining of support for the Belt and Road Initiative in Italy enable China to establish its foothold on the European South’s doorstep in connection with the 17+1 regional platform.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Economy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, France, and Germany

348. The risk to biodiversity along China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Author:
Alex Lechner, Hoong Chen Teo, and Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) poses a great risk to biodiversity, particularly as many of the infrastructure projects are due to take place in regions that are home to threatened and endangered species found nowhere else in the world. This policy brief makes recommendations for the UK government to develop a BRI Biodiversity Strategy.
Topic:
Environment, Brexit, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Ecology
Political Geography:
Britain and China

349. The role of Chinese finance in the City of London after Brexit

Author:
Sarah Hall
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:
London is the largest western financial centre for financial transactions denominated in Renminbi (RMB) and has played an important role in shaping the rapid and recent internationalisation of Chinese finance. This policy brief discusses how to maintain this leading role post-Brexit.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Finance, Brexit, and Financial Institutions
Political Geography:
Britain, China, and United Kingdom

350. The United Kingdom's Belt and Road Initiative strategy after Brexit

Author:
Benjamin Barton
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham
Abstract:
As China’s President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become one of the world’s most active infrastructure development drivers. The BRI is helping to meet the increasing demand for infrastructure development in emerging markets across the world. This policy is unlikely to change due to the importance that the Chinese government attributes to the BRI, with it now being formally enshrined into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution. For the UK, the BRI stakes are high; it matters both domestically and internationally. It is impacting the wellbeing of countries that are of strategic importance to the UK. It also contributes to the emerging geopolitical rivalry on infrastructure financing. The government should explore bilateral and multilateral venues to seek to cooperate with China on the BRI by developing a UK BRI strategy post-Brexit.
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Brexit, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Britain, China, United Kingdom, and Asia

351. North China, Boxer Rebellion, Japan, Nepal, and Foreign Explorers: Ekai Kawaguchi’s Notes on 20th Century Tibet

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Following his arrival and getting adjusted in Lhasa in March 1901, Japanese Buddhist explorer, Ekai Kawaguchi began familiarizing himself with the life and times of 20th century Tibet. Kawaguchi embarked upon his destination, Tibet, in June 1897 when he left Japan. Arriving in Lhasa nearly four years thereafter, in 1901, Kawaguchi was prepared for the challenges in store, though unaware of the scale of their manifestation. There was a sense of relief though, that he had been able to overcome perhaps the most arduous part of his journey, which was reaching this wearisome and forbidden land whilst being in disguise all through.
Topic:
History and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Nepal

352. Countering Foreign Influence and Inter ference in Open Societies —A Japanese Perspective on Authoritarian Infiltration

Author:
Hideshi Tokuchi
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
It is almost a cliché that Australia and New Zealand are canaries in the coal mine for Chinese attempts at exerting political influence. In fact, Chinese influence is not a topic that affects just Oceania. It is already a serious challenge that confronts all democracies and open societies. According to Clive Hamilton’s “Silent Invasion,” a Chinese diplomat who sought political asylum in Australia told Hamilton that Australia’s openness, relatively small population, a large number of Chinese immigrants and commitment to multiculturalism have weakened Australia’s capacity to recognize and defend against the Chinese infiltration, but all democracies and open societies are susceptible to the threat
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

353. The European Union-Russia-China energy triangle

Author:
Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We argue that energy relations between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy technology exports and energy investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe: 1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas 2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents 3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise in different technologies 4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely 5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political goals, than about EU investments We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China energy relationship. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Oil, and Europe Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

354. The Great Puzzle: China in Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Małgorzata Jankowska
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) through the 16+1 economic platform addressed investment needs imposed by the global financial crisis. Despite limited outcomes, it was accompanied by a negative EU narrative towards the sponsor of the program. The main argument has been that the platform undermines EU cohesion and unity. This narrative discouraged bilateral or sub-regional initiatives of CEE states towards China and served to mobilize European Institutions around policies that were primarily shaped by Berlin.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

355. Belt and Road in Latin America: A regional game changer?

Author:
Pepe Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Four new BRI trends to watch: (i) enforcement of transparency, debt, and environmental safeguards; (ii) growing participation of the private sector; (iii) the role of the advanced economies in BRI; and (iv) new BRI sectors beyond infrastructure Governments and companies in Latin America and the Caribbean should engage and help shape an evolving BRI, mindful of both the opportunities and risks involved The United States can play a key role in setting standards for economic development projects in the region and beyond
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Financial Markets, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Latin America

356. Sanctions are an Important Tool in China's North Korea Diplomacy: Concerns over nukes have been growing in Beijing

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Beijing has imposed sanctions on North Korea each time the latter has conducted a nuclear test, sometimes leading Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table. The aim is to make North Korea abandon its nuclear program and open up its economy. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Denmark should support UN inspections of North Korea’s denuclearization activities, as well as the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the signatory states. ■ Denmark, in collaboration with other countries, can monitor the implementation of economic sanctions against North Korea while at the same time joining the EU’s discussions on the option of gradually easing sanctions. ■ Denmark should also prepare for the possibility of diplomatic and political normalization between North Korea and the rest of the world in the medium to long term....
Topic:
Diplomacy, Power Politics, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Denmark

357. Getting Japan to the Negotiating Table on the North Korea Crisis: Tokyo's evolving security agenda

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Japan’s absence from frontline diplomacy on the North Korea crisis is undermining inter-national efforts to bring about a lasting peace. A close alliance with Tokyo is essential for American and European interests in East Asia. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The European Union should consider playing a larger role as a mediator in the North Korean crisis. ■The United States can use its diplomatic weight to help Japan solve the abductee issue with North Korea. ■In the face of their shared security threat, Japan should take steps to ease current tensions with South Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

358. Can China Buy Peace? Money and Security in the South China Sea

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite China’s strong economic influence over Southeast Asian countries, tensions in the South China Sea have been flaring up again this year, as domestic oppositions and external interventions create dilemma for Southeast Asian governments. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ When considering joining the freedom of navigation operations in the SCS Denmark should consider that foreign interference will likely escalate Chinese military activities. ■ Denmark’s delicate relationship with the US and China must be carefully evaluated and managed. ■As a major maritime nation it is important for Denmark to secure a free sea through diplomacy and UN institutions. ■European countries have much room to enhance their contribution to regional development in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, Power Politics, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China and Asia

359. Denmark's China Challenge

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknowledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task. Recommendations Intensify cooperation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to ensure Denmark’s initiatives in foreign policy, security and economic relations with China are more closely integrated. Beware of the bilateral. Beijing’s new assertive foreign policy and US-China strategic competition require that Denmark leverage its interests increasingly through the EU, NATO and other multilateral bodies. Assess the economic vulnerabilities of Danish industries in China and diversify trade and investment across Asia’s emerging markets and developed economies in the G7/EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

360. Expo promotes high-quality development

Author:
Dong Yan and Wen Jun
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
China will promote higher-level opening-up by continuing to expand access to its market, increase imports, foster a world-class business environment, deepen multilateral and bilateral cooperation and jointly build the Belt and Road Initiative. This is the promise President Xi Jinping made in his keynote speech at the second China International Import Expo in Shanghai on Tuesday. ...... China's imports have made important contributions to global trade and economic growth, accounting for 10.67 percent of the global goods imports last year. At the second CIIE, which concludes on Sunday, more than 150 countries, regions and international organizations from across five continents are showcasing their development results while more than 3,000 enterprises are holding talks with purchasing agents both inside and outside China. The CIIE is a platform for not only trading goods and services, but also exchanging ideas and discussing global trade issues.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Business, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China and Asia

361. More than meets the eye in ROK ceding developing economy status

Author:
Dong Yan and Ma Tao
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
A large number of farmers in the Republic of Korea took to the streets of Seoul on Wednesday, protesting the government's recent decision to give up its developing country status at the World Trade Organization in future trade negotiations and thus lose the benefits accruing out of it. The protesters were worried that the decision would eventually lead to a drastic cut in state agriculture subsidies and tariffs. …… Given that countries could experience uneven development, gaining undue advantages in some areas while being weak in others, the WTO has prevented some developing countries from enjoying some of the special and differential treatments in certain fields. For instance, it has restricted the ROK and India from using measures to promote balance of payment. Besides, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, revised in 2003, allows countries that lack production capability to import nonproprietary medicines, which is opposed by the developed countries－and 11 countries including China, the ROK, Mexico and Turkey have agreed to implement the agreement only in emergencies.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, World Trade Organization, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Korea

362. Tariffs will ultimately harm US economy

Author:
Dong Yan and Zang Chengwei
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
That Vice-Premier Liu He talked with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on the phone on Monday raises hope that China and the United States would resume the bilateral trade negotiations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

363. Fair competition put into practice

Author:
Lu Tong
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
This year's Government Work Report sent an important signal to the global community that China aims to create a fair market environment based on competitive neutrality. Competitive neutrality is a set of public policies for regulating domestic market order. It means that State‐owned enterprises and private businesses compete on a level playing field and that SOEs should not obtain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of free trade in such areas as tax, subsidies, debt, supervision and market entrance.
Topic:
Markets, Business, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

364. Trade trends show China should take the opportunity to diversify its market

Author:
Dong Yan, Ma Yingying, and Xu Tingting
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The China-US trade row has been drawing a lot of attention. A detailed review of the bilateral trade situation between China and the US from January through April is a good reference for the future trend. Also, as uncertainties loomed amid tariff hikes, some related US industries were afflicted, such as plants, minerals and precious metal in the first quarter.
Topic:
Markets, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Diversification, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

365. The Function Transformation of Central Banks and Commercial Banks under the Application of Digital Fiat Currency

Author:
Song Shuang and Liu Dongmin
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
Since the advent of Bitcoin, digital currency and its underlying distributed ledger technology have been spread and applied rapidly around the world. Traditionally, currency issuance and circulation are based on binary tree structure, with the central bank as the highest node, commercial banks in the middle and the public and enterprises at the bottom. However, in the distributed ledger system, all nodes have similar privileges and can transact with each other directly. Hence, the advocators promote the potential of digital currency to subvert the monetary control of sovereign countries and alter the traditional business of commercial banks with the characteristics of decentralization, trust-free intermediary, non-tampering and encryption security. On the other hand, the dissenters believe that transaction nodes in distributed ledger system will be greatly increased, and hence reducing the professionalism of transaction processing and forfeiting the authenticity of original information, which then becomes difficult to play a significant role in the future economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Banks, Central Bank, Currency, and Bitcoin
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

366. Opinion: What Is China’s Core Economic Interest in Trade War?

Author:
Qiyuan Xu
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The trade conflict between China and the U.S. has lasted for more than half a year. The two sides have held several rounds of consultations, but agreements were later broken and tensions have only intensified. The spat will likely be protracted, with frictions to continue and possibly escalate for a period of time, given the two countries’ diverging interests, public opinions and historical experiences. A broad range of issues are involved in the trade dispute. For example, the U.S. has pressured China on forced technology transfer, talent strategy and industrial policy issues, as well as issues the two sides have long been at odds over, such as intellectual property rights, labor, environmental protection, stateowned enterprise reform and foreign exchange rates. Meanwhile, the U.S. has targeted products and sectors that go well beyond those in which China has a competitive advantage. The U.S. tariffs also target industries that the country plans to focus on for future development.
Topic:
Development, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

367. China’s economy seeks bottom amid downward pressure in 2019

Author:
Qiyuan Xu
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
Proactive fiscal policy will be employed this year to meet the challenge of downward pressure In 2019, the Chinese economy is expected to seek a bottom as a slowdown is inevitable. It is anticipated that it will stabilize at the end of the year or early next year at a growth rate of around 6.3 percent. With China's economy entering a new era, policymakers should focus more on the quality of growth in addition to maintaining a moderately high growth rate. ...... At the same time, China's economy is facing a lot of downward pressuredomestically. First, confidence in the financial market needs to be restored. In2018, China's financial market was hit many times; its stocks, bonds, fundsand internet finance, for example, were all affected. In addition, at present, thewidening credit spreads and the high degree of liquidity between bankscannot be converted into loans to enterprises and other market entities. Facedwith rising market risks and faltering consumer confidence, investors preferlow-risk or risk-free asset allocations.
Topic:
Markets, Financial Markets, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

368. Supply-side reform leads to economic resilience

Author:
Qiyuan Xu
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
China's GDP grew 6.6 percent in 2018, according to National Bureau o ftatistics data. Despite the slight slowdown in the GDP growth rate, however, exports grew at a relatively high 9.9 percent year-on-year calculated in US dollars. And, not surprisingly, China's trade surplus with the United States expanded further. ...... Besides, the relative prosperity index of small and medium-sized enterprises has dropped to the second-lowest point in a decade, and the financial cost differentiation among various industries is growing. This may have a negative impact on not only short-term macroeconomic stability, but also the development space of relevant emerging industries and long-term growth momentum.
Topic:
Reform, GDP, Economy, Economic Growth, and Resilience
Political Geography:
China and Asia

369. How to strengthen Europe’s Policy Brief agenda on digital connectivity

Author:
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Connectivity is high on the EU’s agenda, but its digital dimension remains underdeveloped. The short paragraph on digital in the EU connectivity strategy is telling. The EU’s distinct approach to digital connectivity – with a focus on the internal market, rule-making and development – differs from similar strategies, particularly China and its Digital Silk Road. "Now is the time to act on digital connectivity's practical as well as strategic elements of hard infrastructure and business operations." Needed, now, is a comprehensive strategic vision that spurs action on all three practical elements of digital connectivity – namely, telecommunications infrastructure, business and regulation – and gives strategic guidance in the political and even securitized sense, and not only from a market perspective. Read the full Policy Brief by Senior Research Fellow Maaike Okano-Heijmans.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and Digital Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Europe

370. Assessing China’s Influence in Europe through Investments in Technology and Infrastructure. Four Cases.

Author:
Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s role as a global investor and financier has grown rapidly in recent decades, nowhere more so than in Europe. In 2017, a full quarter of China’s outbound foreign direct investment was destined for Europe. China has stepped up promotion of its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Europe as its final destination, ever greater flows of investment in Eurasian connectivity are on offer. However, in recent years scepticism about rising flows of Chinese investment into the EU has grown. This report aims to carefully scrutinize the linkage between Chinese investment in Europe and China’s influence in the region and provides a nuanced and careful analysis that goes beyond the alarmism and polarization that dominates so much of the recent discussion about China’s role in Europe. It is based on a series of case studies examining a Chinese port investment in Greece, a Chinese-financed rail project in Hungary and Serbia, and two Chinese acquisition deals in the Netherlands. Thus, the authors shed light on the motives behind these individual Chinese investments and financial packages, including the interests of both the Chinese and the host governments and firms involved, evaluating what, if any, Chinese “influence” can be linked to the deals. According to the findings, the specific terms of each investment or loan package are dependent on the individual circumstances of the countries and firms involved. In each case there is an identifiable commercial basis for the Chinese investment, but economic and political viability of each deal varies.
Topic:
Globalization, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

371. Defense Transparency Index 2019

Author:
IGCC
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In an increasingly volatile world, mutual trust and confidence among defense establishments is critical. Growing arms competition and security anxiety in Northeast Asia, one of the most strategically important but politically volatile regions of the world, is increasing the demand for defense information, not only from governments and militaries but also from businesses, the media, and concerned citizens. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security. Included in the Index are the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Korea, along with the external major powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia. What constitutes “defense transparency” is contested, and there is a lack of agreed-upon definitions and standardized means of measurement. The DTI addresses this gap by providing a framework for defining and measuring defense transparency. We rank countries across eight indicators to come up with overall rankings and for each country, providing a rigorous measurement of this essential but contested concept. Countries score well for budgetary disclosures, issuance of defense white papers, and being transparent on their military capabilities. The DTI is presented at the annual Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a multilateral forum for track-two diplomacy. NEACD, which was founded by Susan Shirk, seeks to reduce the risk of military conflict in the region and to lay the groundwork for an official multilateral process in Northeast Asia by providing a regular channel of informal communication among the six governments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

372. Berlin’s Preliminary 5G Decision: Limiting Damage and Learning Lessons

Author:
Kaan Sahin and Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Despite the security concerns of the US, EU, and Australia, Germany plans not to exclude any telecom equipment vendors, including Chinese companies such as Huawei, from its 5G network. This stance reflects a narrow view of the issue that prioritizes short-term economic interests and fails to uphold national security and democratic values. Widespread criticism, including from within the government, shows that political decision-makers in Germany need a more sophisticated, forward-looking approach to 5G.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Internet
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Germany, Australia, North America, and United States of America

373. Security First, Technology Second: Putin Tightens his Grip on Russia’s Internet – with China’s Help

Author:
Andrei Soldatov
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Since his return to the Russian presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has sought to bring the Russian internet under his control. Digital businesses in Russia pay dearly for his expensive system of surveillance and censorship. This slows down the pace of innovation and puts the modernization of the economy at risk. Even then, technical control over the internet remains shaky. The Kremlin is seeking Chinese assistance to enforce restrictions and be able to cut Russia off from the global internet.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Internet, Surveillance, and Censorship
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

374. China’s great game in the Middle East

Author:
Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, and Naser Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China has significantly increased its economic, political, and – to a lesser extent – security footprint in the Middle East in the past decade, becoming the biggest trade partner and external investor for many countries in the region. China still has a limited appetite for challenging the US-led security architecture in the Middle East or playing a significant role in regional politics. Yet the country’s growing economic presence is likely to pull it into wider engagement with the region in ways that could significantly affect European interests. Europeans should monitor China’s growing influence on regional stability and political dynamics, especially in relation to sensitive issues such as surveillance technology and arms sales. Europeans should increase their engagement with China in the Middle East, aiming to refocus its economic role on constructive initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

375. Not smart enough: The poverty of European military thinking on artificial intelligence

Author:
Ulrike Franke
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
There is currently too little European thinking about what artificial intelligence means for the military. AI experts tend to overlook Europe, focusing on the US and China. But AI will play an important role for Europe’s defence capabilities, and its funding and development decisions will influence the future of military AI. France and Germany stand at opposite ends of the AI spectrum in Europe: France considers AI a part of geopolitical competition and shows clear interest in military AI, while Germany sees AI only as an economic and societal issue. The new European Commission’s stated goal of achieving “European technological sovereignty” should lead it to include engagement on the topic of military AI, and help EU member states harmonise their approaches. Failing to coordinate properly in this area could threaten future European defence cooperation, including PESCO and the European Defence Fund.
Topic:
Development, Military Affairs, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Europe, France, Germany, and United States of America

376. Rescuing multilateralism

Author:
Anthony Dworkin and Richard Gowan
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Multilateralism is core to Europe’s approach to foreign policy, but in recent years this has weakened as EU countries disagree among themselves. The US, China, and Russia have each sought to challenge or disrupt the existing, post-1945 world order; and each seeks to divide Europeans from one another. The turmoil in the current system represents an opportunity for Europeans to shape a new order that meets their strategic needs. In addition to the fight against climate change, European interests include: increasing stability on its troubled periphery; managing migration more effectively; and defending the open world trading system. European countries will need to transform EU foreign policy decision-making processes, deepen their cooperation in multilateral settings, and set multilateral standards for emerging technologies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Political stability, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Europe

377. Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Secondary sanctions have become a critical challenge for Europe, due to the Trump administration’s maximalist policy on Iran and its aggressive economic statecraft. Europe’s vulnerabilities mostly result from asymmetric interdependence with the US economy, due to the size of US markets and the global role of the US dollar. In future, states will likely weaponise economic interdependence with the EU to target countries that are more important to the European economy than Iran, such as China and Russia. European countries should demonstrate that, despite their economic interdependence with the US, they control EU foreign policy. The EU and its member states should strengthen their sanctions policy, begin to build up their deterrence and resilience against secondary sanctions, and prepare to adopt asymmetric countermeasures against any country that harms European interests through secondary sanctions. They should also attempt to bolster the global role of the euro and lead a robust international dialogue on the role of sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, North America, and United States of America

378. Harnessing artificial intelligence

Author:
Ulrike Franke
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence is impossible to disregard – it is set to transform society, the economy, and politics. Europe has not yet taken all the steps it needs to benefit from these advances or to protect itself from AI’s potentially dangerous aspects. The US, China, and Russia are alert to AI’s power to change modern warfare: they grasp the geopolitics of AI and may pursue techno-nationalist agendas in recognition of this. Europe can develop sovereignty in AI by beefing up the talent, data, and hardware it draws on; and as a “regulatory superpower” it can set standards the rest of the world will have to follow. If Europe does not address these difficult questions soon it will find itself surrounded by more powerful rivals deploying AI against it.
Topic:
Politics, Geopolitics, Economy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

379. From plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years

Author:
Carl Bildt and Eric K. Leonard
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU’s foreign policy is inadequate to the task of keeping Europe safe in today’s world of great power politics and uncertainty. Over the last five years, trust between Brussels and member states dwindled, and policy came to reflect the lowest common denominator of popular opinion. The coming five years herald acute pressure on Europe, particularly as Russia, China, and the US undermine multilateral institutions and treat trade, finance data, and security guarantees as instruments of power rather than global public goods. The new high representative should move quickly to rewire European foreign policymaking to exercise strategic sovereignty. The high representative needs more support on this strategy – from deputies, special representatives, and foreign ministers tasked with specific roles. The new leadership team in Brussels needs to reoperationalise European defence, build Europe’s self-sufficiency through a strong European pillar in NATO, and consider innovations such as a European Security Council. Europe will only build greater unity by tackling controversial issues head on in the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The high representative needs to play a much more active role in these debates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

380. Europe can spearhead a new cycle in transatlantic relations, not President Trump

Author:
Martin Michelot
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Transatlantic cooperation has, ever since the election of President Donald Trump, been a topic of contention and concern in Europe, and created a lot of questions regarding whether the fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship were being questioned. Concerns about US engagement in NATO, a potential dissonant threat perception towards and relationship with China and Russia, and the tensions around trade agreements, and in general a perceived defiance of international liberal order are all issues that have ranked high on the agenda of European leaders since early 2017, and that continue to represent - among other issues - topics that require a deeper discussion at the political and the expert level.
Topic:
NATO, Engagement, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

381. Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Business, 5G, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China and Europe

382. China’s Export Success: Due to Unfair Practices or Fair Competition?

Author:
Rolf Langhammer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Compared with previous ratings, China’s trade policy today is more positively acknowledged. Yet, China can still be criticised in particular because of its non-transparent subsidy policy, the privileged role of state-owned enterprises, the heavy hand of the state in general, the sluggish enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers. Yet, it cannot be ignored that Chinese entrepreneurship mentality is highly developed outside state interference in world markets. Especially, in the digital economy, high motivation and a large pool of human skills act as drivers of innovations, so far mainly process innovations. The trade war with the US hurts China and is responded by China with asymmetrical retaliation. The more Chinese exports to the US in total are affected, the more costs will have to be borne by US consumers as options to shift to alternative suppliers become weaker. What President Trump would see as a “good” deal for the US is unclear. It can be thus presumed that the trade war will continue into 2020 and that it is in fact a tech war. The EU is affected as EU companies produce in China for the US market and in the US for the Chinese market. While it might gain from trade diversion effects in the short run, the negative effects on investment due to uncertainty weigh more heavily. The EU is tempted to negotiate a free trade agreement with China but rightly refuses to start negotiations before China is prepared to conclude an agreement on investment. The EU should not see China and the US on equidistance. Workable relations with the US are much more important. To conclude, China’s trade policy has improved relative to Western standards but still warrants further steps towards much less state influence. Yet, its global competiveness especially in the state-of-the-art digital economy is high and is owed to a strong entrepreneurial mentality.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Asia, Exports, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

383. China’s Inroads into Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe

Author:
Jacopo Maria Pepe
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Could China’s quiet but steadily rising penetration of Central Europe bear risks for the EU? Certainly, Beijing is using the region as a gateway to Western Europe’s markets while including the EU in its “Eurasian” integration project. But a deepening trade triangle of China, Germany, and Central European countries could put other EU countries at an economic disadvantage. Germany must address this risk, carefully balancing national interest and European cohesion.
Topic:
International Affairs
Political Geography:
China

384. China's Top Five War Plans

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
This publication breaks down Beijing’s likely top five war plans to understand what may be driving China’s military reorganization and reform campaign. Easton analyzes available Chinese military sources and concludes that China’s primary strategic goal is to take Taiwan using one or more of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s five outlined combat operations, in the 21st century’s foremost flashpoint. He also explains how these five different joint operations could be used to isolate or occupy Taiwan, thwart American intervention in offensive operations against U.S. military units, and repel potential border threats from India in the event of aPLA invasion of Taiwan.
Topic:
International Relations and International Security
Political Geography:
China

385. Chinese Leadership and the Future of BRI: What Key Decisions Lie Ahead?

Author:
Brad Parks
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
It’s 2028. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been underway for 15 years, but the initial enthusiasm and momentum behind BRI has vanished. Many of the governments that initially joined the initiative have publicly withdrawn or quietly wound down their participation. China’s staunchest allies remain engaged but even they have reservations about the wisdom of the initiative. They are saddled with unproductive public investment projects and struggling to service their debts. Domestic public sentiment towards China has soured, and they have come to view their participation in BRI as more of a political liability than an asset. But they worry about the consequences of alienating their most important patron and creditor. China has also assumed a defensive posture. Lacking the goodwill that it possessed at the beginning of BRI, it is now using inducements and threats to prevent its remaining clients from abandoning the initiative. Western donors and lenders watch from the sidelines with a sense of bemusement. They encouraged China to “multilateralize” BRI by establishing a common set of project appraisal standards, procurement guidelines, fiduciary controls, and social and environmental safeguards that other aid agencies and development banks could support. But Beijing chose to go it alone. It opted not to embrace the use of economic rate-of-return analysis to vet project proposals; resisted efforts to harmonize its environmental, social, and fiduciary safeguards with those used by aid agencies and development banks outside of China; and pushed back on the “Western” suggestion that it modernize its monitoring and evaluation practices. China bet that its fast and flexible approach to infrastructure finance would prove to be so compelling that traditional donors and lenders would eventually jump on the bandwagon and co-finance BRI projects. But it miscalculated. Its model was insufficiently attractive on its merits to enlist the participation and support of the other major players in the bilateral and multilateral development finance market. Nor was it sufficiently appealing to sustain elite and public support in partner countries.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Leadership, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

386. The Conflict Resource Economy and Pathways to Peace in Burma

Author:
Kevin M. Woods
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Burma’s natural resource economy is inextricably tied to the ongoing armed conflict within the country. Questions of who has what ownership rights over what resources and how these resources can be more equitably shared with the wider population loom large. This report focuses on Burma’s resource-rich ethnic states and territories near the borders with China and Thailand and suggests that a more robust, accountable, and equitable system for managing the country’s resource wealth can help lay down the pathways to peace.
Topic:
Economics, Environment, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Burma, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

387. International Sustainable and Climate Finance: Where are we and which is the role of China on this?

Author:
Alice Amorim
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
This brief focuses on climate finance, as it encompasses a substantive part of the resources in this broader sustainability agenda. Having a better understanding of this field is important given the possible risk of other development resources being hijacked by the climate finance rhetoric. The paper also presents updated data on climate finance flows and for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Finally, it presents some evidence of how China and Chinese-led financial institutions are becoming key players in this field.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Regulation, Finance, Risk, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China

388. Gender and Energy approaches by BASIC countries

Author:
Alice Amorim and Marco Antonio Teixeira
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
This Policy Brief analysis how the BASIC countries have incorporated gender and energy issues in their NDCs and assesses some of the interrelations between key energy and gender inequalities of the bloc.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Gender Issues, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

389. China-Global governance without hegemony

Author:
Pan Zhongyin
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pangoal Institution
Abstract:
Where is global economic governance heading? What will the future of global economic governance hold? These questions are on everyone’s lips. In the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s foreign policy principle of ‘never seeking hegemony’, but this does not mean that China should disavow the role of international leadership. Indeed, it is now engaged in what might be called a non-hegemonic leadership, which is sure to be hugely significant in the future of global economic governance.
Topic:
International Relations, Governance, Hegemony, and Economy
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

390. Between Giants: The Sino-Indian Cold War in the Indian Ocean

Author:
David Brewster
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean is growing and has the potential to profoundly impact the stability and security of the region. The Indian Ocean is becoming the scene of a sustained contest that in some ways resembles strategic competition during the Cold War. This will include pressure on Indian Ocean states to align themselves with one side or another within an increasingly unstable and complex strategic environment.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Political stability, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Indian Ocean

391. The three stages of China’s ODI development

Author:
Bijang Wang and Kailin Gao
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
In 2016, China became the world’s second-largest outward investor after the United States, with US$196.2 billion of outward direct investment (ODI) flows. China’s foray into ODI developed in three stages, moving from a ‘restricted’ to a ‘relaxed’ and most recently to a ‘regulated’ approach. Today’s strengthened ODI regulations correct imbalanced ODI practices of earlier eras, but some challenges remain. Before 2000, capital shortages prompted China to invite capital inflows and restrict capital outflows. Chinese enterprises had to apply for approval to invest overseas on a case-by-case basis, which minimised overseas investment. By the end of 1999, China ranked 23rd in the world for outward investment with an ODI stock of US$27 billion, representing 0.4 per cent of the global total.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Investment, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China and Asia

392. China and Canada eye more mutually beneficial trade deal

Author:
Dong Yan and Bai Jie
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
A clause in the US-Mexico-Canada trade pact, widely known as a "poison pill" aimed at China, will not stop Canada from continuing to negotiate a free trade agreement with China, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said at an event at the National University of Singapore on Thursday. This suggests the US will find it extremely difficult to administer its "poison pill", because it has gone too far in using bullying tactics against other countries－in this case, China.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

393. China Responds to Trade Tensions Responsibly

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
In March 2018, the United States slapped tariffs of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum in the name of national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Then, the Office of the United States Trade Representative released a report on the investigation of China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, claiming China’s acts, policies, and practices regarding technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are “unreasonable and discriminatory, and burden U.S. commerce.” In early April, it issued a list of products imported from China subject to additional tariffs of 25 percent totaling US $50 billion. In June, Donald Trump approved the tariff imposition on US $50 billion worth of Chinese goods, officially starting from Chinese exports worth US $34 billion on July 6. The remaining US $16 billion was to be imposed later. In July, the U.S. issued another trade barrier of 10 percent tariff on imports from China with a value of US $200 billion. On August 1, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said the barriers were suggested by President Trump, who ordered to increase the amount to 25 percent.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

394. China can overcome a trade war

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The tariff war the United States has launched against China shows no sign of abating, as the Donald Trump administration made good its threat to impose 25 percent tariff on another $16 billion worth of Chinese imports on Thursday. Instead, since the US has threatened to slap tariffs on $500 billion worth of Chinese goods, or on almost all Chinese imports, the trade conflict seems set to intensify. Thanks to its national strength and moral righteousness, as well as its objective assessment that the US' tariff war will have a limited impact on the Chinese economy, China is confident and capable of safeguarding the core interests of the country and its people. The trade dispute, however, will affect on three areas－foreign trade, investment (including overseas investment) and the macro-economy. But the impact is likely to be limited and manageable.
Topic:
Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

395. Emerging economies need safeguards to tackle currency crisis

Author:
Gao Haihong
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The recent appreciation of the US dollar and the uneven pace of monetary policy normalization in many countries have become a headwind for emerging economies. This month, the Turkish lira has sharply depreciated against the US dollar, followed by a jump in Turkish bond yield for fear of high inflation. Earlier this year, after failing to stabilize its currency, Argentina sought the International Monetary Fund's support to stabilize the peso. The IMF agreed to give a $50 billion standby line of credit but on conditions that required necessary domestic fiscal and structural adjustment. These developments reaffirmed the eminent risks facing the emerging economies. A strong dollar and tightened monetary policy in the US are prompting capital flight from countries that have high domestic public debt, huge external liability, and a weak current account balance and relatively open capital account. For example, Turkey’s total external debt to GDP was at 53.5% and its current account deficit was 7.1% to GDP.
Topic:
Economy, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Asia, Argentina, and United States of America

396. “Triple punch” policies to bring years of trade tensions

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
US President Donald Trump has adopted a hard-line trade policy and recklessly instigated the trade conflict with China. This is the result of a combination of adjustments to his trade, foreign, and fiscal policies. These intertwined policies will likely stretch China-US trade frictions throughout Trump's presidency. First of all, the adjustment to the trade policy includes a shift from multilateral free trade to regional free trade and pressuring other countries to open their markets.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Markets, Trade Wars, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

397. Opinion: China International Import Expo: New era, shared future

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The first China International Import Expo (CIIE) will be held from November 5 to 10 in Shanghai. The theme of the CIIE is "New Era, Shared Future," which has rich connotations. The first implication of the new era is that countries around the world begin to realize the importance of imports Economists usually emphasize sellers and exporters when they analyze the exchange between peoples and trade between countries. They tend to attach importance to exports when participating in international trade, and try to promote the growth of export.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China and Asia

398. BRICS Plus: An innovative model for cooperation

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
It has been ten years since the BRICS mechanism was established. During this process, BRICS has undergone two significant improvements. The first is the accession of South Africa in 2011, and the second is promoting the formation of BRICS Plus in 2017. This reveals that BRICS cooperation is a continuous development mechanism. BRICS Plus is the perfection and innovation of the current system. The main body comprises the countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This is conducive to ensuring the stability and efficiency of the organization’s cooperation. However, the cooperation is an open and inclusive platform.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:
China, India, and South Africa

399. US tariff measures may boomerang

Author:
Dong Yan
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
US President Donald Trump has launched a tariff war not only against China but also against some other economies and threatened to undermine the multilateral trading system. Apart from China, quite a few other economies have also taken countermeasures to Trump's unilateral and protectionist moves. For instance, Russia plans to impose 25-40 percent tariff on US industrial goods, including equipment for road construction, oil and gas, and mining in response to the US tariffs on Russian metals.
Topic:
Multilateralism, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

400. Keeping China’s WTO Commitments Clear

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
In terms of fulfillment of WTO (World Trade Organization) commitments, all members of the organization should be treated equally. First of all, China’s WTO accession commitments, which were made when the country was admitted to the organization in 2001, were recorded in three documents, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China to the WTO and two reports from the working party on the accession of China to the WTO. The two reports specified China’s promises to open up its services market. And the protocol defined the country’s other promises outside the realm of the services market. Second, after years of China’s accession to the WTO, WTO members should be very clear of China’s compliance with its WTO commitments. For questions as to whether China has opened up in compliance with its commitments, whether it met targets on the time table and whether reforms have been carried out in some areas, the results should be clear. Third, since 2006, WTO has been performing a trade policy review on China every two years. Every WTO member can supervise China’s fulfillment of its WTO commitments within the WTO framework. If any have complaints about China, the two sides can solve the problem within the WTO review mechanism. In fact, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism can be employed to force China to make readjustments.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, World Trade Organization, Economy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia