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Begin New Search Political Geography China Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

61. How China Came to Dominate the Global EV Lithium-ion Battery Value Chain: Lessons and Opportunities for Africa

Author:
Xieshu Wang
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
The electrification of vehicles is accelerating and the global automotive industry is under full transformation. China has become an indispensable partner for EV makers as the only country that has succeeded in building a complete and competitive industry value chain of EV lithium-ion batteries. Top-down government-led policymaking has been an important driver; bottom-up firm-level vertical integration strategy and investments have effectively created a closedloop supply chain. Africa is still at an early stage in this mobility transition. But with its rich deposits of minerals and potential markets, it can become a key player in the global EV value chain, if a favourable ecosystem for the fast uptake of EV and related green businesses could be developed in time.
Topic:
Industry, Global Value Chains, Lithium, Automotive Industry, Batteries, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Africa and China

62. How Does China’s Industrial Policy Support Specific Sectors?

Author:
Barry Naughton and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The brief summarizes discussions and findings from the workshop on China’s Industrial Policy: Sectors and Resources, which was hosted by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) with support from the UC San Diego 21st Century China Center, on September 30–October 2, 2022. Held in La Jolla, California on the UC San Diego campus, the workshop examined Chinese industrial policies in the sectors in which China hopes to make the biggest technological leaps, including high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, solar, robots, aerospace, and biotech. Participants from leading universities, think tanks, and industry, along with U.S. government representatives, shared their research and observations along China’s industrial policy life cycle, from formulation to implementation.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

63. China and the U.S. Compete for Global Techno-Security Dominance

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In the struggle for global geostrategic and geoeconomic supremacy between the United States and China, the technosecurity sphere where economics, technological innovation, and national security meet has become a principal battleground. Two contrasting models are pitted against each other: China’s state-led top-down approach and the United States’ market-driven bottom-up system. Which of them will ultimately prevail will depend on how capable, robust, and adept they are in meeting the challenge of rapid and disruptive change? This brief examines the underpinnings of U.S.-China great power technosecurity competition and assesses what the countries’ different approaches imply for future techno-security rivalry.
Topic:
Security, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

64. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China and Europe

65. Ending the Destructive Sino-U.S. Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Recent years have witnessed steadily rising hostility and suspicion between the United States and China over each other’s approach vis-à-vis Taiwan. The unprecedentedly aggressive Chinese military exercises in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei this year indicated that the continued downward spiral in Sino-American relations over Taiwan would increasingly expose Washington and Beijing to risks of repeated crises with a potential of a dangerous armed conflict. This brief lays out the policy steps necessary to reverse this spiral of escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

66. The Worsening Taiwan Imbroglio: An Urgent Need for Effective Crisis Management

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A severe diplomatic or military crisis over Taiwan is the issue that poses the greatest risk of war between the United States and China. Worryingly, the risk has increased in recent years with the deepening Sino-American rivalry amid intensifying conflicts of interest vis–à–vis Taiwan. Washington and Beijing must recognize the cycle of confrontational deterrence that drives it and take urgent measures to stop it. If the United States and China fail to take measures of mutual reassurance, the two countries will continue on the path to confrontation over Taiwan. This is particularly likely if their overall bilateral relationship continues to deteriorate. While acknowledging the likelihood of such a dangerous scenario, this brief affirms the need to improve crisis management on the Taiwan issue, outlines the major problems and limits of existing crisis management efforts, and offers concrete recommendations for improving the ability of both Washington and Beijing to more effectively manage future crises over Taiwan, as well as Sino-American crises in general.1
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

67. A Restraint Recipe for America’s Asian Alliances and Security Partnerships

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
As Sino–American relations deteriorate, risks of conflict between Washington and Beijing are growing. A major war would be terrible for both the United States and the region while setting back critical goals, like the fight to stop climate change. Avoiding a war while safeguarding vital U.S. interests ought to be a priority. But while many in the United States want to strengthen alliance structures as a means of deterring China and to make Taiwan a de facto security ally, those who espouse a strategy of Restraint believe this approach endangers Americans and undermines their prosperity. A policy of Restraint is predicated on the view that alliances are not ends in themselves, but a means of bolstering U.S. security. This brief analyzes the utility of America’s Asian alliances and security partnerships from a Restraint perspective under two scenarios. The first and preferred scenario is that of the United States and China walking back from their current march toward confrontation to achieve a stable, if still significantly competitive, relationship. The second and more likely scenario is a much sharper and sustained rivalry with China becoming a regionally strong, possibly in many ways dominant, power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

68. How to Engage and Prevail in Political Warfare against China

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his report to the Twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party in October, Xi Jinping praised the progress made over the past decade under his leadership to advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation domestically and internationally. According to Xi, this is taking place in an era of “momentous changes of a like not seen in a century [and which] are accelerating across the world.”1 For Xi, these “great changes” comprise “a significant shift [that] is taking place in the international balance of power, presenting China with new strategic opportunities in pursuing development.”2 A pillar of Xi’s plan to realize the rejuvenation of China and to emerge as the preeminent nation in the region and beyond is to shrink the strategic, military, economic, political, and normative ground in the region on which the United States can sustain, build, and demonstrate its power and influence. This is because China knows there is no material or nonmaterial counterbalance without the US. Additionally, the more China can weaken the resolve of US allies and other countries to support American-led initiatives to counter China and the credibility of the US-led alliance system, the smaller and weaker the ground for Washington to maintain its footholds in distant lands becomes, and the closer China draws to its goal of preeminence. The Chinese plan relies on building unmatched “comprehensive national power,” or CNP, which China can use to seduce, compel, or coerce other nations.3 CNP has material and nonmaterial elements. Regarding the latter, Beijing places enormous emphasis on political warfare in the form of information and influence operations. The first three memos in this series on Chinese political warfare argue that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) makes no distinction between wartime and peacetime and believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West.4 Regarding political warfare, the previous memos noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

69. In support of a new approach with the Western Balkans: Staged accession with a Pierre MIREL consolidation phase

Author:
Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In his “Strasbourg Speech” to the European Parliament on 9 May 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron put forward the idea of a European Political Community, to organise Europe from a broader political perspective than the European Union. He was targeting the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. He nonetheless created a stir in the Western Balkans, even though he made it clear in his press conference that "for the Balkans, the path is already mapped out", by which he meant membership. This concern is understandable given the European perspective they were offered twenty years ago at the European Council of Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, and that many voices are now being raised in favour of granting the new candidates to the East this formal membership status, or even of opening negotiations already. The European Council of 23-24 June will be important for two reasons: what is the European future of the three new candidates? Will Bulgaria lift its veto on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia? Maintaining it would further weaken the credibility of the European Union at a time when China and Russia are making their ambitions clear.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, and European Council
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

70. Where is China heading?

Author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
China is ambitious, it is making this known and everyone is beginning to realise it. So much so that today a growing number of observers fear that it will take greater risks to achieve its objectives and fall into the famous "Thucydides' trap"; in short, that it will launch into a war, notably around Taiwan, which would inevitably involve the United States. Isn't its goal to supplant America and become the world's leading power? If, by 2028 or 2030, the Chinese economy were to exceed the US economy in terms of GDP, it is doubtful that it will succeed in removing the US from its pedestal. This is likely to be lower and more contested. But rather than a power transition, the world is witnessing the emergence of new, permanently asymmetrical bipolarity and, no doubt, a new Cold War[1].
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
China and Asia