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211. Recommendations to Congress Concerning the Investigation into SARS-CoV-2's Origin

Author:
Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On May 26, 2021, President Biden announced that he had tasked the US Intelligence Community (IC) with providing a definitive review of SARS-CoV-2’s origins within 90 days, and that deadline is fast approaching. On the same day, CNN reported that the Biden administration had shut down another investigation into possible Chinese government dual-use biological programs being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and its associated facilities. This investigation, which was being conducted by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC), had been initiated by Secretary Pompeo’s State Department in 2019, and its purpose was to answer the following questions: What role, if any, did the Chinese government’s virus research program play in its biological weapons program? Under the Biological Weapons Convention, any use and development of capabilities with potential dual uses (civilian and military) must be for peaceful purposes. Did this virus research program and the spread of SARS-CoV-2 represent a further Chinese violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? Following the completion of the 90-day review, Congress should, over the short term, request that the AVC Bureau continue the investigation into SARS-CoV-2’s origin that President Biden interrupted and re-assigned to the Intelligence Community. In contrast to the US IC, the Bureau’s sole function is to assess other nations’ compliance with their international arms control obligations and, moreover, has the legal mandate to do so. Additionally, this memo contains recommendations concerning the US government’s compliance-and-verification function over the long term that would support policymakers and allow it to effectively fulfill its Congressional mandate.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
China and Asia

212. Europe's China Chimera

Author:
Peter Rough
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

213. A US-India Trade Agenda for the Biden Administration

Author:
Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US ought to counteract the influence of Chinese authoritarianism early and often. One relatively low-cost way is to encourage India to engage more deeply as a competitor with China in the global economy. A democracy since its independence in 1947, with a population about the same as that of China, India is that country’s natural rival in Asia. Beginning with India’s decision in 1990-91 to liberalize its economy, the nation has gradually opened its vast market to global trade. Fueled by fresh access to foreign capital and technology, India’s economy grew over six percent during the first decade of the 21st century. In May 2014, this progress was further advanced by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time in India’s history, a conservative administration had a clear parliamentary majority, making it possible to legislate foundational, market-positive reform. India has adopted a new insolvency and bankruptcy code and replaced multiple taxation regimes across its states with a federal goods and services tax, which is welcome. But India has done little to end its excessive protectionism. Its distrust of foreign corporations, a legacy of colonial rule, endures. Indian policy makers may believe that the US is so eager for Indian competition with China that Washington will grant them a pass on restrictive trade and investment policies. But there is a better choice. India is nowhere near its full economic potential, and the fix isn’t complicated. The Biden agenda for India should encourage India to lower tariffs, to remove barriers to foreign retail, to roll back unnecessarily restrictive data privacy rules, and to provide economic incentives for foreign investment.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

214. US Support for Australia and the Region Against PRC Coercion: A Six Point Agenda

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since around 2016, Australia has been transitioning away from a “small target” hedging mindset toward a more proactive countering and balancing approach vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China. This is largely a response to the increasingly assertive and coercive activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is the predominant cause of instability, uncertainty, and anxiety in Canberra and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The CCP has implemented a sustained and cascading array of economic and diplomatic punishments against Australia in an attempt to intimidate Australia and force changes in Australian policy. Beijing is explicit that this is the purpose of the ongoing series of punishments against Canberra. In November 2020, its embassy in Canberra went to the extraordinary lengths of releasing the infamous “14 grievances” against the Australian government[i] to justify the ongoing punitive measures. These included mainly domestic Australian policies such as restrictions on Chinese investment, the funding of Australian think tanks critical of the PRC, the passing of foreign interference legislation to root out Chinese interference in Australian institutions, and the banning of Chinese firms from the Australian 5G telecommunications roll-out. Australia is widely seen as the proverbial canary in the mine and needs American support. If Australia can hold its ground and continue to find the courage and creativity to pursue its national interest, then the PRC will suffer an enormous blow. On the other hand, if Australia is eventually cowed by the PRC and relents on key policy settings, then other sovereign nations might well lose the courage to stand firmer against the PRC’s coercion and intimidation. Strengthening the fortitude of Australian leaders is the assurance that the United States is behind its ally. That assurance was previously given to Canberra by the Donald Trump administration and has been continued by the Joe Biden administration. Indeed, the Biden administration has declared it will go further and do better than the previous administration in reinvigorating and deepening its alliances and friendships with Indo-Pacific nations to better manage the PRC challenge and threat. This brief has been prepared to assist the Biden team in doing just that. It gives some context to Australia’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy: how a nation that is not a superpower is thinking about the PRC’s policies and activities in the region, why Canberra is taking proactive and forward leaning actions to counter and balance the PRC, and what Canberra is hoping will be some priority areas for the Biden administration with respect to the Indo-Pacific approach and strategy by the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Joe Biden, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

215. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:
Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

216. China's Ties with Southeast Asia : From Green Shoots to Sustained Recovery

Author:
Kensuke Tanaka
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
China's rebound happened relatively quickly owing to a large extent to timely macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis. Lagging somewhat behind China, most Southeast Asian countries have now entered the transition from recession to recovery. Some export-dependent Southeast Asian countries shifted their export destination to China to benefit from its early recovery. This switch of export destination to China illustrates China's important role in leading the recovery of the region. Enhancing regional macroeconomic co-operation would help reduce vulnerability of the region and ensure a sustained recovery. Regional macroeconomic co-operation remains at an early stage in Southeast Asia, but possibilities for further co-operation should be explored.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

217. Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
What are China's intentions in the South China Sea? In The 2020-21 Wilson China Fellowship: Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications, Oriana Skylar Mastro uses a two-part analytical framework to outline why she believes China is trying to establish de facto control over the South China Sea. This means sovereignty over the disputed islands and the ability to dictate the rules of behavior in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests. Mastro goes on to provide a list of recommended measures the United States can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

218. Mitigating the Risk of a China–India Conflict

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The Ladakh crisis between China and India seems to have settled into a stalemate, marked by somewhat reduced tactical tensions and continuing fruitless talks on disengagement—but its trajectory could again turn suddenly, even flaring into a limited conventional war. Despite a limited disengagement, both sides continue to make military preparations near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to increase their readiness for potential conflict. While China proved its revisionist intent with its 2020 incursions, its specific goals and plans remain opaque. The broader political context is marked by distrust and hostility, and bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb in decades. War remains unlikely—both sides can ill-afford the distraction from higher national priorities and have demonstrated a recent keenness to step back from the brink. But, with growing capabilities and unclear intent, and with military operations no longer impaired by winter, the Ladakh crisis may still escalate to conflict. The crisis has been full of surprises. Despite observing major military maneuvers in China, India didn’t anticipate the multiple incursions across the LAC in May 2020. For weeks thereafter, the Indian Army leadership insisted the incursions were nothing out of the ordinary. After both sides agreed to an early disengagement plan, the crisis took a shocking turn with a deadly skirmish in June — the first loss of life on the LAC in 45 years. India also mustered its own surprises, deploying troops to occupy tactically valuable heights in late August, to gain some bargaining leverage. And the crisis also abated with a surprise, with the sudden announcement of disengagement from heavily militarised stand-off sites around Pangong Tso Lake in February 2021. Future surprises may yet occur. This paper argues that the risk of China–India conflict is significant because, even if its likelihood is low, its consequences may be considerable. A limited conventional war would be likely to impose significant costs on India, but, depending on the reactions of its partners, it may also reinforce latent Indian suspicions over the utility and reliability of its strategic partnerships. In that way, even a localized limited war on the LAC may have far-reaching implications, if it incidentally drives a wedge between India and its partners in the Quad. Mitigating that risk will require sound policy settings and astute diplomatic and public messaging from Canberra, Washington, Tokyo, and other like-minded capitals. The remainder of this paper is in three parts: first, why a border war is plausible; second, what costs it would impose on India and how it might stir distrust of India’s Quad partners; and, finally, a framework to mitigate those risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Risk, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

219. Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro begins her paper by emphasizing that U.S. national defense strategy has characterized the US-China relationship as one of great power competition (GPC). Both the US and China have existing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region and are undergoing efforts to foster new relationships there as well. China’s efforts, however, conflict with US military efforts to promote peace, strategy, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, making them much harder to achieve. Mastro argues that it will be difficult to deter China’s efforts — perhaps even more difficult than it was to deter the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Cold War. She cites the geography of the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of Central Europe), the US’s ongoing struggle to establish a credible deterrent, China’s range of options for nonlethal but effective uses of force, and the lack of US willingness to grant China a parallel sphere of influence to that in which the Soviet Union was allowed to control as evidence to support her claim. Thus, Mastro recommends that the US must avoid relying on the same Cold War tools and competition strategies in its competition with China, despite their success in the past. Instead, the US needs to combat the threat posed by China through 1) convincing China that the costs of using force outweigh the benefits and 2) forging a counterbalancing coalition of allies and partners that are confident that the US will not only protect them from a military attack but other costly behaviors (e.g., economic coercion, diplomatic isolation) that China may leverage against them as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

220. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America