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1081. The 2022 Israeli elections: Change, but no change

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 November 2022, Israelis will cast their votes to elect a new parliament for the 25th time since 1948. Between 1949 and 2019 (70 years), Israelis went to the polls 20 times. Each parliamentary assembly (Knesset) averaged 3.5 years. But between 2019 and 2022, Israelis voted four times. Each parliamentary assembly averaged only nine months. This brief examines some of the causes of Israel’s political turmoil and assesses whether it matters for two issues of European concern: Israel’s status as ‘democratic’ ally and the occupation of Palestine. Despite their evident shortcomings with regard to Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, we do not expect the Israeli elections of November 2022 to downgrade the country’s allied status across European capitals. Neither do we anticipate the Israeli elections to moderate the country’s policy of annexation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Our analysis suggests instead that future Israeli governments will maintain majoritarian Jewish rule and expects it to be propelled by a more unapologetic and repressive ethno-nationalism. This will lead Israel further down the path of exclusionary governance and large-scale human rights violations that risks backfiring in the long term. It will also further erode the moral credibility of the European Union, including the Netherlands, in the areas of human rights and accountability.
Topic:
Human Rights, Elections, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

1082. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1083. Policing the police: The EU’s struggle to strengthen the Libyan security sector

Author:
Matteo Colombo and Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
More than ten years after the ousting of Gaddafi, the Libyan police under the Ministry of Interior are still struggling to effectively carry out their duties across the country. Drawing from 25 interviews conducted with experts, Libyan police officers, civil servants of the Ministry of Interior, and EU officers between June and August 20221, our research found four main obstacles facing the Libyan police force in Western Libya. These are: i) the proliferation of armed groups; ii) divisions within the ruling elite; iii) administrative mismanagement in the security system; and iv) the presence of alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms. It also emerged that each area comes with its own challenges. Against that background, this policy brief calls for a change in EU policies. We suggest that EU member states align on specific and measurable goals and take a more adaptive and incremental approach. More specifically, the EU could consider identifying a set of measurable and achievable objectives and adapting its policies to the different contexts in which it operates, tailoring its priorities and timescales to different locations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Police
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

1084. Open strategic autonomy in European defence: what countries must do

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has resulted in wide support for strengthening European defence capabilities. At the same time, the debate on whether to rely on NATO or to seek European strategic autonomy in the area of security and defence has withered away. There is wide recognition in Europe that both the EU and NATO are key actors in response to Russia’s armed aggression and violation of international law, agreements and norms. While the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture, the role of the EU in security and defence is growing. Better European capabilities will allow the EU to act on its own when needed – more in particular in areas and countries outside the Union – and simultaneously support NATO to defend its territory. Nevertheless, the question has to be asked how European defence capabilities can best be strengthened. In recent years, the European Commission has taken various initiatives to promote cross-border defence cooperation. These efforts have been further expanded after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The steps taken by Berlaymont are bold and most welcome, but the member states are in the driving seat: they continue to deliver the military forces that are needed to secure Europe’s interests. Defence policy and planning provides the basis for allocating money to investment programmes and the acquisition of military equipment. The procurement of military equipment is still primarily conducted on a national basis instead of collaboratively with European partner countries. This Policy Brief assesses the scope for a closer coordination and synchronisation of the defence policies, planning and investment of the European countries in order to contribute to open strategic autonomy. First, the author provides an overview of the recent EU initiatives and how these relate to the efforts of the member states. Next, the question of what the member states should do to increase cross-border defence cooperation in terms of decision-making, budget cycles and defence planning will be addressed. The subsequent section assesses how the hurdles to moving from national to multinational defence planning and investment can best be overcome. The final section points to the way forward, including suggestions on the specific role that the Netherlands can play in enhancing European collaboration in defence programmes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

1085. Realising the EU Hybrid Toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Kenneth Lasoen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years European and other nations have been increasingly targeted by different manipulation or coercion tactics that remain under the threshold of violence, and are commonly referred to as hybrid threats.For the debate on defining hybrid threats, see Dick Zandee, Sico van der Meer and Adája Stoetman, Countering hybrid threats: steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, Clingendael Report, October 2021, p. 2-5; Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou, The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model, Publications Office of the European Union, February 2021. For instance, in 2016 the elections in the United States were manipulated by a foreign state actor through targeted propaganda and the leaking of hacked material that compromised one of the presidential candidates. In the same year the British referendum on remaining in the European Union was also targeted by sophisticated propaganda efforts.United States Senate, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, Committee on Foreign Relations, 115th Congress, 2018, p. 116-118. The need to counter these threats and deal with them comprehensively has therefore been acknowledged in the EU Strategic Compass. It provides for the development of a toolbox to put at the disposal of member states a wide range of measures to respond to hybrid campaigns, should they choose to invoke the assistance of the EU. This EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) intends to gather all civilian and military instruments that can be employed to counter hybrid campaigns. Operationalisation was intended by the end of 2022 but this no longer seems attainable. However, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having a coordinated reaction capability to counter hybrid campaigns and is likely to provide the momentum to bring the development of the EUHT to fruition. This policy brief examines the most recent progress on operationalising the EUHT. First, the rationale for the EUHT is explained. Next, the state of play in the operationalization process is analysed. The subsequent section focusses on the difficulties stemming from differences of opinion between the member states, followed by an assessment of the issues surrounding decision-making. After suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the EUHT are given, the policy brief ends with conclusions and a listing of opportunities and pitfalls.The methodology used for this policy brief consists of a combination of literature scanning and a limited number of interviews. The author would like to thank the interviewees for their valuable input that was given under the application of the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
European Union, Hybrid Threats, Coercion, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

1086. The 2023 Turkish elections: An unmarked road

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
As the date of elections approaches, the political and economic landscape will undoubtedly come into clearer focus. But at this point, amid so many uncertainties, it is still too early to predict electoral outcomes with any confidence.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Elections, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1087. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:
Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its ­institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

1088. Managing Risks in the EU-China Economic Relationship

Author:
Claudia Schmucker and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
As the German Chancellor heads to Beijing – the first visit by a G7 leader since the pandemic began, Germany and the EU must reevaluate their approach to China, especially after the recent Communist Party Congress further cemented a system of uncontested authoritarian power. European unity is critical in dealing with China. Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed Germany’s energy dependency and many Western companies have had to leave Russia. To be prepared for a possible escalation of geopolitical tensions with China, Germany needs to draw lessons and review critical dependencies and corporate risks. Better corporate risk management, a diversified trade policy, and a targeted industrial policy are necessary to manage economic risks.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Trade, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

1089. A Reliable Global Cyber Power: Cyberspace and Germany’s National Security Strategy

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany’s major allies have declared their roles in shaping cyberspace. The United States sees itself as a democratic, values-driven cyber power ready to impose substantial costs on adversaries engaged in nefarious conduct. The United Kingdom strives to be a responsible cyber power that eschews reckless behavior. France aims to operate as a stabilizing power that counters a destructive Russia and other malicious actors. But what kind of cyber power is Germany to be? As it draws up its first national security strategy, the country can rectify its lack of vision and narrative for its domestic and international cyberspace efforts. This policy brief proposes that Germany espouse a sober focus on reliability that links its cyberspace strategy to those of its allies, thereby providing a vital anchor for Western cybersecurity. To do this, Germany should:
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Stability, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

1090. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America