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Begin New Search Topic International Security Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Are Gender Inclusive Militaries Better at Integrating Disruptive Technologies?

Author:
Shira Eini Pindyck
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Recent advances in big data and analytics, cyber security, automation, and artificial intelligence can make critical contributions to the demonstration of power on the international stage. New technologies not only offer militaries the ability to conduct operations with greater effectiveness but also reduce the potential human cost of operations. In an increasingly digitized world, organizations that do not adopt and leverage these advances can become inefficient and even fall by the wayside. Yet, despite the immense promise of emerging technologies, many organizations struggle to integrate and utilize them. This is true in both the military and business sectors. For business organizations, a failure to adopt and use novel technologies may threaten profits and even their survival. For militaries, where soldiers’ lives are on the line, the consequences can be even more severe. Why is the integration of new technologies often so difficult? This policy brief highlights an important and overlooked reason, namely how gender policy can affect resistance to organizational change. Gender policy reform requires organizations to invest resources in the recruitment and retainment of an inclusive workforce, and therefore demands that organizations be flexible and resilient. Flexibility and resilience are also required to integrate disruptive innovations. Rather than trying to chain a new technology to old systems of ascension and reward, organizations that want to advance technologically must rethink their incentive systems and work hard to restructure entrenched hierarchies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications

Author:
Marco Lyons and Natalia Angel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1 The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

3. A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
I n recent years, gender has come up in arms control and disarmament deliberations. Ireland, for example, submitted working papers on gender to preparatory committee meetings of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) emphasizes that nuclear weapons use affects men and women differently and calls for equal representation in disarmament negotiations. However, such references to gender are so far the exception rather than the rule in arms control and disarmament talks. We argue that a systematic inclusion of gender perspectives advances arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations in four main ways. First, a gender lens calls attention to the human and gendered consequences of the development and use of weapons. Second, it exposes arms control and disarmament agreements that lack gender provisions. Third, a gender lens highlights the absence of diversity in arms control and disarmament communities.3 Fourth, gender perspectives help reveal hierarchical power structures and encourage critical reflections on the legitimacy of established processes and agreements. In sum, the inclusion of a gender perspective produces more humane, effective, legitimate and sustainable agreements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Women, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future

Author:
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Despite the Biden administration’s push to revitalize U.S. alliances, U.S. relations with NATO are due for a reset. The United States should incentivize European members of NATO to take on additional responsibilities for their defense. Encouraging the European allies to take initiative will help the United States focus on its other domestic and international priorities and may facilitate improving relations with Russia. This approach will also prove attractive to European states concerned about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Recalibrating the U.S. role in Europe would conform with the United States’ post–World War II efforts to stabilize European security — and stand as the fruit of Washington’s success in this regard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

5. Responsible Statecraft Requires Remaking America’s Foreign Relations Tool Kit

Author:
Gordon Adams
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
To meet today’s foreign policy challenges, the United States needs to end its overreliance on military superiority and intervention and instead put creative and persistent diplomacy in the lead to promote locally owned solutions to national, bilateral, and regional security issues and to address global challenges not amenable to military force. This rebalancing will not succeed if civilian statecraft is dysfunctional and unprepared. More funding and more diplomats will not solve this problem. What is needed is fundamental reform of structures, processes, and personnel practices, particularly at the State Department. These include strategic planning, resource planning, institutional integration, clear authority over security assistance programs, and moving away from nation-building and toward conflict prevention. Far-reaching changes in the way diplomats are recruited, trained, and promoted are also required. Without such changes, there is substantial risk that our diplomatic tools will be ineffective, resulting in even greater militarization of U.S. foreign policy when diplomacy fails.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, Alliance, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
United States

6. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence

Author:
Stephen Haggard
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

7. Is Arms Control Over?

Author:
Andrew Reddie
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In February 2021, the Biden administration announced that it would exercise Article XIV of the New START Treaty—extending the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia for five years. The announcement came against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving arms control landscape. The collapse of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty have led many to suggest that the existing arms control regime might be close to its end. Complicating matters are growing calls for emerging military technologies like cyber and artificial intelligence to be regulated by arms control agreements.2 These developments beg several questions for both policymakers and academics: Why does arms control matter today? What are the near-term challenges to the existing arms control regime? And what are the possible paths forward for arms control?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States of America

8. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

9. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

10. Bridging the Silos: Integrating Strategies across Armed Conflict, Violent Crime, and Violent Extremism to Advance the UN’s Prevention Agenda

Author:
Céline Monnier and Daniel Mack
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The consequences of violence worldwide are dire. More than half a million people die from violent deaths each year. In 2019, violence cost the global economy $14.5 trillion USD, or $1,909 USD per person. Countries with armed conflicts account for 80 percent of humanitarian spending. Beyond these cold numbers, the human toll of violence results in the suffering of families, trauma-affected communities, and increased fear and hopelessness. Different types of violence—such as crime, violent extremism, and armed conflict—are often interlinked and share risk and resilience factors. Although currently siloed, the UN system has the capacities and knowledge to develop approaches to prevention that cut across interlinked forms of violence. This policy paper makes the argument that the UN can and should adopt a more integrated violence prevention strategy across these three forms of violence. It draws from desk review of UN and academic documents, interviews with UN staff working on different types of violence prevention across the UN system, and a workshop among them. The paper discusses why there is a need for more integrated prevention approaches across different types of violence, what benefits that would bring, and what challenges need to be overcome first. It concludes by making four recommendations: governments should use the SDG 16.1 framework to bring actors together at national level; member states should ask the UN to develop evidence-based guidelines on prevention for countries to implement themselves; the UN should initiate a strategic dialogue at headquarters between fields to better identify commonalities in approaches; and country teams should develop an integrated strategy with specialized sub-strategies.
Topic:
United Nations, International Security, Peace, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

11. NATO and 5G: Managing “High Risk” Vendors and Other Outsourced Infrastructure

Author:
Clodagh Quain and Isabelle Roccia
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
Fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) technology promises to dramatically increase the interconnectedness and efficiency of commercial and civilian communication infrastructures. 5G will also enable other advances. On the civilian side, it will improve existing applications and give rise to others, from telemedicine to connected cars. It also presents an opportunity to enhance NATO’s capabilities, improving logistics, maintenance, and communications. For instance, 5G will speed communication and improve response time in a theater of operation.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, International Security, Communications, Cybersecurity, 5G, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Stronger Together: NATO’s Evolving Approach toward China

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Gabrielle Tarin
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
The rise of China poses a strategic challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance needs a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy to deal with China’s growing global power. The more assertive a role China plays in world affairs, the more it could undercut NATO’s cohesion and military advantages by translating commercial inroads in Europe into political influence, investing in strategically important sectors, and achieving major breakthroughs in advanced digital technologies.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, International Security, Digital Cooperation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

13. Do the BRICS care about International Security?

Author:
Filippo Cutrera
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
The present paper has three main objectives: first, to show that, over the first decade of existence of the group, between 2009 and 2018, the BRICS have manifested an increasing interest in expanding their cooperation beyond the traditional areas of economy and development to the field of global security; second, to present the content of their common security agenda and how it has developed throughout this period; third, to identify the main factors influencing the agenda-setting process of the group as well as the main challenges to further advancement. The research will conclude that the high levels of informality in the group’s cooperation and heterogeneity in the interests of its members have enabled BRICS to formulate common positions and to establish cooperation mechanisms on a broad range of issues of international security.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Regional Cooperation, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

14. U.S. Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and Alternatives

Author:
Kingston Reif and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In a little-noticed comment before his controversial July 2018 summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his government’s multi-hundred billion dollar plans to replace the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal as “a very, very bad policy.” He seemed to express some hope that Russia and the United States, which together possess over 90 percent of the planet’s nuclear warheads, could chart a different path and avert renewed military and nuclear competition. The Helsinki meeting, however, did not produce any agreement on nuclear weapons and Trump has so far shown little interest in a different nuclear spending path. Quite the opposite, in fact.“We have far more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said last October. “We’ll build [the U.S. nuclear arsenal] up until” other nuclear-armed states such as Russia and China “come to their senses.” Citing a deteriorating international security environment, the Trump administration is pursuing a significant expansion of the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition to continuing full speed ahead with its predecessor’s plans to replace the nuclear triad and its associated warheads on largely a like-for-like basis, the administration is proposing to broaden the circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons, develop two new sea-based, lowyield nuclear options, and lay the groundwork to grow the size of the arsenal. At the same time, key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, which serve to regulate the nuclear balance and prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, are now in serious doubt. The Trump administration has announced the United States will leave the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 unless Russia returns to compliance with the pact, and expressed hostility towards extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to five years subject to the agreement of Washington and Moscow. In short, the Trump administration is preparing to compete in a new nuclear arms race while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of such a contest. The projected cost of the proposed nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, according to a January 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. This is an increase of nearly $100 billion, or about 23 percent, above the already enormous projected cost as of the end of the Obama administration. Over the next 30 years, the price tag is likely to top $1.5 trillion and could even approach $2 trillion. These big nuclear bills are coming due as the Defense Department is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces and internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of—and perhaps reduce—military spending. “We’re going to have enormous pressure on reducing the debt which means that defense spending—I’d like to tell you it’s going to keep going up—[but] I’m not terribly optimistic,” Alan Shaffer, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in February 2019. This report outlines the ways in which the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy is unnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe. It describes three realistic options to reduce spending on nuclear weapons while still maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. Scores of billions of dollars could be saved or redirected to higher priorities by eliminating, delaying, or scaling back the administration’s proposals for new delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

15. A Vision for Nuclear Security

Author:
Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The goal of global nuclear security efforts should be a world in which all countries with nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, and nuclear facilities whose sabotage could cause a major radiation release have reduced the risk of nuclear theft and sabotage to the lowest possible level. This will require policymakers, regulators, and operators to commit to a continuous process of striving for excellence in nuclear security performance.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Combating Complacency about Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Complacency about the threat of nuclear terrorism—the belief that nuclear and radiological terrorism threats are minimal and existing security measures are sufficient to address them—is the fundamental barrier to strengthening nuclear security. Many factors can lead to complacency, but the most significant contributors are lack of knowledge about: events related to nuclear terrorism; weaknesses of nuclear security systems; and the capabilities demonstrated by thieves around the world. People will be more likely to take action to strengthen nuclear security if they believe that nuclear terrorism poses a real threat to their own country’s interests and their actions can significantly reduce the threat. There have been many incidents in recent years that demonstrate the need for strong and sustainable security at both military and civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials Worldwide: Expanded Funding Needed for a More Ambitious Approach

Author:
Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The Trump administration budget request for programs to reduce the dangers of nuclear theft and terrorism is too small to implement the ambitious approach that is needed. Congress should increase funding in this critical area; direct the administration to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for improving security for nuclear weapons and materials worldwide; and exert expanded oversight of this effort. This brief highlights the importance of ongoing nuclear security work; describes the evolving budget picture; and outlines recommendations for congressional action.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States of America

18. India's New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, Crises, and Consequences

Author:
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Bottom Lines Counterforce incentives. Pakistan’s threats of nuclear first use have given India incentives to develop disarming capabilities that might neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in a future conflict. The goal of such a shift would be to allow New Delhi to recapture the space it believed it had lost for conventional retaliation, without fear of nuclear use from Pakistan and without having to engage in tit-for-tat nuclear warfighting. Expanding options without doctrinal change. This risk of first-strike instability may force India to consider circumstances under which it could use nuclear weapons preemptively, posing a challenge to its long-standing “no first use” (NFU) declaration. Senior former officials have argued that preemption may be consistent with India’s NFU policy, meaning that Indian nuclear strategy may be changing even without any public revisions to its declaratory doctrine. Growing but still insufficient capabilities. India has dramatically expanded the number of precise nuclear-armed and conventional weapons that it possesses that can strike deep into Pakistan, along with the necessary systems and infrastructure to find and destroy Pakistani nuclear systems and intercept any forces it may miss with missile defenses. Nevertheless, it is far from achieving the ability to execute counterforce strikes against Pakistani nuclear targets, but even the mere pursuit of such options creates both an arms race on the Indian subcontinent as well as dangerous incentives to strike first in a crisis.
Topic:
International Security, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

19. A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense

Author:
Seth Johnston
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Europe is pursuing significant new defense initiatives that span capability development, policy, and institutional cooperation. Many of these efforts occur under the auspices of the European Union and are part of the EU’s longstanding aim to grow itself as a security and foreign policy actor. But real security challenges in Europe—from Russian aggression to terrorism and regional instability—have contributed to the importance and potential of European efforts. The political dynamics of the transatlantic relationship may also favor Europe’s initiatives: although the Trump administration’s calls for greater European defense spending have rankled European leaders and U.S. officials have legitimate concerns about the details of EU initiatives, the larger issue of strengthening European defense is consistent with U.S. goals. The EU’s security and defense efforts have implications for the transatlantic economy and defense industry, the NATO alliance, and U.S.-European relations generally. While the United States should work to ensure continued transatlantic defense policy coordination, secure and competitive markets for the defense industry, and preservation of the longstanding principle of ‘no duplication’ with NATO, it should also broadly support European efforts to invest more and more wisely on defense. Both the United States and Europe stand to benefit from greater European defense investment and capability. The history of intra-European and transatlantic differences over European defense cooperation endures in the EU’s current efforts. But today’s environment favors change and represents a rare opportunity for bold action.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, Europe, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

20. How the United States Can Still Keep Faith With Its Best Allies in Syria

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the United States prepares to withdraw its 2,000 troops from Syria, it has one last essential mission to accomplish. Those U.S. forces have fought successfully, hand in hand, with 60,000 Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against Islamic State terrorists for the past four years. And President Trump’s latest statement about this, on January 2, noted his desire to protect these Kurds. So, despite all obstacles, the United States should still try to protect that brave and loyal militia in the short term, and secure a safer medium-term future for the Syrian Kurds and their local partners.
Topic:
International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Syria

21. China's Top Five War Plans

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
This publication breaks down Beijing’s likely top five war plans to understand what may be driving China’s military reorganization and reform campaign. Easton analyzes available Chinese military sources and concludes that China’s primary strategic goal is to take Taiwan using one or more of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s five outlined combat operations, in the 21st century’s foremost flashpoint. He also explains how these five different joint operations could be used to isolate or occupy Taiwan, thwart American intervention in offensive operations against U.S. military units, and repel potential border threats from India in the event of aPLA invasion of Taiwan.
Topic:
International Relations and International Security
Political Geography:
China

22. Two-pronged approaches: considerations in the US-Iran showdown

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Although both the United States and Iran say they do not want a direct military confrontation, such escalation by the United States necessarily invites an Iranian response, particularly since Tehran is butting heads with US regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Iran

23. The assault on Tripoli: Haftar’s military calculations and the political ramifications

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Faced with a failed offensive and weakened political influence, Haftar may decide to focus his efforts on eastern Libya, which would give added impetus to partition and deepen existing divisions.
Topic:
International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Tripoli

24. Beyond Control: Iran and its Opponents Locked in a Lopsided Confrontation

Author:
Borzou Daragahi
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For much of its four decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been blessed with a weak political opposition. While Iran has faced competent and powerful foreign enemies—such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States, and Israel—its Iranian political challengers, both domestically and abroad, have been largely fragmented, unrealistic in their aims, and sometimes as authoritarian as the regime. But, though few credible Iran watchers argue that opposition groups and figures arrayed against Tehran’s establishment pose a serious threat, Iran treats them as if they are mortal dangers to the regime. This paper attempts to sketch out the landscape of the various major political opposition groups, and begin to grapple with the question of why Iran perceives them as such a challenge.
Topic:
International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. Deter and Normalize Relations with North Korea

Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. is strong and safe—North Korea is weak, deterred by U.S. power, and desperate for economic relief.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, North Korea, and Korea