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201. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action

Author:
Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

202. German Defense Spending: A Repeat of the Past Instead of a New Era

Author:
Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sören Hellmonds
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The historic aspiration of Germany’s Zeitenwende – the new era in its foreign and security policy – will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

203. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

204. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:
Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

205. Decisive but Forgotten: Germany’s Missing Technological Zeitenwende

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Bjorn Fägersten
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The digital technology transformation is a largely overlooked dimension of Zeitenwende. However, preserving national security, safeguarding core values enshrined in technology, ensuring access to critical technologies, and maintaining competitiveness need to be a policy priorities for Germany and Europe. All of these are integral elements of autonomy and sovereignty in a world increasingly characterized by great power rivalry. The looming policy decisions, however, will have divergent outcomes depending on the prevailing political paradigms.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

206. Protecting the EU’s Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Germany’s Opportunity to Transform Vulnerability into Mutual Resilience

Author:
Jannik Hartmann
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Submarine cables handle over 95 percent of the world’s internet traffic, making them essential for everything from finance to foreign affairs. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and increased Russian naval activity brought greater awareness of how European – and German – interconnectedness also brings vulnerability. The urgency of tackling this threat offers Germany an opportunity to take a structural and joined-up approach that shows it can act as a “team power.”
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

207. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

208. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

209. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

210. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

211. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

212. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

213. Ethnic Divisions and Ensuring Stability in Kazakhstan: A Guide for U.S. Policy

Author:
Suzanne Loftus
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief assesses ethnic divisions in Kazakhstan, analyzes the potential risks of ethnic and geopolitical tension and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Kazakhstan’s current approach to managing its internal divides and overall stability is assessed and drivers of potential risk are evaluated. Due to renewed cold war tensions with China and Russia, the United States must resist any temptation to become involved in Kazakhstan’s internal politics and refrain from any efforts to sway Kazakhstan to ally itself with the West. This would only cause internal instability and hostile relations with its neighbors, Russia and China. Given Kazakhstan’s potential for domestic strife, U.S. interests are best served by a restrained approach to the country that better preserves its internal and external stability. Kazakhstan’s vast land mass and sparse population leave the country vulnerable to potential external threats. Kazakhstan borders Russia and China, its strongest security and economic partners respectively. These two powers are very close while the United States is far and consequently plays a relatively minor role in the country. The United States can and should, however, engage economically with Kazakhstan to support its development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Ethnicity, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and United States of America

214. The Future of European Security

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:
European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

215. Winning the Majority: A New U.S. Bargain with the Global South

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing Ukraine war has exposed the waning influence of the United States in the vast arc of the world stretching from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands known as the Global South. Most Global South states, while opposed to the Russian invasion, have not backed the United States on its strategies of sanctioning Russia or seeking a defeat of Moscow. Some have explicitly criticized what they see as Washington’s double standards. Despite the region’s great diversity and heterogeneity, a new nonalignment is emerging in the Global South. However, it is not the same as its previous version (of the Non-Aligned Movement) in important respects — being much less institutionalized, less ideological, and based more on national interests. This makes it more durable and harder to counter through tools that the United States has traditionally employed. The United States cannot succeed in a world where power is increasingly diffuse without strong ties to the Global South. It is the region where the majority of humanity lives. It contains sites of crucial natural resources, supply chains, major markets, and increasing innovation. It is an essential partner to solve the climate challenge. Its states are wealthier and more assertive when it comes to their interests and resources. Over the past two decades, most have built deep economic ties with China, and continue to value ties with Russia. In general, the states of the Global South wish to leverage all of their international relationships for their own benefit and not take sides in or support a new cold war between the great powers. Most are unconvinced or alienated by Washington’s rhetoric of “democracy v. autocracy” and the “rules–based order.” They feel particularly threatened by U.S. policies of secondary sanctions designed to limit or end their ties with U.S. rivals. But the current U.S. strategy is inadvertently pushing the Global South toward Beijing and Moscow. This is an unforced error Washington can ill afford.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nonalignment
Political Geography:
United States of America and Global South

216. Competition Versus Exclusion in U.S.–China Relations: A Choice Between Stability and Conflict

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s China policy is pulling in two different directions, but the tension is not widely recognized because every antagonistic measure aimed at China is filed under the heading of competition. As a result, Washington’s debate on China loses the crucial distinction between “competition” — a kind of connection with the potential to be carried on in healthy ways — and “exclusion,” an attempt to sever connection that necessarily leads to conflict if the domain is significant. Biden’s exclusion policies focus on cutting China out of the principal growth sectors in the global economy and the most lucrative and strategically important markets. Administration officials think their approach is sensible and moderate compared to more extreme voices in Washington calling for exclusion in all realms. Even so, the Biden approach is highly destabilizing because both countries consider the targeted areas vital to the future of global authority and economic prosperity, and because the attempt to trap China in a position of permanent subordination represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of China’s leaders. Healthy competition requires a shared stake in the future. In earlier periods, despite sharp tensions and mutual suspicions suffusing the relationship, U.S.–China ties were stabilized first by the joint project of containing Soviet power and then by a shared commitment to market–led globalization. Now that leaders on both sides are disenchanted with key facets of globalization, the two countries are caught in an escalatory cycle of exclusion and retaliation that risks hardening zero–sum pressures in the global system into a permanent structure of hostility. In such a scenario, each country would organize its own society and international partners to undermine the other, dramatically increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The warning signs are already clear on both sides, as each increasingly interprets every action on the other side as part of a conspiracy to achieve domination. Notwithstanding widespread complacency about the risks of conflict after a tentative diplomatic opening in recent months, the rise of securitized thinking in both countries is steadily building institutional and ideological momentum for confrontation that can only be broken by a new and inclusive direction for the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

217. Common Good Diplomacy: A Framework for Stable U.S.–China Relations

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
One curious feature of the emerging U.S.–China conflict is that each side claims to be defending the existing international order against the threat the other poses to it. Hidden beneath this seemingly irreconcilable dispute is a crucial truth: both the United States and China are status quo powers, sharing a deep interest in a stable global security environment and an open global economy. At the same time, both countries are pursuing urgently needed reforms to a global system increasingly defined by zero–sum pressures. Yet both are prone to exclusionary impulses that threaten to ruin the possibility of a shared reform agenda and instead throw the world into conflict. Working with China to revitalize the international order would not only prevent such a conflict, it would also establish the conditions for healthy forms of both competition and cooperation in the U.S.–China relationship. But how can U.S. leaders pursue such a project without simply giving a pass to China’s sometimes undesirable behavior? The focus should be diplomacy to frame an inclusive global system, focusing on actions that would reduce zero–sum constraints. In the three key realms of global authority and security, the global economy, and climate change, China is currently engaged in counterproductive moves that exacerbate existing tensions but is also pursuing promising reforms that could expand the scope for positive–sum outcomes. Rather than seeking to counter every Chinese initiative, U.S. leaders should carefully distinguish between beneficial and damaging outcomes, affirming and building on China’s constructive proposals and managing differences through negotiation rather than polemics and confrontation. Some potentially fruitful areas for cooperation include joint action to limit climate change, development in the Global South, revising the global guidelines for economic statecraft, and reforming international institutions to create a more open and inclusive world order. Pursuing cooperative efforts in such areas would both create direct benefits and improve U.S. credibility as a responsible leader of the world order rather than simply a rival of China. It would also open space to pursue competition within a rules–based order rather than risk a slide into destructive zero–sum conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

218. Post-Disaster Aid in “Politically Estranged” Settings: Findings from Ten Years of Post-Nargis Social Research in Myanmar

Author:
Markus Kostner
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This paper aims to inform post-disaster relief and recovery efforts in situations where relations between major development donors and national authorities are estranged. It reflects on the “what” and the “how” of aid as well as on the challenges encountered, and created, by aid providers following the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. It thereby demonstrates the importance of giving agency to communities for both aid delivery and oversight in these settings. Longitudinal social impacts monitoring (SIM) in a panel of 40 villages following the 2008 Cyclone Nargis identified three interrelated, yet often neglected principles that help to determine the effectiveness of post-disaster aid: empowerment—communities not only participate in, but own decision-making throughout the project cycle; transparency—communities know what aid a provider intends to deliver, and how; and accountability—communities can seek redress for aid that risks harming them in some way. Had these principles been applied consistently during the post-Nargis period, the aid effort could have identified critical challenges and opportunities more easily, such as: the fact that communities are readily able to identify what they need, and to prioritize the types of assistance they wish to receive (particularly regarding livelihood recovery); the importance of anticipating longer-term, direct and indirect economic, social, and mental health impacts; the value of building flexibility into the aid effort as needs change throughout the recovery process; the need to differentiate between livelihood groups, consider their interdependence, and target aid accordingly and consistent with village social norms; the importance of including local formal and informal leaders in the decision-making process from the outset; the imperative of providing aid irrespective of identity markers such as ethnicity or religion; and the need to avoid overburdening or harming communities through the way aid is administered. The post-Nargis aid effort faced numerous political and logistical complexities of operating in a country that was facing international sanctions. These challenges notwithstanding, several aid providers demonstrated that adherence to the three principles was possible. The SIM series thus confirmed that, for aid in “politically estranged” post- disaster settings, community-driven approaches can be an effective delivery modality and community-based, participatory social research can be a powerful oversight mechanism.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Natural Disasters, and Donors
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Myanmar

219. Seven Questions to Consider in Designing, Implementing, and Supporting Effective Nationally Led Violence Prevention Strategies

Author:
Céline Monnier
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The New Agenda for Peace (NAfP) calls for a shift to focus more attention on national prevention strategies, with a universal and more upstream approach to preventing all forms of violence. This is good news. By calling for all member states to create these strategies, the secretary-general is assuaging member states’ fears that prevention may be used to meddle into their internal affairs or that the need for prevention can be stigmatizing. Member states are now in the driver’s seat of this agenda. The upcoming Summit of the Future is an opportunity to establish a coherent vision for the role and the relevance of the UN in prevention—aligning approaches across different parts of the UN system—and to provide tailored-made packages and expertise for “member states seeking to establish or strengthen national infrastructures for peace,” as promised in the New Agenda for Peace. As the first in a new series of policy briefs on “Operationalizing the New Agenda for Peace,” this piece is a conversation starter on the conditions to consider in designing, implementing, and supporting effective nationally led violence prevention strategies and it calls on member states to lead on the development of an evidence-based framework for nationally led prevention strategies, and for experts, practitioners, and UN staff to feed into this discussion based on research and past experiences. This brief is based on research on violence and on violence prevention strategies—particularly crime prevention, prevention of violent extremism, and infrastructures for peace—and interviews of experts and practitioners.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, United Nations, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Global Focus

220. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018

Author:
Joshua Craze
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Though elections are now postulated for next year, South Sudan remains in crisis. Conflict continues to scar the country, and climatic shocks exacerbate already acute resource scarcity, leaving approximately 76 per cent of South Sudan’s population surviving on humanitarian assistance. The regime of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir survives by diverting revenues in three key areas—oil production, humanitarianism, and loans from international financial institutions—to the benefit of an elite class in Juba, but at the cost of the immiseration of the people of South Sudan. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018—a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—analyses this predatory political economy in South Sudan, and charts a shift from the use of wages to reward loyal appointees to a more obscure system based on the dispensations of favours.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Political Economy, Elections, Conflict, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

221. Climate Adaptation in Africa: Locally Led and Nature Based Solutions

Author:
Jamal Saghir and Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University
Abstract:
Climate change continues to cause damage in Africa. It triggers food insecurity, poverty and displacement. The impacts of climate change are being exacerbated by rapid urbanization, geopolitical tensions, headwinds caused by the invasion of Ukraine and its impacts on agricultural exports and fertilizers. Equally important, inflationary pressures, risks of global and regional economic recession, and unsustainable debt levels for many countries are amplifying the impacts of climate shocks on African economies and communities. Our recent analysis by the Global Center for Adaptation (GCA)1 shows that Africa is ground zero for the climate emergency. The climate is changing, and Africa needs to adapt. It must adapt to rising temperatures, more extreme storms, and floods, rising sea levels, more intense heatwaves, and longer and more severe droughts. However, an enormous funding gap on adaptation is holding Africa back. This policy brief analyses climate adaptation financial flows to Africa and argues that the limited resources available to Africa for adaptation need to be used in the most efficient and productive manner to dampen the combined impacts of climate shocks and economic downturns. Nature-based solutions (NbS) and Locally Led Adaptation programs (LLA) are critical in this respect. Moreover, multilateralism and collaboration between governments, international organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, and the private sector are critical to ensure more support for adaptation in Africa.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Food Security, Nature, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Africa

222. Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in West Africa: Lessons from Ghana

Author:
Titilope F. Ajayi
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
This briefing note draws on discussions and recommendations from a policy dialogue co-organized in Accra by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) on June 25 and 26, 2023. In the past decade, West Africa’s vulnerability to violent extremism and terrorism has intensified as attacks have spread across the region, exacerbating existing multi-layered crises, and raising critical questions about the effectiveness of existing responses. Recent extremist incursions into Coastal West Africa are of special concern. As the only coastal state that has not experienced extremist or terrorist violence, Ghana offers an interesting case study into strategies and frameworks for preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) in Africa.
Topic:
Security, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa, West Africa, and Ghana

223. Working Toward Peaceful Relations between Oromia and Somali Regional States, Ethiopia: Policy Options

Author:
Ketema Debela
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
In recent years, Ethiopia has increasingly faced violent conflicts which are intergovernmental, interparty, and interethnic in nature. In this regard, the conflict between Oromia and Somali regional states, which used to be local and confined to border areas prior to 2017, expanded its scale from local to the regional level, from clan to ethnic level. By drawing on research about intergovernmental conflict resolution and peacebuilding between Oromia and the Somali Regional State, this policy brief identifies the root causes of conflict along the borderlands between Oromo and Somali, examines the effectiveness of the measures taken to address the conflict, and recommends key areas for policy interventions to resolve the conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Armed Conflict, Dialogue, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, Oromia, and Somali Regional State

224. A New Horizon in U.S. Trade Policy: Key Developments and Questions for the Biden Administration

Author:
Trevor Sutton and Mike Williams
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
This issue brief examines some of the key trade initiatives pursued by the Biden administration to date. It then sets out key questions facing U.S. trade policy in a global environment defined by volatility and renewed ambition to tackle the great challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, inequality, and great power competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Inequality, Economy, Trade Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Americas

225. A post-Western global order in the making? Foreign policy goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

Author:
Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta, and Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as independent great powers. For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. They all call for a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned logic of their foreign policies. India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western countermeasures from their own perspective. They describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs. Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features offer opportunities for the EU to engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally been the case.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, UN Security Council, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, India, Asia, Brazil, and Latin America

226. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:
Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

227. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:
Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

228. Climate change and security: Preparing for different impacts

Author:
Emma Hakala
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
As the disastrous impacts of climate change are already visible, the need to respond to them becomes increasingly urgent. Yet there is still a lack of understanding about the comprehensive security impacts of climate change. Climate security impacts tend to be complex as they often take shape through chains of compounded effects. This makes them difficult to fully comprehend, and in the absence of adequate situational awareness, policy responses are likely to fall short. The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of climate security by providing concrete illustrations of potential direct, cascading and transition impacts. Impacts like forest fires, a heatwave in Europe and increased wind energy production all challenge Finland’s security in various ways, such as threatening human health and livelihoods, fuelling political polarisation and creating new supply chain risks. Strategic foresight, international cooperation and well-planned climate policy can help to counteract climate risks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

229. US-EU climate change industrial policy: Pulling in different directions for cooperation, competition, and compromise

Author:
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States and the European Union agree on prioritizing policies to address climate change, which includes securing supply chains for components essential to low-carbon technology. Despite this agreement, their policies to address climate change and low-carbon technology could foster competition. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) reflects the competitive advantage of the US to draw in the best talents, capabilities, and resources from outside sources. This leads to a disconnect between the industrial policy benefits of the IRA within the US and the potential competitive impact the IRA has on US relationships with allies. The EU’s policies are shaped by the bloc’s desire to respond to external actors—including China and Russia—while protecting the common market and building up its internal capability to ensure security of supply. This is complicated by individual member-state objectives. The 2024 US presidential election could bring change: A Republican administration might not share the EU’s outlook on climate change, the need for government intervention, or even the close transatlantic relationship seen during the Biden administration.
Topic:
Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and United States of America

230. The geoeconomics of the hydrogen era: Towards a new global energy architecture

Author:
Timo Behr
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Clean hydrogen is crucial for ensuring the transition to a carbon-neutral economy, and large quantities of it will be needed in the future. The transition from a hydrocarbon to a hydrogen economy will have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. Due to its unique properties, hydrogen will not become the “new oil”. While oil and gas have encouraged a concentration of power – in the hands of producer countries, major oil companies, and around strategic choke points – hydrogen will favour a dispersion of power. The transition to a hydrogen economy will see strong competition over technologies, raw materials, and regulatory standards. Hydrogen has the potential to make the world energy trading system more balanced, more democratic, and less prone to price fluctuations, but it could equally lead to fragmentation, inadvertently contributing to current geopolitical divisions. For the EU and Finland, the transition towards a hydrogen economy presents both challenges and opportunities. Concerted action and active diplomacy will be needed to prevent Europe from being overtaken by others and slipping into new dependencies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Governance, Hydrogen, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

231. Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts

Author:
Katja Creutz
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered debates and initiatives on how to address crimes under international law committed in and against Ukraine, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. A single institution capable of dealing with all international crimes is nonetheless lacking. Tens of thousands of alleged war crimes have been reported and documented, part of which the Ukrainian courts themselves are handling. The massive caseload requires international assistance, in addition to which the ICC is also investigating alleged war crimes. The international community is divided in regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression. As the ICC lacks jurisdiction with respect to this crime in this particular situation, European states are advancing a special ad hoc tribunal. Nonetheless, the majority of countries globally, particularly in the Global South, find it hard to support the initiative. The discussion on the best way to proceed with regard to addressing the crime of aggression committed by Russia is ongoing. Many problematic issues are being debated, ranging from political desirability to the issue of head of state immunities.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, United Nations, War Crimes, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

232. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

233. Outlining EU-Turkey relations: The impacts of the Ukraine war and Turkey’s crucial elections

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Turkey-EU relations are affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine and its consequences for the EU’s place in the world. Another major factor is Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections held in May, which are defining the prospects for the country’s democratic future and its foreign policy. The second round of the presidential election took place on 28 May. The re-election of President Erdoğan indicates that the unilateral foreign policy and strained relationship with the West is likely to continue, although there is a chance of a short-term burst of cooperation due to Turkey’s economic troubles. There are increasingly divergent views about Turkey in the West, and the EU’s future relationship with Turkey needs to accommodate these different conceptualizations of the country as a state actor. The EU needs to be flexible in the coming months and to find ways to engage with Turkey in a more fruitful manner, irrespective of the election results.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

234. EU reform is back on the agenda: The many drivers of the new debate on treaty change

Author:
Steffen Müller
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Institutional reform is back on the European Union’s agenda, with the European Parliament, the Commission and large member states like Germany and France all supporting changes to the way the EU operates. While opening the EU treaties is not without political risk and there is still no consensus on doing so among member states, this momentum for reform is unlikely to wane in the near future. There are several reasons for the new reform drive. In particular, reforms are intended to strengthen the EU’s democratic credibility, to prevent institutional erosion in a time of permanent crisis, to make the EU more resilient to blockades by individual governments, and to lay the groundwork for the accession of new member states. While some of the proposed changes could be achieved without treaty change, the number and variety of issues at stake entails the risk of getting bogged down in parallel debates and missing opportunities for package deals. The most efficient way to deal with the EU’s reform needs would therefore be the launch of a treaty convention.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

235. Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls

Author:
Marco Siddi
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The European Commission has published numerous policy documents concerning the European Green Deal and the energy transition since 2019. Several have an important foreign policy component. Following the Covid-19 crisis and especially Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the discourse and policy objectives of these documents have taken a ‘geopolitical turn’, meaning that the EU’s security, interests and cooperation with Western allies have become more prominent than before. The REPowerEU plan, the new External Energy Strategy and the Green Deal Industrial Plan exemplify this shift by combining green and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s geopolitical turn in external energy politics involves several risks. Third countries could perceive some policies as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘green colonialism’. Domestically, some business actors dislike restrictions on imports of critical raw materials and green technology from abroad, whereas additional mining in the EU may not be compatible with biodiversity and environmental protection. At the same time, ‘offshoring’ mining outside the EU may transfer the ecological consequences to contexts with laxer regulation.
Topic:
Geopolitics, European Commission, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

236. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

237. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security

Author:
Timo R. Stewart
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
Topic:
Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

238. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

239. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

240. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

241. Centre-right parties in Germany and Sweden: Challenges and strategies in a changing political landscape

Author:
Sanna Salo and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Centre-right parties have played a central role in stabilising European party politics and advancing European integration, but the increased fragmentation of party systems and the rise of the radical right present serious challenges to them. The way that centre-right parties respond has important implications for domestic and EU politics alike. Many European centre-right parties have become divided on their political profile and programme, debating between leaning towards the progressive-liberal or the conservative-authoritarian end of the political spectrum. In Germany, the rise of the radical-right AfD has fuelled disagreements within the CDU/CSU and generated demands to sharpen its profile. However, this has thus far not led to major changes to the CDU/CSU’s platform, as it is also challenged from the political centre by the SPD and the Greens. In Sweden, the Moderates have clearly reshaped their political agenda in the last decade, focusing on immigration and law-and-order issues, as well as adopting positions and rhetoric reminiscent of the SD. This shift culminated in the formation of a Moderate-led coalition government supported by the SD in late 2022.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Sweden

242. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

243. Cities as global actors: Bringing governance closer to the people

Author:
Katja Creutz
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Globalization and extensive urbanization worldwide have brought cities to the forefront of global governance in a multilateral system designed and created for states. Cities have come to exercise power due in part to the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of inter-state action, but also because their democratic nature and immediate connection to the population make them legitimate actors. Cities are also home to many problems of a global nature, such as greenhouse gas emissions, pandemics, and sustainability. This makes them uniquely situated to address these challenges. City diplomacy has become a prevalent feature in many global policy issues, ranging from climate change to development cooperation. The primary tool through which cities act is networking, with hundreds of global city networks pursuing the interests and values of their constituencies. By demanding a seat at the table where global affairs are decided upon, cities challenge and complement the state-based international order, in addition to which they stretch the basic concepts and constructs of both international relations and international law.
Topic:
Globalization, International Law, Governance, Democracy, and Cities
Political Geography:
Global Focus

244. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

245. Unfinished Business: Contract Transparency in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:
Robert Pitman and Aubrey Menard
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
How are EITI-implementing countries faring with disclosure of oil, gas and mining contracts? The urgency of climate action and the complexity of the energy transition mean it has never been more important to be able to understand the deals made between companies and governments for oil, gas and minerals. For this reason, since 2021, implementing countries of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have been required to disclose the contracts between governments and extractive companies. This briefing by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Oxfam and Publish What You Pay (PWYP) surveys the contract disclosure practice of the 57 EITI-implementing countries to understand the extent of their contract disclosure practice. The briefing highlights trends, areas of insufficient disclosure and best practices. Readers can explore the data on a dedicated visual tool on the #disclosethedeal microsite.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Accountability, Transparency, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:
Global Focus

246. Why Senegal Should Minimize Petroleum Operations Emissions

Author:
Papa Daouda Diene, Thomas Scurfield, and William Davis
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Slowing climate change is not the only reason Senegal should reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Minimizing emissions, particularly of methane, from the country’s oil and gas operations will increase government revenues, support its ambitions to use gas to increase domestic energy access, and reduce harms to the health and environment of local communities. Senegal’s government is starting to act on minimizing emissions from oil and gas production, but officials should consider strengthening the regulatory framework to support emissions minimization. Greater transparency and accountability, including effective campaigning by civil society actors, is critical to ensure effective action by companies, investors and the government. Measures to reduce oil and gas methane emissions have been well-known and cost-effective for many years, but progress in most countries has been slow. Senegal’s government should at a minimum ensure that the existing regulatory framework is publicly accessible, while Senegal EITI should advocate for disclosure of actual emissions when oil and gas production starts.
Topic:
Gas, Fossil Fuels, Carbon Emissions, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

247. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

248. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:
Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:
Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

249. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

250. British Nuclear Policy

Author:
Peter Watkins
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

251. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

252. Military Command and Control

Author:
Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

253. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

254. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

255. Defence Spending

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:
NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

256. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

257. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

258. French Nuclear Policy

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and France

259. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation

Author:
N. Lill
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
Topic:
Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

260. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union

Author:
Simone Bunse
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

261. The Arctic is Hot: Addressing the Social and Environmental Implications

Author:
Emilie Broek
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic is becoming more hotly contested and attracting new developments. The European Union (EU) is one actor that is turning to the Arctic to achieve its climate, energy, space-related and security goals. However, this increased interest can result in negative social and environmental local implications if not properly planned for and considered. This SIPRI Policy Brief provides an overview of the EU’s focus on the Arctic, with a particular focus on Kiruna, and the importance of human-centred and precautionary approaches.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Space, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

262. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP

Author:
Timo Smit
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

263. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

264. The Fourteen Facts about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years, Russian troops have ravaged Ukraine’s cities, raped its women, and stolen its children. Russian missiles and Iranian drones strike Ukrainian cities daily, often hitting civilian targets. Russia is the aggressor. Ukraine is the victim. For Americans who believe in respect for national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine is natural. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the resources required to give them a fighting chance. Meanwhile, Russia is among America’s top geopolitical adversaries. As former Secretary of State and Hudson Distinguished Fellow Mike Pompeo said last week, a Russian victory “would be felt well beyond Ukraine’s borders, including by strengthening a Russia-China-Iran alliance that aims to weaken the US and our allies across the globe.” As Congress debates additional support for Ukraine, detractors will spread false and misleading information. It is important to understand the facts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

265. Why Overbroad State Library Ebook Licensing Bills Are Unconstitutional

Author:
Devlin Hartline
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
There has been a coordinated push over the past few years for states to enact legislation that would regulate the marketplace for licensing copyrighted ebooks to public libraries. The supporters of these bills argue that publishers offer ebook licenses that are too costly and restrictive, making it difficult for libraries to provide adequate access to their patrons. The gist of these complaints is that the market for digital ebooks should mirror the one for physical books, in which libraries pay the same price as everyone else and set their own rules for making loans. In essence, they want states to step in to remedy the perceived disparity with ebooks, which they blame on the allegedly abusive trade practices of publishers. But the reality is that publishers treat the two markets differently because they are fundamentally different, and there is nothing abusive about it. Moreover, publishers are merely doing what federal copyright law encourages them to do, and states are powerless to enact overbroad laws that would unconstitutionally punish them for doing so. While these concerns with the ebook licensing marketplace may be relatively new, the legal issues presented by the proposed state regulations to address them are not. Many states already have laws on copyright licensing in other contexts, and the extent of a state’s limited capacity to regulate in this area has been long-settled by the courts. Nevertheless, supporters of the new ebook licensing bills appear uninterested in the clear legal implications of their favored policy position. Shortly after the first such ebook law went into effect in Maryland, a federal district court struck it down as unconstitutional because it forced publishers to grant licenses. Other states have since moved forward with new ebook legislation based on the model text provided by Library Futures, a policy organization, that purports to solve the constitutional issue by merely dictating the terms of the licenses. However, Library Futures makes no real effort to defend the legality of its proposed legislation, and the truth is that it suffers the same constitutional defect. This policy memo explains how federal copyright law supersedes and limits state laws that regulate the licensing of copyrighted works. While states can validly target certain abusive conduct related to the manner in which copyright licenses are negotiated, federal law is clear that states cannot cross the line by dictating the terms of such licenses when they directly implicate the exclusive rights secured by the Copyright Act.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Domestic Policy, and Libraries
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

266. Primer: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Visit to the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While Ukraine, Gaza, and climate change will feature heavily on the agenda during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington, DC, the most important and enduring issue between the two countries is progressing AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) as the key ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) contemporary alliance initiative. If the AUKUS arrangement stalls and fails to have a meaningful impact on the strategic and military balance of power, then America’s regional allies and partners will lose faith that a reinvigorated American-led alliance system can serve as a check on Chinese power. America’s slow progress to reform the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is an immense frustration for Australian and American proponents of AUKUS. However, concerns regarding inadequate investment in the American military industrial base are reasonable and legitimate. Australian defense policy is underfunded and lacks urgency despite defense analysts’ assessment that the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating. Australian underperformance will increase skepticism of AUKUS in both countries. Both countries need to undertake much more detailed scenario planning and commit to the agreed sharing of burdens and responsibilities to deter or defeat China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

267. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:
Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

268. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:
Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

269. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

270. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

271. The “Odious” Legacy of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: The Case of Angola

Author:
Rafael Marques de Morais and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Within days of taking office, China’s new foreign minister, Qin Gang, was on a plane to his country’s main African client: Angola. Landing in Luanda on January 12, Qin Gang was ostensibly bringing a gift—a $250 million loan to help Angola expand high-speed broadband. Some gifts, however, are not what they seem, and some of the recent financial gifts from Chinese sources have been toxic. Soon after Qin visited Angola, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to three African countries but skipped Angola, possibly because of its checkered history with Chinese development assistance. The case of Angola raises questions about the extent and nature of Chinese loans and infrastructure aid to a growing number of African nations, as well as the consequences of such loans on those countries’ relations with the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, Trade, Development Assistance, and Loans
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Angola, and United States of America

272. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:
Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

273. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

274. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

275. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Abraham Accords provide an unprecedented opportunity to increase trade and investment among its members significantly by establishing a regional free trade area that would ensure progress toward their aspirations, preserve the integrity and stability of global markets, fuel growth, and constrain China’s predatory trade practices. Signatories to the accords committed to a shared vision of peace and prosperity and recognized that economic integration can enable members to achieve their long-term economic goals. The accords have paved the way for comprehensive partnerships on a variety of issues related to security, trade, investment, the environment, innovation, tourism, energy, and other key sectors. While the growth in bilateral trade is of great significance, the true transformative power of these peace agreements lies in expanding regional integration and cooperation. This is already underway. Israel concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in December 2022 and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Both will significantly accelerate economic development and provide incentives for others to follow suit. Israel's new foreign minister, Eli Cohen, recently stated that the volume of trade with Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords in 2020 exceeded $2.8 billion dollars in 2022. While progress has been remarkable, its potential is far greater. According to RAND analysis of the potential of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) between Israel and current signatories, the accords could create 46,000 new jobs and $24 billion in new economic activity for Israel's four partners. The benefits of a multilateral FTA encompassing current signatories would triple the overall benefit, creating more than 150,000 new jobs and new economic activity exceeding $75 billion. A multilateral FTA among an expanded number of potential signatories to the accords could create as much as 4 million new jobs and $1 trillion in new economic activity through 2030. This potential is not lost on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP represents one of the most significant threats challenging the United States and its partners and allies. China’s state-directed economic policies, predatory lending, cyber intrusions, theft of intellectual property, illicit technology transfer and other coercive practices, industrial subsidies, and market access restrictions on key sectors of China’s economy constitute the most significant threats of the coming century. Several trends exacerbate the need for integrating markets aligned toward common goals. The global pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Brexit, tariff tensions, political instability, protectionist policies, and regulatory uncertainty have threatened global trade by disrupting established supply chains and their underlying constellation of business models and trade relationships. As is often the case, these complex and interrelated challenges constitute an opportunity to realign our trade to safeguard the integrity of global markets and pursue US goals and objectives in collaboration with our partners and allies. The Abraham Accords offers just such an opportunity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Free Trade, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

276. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

277. Radical Steps Are Essential to Jump-Starting the Replacement of the Flawed US Money Regime

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A previous policy memo argued that flaws in the actual US money regime are responsible for the Great Pandemic Inflation.1 Now that reported inflation has been falling, some of us might imagine that addressing these flaws has become a non-urgent matter. After all, great supply shocks tend to come rarely. But such complacence does not fit the facts. The case for getting rid of the present rotten monetary regime is not simply based on the argument that it has malfunctioned so severely during the pandemic and war supply shock. That malfunctioning continues into the present, where there is now positive supply side news (the pandemic dislocation is fading, and a natural gas glut has emerged despite the continuing Russia-Ukraine War). The Federal Reserve and other central banks, still trying to navigate policy in an anchorless monetary system by choosing a path for short-term interest rates, are stumbling from one huge blunder to another, even if they have a rare lucky stretch in between. Beyond the woes of how the 2 percent inflation standard performed during the supply shock and subsequent supply restoration, this regime should be held responsible for a range of economic and social consequences that predate the pandemic and war. These include malinvestment (poor allocation of capital due to corrupted signaling in markets), advancement of monopoly capitalism, bloated government outlays, and punitive monetary taxation (in the form of inflation tax or monetary repression tax), all of which take their toll. Instead of enjoying a top-quality money with all its benefits, individuals have had to put up with a poor money and all its related costs, particularly the ongoing danger of serious loss of purchasing power.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

278. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

279. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

280. Seven Ways to Deepen NATO-Ukraine Relations at the Vilnius Summit

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
NATO will hold a major summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, from July 11 to 12, and Ukraine will undoubtedly be a top agenda item. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently said that the summit should present “a clear plan on when and how Ukraine will enter [NATO].” Meanwhile, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that “there is no alternative to Ukraine's accession to NATO.” With expectations high, NATO leaders and policymakers need to start developing a plan to keep Ukraine on the path to eventual membership while deepening NATO-Ukraine relations. With some creative thinking and political will, the summit could serve NATO’s interests and meet the Ukrainian government’s reasonable and understandable expectations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

281. Winning in Ukraine Is Critically Important for Deterring a War in Taiwan

Author:
John P. Walters
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are remarks by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters during a debate over whether winning in Ukraine is important for deterring a war in Taiwan. To view the debate, click here. I support the judgment of the commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, who was recently asked by Senator Roger Wicker, “There’s some people who feel our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific. . . . What do you say?” Adm. Aquilino replied, “Senator I do not . . . I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.” Why is Adm. Aquilino correct in linking the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of Communist Chinese aggression to our support for Ukraine? First, US victory in Ukraine is essential for generating support for Taiwan at home. Winning in Ukraine will help generate the domestic resolve to fight for Taiwan. If we pull back from Ukraine, however, the US will strengthen those isolationists who pit baby formula against defense spending. Success creates a slipstream of confidence, which the country is currently lacking after our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. A victory in Ukraine can restore confidence in our ability to win wars—at home and abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

282. America’s Best Choice in Sudan Is the Least Bad Option

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Long-simmering tensions between Sudan’s two most powerful generals broke into open warfare on April 15. A series of ceasefires have failed, and fighting continues in the capital city, Khartoum, and in other areas throughout the country. Street protests in April 2019 prompted Sudan’s security services to oust the former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, and forced them to include civilians in the subsequent transitional government. Ever since, the United States has tried to help those civilians consolidate power.1 In October 2021, however, the two most senior generals in the transitional government—Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (usually known as “Hemeti”), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—forced the civilians out. Still, the United States supported negotiations between the junta and elements of the civilian protest movement until both generals’ desire for supreme power forced the confrontation that now threatens to dismember the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Leadership, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and United States of America

283. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

284. The Jeju 4.3 Attacks Were Not a Democracy Movement

Author:
Tara O
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On April 3, 1948, on the Korean island of Jeju, communist guerrillas went on a rampage, killing police officers, election workers, and others; setting houses on fire; and terrorizing villagers, all to discourage them from voting in the upcoming May 10 elections that would establish the Republic of Korea (ROK). The insurgency—referred to as Jeju 4.3—triggered a government counterinsurgency, forcing the communists into the mountains where they would continue their guerrilla operations for nine more years. In March 2023, the Democratic Party of Korea (Deobureo Minju Party) introduced a bill mandating that citizens refer to the insurgency only as a “democracy struggle,” with punishments of up to five years in prison. But historical documents, eyewitness testimony, and statements from the perpetrators show that the incident was a campaign of irregular and unconventional warfare, a prelude to the communist military invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and part of the larger Korean War.
Topic:
History, Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and Korean War
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

285. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East

Author:
Yair Albeck
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Middle East

286. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

287. Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters to Americans

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine aid is a good investment for the US. The United States has given Ukraine $43.7 billion in military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion last year. This is about 5 percent of America’s fiscal year 2023 defense budget, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. Ukraine is degrading one of America’s two major adversaries. Ukraine has destroyed more than 11,350 pieces of Russian military equipment, including 2,164 main battle tanks, 2,566 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 pieces of towed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 84 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and 12 naval ships—all without shedding a single drop of US blood. President Zelensky: “Ukraine never asked American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us.” Ukraine matters to the US economy. In 2021, Europe accounted for $3.19 trillion of foreign capital investment in the US (out of a total of $4.98 trillion). In 2022, 45 out of 50 states—including the largest single-state economy, California—exported more goods to Europe than to China. Ukraine shapes global commodities markets. Ukraine ranks in the top ten in the production of corn, wheat, barley, sunflower, sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and canola. It has reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals in the world, including titanium, iron, lithium, coal, and other energy deposits. At present, Russia occupies Ukrainian territory containing at least $12.4 trillion worth of raw materials.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

288. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

289. Avoid a Sequester and Fully Fund a Preeminent Military

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Kennedy Lee
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In early summer 2023, President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling and avert a government default. While compromise is necessary, the deal included caps on overall spending at fiscal 2022 levels and made no exception for national defense. The United States is in the beginning of a tumultuous time: a new cold war with China and Russia. Washington ought to be moving with a great sense of urgency and national purpose to rebuild its defense industrial base (DIB), modernize its nuclear forces to meet the dynamic threats, grow the US Navy, and upgrade critical space systems, among other things. The caps on military spending undermine America’s ability to support its immediate interests in Ukraine and limit its capacity to deter future aggression and expansion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), further violence by China’s junior partner Russia, and rogue action by the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. The debt deal caps US military spending at $886 billion, which may initially appear to be a raise, but effectively flattens the Pentagon budget over the next two years. The dollar amount is 3.2 percent higher than last year’s request and will rise by 1 percent next year for a total of $895 billion in fiscal year 2025. But when accounting for inflation, the cap amounts to a significant cut in real terms over last year’s budget. The projected figures suggest that US defense spending could fall below 3 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since the 1990s’ “peace dividend.” The budget that the Pentagon submitted for this year should be $23 billion higher just to keep pace with the current rate of inflation. This is before factoring in the budget increases necessary to keep up with the evolving threat environment, including an ongoing land war in Europe and a Chinese Communist Party with revanchist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Raising the stakes, the deal also included a provision that triggers an automatic sequester against the budget, including the military: an indiscriminate 1 percent cut if the House and Senate fail to pass 12 annual spending bills by midnight on New Year’s Eve. The military has only now begun to recover from the effects of the sequester that occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Another one now, at a time of acute and immediate threats from multiple adversaries, could have catastrophic effects. Congress would be wise either to urgently amend the bill or to prioritize the imperative of avoiding a second sequester over all other political matters. Then Congress should pass supplemental funding measures to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) has the resources it needs to address the significant shortfalls that already exist and that the Obama-era sequestration only exacerbated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

290. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:
Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

291. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:
Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

292. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:
Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

293. Autumn of the patriarch: How to help Tunisians defend their democracy

Author:
Tarek Megerisi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Recent arrests and protests in Tunisia are a sign of growing instability in the country and panic in the government over waning public support. President Kais Saied seized full power more than 18 months ago but he has spent his time embedding autocracy through constitutional reform rather than attending to Tunisia’s economic and social problems. The president’s indecisive and reclusive nature leaves Tunisia in economic limbo as he fails to show the leadership required, including to give confidence to international partners and financial institutions. Europeans have invested heavily in Tunisia. As the US contemplates disengaging from the country, the EU and its partners must assemble a ‘coalition of the concerned’ to put in place the support structures Tunisia will need to withstand Saied’s inevitable crash.
Topic:
Democracy, Domestic Politics, Instability, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia

294. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

295. The politics of dialogue: How the EU can change the conversation in Kosovo and Serbia

Author:
Engjellushe Morina
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU is concerned at rising tensions in the north of Kosovo and the prospect of Russian interference in disputes between Kosovo and Serbia. To address this, the EU drew up a new proposal for engagement between Kosovo and Serbia, which the two sides have agreed to. The agreement makes some progress on the unresolved question of mutual recognition but is not yet a roadmap to full normalisation. Tepid EU efforts to enable Western Balkans states to advance Euro-Atlantic ambitions are part of the reason for the unresolved issues in northern Kosovo. The EU can transform this dynamic by setting out clearer prospects for accession for both Kosovo and Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Normalization, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

296. Opening the Global Gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the southern neighbourhood

Author:
Alberto Rizzi and Arturo Varvelli
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The southern neighbourhood should be a key focus for the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure programme – but the bloc has so far directed relatively little of its investment to the region. Strategic goals for the EU in the Mediterranean include promoting ‘nearshoring’ to shorten key supply chains including of energy; and improving regional connectivity, decarbonising economic activity, and creating jobs. The EU can propose more attractive investment offers than China and other players. The Global Gateway’s use of grants rather than loans is central to this. Going beyond investments, the EU should promote inclusive growth by sharing technical know-how and supporting training to enhance the skills of workforces in the region. Protecting physical connections is of great importance. The EU should work hand in hand with southern neighbours to monitor Global Gateway-funded infrastructure.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and North Africa

297. Tricks of the trade: Strengthening EU-African cooperation on trade in services

Author:
Iza Lejarraga
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Services are increasingly important for international trade, accounting for about half of global trade flows. Trade in services is growing more rapidly than trade in goods. Trade in services is critical for improving the competitiveness of African economies, increasing their participation in regional and global value chains, and promoting inclusive growth. Improved trade in services with African countries could help the EU diversify its supply chains, strengthening resilience and reducing dependencies on China and other Asian countries. The cooperation on domestic regulatory frameworks required for trade in services can promote a shared understanding of regulatory goals and standards between the EU and Africa across many sectors. None of the trade agreements between the EU and African countries currently covers services, and only one African country is part of the WTO Joint Initiative on Domestic Services Regulation. There is therefore no dedicated platform for cooperation on services regulations. The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement provides an unprecedented opportunity for African countries to improve domestic services regulations and could be a new basis for cooperation with the EU.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade Liberalization, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe and Africa

298. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

299. From aid to inclusion: A better way to help Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan

Author:
Kelly Petillo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The number of Syrian refugees attempting to enter Europe has doubled in the last two years. This shift is driven by growing hostility towards Syrian refugees in host states Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Governments in these countries are ratcheting up the political rhetoric and deploying new ways to force Syrians to return. Home-grown economic and social pressures, and problems caused by the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, contribute to these tensions. Europeans’ support for Syrian refugees remains humanitarian-led and short-termist. The EU and its member states should switch to a longer-term ‘inclusion’ approach that helps Syrians live in dignity in their host countries. This new approach would also benefit local communities, as well as discourage Syrians from making the dangerous journey to Europe.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Syrian War, Integration, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

300. Sunny side up: Maximising the European Green Deal’s potential for North Africa and Europe

Author:
Laura El-Katiri
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
North African states hold great potential to become important partners in Europe’s energy transition in the medium and long term. The EU and its member states can make stronger use of the European Green Deal to direct investment in North Africa in support of clean energy. Governments in the region are worried about the impact of some EU decarbonisation tools, such as the carbon border adjustment mechanism. Europeans can allay some of these fears by providing political commitment, financial investment, and advice on the energy transition. New partnerships between the EU and North African states also offer the opportunity to make progress on wider environmental considerations, including biodiversity, and to embed a human rights-based approach.
Topic:
Climate Change, Foreign Direct Investment, Partnerships, Solar Power, Green Deal, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe and North Africa