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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)

1. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: A Foreign Policy Assessment 2015-2019

Author:
Colin Robertson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
An internationalist and a progressive, Justin Trudeau consistently boosts diversity, social justice, environmentalism and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. A gifted retail politician, Trudeau prefers campaigning and contact with voters to the hurly-burly of the House of Commons. He possesses an empathy and emotional intelligence most people found lacking in his famous father, Pierre Trudeau. But are these attributes and causes out of sync with our turbulent times? Mr. Trudeau is learning firsthand what British prime minister Harold MacMillan warned U.S. president John F. Kennedy what was most likely to blow governments off-course: “Events, dear boy, events.” As Trudeau begins a second term as prime minister, the going is tougher. The Teflon is gone. He leads a minority government with new strains on national unity. Parliament, including his experiment in Senate reform, is going to require more of his time. Canada’s premiers will also need attention if he is to achieve progress on his domestic agenda. Does he have the patience and temperament for compromise and the art of the possible? The global operating system is increasingly malign, with both the rules-based international order and freer trade breaking down. Managing relations with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is difficult. Canadian farmers and business are suffering - collateral damage in the Sino-U.S. disputes. In what was supposed to be a celebration of “Canada is back”, there is doubt that Canada will win a seat on the UN Security Council in June 2020. Losing would be traumatic for his government and their sense of Canada’s place in the world. It would also be a rude shock for Canadians’ self-image of themselves internationally.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, and Justin Trudeau
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

2. Does Canada Need a Foreign Policy Review

Author:
Randolph Mank
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s contemporary foreign policy has been shaped by deep integration with, and dependence on, the United States, offset by multilateral support for a rules-based international order. The Trump administration’s confrontational nationalism, combined with other global events and trends, has now disrupted Canada’s position and assumptions. This raises the question of whether or not it’s time for a Canadian foreign policy review. While the Trudeau government deserves credit for several initiatives, a series of discontinuities in Canada’s domestic and foreign policies suggests that our interests could be better served. The Canadian government has two main options: it can follow its current path of adjusting its policies in an ad hoc fashion, while waiting out the Trump administration and hoping for more favourable successors, or it can attempt to set Canada on a new path, in which case a foreign policy review would be warranted. The review option would only be useful if everything were on the table, including what to do about bilateral relations with the U.S., the future of our multilateral commitments, and domestic policies on such critical global issues as energy and the environment. The ultimate goal should be to advance Canada’s national interests through better aligned domestic and foreign policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Government
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

3. Bringing Chaos to Order: Donald Trump and his Band of National Security Advisors

Author:
Eugene Lang
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Two hundred and forty days. That is the average length of tenure – eight months – of the national security advisor to the U.S. president during the past two-and-a-half years. With the resignation or firing (depending on who you listen to) of John Bolton, Donald Trump is now on to his fifth assistant to the president for national security affairs, the official title of the job. It is an historic anomaly of epic proportions. Since the position was created during the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950s, on average national security advisors have served 32 months, exactly four times the average shelf life of Trump’s advisors (and Trump is only just over halfway through his first term of office).1 Revolving doors are of course a hallmark of the Trump administration, but does this one really matter?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, National Security, Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

4. Funding Defence for the Age of Accelerations

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
At a time when even large, high-tech Silicon Valley corporations that operate as market disruptors are challenged to keep up with the pace of change, national Western governments need to ensure that defence funding is responsive to persistent, dramatic and non-linear shifts in the international strategic environment. The United States is experiencing a “deepening crisis of credibility in global affairs”,2 largely resulting from an America-first posture, rather than a multilateral approach with traditional allies. Some nations now view the U.S. as “undermining the international order”,3 and reliance on the U.S. as the leading democratic nation is less certain. Indeed, periods of great economic change “driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact on social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states”,4 create a dynamic that shifts power, influence and trade among nations. Further, nations that can “develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively”5 can gain a comparative advantage in the current security environment, where the rate of technological change is accelerating. However, with adversaries advancing their military technology in increasingly shorter cycles, market dominance by Western defence firms has only fleeting or transitory advantage. The revolution in military technology has been a constant topic for analysts, but the changing military and defence department skill sets required in the future security environment are equally important, with the cyber-realm and space being two prominent examples.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

5. Engagement and Pragmatism: Towards an Enduring Canadian Strategy in Latin America

Author:
Eric Miller
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
With a majority government and a different world view than his predecessor, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is re-making Canada’s foreign policy priorities and approaches. This paper offers some suggested approaches for engagement with Latin America. In the area of trade, the paper recommends seeking associate membership in the Pacific Alliance while continuing to strengthen linkages with Mexico within the North American commercial policy framework. It also suggests exploring the scope of what is possible with countries with which Canada does not have free trade agreements, especially Brazil and Ecuador. On the security front, the paper suggests that Canada needs a strategy for the Colombian peace process and to step up support to Mexico in strengthening the integrity of the southern border of North America. With regards to foreign policy, Canada needs a serious strategy for the new Cuba and needs to expand its diplomatic representation, namely in Paraguay and Bolivia. Finally, on the institution-building front Canada needs to secure senior positions at the Inter-American Development Bank and Organization of American States in order to help to drive institutional reform. Canada further needs a coherent strategy to attract in-bound foreign investment from Latin America. The region is rich with possibilities and a coherent engagement strategy can deliver much.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Canada and Latin America

6. The Case for RAIPON

Author:
Ron Wallace
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada is about to enter an entirely new phase of heightened diplomatic responsibilities in the circumpolar Arctic. This comes at a time when international attention to polar aboriginal, economic, strategic, SAR and environmental concerns approach new heights. Additionally, the deadline of December 2013 is fast approaching for Canada’s anticipated first submission under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for claims to subsea lands that extend beyond the existing 200 nm limits delineated by the current Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic1. For Canada, these represent material social, economic, diplomatic and strategic interests. They also constitute an opportunity for Canada to exert tangible international leadership in the Arctic – a region that many Canadians consider to be a vital component of our national identity. Significantly, Prime Minister Harper has deftly selected an Inuk to lead Canada’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at a time when these, and other, international issues are assuming increasing importance throughout the Circumpolar Arctic. This paper touches on current affairs that may affect Canadian and US relations with Russia and is meant to place in perspective recent events that affect our circumpolar trading neighbours, including the fate of indigenous peoples of the Russian North. Under the renewed leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has embarked on a determined course of heightened nationalism designed, among other things, to control “foreign influences” in Russia, especially those targeted NGOs and other agencies such as RAIPON (the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East) that have received external funding from the West. Such policies have material consequences for Russia’s civil and political institutions – including their indigenous peoples throughout Arctic Russia. Without understanding the events that have overtaken Russia since the rise of the Putin regime, the significance of the recent international uproar surrounding RAIPON might well be lost. Canada, with its increasingly high-profile participation on the Arctic Council, may have a unique opportunity to work with other international agencies, and through diplomatic channels, to prevent a further deterioration of the Russian-Western dialogue by seeking to elevate and inform future discussions about the circumpolar region. Recent events in Russia may force reconsideration by the West of Russia’s developing political and international strategic intentions, many of which involve the circumpolar Arctic region. In short, Canada has an opportunity to advocate for the meaningful participation of Russia’s indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council. Responsible Canadian leadership and advocacy in the Arctic Council could further elevate its work and also enhance Canada’s position at a time when the Arctic – and its peoples – has become a growing focus of international attention.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and Arctic

7. North Korea, Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada-US Defence Cooperation

Author:
Frank Harvey
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In December 2012, North Korea launched the Unha-3 rocket – a three-stage, intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of 10,000 kilometres. When combined with North Korea’s latest underground nuclear test in January, these moves represent a concerted effort by the regime to develop and deploy an offensive nuclear capability. When acquired, a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile will provide Pyongyang with a credible deterrent that will seriously diminish our coercive leverage in subsequent military security crises involving North and South Korea. The imperative on the part of the international community to move forward with research, development and deployment of ballistic missile defences (BMD) is becoming more pressing each year. In November 2010, 28 NATO members signed NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The most relevant part of the alliance’s new strategy is the commitment by all NATO members to: “Develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence.” As a NATO member, Canada now officially endorses the logic, strategic utility and security benefits of ballistic missile defence, but, apparently, only in terms of protecting European and American territory and populations. The most perplexing aspect of Canada’s policy is the ongoing refusal to engage in bilateral discussions with our most important NATO ally to negotiate BMD architecture to protect Canadian territory and populations. Canadian officials have the luxury to sit back and let allies protect our territory, but this is a foreign policy strategy that has reached the point of taking free-riding to a new and somewhat disturbing level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Missile Defense, and Ballistic Missile
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

8. Should Brazil be “Special” for Canada?

Author:
Jean Daudelin
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After years of mutual neglect and sometimes outright tension, Canada’s relations with Brazil are smoother than ever. As Brazil emerges as a relatively powerful and influential global player, shouldn’t Canada try to build that increasingly fluid relationship into a strategic partnership, making Brasilia a key prong of its global policy? Looking at Brazil’s place in the world, and at the ways in which its foreign policy meshes – or not – with Canada’s, this paper argues that such an option has little appeal and in fact few chances of success. Brazil’s rise has its limits, and the country’s global reach and power remain heavily constrained. Beyond the Americas, and even within, Brazil’s power is very soft and could hardly be harnessed effectively by Canada. Moreover, the two country’s international agendas do not overlap much. In global governance circles, Brazil’s global star is on the rise just as Canada’s is in decline. On democracy and human rights, Canada is much more willing to put sovereignty between brackets, and in the face of nuclear proliferation, Brazil is much more critical of the asymmetry of the global regime and the advantage this gives to established powers. Crucially, Canada largely embraces globalization and sees Asia’s rise primarily as an opportunity, whereas Brazilians feel more threatened by it. In that context keeping things running smoothly, without dreams of “grandeur,” is the most that should be sought: normal is great, special would be too much.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Canada, Brazil, South America, and North America

9. Asia-Pacific: Let's Get Back in the Ring

Author:
Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
At the November APEC summit, having cleared the way with President Obama, Stephen Harper publicly announced Canada’s formal interest in joining the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks. The US and others, while “welcoming” Canada’s interest, reiterated the high bar that new entrants (Mexico and Japan as well as Canada) will have to meet. The promise of the TPP is that it could form the basis for a much wider Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), including China. Canada could have much more easily joined the TPP had it expressed interest back in 2008 when the door was open to expansion. At that time, Asia-Pacific was not on the radar in Ottawa, even for China which has now become a key country of interest for Mr. Harper. Canada has an Asia Pacific legacy that it has squandered through neglect. From the 1960s through early establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1970, and beyond into the 1980s, Canada was considered, and acted like, a leader in the region. That interest seemed to peak, and then wane, after the 1997 Vancouver APEC summit. At the same time, the face of Canada was changing rapidly with a strong and steady influx of Asian immigrants. These cultural and ethnic ties have underpinned a new interest in doing business with Asia, but Canada has been slow off the mark. While we have negotiated free trade agreements with 9 countries in the past six years, not a single one has been in Asia. Meanwhile, Asia is rapidly integrating and establishing new architecture, from which Canada, alone among major Asia Pacific countries, is absent. The US is reaffirming its ties with Asia through security and trade ties. Australia is doing the same. Canada is endowed with the physical and human resources that should allow us to take full advantage of our place in the region. We can reestablish our credentials through a sustained leadership and a long-term strategy. There are signs that this may be happening. The time to do it is now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade Policy, APEC, and TPP
Political Geography:
Canada, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

10. The Panda Bear Readies to Meet the Polar Bear: China Debates and Formulates Foreign Policy Towards Arctic Affairs and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty

Author:
David Curtis Wright
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The rise of China to international prominence by virtually every measure conceivable is the single most important international and geopolitical fact of the early twenty-first century. The insatiable Chinese colossus combs the earth in search of energy to fuel its economic juggernaut; its trade networks now bestride the globe; and its investors now hold the single largest proportion of United States foreign debt in the form of US Treasury securities. China now has many very astute and acutely observant geostrategic thinkers, and several of them have begun lately to focus their attention squarely on Canada. Why? Because of two things: the tremendous untapped wealth and the currently still largely unused Northwest Passage in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (CAA). The Canadian Arctic has what China wants: natural resources and the possibility of a major new shipping route. China knows that Canadian control over these resources makes Canada a major international player, a country with natural resource wealth and geostrategic advantage befitting its sheer geographical size, but out of proportion with its relatively small population. Over the past decade or so China has been paying increased attention to the Arctic and Arctic affairs and since 2004, China has had a permanent land-based presence in the Arctic, specifically in the Svalbard Archipelago, or Spitsbergen (well inside the Arctic Ocean in the Barents Sea). This is where it maintains its Arctic Yellow River Station (Huang He zhan), a facility for oceanic and climatological research. China became the eighth state to establish research facilities there. There are currently energetic discussions and debates in China about the Arctic as the country formulates official foreign policy regarding the region. While it is certainly not an Arctic state, China nonetheless feels entitled to a voice in Arctic affairs and does not want wealthy and powerful northern states to grow even more so at the expense of the wider world’s access to Arctic resources and navigation routes.2 While it seems unlikely that China has any ambitions of becoming an armed belligerent in a future war over the Arctic, or of making serious territorial claims in the region, it can be expected that China will become more assertive and opinionated in its commentary on Arctic affairs, especially as they pertain to extended continental shelf territorial claims currently being prepared by Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Canada needs to be aware that in the course of these discussions and debates, some Chinese scholars are carefully examining Canada's claims of historical sovereignty over the Arctic in general and the Northwest Passage in particular. Although it appears at present that Beijing does not want to affirm the accuracy or appropriateness of Canada's historical claims, Canada should be aware that the small number of scholars in China who consider these claims in detail seem largely to end up sympathetic with, and supportive of, them. Even so, the Chinese government itself does not seem ready to affirm Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Canada needs to be on its guard against Chinese attempts to water down Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and should strengthen cooperation with democratic Arctic states for the security and stability of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and Arctic

11. Marshall Plan Needed for Middle East

Author:
Michael Bell
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The peoples of the Middle East are instituting profound changes that will affect us all. We in Canada, and in the West, must be fully involved, in our own interests, and theirs, by responding generously to viable requests for aid and assistance across a gamut of challenges: justice mentoring, education, small business, civil society and unemployment. They need to feel change in their conditions now. They need a Marshall type plan with immediate impact. If not these revolutions in the sand could turn sour fast. Everything from education in village schools, to the prospects for good governance, to peace in the region, is at stake. Well established countries with homogeneous populations such as Egypt and Tunisia stand a good chance of making it; others with little sense of national identity and little in the way of civil society, like Yemen, do not. Some, like Bahrain, are ruled by minorities with an alienated underclass. They are burdened by powerful neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran in this case, who see their own conflicting interests directly at stake. The Americans are not indifferent. Canada’s role is circumscribed by our politics, which rules us out from anything verging on the political or strategic. But there is still plenty to do, if the will exists.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, Governance, Strategic Interests, and Marshall Plan
Political Geography:
Middle East and Canada

12. Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan

Author:
David J. Bercuson, J. L. Granatstein, and Nancy Pearson Mackie
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan Canada fought for a decade in Afghanistan, its troops sustaining casualties and inflicting them. The war became progressively more unpopular at home, even while Canadian troops, well trained and well equipped, scored successes in the field. But what were the lessons of the war for Canada’s leaders? Did we secure more influence with our Alliance friends? Were there factors that made battlefield success more difficult to achieve? Were there flaws in the government’s organizational structure? In the goals it sought? Canada first went to Afghanistan in December 2001, dispatching some forty members of its secret Joint Task Force 2 to operate against al Qaeda. Early in 2002, the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry began serving in Kandahar Province with a United States Army division and after six months returned home. In July and August, 2003, the Canadian Forces began to return to Afghanistan in force with some 2000 troops, becoming the largest troop contributor to the Kabul Multinational Brigade under the stillnascent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), operating in the Afghan capital while the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom had operational control in the rest of Afghanistan. The Canadian role there would last for over two years, and it included key leadership positions in ISAF Headquarters. In late 2003-04 policymakers in Ottawa began to consider a transfer of Canadian troops as part of ISAF’s expansion out of Kabul to cover all of Afghanistan with either civilian- or military-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs would be accompanied by NATO troops tasked to secure them and to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In general, ISAF’s PRT mission aimed to improve the lot of rural Afghans and thus to build closer relations between the people and the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. Another component of the effort to improve Afghan governance was the SAT-A, the Canadian-provided Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan that from 2005 to 2008 placed Canadians in key advisory roles with Afghan government ministries. For a variety of reasons, including advice from the Canadian diplomatic, aid, and military leadership in Kabul, the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa believed that Canada ought to establish a Battle Group and PRT presence in Kandahar, beginning in 2006, in order to play a more central, more visible role in Afghan reconstruction. There were some dissenters and the two lead departments jockeyed for control over the Afghan file – and where DND, providing the boots on the ground, including the vast majority of those in the PRT, naturally enough assumed that there should be no contest. But there was general agreement that, with this deployment, Canada would raise its profile in the international community and among its NATO partners (especially the United States) and signal an end to the “human security agenda” period of the Chrétien government. For the Army leadership as well, the Kandahar commitment provided the opportunity to strike squarely at the mythology of peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the desire to help Afghanistan and to achieve political and status gains may have overridden the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was wide open and the Taliban insurgency was beginning to grow in Kandahar and Helmand provinces by late 2005. This was largely ignored until Canada took its first casualty in the new campaign on January 15, 2006 – even before the Canadian area of operations moved south - when diplomat Glyn Berry, who was to run the Canadian PRT from Camp Nathan Smith in a northern suburb of Kandahar City, died in a suicide bomb attack. In total, some 157 Canadian servicemen and women have been killed in Afghanistan, along with an undeclared, but large, number of soldiers wounded.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Canada, and North America

13. Foreign Policy in the Election

Author:
Derek H. Burney
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Foreign policy rarely plays a major role in Canadian elections and, CDFAI Senior Research Fellow, Derek Burney contends 2011 will be no exception. Differences about the purchase of new fighter aircraft to replace the aging CF-18 Hornets will surface during the campaign. The Liberals have adopted a preference for “butter” instead of “guns” and should there be a change of government, defence equipment purchases could be curtailed more generally. While other differences are evident, e.g. on Middle East issues and Climate Change, the two major parties are essentially on the same page on the key issues of war and peace – Afghanistan and now Libya. The new bilateral initiative for a security perimeter with the US has attracted little opposition to date, primarily because it is a process not a result, yielding little to attack or defend. Uncertainties about the global economy may simply reinforce public concerns about Canada’s economic prospects. The Conservatives have delivered on what they said they would do: strengthening the military to give more capacity for a global role, engaging constructively with the US and enhancing relations in our hemisphere, notably with a substantial contribution to Haiti. The Liberal alternative seems more rhetorical than prescriptive, citing grievances with the Conservative record along with nostalgic calls for a return to Pearsonian emphasis on peace-keeping and multilateralism. Regardless of who wins, and excepting the possibility of different commitments to defence, the main lines of Canadian foreign policy are unlikely to change significantly.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Canada, and North America