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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)

1. The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

Author:
Brett Boudreau
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
On November 2, 2020, the Ottawa Citizen ran the front-page headline “Canadian Military Wants to Establish New Organization to Use Propaganda and Other Techniques to Influence Canadians.” This seemed an unbelievable story, and one initially denied by a spokesperson for the minister of National Defence. Just three days later, though, then-chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Jonathan Vance shuttered the group in question, terminating an initiative more than five years in the making that called into question the Department of National Defence’s (DND) commitment to objective and appropriate public communication, at a time when truth decay, misinformation and disinformation have gained much traction around the world and in Canada. In June 2021, the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, DND acknowledged to select media that acting CDS Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre and then-deputy minister Jody Thomas had determined the initiative was “incompatible” with government communications policy and the vision, mission and principles of DND Public Affairs. In a surprising self-indictment, the leaders also admitted a lack of “institution-wide strategic level direction and guidance,” to build information-related capabilities that were “governed by appropriate authorities and oversight.” Deliberate influence campaigns by malign state, non-state and increasingly by domestic actors to disturb, disrupt and create disorder in democratic societies have become widespread and commonplace. The volume of vitriol is increasing. This is fast eroding citizen faith, trust and confidence in government and public institutions and may be the greatest contemporary threat liberal democracies face – arresting this trend and then restoring trust, the ultimate challenge. National Defence’s entire program – to be successful on operations; secure sufficient funding; recruit, train and retain; effect culture change; reconstitute the force post-pandemic and procure the equipment needed to contest, confront and defeat adversaries – will largely depend on whether the institution can modernize its approach to strategic communications to manoeuvre more agilely and to better effect in a complex, frenetic and hostile information environment.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Communications, Reform, Propaganda, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

2. Arctic Perils: Emerging Threats in the Arctic Maritime Environment

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
When Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian border in February 2022, the Western world’s perception of great-power conflict changed overnight. Formerly a competitor, Russia had unambiguously transformed itself into an enemy – one sitting perilously close to Canada, on the far side of the Arctic Ocean. The premiers of the three northern territories declared this a “wake-up call”1 while security experts called for Canada to “rethink its entire understanding of Arctic security.”2 Minister of National Defence Anita Anand responded in June 2022, with a pledge to update NORAD systems against that crystallizing threat of Russian missiles and bombers using the North as an avenue of attack. The expanded invasion of Ukraine (from a war Russia began in 2014) certainly brought the conventional threats to Canada through the Arctic into stark relief. These are the hypersonic weapons and advanced capabilities that NORAD has been monitoring and planning to deter or defeat for years, and to which the Canadian and American governments are now paying closer attention.3 What has received less attention in recent years are threats to the Arctic itself, and specifically those in the maritime environment. In his framing of the Arctic security dynamic, Whitney Lackenbauer defines those threats as “those that emanate from outside of the region [which] affect the region itself.”4 This category extends to a wide array of emerging, non-military threats – from state and quasi-state actors to private adventurers and environmental dangers tied to the region’s increasingly busy waterways. While the dramatic new (or renewed) state-based military threats – like submarines, bombers and cruise missiles – have made headlines, it is the threats to those quasi-state-based fishery operations, surveillance and dual-use marine scientific research expeditions that will probably develop into persistent challenges requiring constant attention and regular management. These threats are often more opaque and harder to define, sometimes difficult to tie directly to an adversary government, yet still indirectly linked to state actors with malign intent. This is not to say that the emerging military threats from Russia, and even China, in the Arctic can be ignored, but rather that these should be considered continental or even global challenges, rather than Arctic-specific dangers requiring a greater military presence and response capability in the region.5 The nature of the emerging military threats points to a growing need for surveillance and detection and, when necessary, interdiction by assets based further south. Responding to real or perceived adversarial threats with a greater allied combat capability in the Arctic itself would represent an overinvestment and misunderstanding of these emerging threats. While the emerging security dynamic demands new platforms and capabilities, these will be most effective when geared to the constabulary end of the defence spectrum. Deterrence and defence will also mean more than new ships and technologies; it will require a consistent presence, improved situational awareness and the ability to scale our national and international response to a wide range of both obvious and nebulous threats. This paper is an overview of that evolving threat environment and how Canada might respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Maritime, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and Arctic

3. The Quantum Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada

Author:
Eric Miller
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
he world is on the cusp of a revolution in quantum technologies. Countries and private investors around the world are deploying hundreds of millions of dollars to advance research and develop quantum technologies for defence and commercial applications. This interest is driven by what quantum technologies can do relative to their “classical” counterparts. Quantum technologies function by harnessing the key characteristics of the theory of quantum mechanics, including superposition, entanglement and uncertainty. The resulting technologies are expected to be diverse and far reaching. For example, quantum computers are expected to overcome most “public key encryption” systems, presaging a radical change in cybersecurity. Given its aptitude for navigating complexity, quantum tools are expected to shave years off the time to market for medicines. Secure, efficient communications among drones and other autonomous vehicles will underpin safety and operational effectiveness in the crowded skies of the future. Of course, these nearer terms examples will be joined by applications barely yet imagined as the technology matures.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Quantum Computers, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Canada and Global Focus

4. Financing Capital Assets: The Missing Link in Defence Procurement

Author:
Vern Kakoschke
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Defence procurement in Canada has had some well-known challenges in recent years. Many commentators have suggested possible strategies for fixing the defence procurement system. The identified problems include overspending on defence programs, unnecessary and undue delays in re-equipping Canada’s fleet of aircraft, ships and ground transport, and defence budgets that remain unspent. The problems also include procuring authorities experiencing a shortfall in manpower and expertise, the inability to execute on defence procurements, unjustified sole-sourcing without a proper competition, political interference in selection issues, and the list goes on. The proposed solutions often address process-related matters: establish a single agency responsible for defence procurement or perhaps a cabinet secretariat to manage the involvement of three of four government departments who are often not on the same page. To date, not much has been written or discussed in public policy forums on a critical question: How should the necessary capital assets be financed? At one extreme, Canada could simply write a cheque and pay for them up front, thereby placing the assets on Canada’s balance sheet. At the other extreme, Canada could drop the financing obligation into the laps of private-sector bidders and let them worry about the most efficient way of raising the necessary capital. A middle-ground solution could involve a public-private partnership (P3) structure, a model which seeks to balance the interests of the public and private sectors in a manner that leads to a better solution for all parties. Any public policy discussion often begins with first principles. What is the government’s policy objective? It is to procure the best available equipment, with the most benefit to the Canadian economy or local interest groups and at the lowest possible cost. All three goals must be balanced in a manner that is politically acceptable, meets budget constraints and withstands public scrutiny. In major procurements, capital can be the largest single cost of a defence procurement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Armed Forces, Finance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

5. Knocking NATO: Strategic and institutional challenges risk the future of Europe’s seven-decade cold peace

Author:
Anessa L. Kimball
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Despite providing European stability through collective defence and crisis management in an exclusive club, NATO faces persistent challenges from strategic insecurities complicated by recent institutional uncertainties. The club’s structure permits several goods-producing schemes, depending on how individual contributions combine, the qualities associated with a good’s publicness (i.e., its possible substitutes or how it excludes benefits from non-members) and partner differences in capacity and willingness. NATO faces challenges from Russia ranging from cybersecurity and media manipulation to overt and covert military pressures. Recent deployments sink costs and tie hands, reassuring commitment credibility, and are essential given the uncertainty generated from U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous commitment to Article 5, compounded with the effects of Brexit on alliance politics and burden-sharing. Given the conjunction of strategic insecurities and institutional uncertainties, it is convenient to knock NATO, but rational institutionalist theory (RIT) is optimistic. RIT argues that the club’s design permits strategic adaptation to new contexts and insecurities, but partners must signal commitment credibly to prevent uncertainties about cohesion. RIT favoured enlargement to shift burdens, and data confirm that the Americans, British and Germans shifted burdens to others, including Canada. Moreover, any alternative to NATO is costly for less-endowed partners facing direct defence pressures. Canada’s role as a broker of compromise and its willingness to make its commitments credible places it in future missions, regardless. Canadian leadership in reassuring and socializing new partners in Operation Reassurance offers an opportunity to retain its objective and subjective position as a key partner.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, and North America

6. Complex Strategic Coercion and Russian Military Modernization

Author:
Julian Lindley-French
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The purpose of this short briefing paper is to consider the capability and utility of contemporary Russian forces in relation to President Vladimir Putin’s strategic goals. Specifically, this paper examines the critical role played by Russia’s “New Look” military force in the realization of Moscow’s political goals via complex strategic coercion. Complex strategic coercion is the use of all national means and beyond by a “securitized” state such as Russia to systematically undermine the command authority, as well as the political and social cohesion of adversary states and institutions. This end is achieved by creating and exploiting divisions within diverse societies, interfering in national political processes and exacerbating tensions between democracies. Complex strategic coercion is underpinned by the threat of overwhelming conventional military power against weaker states at a time and place of the aggressor’s choosing. This type of coercion is allied to the implicit threat of nuclear and other means of mass destruction to confirm the changed facts on the ground by preventing strategic peer competitors from mounting a successful rescue campaign. Western strategists increasingly confuse strategy, capability and technology, thus undermining deterrence and defence efforts. Russian Chief of the General Staff Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov has been pioneering precisely the fusion of the three elements of warfare for a decade. The modernization of Russia’s armed forces must thus be seen in the context of a new form of complex strategic coercion that employs systematic pressure across 5Ds: disinformation, destabilization, disruption, deception and implied destruction. Russia’s strategic goal is to conduct a continuous low-level war at the seams of democratic societies, and on the margins of both the EU and NATO, to create implicit spheres of influence where little or no such influence would otherwise exist. In the worst case, complex strategic coercion would be used to mask Russian force concentrations prior to any attack on NATO and EU states from above the Arctic Circle and Norway’s North Cape in the north, through the Baltic States and Black Sea region and into the southeastern Mediterranean. The strategy’s enduring method is to use the implicit threat of force to keep the Western allies permanently off-balance, strategically, politically and militarily, and thus to offset any innate advantages afforded Western leaders by either their forces or resources. If the Alliance concept of deterrence and defence is to remain credible, an entirely new and innovative concept of protection and projection must be considered as a matter of urgency.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Russia and Canada

7. Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints

Author:
Jeff Collins
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Substantive defence issues rarely make national political campaign platforms. However, in the 2019 federal election, reforming the defence procurement bureaucracy to overcome delays became a highlight for not one but two of the country’s main political parties. To “ensure that priority projects are progressing on time and on budget”, the Conservatives called for the creation of a defence procurement secretariat within the Privy Council Office, akin to a model used by the Robert Borden government in the First World War. The winning Liberal party went further and promised to create a separate defence procurement agency, called Defence Procurement Canada (DPC). As of this writing, details remain sparse, but as with the Conservatives, the ostensible purpose of such a reform is to ensure that “Canada’s biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency …” Considering that the government’s own defence white paper, 2017’s Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) found that 70 per cent of all defence procurement projects were not delivered on time, the existing bureaucratic process warrants a serious look. In fact, a substantial shake-up of the Canadian defence procurement bureaucracy has not taken place since the last separate procurement organization, the Department of Defence Production (DDP), was abolished in 1969. Arguments for altering the bureaucratic architecture of Canadian defence procurement have ebbed and flowed since the mid-2000s, when the first of successive governments began acquisition plans for replacing decades-old fleets of equipment, including CF-18 jets, Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. With much publicized delays in these and other major Crown projects (MCPs), reform advocates have drawn attention to Canada’s multi-departmental procurement process as a source of frustration. Unique among allies, Canada relies principally upon three departments – National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) – for acquiring MCPs. Other countries typically rely on one of three approaches to acquiring material for their armed forces: procurement by individual armed services (United States); centralized government organizations (United Kingdom) or independent civilian corporations (Sweden). Although it is not clear whether the Liberal proposal is a new department (akin to the DDP), a Crown corporation or an agency under the DND’s auspices, any restructuring of the defence procurement system will not be easy. No matter what shape it takes, any new organization must deal with rearranging a complex set of institutional realities based on decades’ worth of statutes, policy frameworks and human resources allocations. Political realties still apply, too. Any new organization must contend with Canadian procurement politics, including the impact of new governments, differing priorities, regionalism and purchasing patterns.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Politics, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

8. Funding Defence for the Age of Accelerations

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
At a time when even large, high-tech Silicon Valley corporations that operate as market disruptors are challenged to keep up with the pace of change, national Western governments need to ensure that defence funding is responsive to persistent, dramatic and non-linear shifts in the international strategic environment. The United States is experiencing a “deepening crisis of credibility in global affairs”,2 largely resulting from an America-first posture, rather than a multilateral approach with traditional allies. Some nations now view the U.S. as “undermining the international order”,3 and reliance on the U.S. as the leading democratic nation is less certain. Indeed, periods of great economic change “driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact on social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states”,4 create a dynamic that shifts power, influence and trade among nations. Further, nations that can “develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively”5 can gain a comparative advantage in the current security environment, where the rate of technological change is accelerating. However, with adversaries advancing their military technology in increasingly shorter cycles, market dominance by Western defence firms has only fleeting or transitory advantage. The revolution in military technology has been a constant topic for analysts, but the changing military and defence department skill sets required in the future security environment are equally important, with the cyber-realm and space being two prominent examples.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

9. Beyond NORAD and Modernization to North American Defence Evolution

Author:
Andrea Charron and James Fergusson
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
While most attention on NORAD and North American defence cooperation is focused on the modernization of the North Warning System (NWS), significant developments have occurred that suggest modernization will be accompanied by significant evolutionary changes to the Command. The new threat environment, centered upon Russian behaviour in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria, a new Russian strategic doctrine, and a new generation of advanced Russian long-range cruise missiles dictate not only layered, multi-sensor early warning system, but also changes in NORAD command arrangements. In addition, the maritime component of the cruise missile threat, alongside continuing concerns of terrorists employing freighters as cruise missile platforms, raise the question whether NORAD should evolve into a binational air-maritime defence command. These considerations are central to the ongoing Evolution of North American Defence (EVONAD) study, emanating from the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, under the lead of NORAD, in collaboration with the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and US Northern Command (the tri-command structure). The final result is difficult to predict. However, it is clear that both modernization and evolution will be driven by the militaries engaged, with civilian authorities guiding the process, and the public and Canadian government not paying attention.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
Canada

10. The Future of Foreign Military Training

Author:
Mike Jeffery
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the nature of foreign military training, Canada’s history in the provision of military training assistance, including its training mission in Afghanistan, evaluates the success of these commitments and assesses the future of such missions. It concludes that, as a professional force, the Canadian Forces has excelled at providing foreign military training. However, the effectiveness of such assistance is limited by the nation’s lack of a strategic focus and the consequent short term provision of training. The process of developing a professional military capable of defending the nation and supporting the government is a long one, and only through consistent and trusted mentoring can nations like Canada expect to achieve the influence essential for success. The paper suggests that foreign military training is a very effective diplomatic tool and should form a key component of Canada’s long term focus for international development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Governance, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

11. The Future of Drones in Canada: Perspectives from a Former RCAF Fighter Pilot

Author:
DF Holman
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
What are the prospects for implementation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the Canadian military? Holman explores many aspects of how UAVs operate, their strengths and shortcomings. Examining them in the context of the overall systems that enable their capabilities, he looks at communications vulnerabilities, degrees of automation and autonomy, categories of UAV, rotary versus fixed wing applications, legal and airspace management constraints, and the potential roles in which UAVs might offer an immediate advantage. He concludes that surveillance is a very likely application, particularly in Canada’s far north. He is less sanguine about armed UAV roles, particularly when it comes to air combat. Improved reliability, a matured regulatory framework, and a more stable customer base are the critical elements for future system development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

12. North Korea, Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada-US Defence Cooperation

Author:
Frank Harvey
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In December 2012, North Korea launched the Unha-3 rocket – a three-stage, intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of 10,000 kilometres. When combined with North Korea’s latest underground nuclear test in January, these moves represent a concerted effort by the regime to develop and deploy an offensive nuclear capability. When acquired, a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile will provide Pyongyang with a credible deterrent that will seriously diminish our coercive leverage in subsequent military security crises involving North and South Korea. The imperative on the part of the international community to move forward with research, development and deployment of ballistic missile defences (BMD) is becoming more pressing each year. In November 2010, 28 NATO members signed NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The most relevant part of the alliance’s new strategy is the commitment by all NATO members to: “Develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence.” As a NATO member, Canada now officially endorses the logic, strategic utility and security benefits of ballistic missile defence, but, apparently, only in terms of protecting European and American territory and populations. The most perplexing aspect of Canada’s policy is the ongoing refusal to engage in bilateral discussions with our most important NATO ally to negotiate BMD architecture to protect Canadian territory and populations. Canadian officials have the luxury to sit back and let allies protect our territory, but this is a foreign policy strategy that has reached the point of taking free-riding to a new and somewhat disturbing level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Missile Defense, and Ballistic Missile
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

13. Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada?

Author:
J. L. Granatstein
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the most successful military alliance of the modern era. Set up in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union, NATO won the Cold War some four decades later without firing a shot. Perhaps it might have been better if NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead sought a new role and found it out of area. It conducted operations in Former Yugoslavia, war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later still an air campaign that brought down Gaddafi in Libya. None of these operations were notable successes. In 2011, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that NATO faced “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future....The military capabilities simply aren’t there." The transatlantic alliance, Gates said, must confront fundamental strategic questions about its future. All this makes a hard look at NATO essential. The European nations can readily handle the defence of their territory, and it is time to ask if NATO is the best way for us to contribute to Western defence, to ask which nations can and will act to protect democratic values? The "Anglosphere" states all fought in Afghanistan. So too did France and Denmark. And in Asia, there are other friendly states. There is no talk of a military alliance yet but there is the possibility of coalitions of the willing. Instead of pledging fealty to NATO's hollow shell, it is time for Canadians to produce a strategy for the next twenty years. Any such review will give primacy to Canada’s alliance with the United States. But one question must be asked and answered: does NATO any longer serve our political and military needs?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

14. How Should Canada's Parliament Decide Military Deployments? Lessons from the United Kingdom

Author:
Philippe Lagassé
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Since 2006, Canada’s House of Commons has been asked to vote on military deployments. These votes have allowed Members of Parliament to express their views on the operations of the Canadian Forces, while serving to democratize the executive ’ s power to send armed forces overseas. However, this practice of consulting the Commons does not impose any binding legal or political constraints on the executive ’ s prerogative to deploy the military. The legal and constitutional authority to send forces abroad still rests with the prime minister and Cabinet. The practice of consulting MPs when deploying the military remains a courtesy, rather than an obligation. In contrast, the British House of Commons has been granted politica l control of the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative through a constitutional convention. The effect of this convention was recently shown in the vote involving British military strikes against Syria. Unlike in Canada, the British government is pol itically bound to consult and adhere to the views of MPs before considering military deployments overseas. This paper examines whether Canada should follow the British example, granting member s of Parliament control over the executive ’ s power to deploy the armed forces by means of a constitutional convention. It concludes that Canada ’ s existing practice has many advantages, and that Canadian parliamentarians should be mindful of the risks and costs involved in adopting a constitutional convention to control the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Parliament, and Military
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, and North America

15. Homegrown Jihadists and the Evolution of al-Qaeda

Author:
Barry Cooper
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Accurate assessments of the threat posed by al-Qaeda to Western interests and government have been hampered by imprecise language and an absence of historical memory. Arguably the organization is over thirty years old. Unquestionably the franchises and self-described affiliates of al-Qaeda bear little resemblance to the elite terrorist organization that attacked the United States on 11 September, 2001. This paper describes the evolution of al-Qaeda from being a source of assistance to mujahedeen fighting the Red Army in Afghanistan to the armed insurgents operating today in Africa and the Greater Middle East, on the one hand, and the homegrown, often self-recruited and largely incompetent “jihadists” who are more a nuisance to western police forces than they are a serious military threat. This change in the effectiveness and operational capability of al-Qaeda does not mean that it will disappear, not least of all because the members of that organization think of themselves as fighting an endless war. It does mean that we ought to have a realistic understanding of the reduced nature of the threat that al-Qaeda can make to our interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Eurasia

16. Exigencies of Future Deployments: What Canada must Exact from its Military Partners

Author:
Hugh Segal and Jessica McLean
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
An increase in global threats, failing states, and crisis prone regions around the world, coupled with shrinking defence budgets in the US, as well as budget cuts in Canada’s most loyal joint deployment partners – France, the UK, and The Netherlands – indicates there will be no less of a demand for Canadian deployable capacity over the next few years. In this context, understanding the ‘political’ requirements for various kinds of deployments is important and a key planning area for defence policy makers as well as military and strategic practitioners. To better understand the future of Canadian military deployments it is first necessary to examine the historical context of our post-war NATO and UN deployments as well as Prime Minister Harper’s 2006 commitment that required all significant military deployments to have parliamentary approval. Each deployment since WW II has been unique. The command structures, intelligence-sharing, mission design and assigned areas of responsibility for Canada, whether under the UN or NATO, have varied by the deployment itself and the nature of the mission. This requires our political and command requirements to adapt to the mission at hand. But whether or not Canada will participate in future deployments relies on not just being able to answer the question of “why”, but also “why us”. Reticence on the part of NATO allies will continue to be a problem in the future and so Canada must be capable to ensure it only takes part in “coalition of the willing” deployments to ensure realistic burden sharing. The pivot towards the Pacific will also require fresh and deeper intelligence cooperation with Australia, other Commonwealth partners in the region and enhanced interoperable capacity with our American allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Troop Deployment, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

17. Canadian Defence Commitments: Overview and Status of Selected Acquistions and Initatives

Author:
Elinor Sloan
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
For years, successive Canadian governments have been overpromising and under-delivering on defence procurement. Timetables have slipped even as repair and maintenance costs for aging equipment have soared, while elaborate rules have obscured the acquisition process in a bureaucratic fog. This paper assembles information from a wide range of official sources and cuts through the confusion. It surveys 15 Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives, each anticipated to cost more than $100 million, to account for the delays. Final replacements for the ancient Sea King helicopters are no closer to arriving — after almost 30 years — because the DND failed to recognize that it asked for technology that is still in development. The Joint Support Ship project is years behind schedule because, as originally conceived, it sought to integrate so many capabilities that it was unbuildable. The Integrated Soldier System Project is almost as far behind because Ottawa’s procurement rules are so complex and niggling that no bidder could fulfill every single one. Canada faces evolving threats, but efforts to equip the Canadian Forces to meet them have been marked by a long litany of failures — failures of communication, of organization and of vision. This paper sets out the military procurement process, and concisely explains the most egregious flaws, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Canada’s military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Procurement, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

18. Defence After the Recession

Author:
David Perry
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
With unfortunate timing, the Harper government released a well-intended plan pledging “predictable, long-term funding”1 for the Department of National Defence (DND), mere months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers signalled the onset of a global recession. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) built on the defence budgetary renaissance begun under Paul Martin’s tenure as Prime Minister and promised the Canadian Forces the resources to project leadership abroad over the next twenty years. Economic circumstances quickly intervened, however, and in 2011 the government launched a Strategic and Operating Review (SOR) to reign in government programs. As a result, defence spending has peaked in 2011/2012 and will decline for the next three years. For DND, this fiscal retrenchment presents a significant problem. Although defence funding increased 54 percent nominally between 2003/2004 and 2010/2011, the CFDS was never adequately funded. While its capital investment plan was long rumored to be insufficient, the Report on Transformation 2011, led by Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, acknowledged this openly.2 As a result, DND faces a perfect fiscal storm as its already inadequate funding is battered by deficit fighting measures and the results of the departmental Strategic Review announced in Budget 2011, which both take effect April 1, 2012.3 This combination of factors means the CFDS is likely no longer viable, at least in its original twenty year timeframe. Although a lack of detail makes the full impact of Budgets 2011 and 2012 difficult to discern, enough information is available to provide a preliminary assessment of the probable impact on the Canadian military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Budget, Military, and Recession
Political Geography:
Canada and North America