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Begin New Search Political Geography Iran Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 3 Years

31. A Stabilizing Factor: Oman’s Quiet Influence amid Mounting Uncertainty in the Gulf

Author:
Jeonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Based on its sound reputation as a conflict mediator and talks facilitator, Oman is well-positioned to tone down flaring rivalries in the Gulf and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control. After a timid thawing of tensions, the Gulf region is witnessing a renewed phase of uncertainty. Despite being a skillful master at navigating turbulent waters, Oman is eyeing the revamping of tensions in its immediate neighborhood with growing apprehension. The failed attempts to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the revamping of Iran’s outward-looking incendiary rhetoric as well as localized military retaliations amid recent mass protests, and the failure to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire in Yemen do not bode well for the region’s precarious stability. Muscat has a vested interest in preventing at-sea incidents from escalating and harsh infighting among rival Yemeni factions from reaching alarming proportions, especially given its coasts looking out on the Strait of Hormuz and much of its southwestern frontier bordering Yemen.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Oman, and Gulf Nations

32. Components of Industry Resilience to Maintain Sustainable Economic Growth under COVID-19 Within the Knowledge-Based Economy Frame-work: A Comparative Study Between Iran and South Korea

Author:
Marzieh Asaadi
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
COVID-19 was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and spread rapidly across the globe. Then on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, causing more than 600 million confirmed cases and 6.49 million deaths around the world so far. The effects of the pandemic on societies can be examined mainly by two criteria: 1) the number of lives lost due to the disease (Mortality Rate), and 2) the number of jobs lost due to social distancing rules (fall in GDP). Both have a wide consequence for economic growth and other key macroeconomic indicators. An important explanatory factor for the significant difference between Case Fatality Rate (CFR) for Iran and Korea can be related to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) components (Daliri and Asaadi 2021). The WGI is a composite index consisting of six measurement factors, including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Furthermore, another critical factor is COVID-19 governance which can be monitored by calculating Government Stringency Index. This index is a composite measure based on several indicators which monitor the state of lockdowns and social distancing and range to values between 0-100, while 100 presents the most restrictive. In addition to the governance of COVID-19, from the perspective of public health and lives saved, maintaining jobs and supporting the resilience of industries to achieve SEG has been another important concern for nations and governments worldwide. As stated by Bernanke (2020), it is widely believed that the global economic crisis caused by COVID-19 is different from past crises in terms of cause, scope, and severity that suddenly disrupted economic activity. These necessitate research on the potential determination factors influencing the response of countries, companies, and individuals to the COVID-19 crisis. The key to ensure Business Continuity and SEG is to identify factors that increase the resilience of businesses under COVID-19 circumstances and other potential public health crises. Theoretical and empirical studies confirm that three main explanatory factors are at play: 1) macroeconomic structure and governance, 2) financial resilience of companies which is traced by available capital (i.e., the physical and human capital), and firms' adopted strategies and 3) digital evolution state and momentum and the adaptation of countries to technological innovations and Digital Intelligence, which is an indicator of transmission to KBE. By examining these components, it is possible to evaluate the structure and response of countries to the pandemic and post-COVID era. Thus, the report seeks to contribute to the literature on sustainable economic growth under crisis through a comparative study of Iranian industries with South Korea. The main research question here relates to the components of successful covid-19 governance from the perspective of SEG and business continuity within a KBE environment.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Industry, Resilience, COVID-19, and Knowledge Economy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

33. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:
Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

34. Additional Losses: Examining the severity of the protests' impact on Iran's economy

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Widespread protests broke out across Iran after the death of Mahsa Amini in a hospital in Tehran in September 2022 while in the custody of the country's morality police. While the current protests differ from previous protests in that protestors demanded women's rights be respected. Later, the protests spread, and the protesters demanded regime change. Yet, the economy's deterioration is one of the main drivers of the spread of the angry protests. As social unrest is likely to further exacerbate across Iran, the protests are likely to incur financial and trade losses, further complicating the economic situation.
Topic:
Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, Inflation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

35. Mutual Aims: Turkish-Iranian targeting of Iraq’s Kurds

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Turkey and Iran, in recent months, have increased their strikes on areas occupied by Kurds in Iraq. The Turkish Air Force, on November 20, announced intense airstrikes, dubbed Operation Claw-Sword, targeting Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Army positions in Northern Syria and against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in Northern Iraq. Iran, at the same time, intensified its missile and drone strikes on locations that belong to Kurdish opposition parties, which Tehran claims to have been supporting the latest demonstrations across the country since September this year. The timing of these strikes raises questions about the intention of both regimes and the timing of their targeting of Kurdish rebels in Iraq.
Topic:
Minorities, Kurds, Strategic Interests, and Military Alignment
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

36. Iran Protests: Limitations of foreign support to protests

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
National Council of Resistance of Iran has said more than 400 Iranians have been killed and over 20,000 arrested since the breakout of nation-wide protests in Iran. Popular unrests and violence have been sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, three days after she was being detained by ‘morality police’ for claims of violating hijab laws.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Protests, Foreign Interference, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

37. Stalling: Analysing Iran’s written response to EU nuclear deal draft

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
EU’s high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, said on August 15 that both the EU and US were studying Iran’s written response and hoping to restore the tattered nuclear deal. There was no timeline given on when the world powers would respond, but Iran’s official media said Tehran expected a reply in two days.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

38. Holding the Hard-line: What is behind Iran’s seizure of Greek ships in Arabian Gulf?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On May 27, Iran seized two Greek tankers, named “Prudent Warrior” and “Delta Poseidon”, in the Arabian Gulf. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) descended on the tankers and ordered them to sail to Bandar Abbas port. Onboard the tankers were 49 crew members. Greece described the operation as ‘piracy’. The seizure seems to be a reprisal for Greece’s role earlier in the month assisting the US impounding a Russian-flagged tanker transporting Iranian oil and carrying 19 crew.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Maritime, and Shipping
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

39. Targeting Financial Entities outside Iran to Counter Tehran’s Economic Strategy

Author:
Yair Albeck
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Tehran is stringing out the nuclear negotiations endlessly with the expectation that President Joe Biden will not admit that the talks have failed. After such an admission, the public would likely pressure the administration to stop offering Iran stealth economic relief through the lax enforcement of sanctions. Rigorous enforcement would, the White House fears, remove Iranian oil from the market and contribute to the global energy crisis that Russia’s war against Ukraine sparked. Meanwhile, Iran is benefitting doubly—strategically and economically—from the war, selling missiles and drones to Russia and oil to China. Given this advantageous situation, Tehran wants negotiations to continue. Can the United States escape from this conundrum? In fact, it can impose severe economic costs on Tehran without removing oil from the market.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Democracy, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

40. Iran’s Resistance Axis Rattled by Divisions: Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s Leader Rejects the Ceasefire in Iraq

Author:
Jacob Lees Weiss
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 20, 2020, 21 Katyusha rockets struck the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, breaking an Iranian-sponsored ceasefire in Iraq for a second time (U.S. Central Command, December 23, 2020). The Iraqi security forces later arrested a member of the Iraqi political and militant organization Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Hussam al-Azirjawi, after finding conclusive evidence of his involvement in the attack (al-Hurra, December 26, 2020). Following al-Azirjawi’s arrest, multiple widely-shared clips on social media appeared to show a large mobilization of armed AAH militants in East Baghdad. A further clip showing masked AAH gunmen threatening to attack Iraqi security forces on command from AAH leader, Qais al-Khazali (al-Arabiya, December 25 2020). These arrests and video clips reveal that AAH has begun to show increasing signs of dissent from the party line set by Iran and its most loyal proxy in Iraq, Kata’ib Hezbollah.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Militias, and Resistance
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East