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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography Iran Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years

1. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

3. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

4. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

5. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:
Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

8. Snapback Sanctions on Iran: More Bark Than Bite?

Author:
Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Threatening to reimpose old UN sanctions would likely have little practical effect on Tehran’s ability to trade oil and export drones, while the plethora of other potential complications suggest that it should be treated as a tool of last resort. In recent weeks, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have argued that Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the backbone of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These allegations, combined with ongoing diplomatic deadlock over reviving that 2015 nuclear agreement, have led some to suggest pursuing “snapback,” a provision that would reimpose terminated UN resolutions on Iran and essentially scrub the JCPOA from the books. How would snapback work, and what political, economic, and security consequences would it have?
Topic:
Security, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

9. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

10. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

11. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

12. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

13. Pugwash Note on the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle Eastern Security

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
This is a very short note addressing the issue of the Iran nuclear agreement and pointing out some key issues that are relevant to enhancing Middle Eastern security.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

14. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:
Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

15. Assessing the JCPOA from a Historical Perspective

Author:
Christian Koch, Marc Finaud, and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue analyses the 2004-2006 initiative to establish a sub-regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf (GWMDFZ) as a tool to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state. The initiative’s gradual approach which aimed at the ultimate goal of encompassing the entire Middle East (including Israel) was innovative, and the assertive role of some smaller Gulf states in expressing their security concerns/interests and verification standards that Tehran would have had to meet was unprecedented. But the entire sub-regional idea remained confined to the declaratory level. In contrast, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or greement/accord) – endangered as it currently is – struck between the E3/EU+3 and Iran exceeds some of the concerns of the earlier initiative, yet misses others. We conclude that new – and ultimately sustainable – regional forums as communication mechanisms are needed to tackle these issues without touching on the JCPOA. The challenges go beyond Iran and include the nuclear activities of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and even more so of Saudi Arabia. Our Cooperative Idea emphasises that moving beyond the purely declaratory policy of the GWMDFZ initiative could also help to overcome the current stalemate regarding a zonal disarmament arrangement for the whole Middle East/Gulf region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

16. Towards a Missile-Free Zone for the Middle East – Moving Beyond the Nuclear Dimension of the JCPOA

Author:
Marc Finaud and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The highly controversial missile problem in the Middle East should – and can – be constructively tackled by not singling out Iran and by avoiding onesided maximalist and unrealistic demands towards Tehran. The authors aim at providing incentives for Iran to start discussion on its missile arsenal in three ways: they propose (a) applying vital elements that led to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA; (b) regionalising future talks in a triangle that includes from the beginning the missiles of Saudi Arabia and Israel; and (c) starting with modest confidence-building steps among the three major powers. Among the extra-regional players the United States continues to have a special responsibility for engaging in such a cooperative approach.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia

17. Slow Thaw: Testing Possibilities for Cooperation with Iran After a Nuclear Deal

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Jacob Stokes, and Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
With nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States restarting today, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Middle East Security Program Director Ilan Goldenberg, CNAS Bacevich Fellow Jacob Stokes, and CNAS Middle East Program Research Associate Nicholas Heras have produced a new policy brief on potential cooperation with Iran in the wake of a nuclear deal. The authors argue any thawing of the relationship would face tremendous challenges.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

18. Beyond Camp David: A Gradualist Strategy to Upgrade the US-Gulf Security Partnership

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran. While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse. In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Persian Gulf

19. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

20. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Monumental Mistake by the Obama Administration or a New Beginning?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will be scrutinized by diplomats, military experts and politicians for months and years to come. Statesmen and politicians will interpret the deal differently and each will vie to use the argument which suites the audience and the domestic base she/he represents. However, the psychological, economic, political, and military implications of the deal on the United States, Europe and many Middle Eastern countries will be monumental. The deal will impact the balance of power in the Middle East and will change its dynamics forever, change the dynamics of the energy markets in Europe, Thus creating tension between Russia and Europe, and will ignite a fierce security debate between Democrats and Republicans in the United States on the culture of regime change and the use of force. The deal will bring the subject of regime change to the political forefront in the US and will raise a serious question on whether the use of force is the only effective mechanism to change the behavior of states in order to achieve favorable outcomes. Both Republicans and Democrats used force as a tool for regime change, however the Obama administration is a advocating for new means: diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Regime Change, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany

21. Mitigating the Security Risks Posed by a Near-Nuclear Iran

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
US President Barack Obama has called the international dispute over Iran's advanced nuclear program "one of the leading security challenges of our time." Fitting for a problem of this magnitude, analysts have thoroughly examined the major policy options for addressing the challenge, including most notably, diplomacy, containment, and military strikes. Lost in this focus on the broad policy options to prevent or deal with a nuclear-armed Iran, however, is the acknowledgement that Iran already possesses a latent nuclear weapons capability and that this capability poses several threats to international peace and security at present. Moreover, it is almost certain that Iran will retain such a capability in the short to medium term regardless of how the nuclear diplomacy progresses-and even if the international community and Iran agree to a "comprehensive" nuclear deal. Rather than an exclusive focus on broad strategies for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, therefore, it would also be prudent to identify and mitigate against the challenges posed by Iran's extant latent nuclear capability, a capability that will likely remain in place even if Washington's policy of prevention is successful.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Iran

22. Background on the 'Possible Military Dimensions' of Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Nima Gerami
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iran's compartmented nuclear program and fears of sabotage have complicated efforts to address IAEA concerns about the program's suspected military side.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

23. Easing US and EU Sanctions on Iran

Author:
Kenneth Katzman
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Since the seizure of US hostages in Iran following the 1979 revolution, the US government has imposed a succession of economic penalties against the Islamic Republic. The complexity and severity of these sanctions intensified following Iran's resumption of a uranium enrichment program in 2006. However, there are a variety of ways to provide extensive sanctions relief should there be a deal placing long-term restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

24. Iran and the P5+1: Getting to "Yes"

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
That nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, U.S. and Germany) were extended beyond the 20 July 2014 deadline was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. The parties ha d made enough headway to justify the extension, which was envisioned in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that was signed in November 2013 and came into force in January, but given the political and technical complexity, they remain far apart on fundamental issues. Unless they learn the lessons of the last six months and change their approach for the next four, they will lose the opportunity for a resolution not just by the new 24 November deadline but for the foreseeable future. Both sides need to retreat from maximalist positions, particularly on Iran's enrichment program. Tehran should postpone plans for industrial- scale enrichment and accept greater constraints on the number of its centrifuges in return for P5+1 flexibility on the qualitative growth of its enrichment capacity through research and development.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, and France

25. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

26. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

27. Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The international community has been acutely concerned for many years about Iran's increasing capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. With sufficient fissile material and a warhead design, Iran could use its existing ballistic missiles to pose a credible nuclear threat throughout the region. Consequently, after repeatedly directing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, the UN Security Council decided in 2010 that Iran also had to halt all activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now that serious negotiations are under way to curtail Iran's ability to dash for a bomb, seeking ballistic missile limits as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would be unwise. Getting adequate and verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program remains the highest priority. The best way to address Iran's potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent. To also demand severe limits on conventional weapons that Iran regards as vital to its self-defense would jeopardize the negotiations' key objective.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

28. Making the Case: Stopping Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Aki Peritz
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The U.S. is currently leading a multinational effort to squeeze Iran and force them to give up its weapons program. Here's how to make the case for that approach and why it makes sense: A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Sanctions are working—they are wrecking the Iranian economy—but they need more time to have their full impact. We can blunt Iran's capabilities by strengthening our allies' missile defense systems. Military strikes now could exacerbate the problem, but all options must remain on the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and North America

29. States Will Not Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

Author:
Daryl Press and Keir A. Lieber
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Nuclear terrorism is often described as the single biggest threat to U.S. national security. The fear is that a hostile state could surreptitiously transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a like-minded terror group, thus orchestrating a devastating attack on the United States or its allies while remaining anonymous and avoiding retaliation. This fear served as a key justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it helps drive current arguments in favor of a military strike against Iran's nuclear program.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Iran

30. Great Expectations: Iran's New President and the Nuclear Talks

Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In a region that recently has produced virtually nothing but bad news, Hassan Rouhani's 4 August swearing in as Iran's president offers a rare and welcome glimmer of hope. There are still far more questions than answers: about the extent of his authority; his views on his country's nuclear program, with which he long has been associated; and the West's ability to display requisite flexibility and patience. But, although both sides can be expected to show caution, now is the time to put more ambitious proposals on the table, complement the multilateral talks with a bilateral U.S.-Iranian channel and expand the dialogue to encompass regional security issues.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Democratization, Diplomacy, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

31. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs as P5+1 Talks Resume

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiations are poised to resume between Iran and the six powers seeking to rein in Iran's nuclear program, it is difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. For years now, the UN Security Council has demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran continues to expand its nuclear program and insists it will never compromise its right to enrich, the United States continues to tighten sanctions on Iranian trade and finances, and alarms are raised about Iran being able to sprint to a nuclear bomb with little warning. Yet, with a new Iranian president and negotiating team, there are grounds for cautious optimism that talks this time can be different. Although Iran continues to enrich uranium and add to its nuclear complex, time remains to negotiate an agreement that adequately guards against Iran building nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

32. Iran's Internal Politics: The Supreme Leader Grows Ever Lonelier at the Top

Author:
Barbara Slavin and Yasmin Alem
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
As the nuclear standoff between Iran and much of the rest of the world deepens, Iranian domestic politics are in turmoil. Trying to reduce endemic conflict within the system, the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has succeeded in recent years in expelling discordant voices and closing off institutional loopholes for dissent.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran

33. Turkey and the Iranian nuclear programme: Key to progress in regional disarmament?

Author:
Hanna Ojanen and Barbara Zanchetta
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The increasing tension around the Iranian nuclear programme and the uncompromising positions of the protagonists have made the goal of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East seem utopic. Yet, the current strategy of maintaining a low profile in the discussions on the zone, while keeping the focus exclusively on Iran, is not likely to lead to progress. Instead, combining the Iranian question with the zone and enlarging the content and scope of the negotiations even further by including Iran's neighbours could be a better strategy. Turkey could play a key role because of its unique relations with Iran, and because of its strong quest for a more prominent international position — if it can only strike the right balance between the role of lead actor and team player. Turkish-Iranian relations could notably inspire the consideration of accompanying pragmatic agreements on regional cooperation in other fields as a way forward for the upcoming Middle East disarmament negotiations in Finland.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Finland

34. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Case Study in Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance Management

Author:
Vance Serchuk
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Speaking at Suntory Hall in Tokyo during his inaugural visit to the Asia-Pacific region as President of the United States, Barack Obama in November 2009 affirmed his Administration’s commitment to “an enduring and revitalized alliance between the United States and Japan.” Noting the impending 60th anniversary of the alliance, President Obama pledged to “deepen” the ties between Washington and Tokyo as a cornerstone of a broader strategy of reengagement with the region. At the same time, Obama cast the U.S.-Japan alliance in global terms, noting Japan’s “important contributions to stability around the world—from reconstruction to Iraq, to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, to assistance for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

35. Diplomatic Engagement: The Path to Avoiding War and Resolving the Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Seel
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
U.S.-Iranian relations are bad and getting worse. The New Year has opened with rising tensions between the United States and Iran and an increased prospect of war—either intentional or accidental. The Nov. 2011 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency details why the international community remains deeply concerned about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. While sanctions and other measures have slowed down Iran’s movement toward acquiring a nuclear weapons option, Tehran continues to improve its nuclear capabilities and has so far refused to implement the confidence-building steps necessary to ensure it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The latest round of U.S. unilateral sanctions has been met with Iranian threats of closing the Straits of Hormuz through which 35% of the world’s seaborne oil passes. Iran reinforced those threats with ten days of military exercises in nearby waters that included launches of anti-ship missiles. These and other developments highlight how relatively minor incidents could quickly escalate into a major military conflict. At the same time, Iran proposed on December 31 a new round of talks with the P5+1 group of nations, suggesting that that diplomatic options to resolve the nuclear concerns about its nuclear activities have not been exhausted. In the following Iran Nuclear Brief, ACA Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann argues that in order to avoid unintentional conflict with Iran, there is an urgent need to establish better lines of bilateral communication at all levels—between military forces in the region, between diplomats, and between senior officials. Thielmann also explains why pragmatic diplomatic engagement is essential to a successful strategy to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

36. Charting a Diplomatic Path On the Iran Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Peter Grail
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Even as tensions over Iran’s nuclear program rise, the principal parties engaged in the issue say that they seek a peaceful resolution through diplomacy. Earlier this month, Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili reportedly sent a letter to European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton—who represents the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—in response to the six-country offer for the renewal of serious talks on Iran’s nuclear program. With the P5+1 insisting that a diplomatic path to resolve the issue remains open and Tehran’s professed interest in dialogue, the question arises: what steps could the two sides take to resolve the impasse? In her letter to Jalili last October calling for renewed negotiations, Ashton said the process would need to begin with confidence-building measures to facilitate longer-term engagement. Given the current trust deficit and the inability of the fractured Iranian political leadership to agree on whether and how to engage on the nuclear issue, an approach that builds upon short-term arrangements makes sense. But it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement might be. In this respect, Ashton said in her letter that the goal of the six countries is “a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” reaffirming the group’s commitment to proposals it put forward 2006 and 2008. This brief provides an overview of these proposals and related confidence-building steps and discusses how they address the critical issue of Iran’s enrichment program.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Dialogue, and P5+1
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

37. The Breakout Option: Raising the Bar for the Supreme Leader

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The U.S. intelligence community still assesses that Tehran has not yet actually decided to build a nuclear weapon. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would be the one to give that order and the one who would control the weapons. It is therefore worth pondering what steps could discourage him from proceeding down the nuclear weapons path. If Khamenei's foremost goals are the survival of the Islamic Republic with himself as supreme leader, developing nuclear capabilities may be seen an asset, even with the damaging sanctions that result. By positioning himself as a defiant defender of Iranian nuclear progress against foreign bullying, he can reinforce the domestic legitimacy of the clerical regime. If he came to believe that Iran could forestall continuing economic punishment and eventual military attack only by abject capitulation, he might decide that breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to build a bomb would be the preferred path for restoring Iran's international position and securing the Islamic revolution. The challenge for the United States is to devise policies that would make it as difficult as possible for Khamenei to retain domestic support and international sympathy if he were to go for a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

38. Iran Nuclear Negotiations: What's Next After Moscow?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
On June 19, Iran concluded the third round of talks on its nuclear program in as many months, this time in Moscow, with senior officials of the six powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Although there were strong incentives for the six to secure limits on Iran's most worrisome stockpiles of enriched uranium and for Iran to avoid an impending tightening of economic sanction, no breakthrough was achieved by the end of the latest round. But neither did diplomatic dialogue come to an end. The sides reached agreement to meet again at a technical level within two weeks in Istanbul, to be followed by renewed contact between the senior negotiators. With perseverance from the parties, the ongoing talks can mark the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end of chances for ultimate resolution.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

39. Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor. What many now consider a proliferation loophole in the NPT was first seen as theoretical because only nuclear weapons states had nuclear-powered submarines when the treaty was negotiated. Now, as more and more countries initiate or announce intentions to initiate nuclear-powered submarine programs, this excuse for enriching uranium to levels beyond the needs of civilian power reactors intensifies the challenge of achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States should adjust its policy by: 1) choosing a reactor for the Ohio-class SSBN follow-on that does not require weapons-grade fuel and 2) pushing for multilateral action to close or at least narrow the NPT loophole that allows for non-nuclear weapons states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Submarines, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

40. Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The broadest and toughest sanctions regime imposed on any country except Libya has not convinced Iran's leaders to abandon a program that appears aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Instead of seeking even more crippling economic penalties—such as an oil embargo—that would fracture the international consensus on Iran, the United States should tighten implementation of measures already in force and enact more sanctions linked to human rights, which have a wide constituency in Europe and demonstrate to the Iranian people that international concerns extend beyond nuclear weapons. The U.S. should also work with its diplomatic partners to craft new proposals that would couple acceptance of limited uranium enrichment with rigorous international monitoring, and encourage China, Iran's major trading partner, to use its leverage in support of nonproliferation.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Iran

41. How Reliable is Intelligence on Iran's Nuclear Program?

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For a country that has been accumulating nuclear know-how since the Eisenhower administration, Iran has hardly been sprinting toward a bomb. Indeed, repeated prognostications that Tehran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear power have a Chicken Little quality: The sky did not fall over the past decade, and it seems unlikely to do so for the next year or two or three. Still, Iran has made steady progress accumulating the elements and expertise required to make nuclear weapons, and it would be naive and irresponsible to discount what appears to be a cottage industry of piecemeal proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

42. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sanctions and China's growing economic clout have altered Iran's trading patterns in ways that are reducing Iran's access to hard currency but may also be insulating the Iranian government and political elite from further US unilateral pressures.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

43. Assessing Iran's Nuclear Program Without Exaggeration or Complacency

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Shortly after the early September release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on Iran’s nuclear program, the Arms Control Association assembled a panel of top experts to assess the status of Iran’s nuclear effort and examine strategies to address it. The September 19 briefing for Congressional staffers was part of an ongoing series of briefings organized by ACA and its partners on “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle.” Along with nuclear terrorism, the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not yet in possession of them is at the forefront of U.S. national security concerns. Iran dominates the field. The following Iran Nuclear Brief by Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, is based on his presentation at the September 19 briefing. It provides a status report on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and an evaluation of their potential as a nuclear weapons threat.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

44. The IAEA’s November Report on Iran: More Confirmation than Revelation

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Loehrke
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program in early November attracted intense media interest and stimulated strong political reactions in the United States and around the world. The IAEA report and its 14-page annex represented a milestone for the Vienna-based agency in terms of its willingness to present detailed information to the public on activities of concern in Iran’s nuclear program. The Arms Control Association provided an in-depth assessment of the IAEA report on November 8, 2011. Yet much of the subsequent press coverage has been inaccurate in its comparison of the IAEA’s latest report with past characterizations of Iran’s nuclear activities – most notably, the public summary of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. The following Iran Nuclear Brief elucidates the similarities and differences in those two documents, incorporating an earlier article by ACA’s senior fellow, Greg Thielmann, and Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, which was published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on November 23, 2011.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

45. Ahmadinezhad's Bomb Rhetoric: Opportunities for U.S. Policy

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 31, according to Iran's semiofficial Mehr News Agency, presidential chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashai claimed that the West had raised no objections to President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's open proclamation that the Islamic Republic could build a nuclear bomb. How should this surprising claim be interpreted? And what implications might it hold for Iran's domestic politics, especially when viewed alongside Ahmadinezhad's history of confrontational rhetoric?
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

46. Internal Divisions among Iranian Hardliners Come to the Fore

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During an August 9 visit to Syria, Ali Akbar Velayati, influential advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Iran is ready to negotiate with the United States regarding its nuclear program. Yesterday, however, Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast announced that Iran has no plans for bilateral negotiation with Washington. These and other conflicting signals point to deep internal divisions among former allies in Iran's hardline camp. Such divisions are part of a longstanding pattern in the Islamic Republic: as soon as one faction seizes power by cutting out its opponents, it splits into warring parties.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Syria

47. Going Critical: Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Reactor Starts Up

Author:
Simon Henderson and Stefanie Peterson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
At a ceremony near the southern Iranian coastal city of Bushehr this Saturday, Russia will begin the process of loading fuel rods into Iran's first civilian nuclear reactor. Theoretically distinct from the rest of the regime's disturbing nuclear program, the Bushehr plant nevertheless remains a major international concern. The low-enriched uranium in the fuel rods would, if diverted, substantially increase Iran's existing stock of the material, which many suspect is already being used to develop nuclear weapons. Even if they were used solely for electricity generation, the rods would eventually produce plutonium-rich residue that could also be reprocessed for use in a weapon. For Iran, the Bushehr event will be a gesture of defiance against U.S.-led international pressure; for Russia, a sign of Moscow's different diplomatic approach to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran; and for the United States, an exception to the tightening sanctions regime, which officials claim is forcing Tehran to reconsider the wisdom of its policies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Moscow

48. President Obama's Cairo Speech: A First-Year Scorecard

Author:
J. Scott Carpenter and Dina Guirguis
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Although likely eclipsed in the media by recent Israeli naval action against blockade runners, the first anniversary of President Obama's much-quoted address in Cairo occurs on June 4. In his remarks, described as a "new beginning," he identified seven issues at the heart of tensions between the United States and the world's 1.2 billion Muslims: the need to confront violent extremism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran's drive to obtain nuclear weapons, democracy, religious freedom, women's rights, and economic development. For each issue, the president indicated where American action was required. On violent extremism, for instance, he highlighted his decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center within the year. Given that two issues -- the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iranian nuclear issue -- have garnered the lion's share of attention over the past year, it is timely and useful to assess progress on the other five.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Israel, and Egypt

49. The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fool's Gold?

Author:
Fred McGoldrick
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is hard to know what is more disturbing — Iran's continued defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions ordering Tehran to cease its uranium enrichment activities and to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or the tour that North Korea recently gave to U.S. scientists of its new uranium enrichment plant. Policymakers fear that these programs will enable these states to produce more fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Arabia

50. The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing

Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The revelation in 2009 of nuclear facilities near Qom intensified international criticism of Iran's opaque nuclear development. As Western countries prepare to pursue tougher sanctions at the UN, China's acquiescence as a permanent Security Council member is vital but will be difficult to obtain. Beijing is reluctant to pursue further sanctions, insisting that a solution to the nuclear impasse must be sought first and foremost through diplomacy. It emphasises that as long as Iran honours its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments not to use nuclear technology for military purposes, it should not be obliged to forgo its rights, including enrichment, under that accord.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
China, Iran, and Beijing

51. New Multilateral Consensus Emerges on Iran

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A February 18 report from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Paris-based organization that sets global standards for combating money laundering and terrorism financing, revealed new details about Iran's ongoing activities in both realms. The same day, a new report from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reached disturbing conclusions about Iran's past nuclear efforts while raising intriguing questions about technical problems the regime may be encountering. As global powers debate a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran, these reports demonstrate growing international consensus on the nature of Iran's illicit conduct.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

52. Analyzing the New UN Sanctions Proposal on Iran

Author:
Patrick Clawson, Jeffrey White, and Michael Singh
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The May 18 draft resolution proposing additional sanctions to curb Iran's nuclear program is backed by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Although this unanimity is the proposal's principal strength, it comes at the cost of making the draft weaker in some sections than ideas discussed previously by the Obama administration. The following is an analysis of some of the resolution's key elements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran and Central Asia

53. Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Developments

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the fluid situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program, perhaps the safest bet is to expect more surprises. Despite the promising draft circulated on May 19, it is not clear how meaningful a sanctions resolution adopted by the UN Security Council will be, even if it is adopted soon. Nor is it clear how vigorously Brazil and Turkey will pursue the trilateral agreement that the two countries reached with Iran on May 16. All the same, important lessons can be drawn from this week's developments.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Central Asia, Turkey, and Brazil

54. The Iranian Opposition, the Nuclear Issue, and the West

Author:
Ray Takeyh and Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the wake of Iran's June 2009 presidential election and the development of an opposition movement, analysts are confronted with two questions: What impact will international diplomacy regarding the nuclear issue have on Iran's domestic politics? And what impact will Iran's domestic politics have on the issues of most concern to the international community? The newly released Washington Institute report Much Traction from Measured Steps offers good, bad, and mixed answers.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Washington, and Middle East

55. The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
There are voices in the Obama Administration who believe that the Kremlin is able and willing to exert pressure on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, perceived geopolitical and economic benefits in the unstable Persian Gulf, in which American influence is on the wane, outweigh Russia's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran. The Kremlin sees Iran not as a threat but as a partner or an ad-hoc ally to challenge U.S. influence. Today, both Russia and Iran favor a strategy of "multipolarity," both in the Middle East and worldwide. This strategy seeks to dilute American power, revise current international financial institutions, and weaken or neuter NATO and the OSCE, while forging a counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Russian technological aid is evident throughout the Iranian missile and space programs. Russian scientists and expertise have played a direct and indirect role in these programs for years. According to some reports, Russian specialists are helping to develop the longer-range Shahab-5, and Russia has exported missile production facilities to Iran. Moscow has signed a contract to sell advanced long-range S-300 air-defense systems to Iran. Once Iran has air defenses to repel Israeli or American air strikes and nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, it will possess the capacity to destroy Israel (an openly stated goal of the regime) and strike targets throughout the Middle East, in Europe, and the Indian subcontinent. Beyond that, if and when an ICBM capability is achieved, Tehran will be able to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Given the substantial Russian interests and ambitions, any grand bargain would almost certainly require an excessively high price paid by the United States to the detriment of its friends and allies. Russia simply does not view the situation through the same lens as the U.S.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

56. U.S.-Iranian Engagement: The View from Tehran

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For perhaps the first time since Iran and the U.S. broke ties in 1980, there are real prospects for fundamental change. The new U.S. president, Barack Obama, stated willingness to talk unconditionally. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, implicitly blessed dialogue, and presidential candidates are vying to prove they would be the most effective interlocutor. Yet, while U.S. objectives and tactics are relatively familiar, little is known of Iran's thinking, even as much is assumed. Western interaction with its opaque political system and decision-making has both shrivelled and been narrowly focused on the nuclear file. Under-standing Iran's perspective is critical if engagement is to succeed. This briefing, based on meetings with officials and analysts, seeks to shed light on what Tehran thinks about dialogue, its goals and visions of a future relationship. It concludes that while full normalisation might be out of reach for now, there is a chance to achieve a more realistic objective: the start of a long-term dialogue that minimises risks of confrontation and advances areas of mutual interest.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Tehran

57. Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Liechtenstein Institute in Vienna, Austria (LIVA) convened the colloquium, “Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System,” March 5-8, 2009 in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein. This colloquium was funded in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, by the SIBIL Foundation, Vaduz, and by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein. It was organized by Miriam Schive, Resident Director of LIVA, and chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Director of LISD.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

58. Iran, the Bomb and Turkey

Author:
Yalım Eralp
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The question of Iran “ going nuclear” is of global concern. Iran has up to now used devious methods to violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has indeed misled the world community. The Obama Administration is concerned about these developments as much as the previous Bush Administration was. However, President Obama's approach to nuclear weapons in general and talks with Iran have been different both in essence and form. Another matter of concern has been the attitude of Israel and the manner in which the US has tried to handle the Israeli dossier towards Iran. The October 1st negotiations with Iran have been considered constructive by the West. These negotiations will take time and probably prove to be difficult. Turkey's attitude towards a “nuclear” Iran seems to be ambivalent in recent times, whereby while Turkey does not want a nuclear Iran, it seems to be pointing a finger to nuclear Israel.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Israel

59. Inside Iranian Politics and Nuclear Strategy: A G-20 Briefing

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji and Stephen P. Rosen
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Studying the behavior of states with nuclear weapons may give some insight into what Iran would do if it acquires nuclear weapons capabilities. Every state that has nuclear weapons, with the exception of India, has shared the technology and the know-how -- not the weapons -- with other states: the United States shared technology with Great Britain and then, in the 1950s, provided nuclear weapons for German fighter jets on German bases flown by German pilots; Israel and France shared nuclear energy technology in the 1960s;China assisted Pakistan; North Korea aided Syria; and Pakistan assisted many countries through the A. Q.Khan network. In short, states transfer nuclear technology because it is easy to accomplish, difficult to track, and returns very high rewards.
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and North Korea

60. Breaking Stalemates on Iran and Syria at the IAEA

Author:
Gregory Schulte
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Mohamed ElBaradei will end his twelve years as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November. Absent a last-minute breakthrough, ElBaradei will leave incomplete the critical safeguards investigations of Iran and Syria. Earlier this month, ElBaradei reported to the IAEA Board of Governors little or no progress on either the six-year probe of Iran's nuclear activities or the more recent probe of Syria's clandestine cooperation with North Korea. ElBaradei reported that Tehran continues to enrich uranium, in violation of IAEA and UN Security Council requirements, and despite any obvious domestic energy demand. Tehran also continues to deny to IAEA inspectors access to information, people, and sites to verify the "peaceful" nature of Iran's nuclear activities.
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North Korea, Arab Countries, and Syria

61. Quds Day in Iran: Velvet Revolution Trumps Nuclear Negotiations

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While the United States is concentrating on the G-20 summit and the October 1 meeting with the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Iranian attention has been focused on the potentially destabilizing protests planned for September 18, Quds Day. This critical difference of agenda -- with Iran focused more on its domestic turmoil than on simmering international issues -- will be a major complicating factor in negotiations between the international community and Iran in the coming weeks.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, International Cooperation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

62. Broadening the U.S. Approach on Iran

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
With Iran's September 14 acceptance of a meeting with the P5+1 countries on October 1, the Obama administration finally appears poised to engage in direct talks with Iran. In entering these talks, Washington faces two obstacles: first, Iran's reputation for recalcitrance in negotiations and its stated refusal to discuss the nuclear issue, upon which American concerns center; and second, the perception that the administration is lending legitimacy to a regime fresh from violent repression of its political opponents.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Washington, and Middle East

63. Iran's Nuclear Program: Lessons from Pakistan

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Public anxiety about Iran's nuclear intentions is focused on the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, which in many respects -- in both the public debate and the policy discussion -- resembles the situation in the 1980s when there was growing concern about Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant. The lessons that can be draw from that experience are not encouraging. The comparison is particularly appropriate because Iran uses the same high-speed centrifuge technology to enrich uranium as does Pakistan. Photos of Iranian centrifuges show some of them as identical to Pakistani designs developed by the disgraced A.Q. Khan. Iran also claims to be operating more advanced centrifuges using its own modifications.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East

64. Engagement or Consequences: Getting the Iran Message Right

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A number of top U.S. national security officials are visiting Israel this week, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Advisor Gen. James Jones, and Iran will surely be at the top of their agenda. With Iran making steady progress toward nuclear weapons capability and remaining silent on the U.S. offer to negotiate, and with the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran looming ever closer, U.S. officials' public message on the consequences for Iran should engagement fail will draw close scrutiny. Although the Obama administration appears to understand the need for serious consequences, its public messaging on this point has been uneven, blunting its effectiveness.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

65. In Their Own Words: Making Sense of the International Community's Nuclear Deadline with Iran

Author:
Max Mealy
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After nearly a month of international focus on the civil unrest in Iran following the June 12 presidential elections, the G8 summit in Italy brought renewed global attention to Iran's nuclear program; the summit's leaders promised to reassess international outreach to Iran at the September G20 meeting in Pittsburgh. The following statements from U.S., European, and Israeli government officials on the status of Iran's nuclear program highlight the differing interpretations of Iran's nuclear deadline.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, International Organization, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

66. New 'Arab Street' Polls: United States Gaining Ground, Iran Losing

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Several new polls suggest that the United States is gaining ground in the Arab street, and that President Barack Obama's latest overtures, specifically his June 4 speech in Cairo, were well received by some important Arab constituencies. Although a great deal of skepticism remains, students of Arab public opinion would regard these numbers as surprisingly encouraging. In contrast, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's popularity has slipped dramatically in the Arab world, with many saying that the outcome of Iran's recent presidential election will hurt the region. Approximately half of the Arabs questioned even agree that "if Iran does not accept new restrictions and more international oversight of its nuclear program, the Arabs should support stronger sanctions against Iran around the end of this year."
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Arabia

67. Polling Saudis and Egyptians: Iran, Jihad, and the Economy

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
New data from credible private polls of the Egyptian and the urban Saudi public show strikingly high levels of support -- especially among Saudis -- for tough action against Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, these findings demonstrate clearly that economic concerns, rather than foreign policy or domestic political issues, dominate the popular agenda in both countries.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

68. To Curtail the Iranian Nuclear Threat, Change Tehran's Threat Perceptions

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear weapons, stems from its complicated threat environment and the historical grievances it harbors concerning the United States. Tehran now faces large numbers of U.S. troops in its neighbors to the west and east with few regional allies. The most productive path for averting nuclear weapons development in Iran is for Washington to seek to alter Iran’s threat perceptions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

69. Strategic Missile Defense: A Reality Check

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Strategic Missile Defense offers no real disincentive for rogue regimes such as North Korea or Iran to develop or use ballistic missiles, nor does it offer any protection against the more acute threat of terrorist groups smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States. Instead, the aggressive pursuit of strategic missile defense makes it more difficult to constrain the potential offensive nuclear threat from Russia and China.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

70. Preventive Military Action: The Worst Way to Deal With Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Although the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons is a major concern for Israel and the United States, leaving the "military option" on the table is counterproductive. Preventive military action by either country against Iran's nuclear facilities would only delay, rather than halt, Tehran's nuclear program, and it would cause Iran to retaliate against the United States as well as Israel. The aftermath of such an attack would be disastrous for the U.S. position in the region-particularly for relations with Israel and with Iraq-and its position in the wider world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

71. Iran's Nuclear Ambitions and Turkey

Author:
Hakki Uygur
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Abstract:
The Iranian nuclear issue has serious implications for regional and international security and as such requires a comprehensive analysis of the Iranian domestic power structure, foreign policy decision making process and nuclear diplomacy. Iran has a complex internal decision making process and the management of nuclear issue makes the situation more complicated. This policy brief argues that the Iranian nuclear issue is as much a regional and international issue as it is part of the domestic power struggle in Iran. It also argues that Turkey should follow the nuclear issue closely and play a constructive role in opposing the proliferation of WMD including nuclear weapons in the Middle East while maintaining good relations with Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

72. PolicyWatch #1350: Iran and the Road Ahead

Author:
Michael Jacobson
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, two important developments have broken months of gridlock on the Iranian nuclear issue: a third round of UN sanctions and a new warning by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Although both measures are positive, their ultimate impact will depend on how aggressively and effectively key governments implement them.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

73. PolicyWatch #1334: Iranian Threats and the UN Sanctions Debate

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On January 26, Hussein Shariatmadari -- the publisher of Iran's most influential newspaper and a close confidant of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- stated that attacks on "Zionists, Americans, and European countries that support Israel," as well as on compliant regional rulers, were both morally permissible and easily carried out. Indeed, Iran's hardliners engage in not only heated rhetoric, but also heated action -- from funding terrorists to ignoring international nuclear mandates. Accordingly, while the UN Security Council attempts to set the agenda with a new round of sanctions, the hardliners may forgo passivity and go on the offensive.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

74. PolicyWatch #1330: Domestic Issues Trump Foreign Policy in Iran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
At each stop on his recent Middle East tour, President Bush centered his foreign policy agenda on the growing threat from Iran. But inside the Islamic Republic, domestic policies -- and not the international issues that Bush highlighted -- are at the center of political debate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

75. PolicyWatch #1324: Raising the Costs for Tehran

Author:
Michael Jacobson
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the wake of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, questions are being raised as to whether sanctions and financial pressure remain a viable approach to changing Tehran's decisionmaking on its nuclear program. As evidence of this strategy's demise, critics point to the foundering attempts to negotiate a third round of UN sanctions against Iran -- sanctions that appeared imminent before the NIE's publication. While additional punitive measures by the UN are important and necessary, better enforcement of the various sanctions regimes already in place could have an equally significant impact.
Topic:
Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

76. Iran Says “No”—Now What?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Neither Iran nor the United States can achieve all it wants in the current nuclear standoff. Iran has demonstrated its unwillingness to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands to cease its enrichment activities or to negotiate seriously toward that end. The United States and other interlocutors should offer Iran a last chance to negotiate a suspension of its enrichment program until the IAEA can resolve outstanding issues in return for substantial incentives. If that package were rejected, the P-5 plus Germany should withdraw the incentives and commit to maintaining sanctions as long as Iran does not comply with IAEA demands. Simultaneously, the U.S. should take force “off the table” as long as Iran is not newly found to be seeking nuclear weapons or committing aggression.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

77. Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis - A Review of Policies and Proposals 2006

Author:
Nicholas Bowen and Martin F. Jakobsen
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The continuing defiance of the Iranian government over its supposedly peaceful nuclear energy program has prompted grave global concern. Many international observers believe that Iran's behaviour is merely a cover to disguise its effort to develop nuclear weapons. This review presents five different approaches to resolving the crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

78. PolicyWatch #1313: How Much Does Weaponization Matter? Judging Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The just-released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," is about weaponization, not the enrichment and fuel cycle issues that have been the focus of multiple UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program. The NIE only suggests that Tehran has changed its sequence -- something that does not slow the country's progress toward a nuclear weapon by a single day. Therefore, it is not clear how this report affects the current thrust of U.S. policy: to stem Iran's nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
Topic:
Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

79. PolicyWatch #1296: Larijani's Resignation: Implications for Iranian Nuclear Policy and Internal Politics

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The October 20 announcement of Ali Larijani's resignation as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has intensified pressure on President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. Faced with criticism over the resignation, Tehran ensured that Larijani attended the Iran-European Union (EU) nuclear talks in Rome on October 23. His continued presence in the negotiations raises serious questions about who is in charge of Iran's nuclear policy and other key issues, making the regime's intentions even more of an enigma to the Europeans. As EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana stated after the Rome meeting, "I found the same Larijani I had met before, and he had the role of chief negotiator."
Topic:
Government and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, Tehran, and Rome

80. The Politics of Iran's Assembly of Experts after Meshkini

Author:
Mahjoob Zweiri and Ramzy Mardini
Publication Date:
09-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
The recent death of Ayatollah Ali Meshkini effectively created a vacuum that was bound to lead to an ideological and political clash among Iran’s power players. Meshkini was the first and only chairman of the Assembly of Experts, objectively Iran’s most powerful institution. He has kept its inherent powers at bay to the desires of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But now that has changed and Meshkini’s passing, with the recent victory of Hashemi Rafsanjani as his successor, has come at a time when the Islamic Republic is witnessing a socio-political redefinition in its conservative establishment. The ambitions of Iran’s old and new elitists have led to a political confrontation in filling Meshkini’s vacuity, a struggle that may have changed Iranian discourse, as we know it. Though this event is little known and hardly emphasized in media circles in the West, the politics leading up to Rafsanjani’s victory over the ultra-conservatives should be of great interest to those in discussion with Iran over its nuclear program and involvement in Iraq, particularly the United States. This article analyzes the Assembly’s role and significance within the Iranian institutional realm as well as depicts the candidates and politics that shaped this historic dilemma.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Nuclear Power, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

81. "Democratic Bomb": Failed Strategy

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Instead of treating nuclear weapons and materials as problems wherever they exist, the Bush administration has pursued a “democratic bomb” strategy, bending nonproliferation rules for friendly democracies and refusing to negotiate directly with “evil” nondemocratic regimes such as North Korea and Iran. Yet regime change and democratization cannot solve major proliferation challenges in the necessary timeframe and actually can make them worse. Nonproliferation should take precedence over democratization. Universal rules remain essential and must be invigorated, which requires cooperation with major powers that differ on democracy.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Democratization, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and North Korea

82. Iranian President Ahmadinezhad's Relations with Supreme Leader Khamenei

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As part of their close consultation over how to respond to the Iranian nuclear challenge, top officials from the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany met in Berlin on September 7. In developing a plan for influencing Iran, a key consideration is, who are the key decision-makers in Iran? In particular, what are the relative roles of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad? The record from Ahmadinezhad's first year in office suggests that at least on domestic policy, his actions have systematically reinforced Khamenei's authority.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran and Germany

83. Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Michael Herzog
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 17, 2006, Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog and Patrick Clawson addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. General Herzog, an active officer in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute. General Herzog recently published Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the International Community, an Institute monograph available for free download. Dr. Clawson is deputy director for research at The Washington Institute, and recently published Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos. Mehdi Khalaji also contributed to the panel; his remarks appear in a separate PolicyWatch. The following is a rapporteur's summary of General Herzog and Dr. Clawson's remarks.
Topic:
Civil Society, Nuclear Weapons, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran, Washington, and Israel

84. Ahmadinezhad's Popularity One Year On

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Westerners believe Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad to be popular in Iran, in no small part because of his strong support for Iran's nuclear program. However, there is much evidence to the contrary. There is limited information available with which to form a judgment about the popularity of any politician or political program in Iran. The government forbids any independent opinion polling on matters as ordinary as the raging problem of drug addiction, let alone sensitive issues like negotiations with the United States or the nuclear program. The main sources of information for Western media are the statements and photographs that come from Iranian state media, or other Western journalists who go to Iran but cannot work freely in the face of government controls. The Western newsmedia has taken the massive turnouts at demonstrations in support of Ahmadinezhad and his nuclear policy as evidence of popular support for both. But the size of such demonstrations has no meaning beyond illustrating the efficiency of the regime's propaganda machine. Unfortunately, Western media take this propaganda for the truth. The Iranian regime has nearly succeeded in fashioning its own image and imposing it on its critics. Official results show Ahmadinezhad was elected by only 35 percent of eligible voters—in an election that was not free and fair, according to many top Iranian officials. Most of Ahmadinezhad's support came from rural regions and the poorer classes of Iranian society; these voters hoped that Ahmadinezhad's election would reduce corruption and raise their standard of living. Today there are clear signs of dissatisfaction within these constituencies. The evidence comes from independent journalists, blogs, and independent Iranian news websites which have reported increasing discontent with Ahmadinezhad's domestic policies.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

85. Facing Iran's Challenge: Safeguarding Oil Exports from the Persian Gulf

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
06-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In a June 4 speech marking the anniversary of the death of his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a warning to the United States in the crisis of over Iran's nuclear program. “If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region,” Khamenei said. This raises questions about the strength of the Iranian military and how the United States could counter it, using military power, alternative export routes, or a combination of both.
Topic:
Energy Policy and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

86. Perils and Promise of U.S.-Iranian Negotiations

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 7, Lebanese Druze leader and member of parliament Walid Jumblat told reporters in Cairo that Hizballah should disarm. These comments came just four days after Jumblat offered his assistance to the Syrian opposition in establishing "a democratic and free Syria." Jumblat has always been an enigmatic and unpredictable interlocutor, and his recent statements on Syria and Hizballah typify his disregard for the conventions of the Lebanese political establishment. While many Lebanese may quietly support Jumblat's truth telling, his statements are sure to increase his list of powerful enemies.
Topic:
International Relations and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Syria

87. Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Threat with Reference to Pakistan's Experience

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 30, the Sunday Times of London reported that Israeli Mossad chief Meir Dagan had warned U.S. officials during a secret visit to Washington of covert Iranian plans for enriching uranium, which may mean Tehran was "nearer to acquiring nuclear weapons than widely believed." The same report quoted Knesset Foreign and Defense Committee chairman Yuval Steinitz as saying that Iran might be only a year from developing a bomb. Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director-general and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed ElBaradei is on the record as saying that, once Iran can enrich uranium in quantity, making an actual bomb would only take "a few months." And, in August 2005, the Washington Post reported that the new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate "projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing [sufficient highly enriched uranium] for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years." In such circumstances it is small wonder if the public is confused, wondering whether some officials are exaggerating the potential danger of a nuclear-armed Iran while others seem to be almost irresponsibly unconcerned. In fact, the statements above are not mutually inconsistent, reflecting instead the discrepancy between hard fact and plausible interpretation. Since Iran's controversial uranium enrichment technology was initially acquired from Pakistan, an examination of that country's progress toward a nuclear bomb is both worthwhile and illuminating.
Topic:
Security and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Iran, Washington, Middle East, and Tehran

88. Preventing Turkey's Popular Slide away from the West

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
04-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iran's nuclear program presents one more issue on which Washington sees Middle East developments in a different light than does the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey. Since coming to power in November 2002, AKP leaders have pursued rapprochement with Damascus and enhanced dialogue with Iran. In March 2006, the AKP welcomed Hamas leaders in Ankara. It is surprising that Turkey, a traditional bastion of Western policies in the Middle East, is promoting close ties with anti-Western actors that have hurt Turkey for decades—Syria provided safe haven to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Iran supported the PKK and radical Islamist terrorists. Why do the Turkish people not resent such policies? The Iraq war and the U.S. agenda for political transformation in the Middle East have clashed with the Turkish people's desire to preserve the Middle Eastern political landscape. What is more, U.S. inaction against the PKK's Qandil enclave in Northern Iraq is angering most Turks in the way Syrian and Iranian support for the PKK upset them in the 1990s. Turkish confusion and anger toward the United States stands in sharp contrast with the improved image of Syria and Iran in Turkey. Meanwhile, with AKP discussing Middle Eastern politics in terms of Islamic codes, some Turks now identify with the region through Islam and not their national identity. The challenge for Washington is to find a way to prevent Turkey's popular slide away from the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Washington, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Syria

89. Miscommunication between Iranian Society and the West on Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In recent months, the growing controversy surrounding the Iranian nuclear program and Western suspicions about the military intentions of the Iranian regime has reached a crucial phase. A serious problem for the Western campaign to press the Islamic Republic about its nuclear program is that Iranian society has been indifferent or hostile to the West's efforts. The United States in particular needs to find ways to reenergize its outreach to Iranian society.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

90. Iran, Its Nuclear Ambitions, the Region, and the West

Publication Date:
04-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs convened a conference, “Iran, Its Nuclear Ambitions, the Region, and the West,” on 31 March and 1 April 2006. The conference gathered a group of diplomats and international practitioners concerned with the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis, as well as academics and experts familiar with the nuclear question, Iran, the region, and related policy issues. Over two days of intensive discussions, participants engaged with the pressing issues of Iran's nuclear aspirations based on the internal politics of the country, Iran's interstate relations and the role it occupies within the Middle East and Central Asia, and Iran's and the wider region's relations with Asia and the West. On Friday, participants viewed, via videolink with the Geneva Center for Security Policy in Switzerland, an address delivered at the Center earlier in the day by Manouchehr Mottaki, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On Saturday Ambassador Javad Zarif, Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations in New York, also participated in the discussions via videolink.
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
New York, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Switzerland

91. We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The intense concern about Iran's nuclear energy program reflects the judgment that, should it turn to the production of weapons, an Iran with nuclear arms would gravely endanger the United States and the world. An Iranian nuclear arsenal, policymakers fear, could touch off a regional arms race while emboldening Tehran to undertake aggressive, even reckless, actions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

92. The Defense Monitor: Philip E. Coyle, III, CDI Senior Advisor, Appointed to Base Realignment and Closure 2005

Author:
Victoria Samson
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
The Center for Defense Information is proud to announce that Philip E. Coyle III, a senior advisor at the center, has been appointed by President George W. Bush to serve on the independent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 commission.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

93. Iranian Media Reactions to the Nuclear Impasse

Author:
Sana Nourani
Publication Date:
08-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iran's hardline establishment often declares that all Iranian citizens are united in their determination to see Iran exercise its "right" to nuclear power and "self-sufficiency" — that is, operation of the complete fuel cycle. But are all Iranians really so enthused by the national nuclear program and heedless of international repercussions? What follows is a collection of Iranian reactions to the recent nuclear impasse.
Topic:
Civil Society and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

94. Iran's Security Challenges and the Region

Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The following summary addresses key aspects that emerged from the discussion at the Ninth Liechtenstein Colloquium on European and International Affairs held in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein on March 17-20, 2005. The colloquium focused on Iran and included an in-depth discussion of the nuclear issue. Since the LCM is conducted under strict off-the-record rules, no attribution is provided. Attending participants included high-level Iranian offi cials involved in the ongoing negotiations with the EU, as well as representatives and experts from the United States, the EU, Russia, and India.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and India

95. Iran: Rogue State?

Author:
Ali Mostashari
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Iran is now an important focal point for U.S. foreign policy. Yet many have argued that the United States lacks a coherent foreign policy on Iran, amounting to no more than an enormous list of “evils”: namely, that Iran exports its radical Islamist revolution, supports Hezbollah and Hamas and actively opposes the Middle East peace process, is building nuclear and biological weapons capacity, was involved in the bombings of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires and the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, provides Al-Qaeda with safe passage and refuge, helps insurgents in Iraq, assassinates its own dissidents and oppresses its people, and so on.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia