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441. Atrocity Prevention Under the Obama Administration: What We Learned and the Path Ahead

Author:
Stephen Pomper
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
This report is intended to provide an insider’s view on where the Obama administration’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities succeeded, where they did not, and where future policy makers who wrestle with the challenge of prevention might find useful lessons in the administration’s experience, both positive and negative. The first part of the report summarizes the intellectual roots of the Obama administration’s atrocityprevention policy, identifying the goals and expectations created by two key works—Samantha Power’s “A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide1 and the report of a bipartisan task force on genocide prevention led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen.2 The second part of the report describes how the administration translated those goals and expectations into policy and summarizes the administration’s record on atrocity prevention. It focuses in particular on situations in which policy changes and innovations appear to have had a positive effect, however modest, and on efforts to develop new capabilities under the policy. The third part looks at the two most prominent situations in which the policy was unsuccessful —Libya and Syria. The fourth part offers an “after action” assessment of the administration’s atrocity-prevention policy, drawing from interviews with former senior officials to identify both the strengths and contributions of the policy and its most pronounced shortcomings. The fifth part offers recommendations for future executive-branch officials, legislators and staff, and civil society partners for ways in which they could help the United States improve its performance on atrocity prevention going forward. The report is in many respects a hotwash exercise. The bulk of it was written in the first six months following the end of the Obama administration, drawing from the author’s reflections on his recent tenure as senior director for African Affairs, Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the staff of the Obama administration’s National Security Council, as well as his experience as chairman of the Atrocities Prevention Board. The report also draws extensively from interviews with more than 30 former senior Obama administration officials and others with insight on the administration’s atrocity-prevention efforts.3 Finally, this report owes a significant debt to earlier reports that have also sought to evaluate the administration’s atrocity-prevention record.4 Given the brevity of the report relative to the scope of its topic, both the analysis and recommendations herein are relatively skeletal. The report is offered with humility and as an effort to add one group of recollections and perspectives to a growing historical record. It is hoped that as this record continues to develop, it will provide the next generation of atrocity-prevention proponents new and better options to confront the challenges of the future, having profited as fully as possible from the lessons of the past.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Intervention, Barack Obama, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, Syria, North America, and United States of America

442. From Independence to Civil War: Atrocity Prevention and US Policy toward South Sudan

Author:
Jon Temin
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
Could the civil war in South Sudan have been prevented? Could some of the violence and misery caused by the war have been avoided? Those questions are academic in some ways, as so much damage has been done. But in other ways, seeking answers is vital because patterns of violence in the 21st century suggest there will be more wars that resemble the South Sudan conflict: (a) fought within a country’s borders, (b) fought between multiple groups that regularly fragment and realign, (c) driven in part by access to lucrative natural resources and capture of state coffers, (d) with civilians often targeted, and (e) in which the lines between civilians and combatants are sometimes blurred. When the threat of such state collapse appears elsewhere—and we should expect that it will—lessons from the South Sudan experience will be valuable. This project seeks to identify some of those lessons by examining US policy toward South Sudan in the years leading up to and during the civil war. President Barack Obama’s administration placed an emphasis on atrocity prevention, and South Sudan’s civil war was the source of some of the most egregious atrocities anywhere during his time in office. The author conducted in-depth interviews with more than 30 former and current American officials (from the Obama and George W. Bush administrations), South Sudanese experts, and longtime observers of South Sudan from the think tank, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and academic communities. Through those interviews, the author sought to identify pivotal periods in US policy making, short stretches of time during which events in South Sudan compelled the United States to act—or, in hindsight, times at which the United States could have acted with greater conviction but did not. This report identifies four such periods. For each, the author seeks to identify alternative policies that could have been considered and to assess whether those policies may have been able to prevent or limit violence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Africa, South Sudan, and United States of America

443. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:
Jin Linbo
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

444. Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options. Official Chinese narratives couch today’s opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance. This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history. South Korea’s history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, History, and Narrative
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Korea

445. Chinese Views of Korean History

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The way Chinese officials and writers view the history of Korea—from ancient times to the post- Cold War developments in South Korea—matters for at least three reasons. It is a commentary on Chinese national identity since Korea bears importantly on multiple dimensions of how that identity has recently been constructed. It is likewise a window on how Chinese view the order they seek to forge in East Asia, linking it to the earlier Sinocentric order. Finally, Chinese views of Korea’s history offer valuable insight into China’s vision of the future of the Korean Peninsula and its relationship to China. It is commonplace to regard historical narrative as a lens on views of the present and plans for future policies, but this is even more the case for a country with the tradition of Confucian historiography with its extraordinary stress on correct thinking about the past, and communist historiography redolent with socialist realism insistent on a zero-sum understanding of the past. We read in Chinese historical writings on Korea a morality tale with undoubted relevance to how China constructs both its identity and its international relations. The Korean Peninsula has significance for Chinese national identity beyond that of any foreign country except Russia and the United States with the possible exception of Japan. It is where ideology was honed as China sent the PLA to prevent the fall of North Korea after Mao had given his blessing along with Stalin to the North’s attack on the South. As ideology has grown again in importance, the significance of North Korea’s socialist pedigree and shared origins in the crucible of revolution against imperialism has risen. In the historical dimension of national identity, China’s leaders in the 1990s weighed allowing candor about the origins of the Korean War at a time when de-ideologization was fitfully taking place and there was no established narrative on history. Some saw sensitivity to North Korean reactions as the key to why China did not go further, but the resistance inside China proved more tenacious than they assumed. Historical purity toward Japan intensified apart from a short-lived interval with “new thinking” in 2003. With South Korea on the frontlines in China’s quest for demonization of Japan over history, its own history became a test case for the national identity gap between it and China. The history of Korea is so interwoven with that of China and it can reveal much about recent views.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Korea

446. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Governance, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

447. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:
David Straub
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

448. South Korea's Diplomatic Options Under Moon

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his first year as president, Moon Jae-in faced a challenging strategic environment and divergent advice on how to manage it. He could cater to his progressive base and act in accord with his political lineage by renewing the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Alternatively, he could strive for consensus at home by reconciling the differences with conservatives in foreign policy. In diplomacy with the great powers, he also had important choices to make. He could double down on the U.S. alliance or, going further, he could agree to trilateralism with Japan. Yet, he also could be tempted by the option of balancing dependence on the United States with a closer relationship with China. Impacting all of his choices was the question of how Kim Jong-un would focus in 2018, shifting from provocations aimed at military leverage to diplomacy linked to his outlook on Moon’s policies. In the following five chapters authors explore each of these options. This introduction reviews some of their findings and points to linkages among them as part of an overall assessment of how Moon has navigated among the choices he was facing. The following chapters set forth the options that Moon Jae-in has before him. Chapter 1 by David Straub seeks to grasp the appeal of a renewed Sunshine Policy to Moon, while spelling out the implications of taking that route, warning of a breach in trust with the United States if not a temporary welcome from Donald Trump eager for a Nobel Peace Prize. Leif Eric-Easley’s analysis in Chapter 2 assesses the prospects of Moon doubling down on the ROK alliance with the United States and argues that, so far, trust between allies has been sustained, including in 2018 as diplomacy intensified with summitry on the agenda. In Chapter 3 John Delury examines the domestic political environment, pointing to the impact of the Candlelight movement, which offers opportunities for Moon as well as constraints on policies he might adopt. Chung Jae Ho in Chapter 4 explores Sino-ROK relations and the prospects of Moon drawing closer to China with consequences for relations with the United States. A fifth chapter by Sheila Smith focuses on Japan-ROK relations, newly strained by different approaches to diplomacy with Kim Jong-un. Each chapter views Moon’s policies and proclivities in the context of the dynamics of bilateral ties, while following closely what has been happening to those ties during the tumultuous course of Moon’s first year in office, notably in the first third of 2018 as diplomacy intensified.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Moon Jae-in, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

449. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

450. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

451. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?

Author:
Tu Xinquan
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the last two decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been considered a primary force to advance the world trading system because the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO has stagnated since its launch in 2001. The continuous expansion of the European Union and the American-led NAFTA and TPP as well as bilateral FTAs between the United States and EU and their partners best exemplified this phenomenon. However, such an approach is facing serious challenges from rising anti-globalization sentiment originating in the EU and United States in recent years. In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to exit the EU as a result of a referendum. This is the first time a EU member chose to leave. On January 23, 2017, at the start of his presidency, Donald Trump signed as his first executive order the withdrawal from TPP, which his predecessor spent years concluding with 11 partners. These two consecutive dramatic actions of the previous and current world leaders shocked the globe. Next to the WTO, regionalism is seen as the second-best choice in promoting globalization. Now, two regional initiatives led by developed countries are facing a serious backlash. The world is concerned that this means the end and a reversal of globalization. Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has also been actively negotiating FTAs with its neighbors as well as some remote partners such as Iceland and New Zealand. While its WTO accession package was praised for its ambition and courage, it is difficult to defend Chinese FTAs as comparable to those of developed countries in terms of market access and institutional changes. One explanation for that is China has made very high-level multilateral commitments. Another one is China is not in such a comfortable strategic and economic position as the United States in negotiating FTAs with either developed or developing countries. The former want to obtain more market access concessions and institutional reforms from China, while the latter are afraid to expose their domestic industries to China’s overwhelming competitiveness in manufacturing. In addition, the Chinese government seems more confident in its own institutions and unwilling to change them due to outside pressure, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during his state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013, which soon was made a top national priority and even included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Nadege Rolland labels this China’s Grand Strategy1 and the organizing foreign policy concept in the Xi Jinping era.2 One key feature of BRI in comparison with RTAs is that BRI focuses more on improving physical connectivity rather than reducing institutional barriers. The logic of physical connectivity is undoubtedly powerful, especially for developing countries with poor infrastructure. The impact of more and better international links on the regional landscape could be huge, not only by boosting trade and commerce but also by easing flows of energy and other resources, stimulating technological innovation, influencing culture and politics, and shaping strategic choices. Given the fact that RTAs are facing serious difficulties, the BRI looks like an attractive and feasible alternative to promote regional economic integration and globalization. However, there are also plenty of uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the BRI, particularly due to China’s centrality as well as its direction of economic and strategic development. Hence, this chapter explores BRI characteristics in promoting regional economic integration and whether it could become an alternative approach to regionalism and globalization for China as well as the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

452. Advancing the Regional Trade Order in East Asia with a Less Engaged United States

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election and immediate pullout from the TPP, a scramble ensued over how to proceed with constructing a regional trade order centered on East Asia. For China this brought closer scrutiny of its pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the case of Japan, questions followed about what to do with the residue of TPP. Others, notably countries in Southeast Asia, were left contemplating the balance between eastern exclusive regionalism and the western presence in regionalism. In the background were efforts in South Asia aimed at advancing economic integration with East Asia. A kind of free-for-all was in progress without the moorings that had been lost after the paradigm of competition between a U.S.-led TPP and a China hub-and-spokes BRI no longer was guiding the strategic calculations of Asian countries. Then, in March 2018 came Trump’s disruptive tariffs, threatening to set a trade war in motion. Four chapters explore the challenge of advancing a regional trade order in East Asia in the new circumstances of 2017-18. Tu Xinquan in Chapter 10 questions whether BRI is a path toward regionalism, delving deeply into the Chinese strategy for BRI. T.J. Pempel follows in Chapter 11 by exploring Japan’s thinking about TPP and the process of refocusing on TPP- 11 following the U.S. withdrawal. Chapter 12 by Sanchita Basu Das offers a hopeful ASEAN perspective on economic regionalism. Finally, in Chapter 13 Pradumna Bickram Rana traces thinking about re-energizing economic integration between South Asia and East Asia. With no finality to the RCEP talks and the recently concluded TPP-11 pact still taking shape and Trump’s “America First” trade policy casting a dark shadow, we aim to capture signs of a new trade order at a time of flux.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Economy, and TPP
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

453. Creating Cohesive, Coherent Immigration Policy

Author:
Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
US immigration policy has serious limitations, particularly when viewed from an economic perspective. Some shortcomings arise from faulty initial design, others from the inability of the system to adapt to changing circumstances. In either case, a reluctance to confront politically difficult decisions is often a contributing factor to the failure to craft laws that can stand the test of time. We argue that, as a result, some key aspects of US immigration policy are incoherent and mutually contradictory — new policies are often inconsistent with past policies and undermine their goals. Inconsistency makes policies less effective because participants in the immigration system realize that lawmakers face powerful incentives to revise policies at a later date. US policies regarding unauthorized immigration, temporary visas, and humanitarian migrants offer examples of incoherence and inconsistency. This article explores key features of an integrated, coherent immigration policy from an economic perspective and how policymakers could better attempt to achieve policy consistency across laws and over time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Immigration
Political Geography:
America

454. The Human Cost of IIRIRA — Stories From Individuals Impacted by the Immigration Detention System

Author:
Saba Ahmed, Adina Appelbaum, and Rachel Jordan
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) has had a devastating impact on immigrants who are detained, indigent, and forced to face deportation proceedings without representation (pro se). In the past 20 years, immigration detention has grown exponentially and a criminal–immigration detention– deportation pipeline has developed as a central function of the immigration system. Despite the growing specter of the “criminal alien” in the American psyche, there is little public knowledge or scrutiny of the vast immigration detention and deportation machine. Enforcement of IIRIRA has effectively erased human stories and narrowed immigration debates to numbers and statistics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Immigration
Political Geography:
America

455. To Assad and his admirers, Trump offers ‘hope and change’

Author:
Mahdi Dakhlallah, Imad Salim, Tahseen al-Halabi, and Bashar al-Assad
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
During the presidential campaign, Trump said he “[doesn’t] like Assad at all” and described the Syrian leader as “a bad guy.” But he compared Assad favorably to the alternatives. “Assad is killing ISIS,” Trump stated, whereas “we don’t even know who they [the rebels] are.” Trump even claimed Assad to be “much tougher and much smarter” than political rivals Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. Unsurprisingly, Assad and his admirers took heart in Trump’s surprise victory last November, with an adviser to the Syrian president saying the American people had “sent a great, a very important message to the world.” Yet Assad supporters – as well as the Syrian president himself – are taking a cautious approach to the new US administration, unsure of whether, and to what extent, Trump will overhaul American foreign policy. Here’s what columnists in pro-Assad media outlets think about Trump’s implications for Syria, followed by excerpts from two interviews with Assad about the new US president.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Elections, News Analysis, Trump, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

456. Uncertain allies: the Jerusalem announcement amid shifting regional priorities

Author:
Andrew McIndoe
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
On 6 December the Trump administration made an unprecedented decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The announcement, which both recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and conveyed President Trump’s intention to relocate the United States’ embassy to the Holy City, is a move shrouded in obscure motivations. Was it a manifestation of the strongly pro-Israel orientation of the new government? Was it merely the fulfilment of a campaign promise, a sop to the president’s evangelical and pro-Israel support base? Or was it truly designed, as the President maintained, to reenergize a peace process that has been stuck in the mud for years?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Peace Studies, Trump, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jerusalem, and United States of America

457. Power play: The United Arab Emirates’ new approach to geopolitics

Author:
JMEPP
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Power – be it tangible, intangible, natural, military, or economic – shapes the capacities of the state and its role within the international system. The Middle East is no exception to this realist reading of international affairs. The Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict, the war in Yemen and the Iranian nuclear deal have all created a battleground, often quite literally, for state power interests to compete with one another. How are these power configurations linked to identity? The United States sees itself as a stronghold of liberal democracy, Japan as the quintessential trading nation, and Switzerland is comfortably ensconced in its 200-year-old neutralism. This “sense of self,” or who states are, shapes and defines what they do. Power and identity routinely mould and inform each other. For a country like the United Arab Emirates, described by many analysts as a middle, regional, or rising power, these questions hold particular relevance as the UAE reshapes its position in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Soft Power, Identities, and State
Political Geography:
Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

458. Navigating the Unknown: Barriers to Evidence-Based Defence and Security Policy in the European Union

Author:
Benedict Wilkinson, Erin Montague, and Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
At a time when Europe faces numerous crises, there is a real need for rigorous evidence to underpin effective policymaking. However, a gap between academia and policy creates clear obstacles in the use of evidence in policymaking. Many of these enduring obstacles are manifest in the inherent differences between separate communities: academics have difficulty communicating research in an applicable manner, and policymakers, in turn, tend to focus on operational motivations. The gap widens considerably when foreign, security and defence policy within the complex institutional structures of the European Union is considered. In addition to these well known barriers to evidence-based policy, there are two more obstacles in the defence and security space: sovereignty and dispersed decision-making. A dialogue of best practices must be opened up to broker knowledge in the EU context.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Academia
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

459. Xi Jinping and China’s Role in the Asian and Global Order

Author:
Kerry Brown
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
What can we determine about China’s strategic intent towards the region in which it exists? This question is best answered by looking at the concepts of historic destiny and China’s rejuvenation which Xi partially inherited from his predecessors but has now made into his own orientating idea. For China, the future is mapped out in two centennial goals. The first, in 2021, marks the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party. The second, more remote one in 2049 marks the hundredth anniversary of the existence of the People’s Republic of China. Both of these structure the short to long-term narrative of country development and the Party’s key role in that under Xi. Needless to say, without the Party, the country’s dream, another term that Xi has been keen to use, would not be realisable. The two are therefore vigorously associated with each other as though one entity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Power Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

460. Beijing’s Policy Towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations

Author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
ions through the lens of both asymmetry and (re-)balancing. Beijing-Taipei relations have become more and more asymmetrical. While this structural asymmetry has allowed the former to exert all sorts of pressures on the latter (economic, ideological and military), this very asymmetry has not prevented the latter from keeping some room of maneuver vis-à-vis the former.1 Balancing against China and bandwagoning with the United States has, since 1950, been Taiwan’s security and survival strategy even if after the U.S. de-recognition of the ROC in 1978, Taipei and Washington have not been linked by a formal alliance but a much more narrow and vague security arrangement, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). However, in this paper, I will argue that under the Tsai Administration, Taiwan’s balancing strategy has remained rather “soft,” because of the island’s hard economic dependence upon China. At the same time, Taiwan cannot ignore the U.S. Administration’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia and the consequences it has on U.S.-China relations and the region. Using this double approach, I will first present Beijing’s new Taiwan policy. Then, I will explore its root-causes and main drivers. Finally, I will venture to speculate on the chances of success of China’s strategy towards the Tsai Administration, particularly after the new U.S. President Donald Trump comes into office and in view of the telephone call that he accepted to have with Ms. Tsai in early December 2016. My tentative conclusion is that for many domestic and international reasons—the KMT’s inability to reform, Taiwan’s consolidated identity and the U.S.’s likely continuing, and perhaps stronger strategic support and overall “rebalancing” under Trump—Beijing will probably not reach its major objectives, at least in 2020. As a result, Taiwan will be able to continue to go its own way; the political gap between both sides will keep widening; and the relations across the Taiwan Strait will probably remain a mixture of political and perhaps military tensions as well as dense exchanges and inevitable interactions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia