721. Airpower: The Flip Side of COIN
- Author:
- Daniel F. Baltrusaitis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2008
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Despite the success of the U.S. military in conventional warfare, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the challenges of pursuing a counter-insurgent strategy against “asymmetric threats” such as improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers. The “asymmetric” strategy often adopted by insurgents allows a relatively weak for ce to incapacitate a stronger one by exploiting the stronger force's vulnera-bilities rather than meeting it head-on in conventional com-bat. Our current wars have focused national attention on the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to cope with this “asymmetric” environment, yet the influence of airpower has been conspicuously missing from the debate. Even the core military doctrine for counterinsurgency, or COIN, fails to acknowledge the benefits that airpower can play against these asymmetric threats. The Army and Marine Corps recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), an impressive and influential 282-page document that skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues. This doctrine is viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq, and will likely become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine that will guide all the armed services. Regrettably, this impressive document fails to inform the COIN strategist, and policymakers, on the influence of highly integrated joint COIN strategy. Rather, it treats the influence of airpower as an adjunct capability confined to a short, five-page annex of “supplemental information.” By failing to integrate the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on only the ground dimension, FM 3-24 falls short of offering U.S. decisionmakers a pragmatic, joint solution for the challenge of COIN. The current doctrine fails to integrate all aspects of military power that may be implemented for the most effective counterinsurgency campaign. By failing to integrate airpower (or seapower) into this cornerstone doctrine document, U.S. and coalition forces risk planning operations in a dis-jointed fashion where planners do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of service capabilities. This paper examines the influence of airpower on COIN strategy and articulates the benefits of an integrated joint COIN doctrine to combat effectively the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Globalization, Government, and International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and United States