Content Type: Journal Article / Publication Year: within 25 Years / Topic: Bilateral Relations

1. Beijing’s Aggression Behind Emerging India-Philippines Defense Relationship

Author:: Peter Chalk
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China’s increasingly assertive stance on affirming its territorial claims in the Indo-Pacific is informing the evolution of a closer defense relationship between New Delhi and Manila. On September 25, the Philippine Coast Guard removed a floating barrier that China had installed at Huangyan Dao (黄岩岛, an island in the Scarborough Shoal) in the South China Sea (SCS) the previous day. Responding to questions about the incident, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin (王文斌) maintained that “China Coast Guard did what was necessary to block and drive away the Philippine vessel,” and that “Huangyan Dao has always been China’s territory. What the Philippines did looks like nothing more than self-amusement” (FMPRC, September 26; FMPRC, September 27). Earlier in September, New Delhi’s Ambassador to the Philippines Shambu Kumaran expressed solidarity with Manila by pointedly rejecting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s new extended ten-dash map of its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and Line of Actual Control (LAC). He criticized the move from Beijing as unhelpful “cartographic expansionism” (Manila Times, September 3). These two incidents, occurring in the space of less than a month, are only the most recent in a string of aggressive acts in recent years. The reactions of both India and the Philippines are indicative of growing unity among some of China’s neighboring countries as a direct response to the security threat that China poses. In recent years, these two partners have increased the areas of engagement for security collaboration and expressed an intent to further such initiatives. The PRC lambasts the Philippines for choosing “to ignore China’s goodwill and sincerity” (MOFA, August 8), but this rhetoric only reaffirms Manila’s shifting calculus. There are limits to how close the Indo-Philippines defense relationship will get, but there is still ample room to explore various forms of cooperation short of a mutual defense treaty. The coming years will see much more of that exploration start to materialize. The PRC has several options in terms of responding to this emerging dynamic. These range from economic coercion, influence operations, and leveraging its relationship with Russia to put pressure on India. It is unclear which combination of these the PRC will ultimately pursue, though the PRC has made it abundantly clear that backing down in the South China Sea is not an option it is willing to entertain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Aggression
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

2. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

3. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

4. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

5. North Cranks up Nukes—and Slams Down the Phone

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

7. China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray China as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Economic Growth, Strategic Stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

8. Washington Zeroes in on Manila

Author:: Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: With an apparent renaissance in the US-Philippine alliance, spurred by rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Biden administration ramped up diplomatic activity with Manila as the two countries moved toward an official visit from President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., in May. At the same time, the 42nd iteration of Cobra Gold, which returned to full strength for the first time since the 2014 coup in Bangkok, suggested momentum in the US-Thailand alliance, albeit with a lower profile. While the international environment continued to be roiled by US-China rivalry, the Russian war in Ukraine, and high food and commodity prices, Southeast Asia’s own internal turmoil was evident. The junta in Myanmar extended the state of emergency and stepped up aerial bombing of areas held by the opposition and armed ethnic groups. As Indonesia takes up the ASEAN chair, prospects for implementing the Five-Point Consensus Plan are dim, if not dead. Vietnam and Thailand began leadership transitions—Hanoi with an anti-corruption purge and Bangkok with the launch of general elections—while Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continued to eviscerate the opposition ahead of his near-certain re-election in July. As Southeast Asian leaders work to grow their economies in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, competition among them to attract foreign domestic investment is intensifying, particularly in technology and electric vehicles. In the meantime, the region awaits the conclusion of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which will offer insight into Washington’s vision of an economic order for the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

9. An Even Larger Role in Everything

Author:: Akhil Ramesh and Michael Rubin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: On May 24, 2022, President Joe Biden met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Quad summit in Tokyo. According to the White House readout of the meeting, “The leaders reviewed the progress made in the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. They committed to deepen the Major Defense Partnership, encourage economic engagement that benefits both countries, and expand partnership on global health, pandemic preparedness, and critical and emerging technologies.” While such statements are often aspirational and lag in implementation, the first four months of 2023 show the renaissance in US-India ties to be real.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

10. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:: Mason Richey
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

11. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

14. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

15. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

16. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

17. Tensions Intensify as Taiwan-US IT Cooperation Blossoms

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of then US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, China’s extensive military exercises continued to impose a more threatening “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan continued to be the focus of heated public exchanges between the US and China. US President Biden said, for a fourth time, that the US would defend Taiwan and added an inflammatory codicil that independence was for Taiwan to decide. At the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping promised China would strive for peaceful reunification with Taiwan but would not renounce use of force. On Dec. 23, Biden signed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and a State Department appropriation providing $2 billion in loans for Taiwan to purchase US equipment. Two days later, China sent 71 military aircraft and seven ships to intimidate Taiwan, its largest-ever one-day exercise near the island. Two days later, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan would extend its military conscription to 12 months. TSMC formally broke ground for the first of two factories in the US, a $40 billion investment. The new year will see Taiwan’s DPP and KMT parties launch their presidential election campaigns, debating visions for cross-Strait defense, dignity, and dialogue as the Chinese military appears determined to intensify its intimidation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Information Technology, and Military
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

18. US-India Relations: Friends with Benefits

Author:: Akhil Ramesh
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2022 was a challenging year, not just for US-India relations, but for every India analyst trying to explain the Indian government’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Explaining to a non-IR audience India’s history of nonalignment during the Cold-War era and its current policy of multi-alignment was not a gratifying endeavor. While the last four months of 2022 did not have the friction and stress-tests as the first four of 2022 or the slow and steady expansion of relations that followed between May and September, they certainly had multiple surprising events that could make them the halcyon months of 2022. In mid-November, the US and Indian armies engaged in a military exercise at Auli, not far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian-held and Chinese-held territory. While the US and Indian armies have engaged in exercises prior to 2022, this proximity to the Indo-China border is a first. A month later, in another first, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to India to meet Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to expand the US-India “Indo-Pacific partnership.” Yellen characterized India as a “friendly shore” for supply chain diversification and as the indispensable partner for the US. A country that earned notoriety for its bureaucracy and trade protectionism over the years was suddenly characterized as “friendly”; one that was highly skeptical of foreign militaries on its shores was actively engaging the US military at one of its most sensitive and tempestuous borders. The primary catalyst for this sea change has been shared concerns over a rising, authoritarian, and hegemonic China. The events of the last four months, while making India’s multi-alignment labored, also made it abundantly clear that the US-India relations will continue to expand to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

19. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:: Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

20. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Factores endógenos y exógenos en el relacionamiento bilateral entre Paraguay y la República de China (Taiwán). Primacías en un contexto internacional tensionado por el enfrentamiento chino-estadounidense

Author:: Julieta H. Heduvan and Maria Antonella Cabral López
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: En el marco de la creciente escalada en el estrecho de Taiwán y en medio de la tensión provocada por dinámicas que buscan desafiar el orden existente, Paraguay, como el único país sudamericano y uno de los pocos Estados a nivel global que reconoce en la actualidad a la República de China (Taiwán) y no a la República Popular China (RPC), percibe desde el otro lado del mundo un conflicto que no es ajeno a él. Este contexto hace oportuno el análisis del relacionamiento de Paraguay con Taiwán y los elementos que determinan su reconocimiento actual, identificando los factores exógenos y endógenos que rigen esta vinculación. Esto permite a su vez, dilucidar cuál es la situación que podría presentarse en un futuro.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Endogenous Factors, and Exogenous Factors
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, South America, and Paraguay

22. Exploring the Interplay between Trade and Industrial Policies and the Impact of Geopolitics on the Transformation of Taiwan’s Economy

Author:: Ying-Jun Lin
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Over the past five decades, Taiwan's economy has shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented, from an import-substitution policy to an export-expansion policy. This evolution in economic structure has also brought about changes in the industrial landscape. While there is an ongoing debate about the respective roles of the market and the government in promoting Taiwan's economic growth, this article argues that the history of Taiwan's economy demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and industrial policies. The integration of market forces and government intervention has played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic success story. However, the dynamics between the United States and China, as well as the emergence of new Asian regionalism, pose challenges to Taiwanese industries and enterprises. In conclusion, this article emphasises the importance of refining trade and industrial policies in line with the geopolitical context in order to maintain the momentum of Taiwan's economy.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

23. La relación de España con Argelia: Más allá de la colaboración energética

Author:: Sagrario Morán Blanco
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: España, puente de unión entre los continentes africano y europeo, tiene como objetivo preferente de su política exterior mantener estrechas y profundas relaciones de cooperación con los dos vecinos situados en la orilla sur del Mediterráneo y actores esenciales del Magreb: Marruecos y Argelia. Este artículo intenta explicar si la recomendación hecha por el Emperador Carlos V a su hijo Felipe, “dos países vecinos no pueden ni deben ser enemigos”, ha sido la tónica general en los vínculos entre los dos Estados; así como los factores que han condicionado el contenido de sus relaciones de cooperación en las últimas décadas, y también los vaivenes o momentos de tensión vividos, junto con las causas específicas que los produjeron. España y Argelia son dos países vecinos y muy próximos geográficamente, pero representan realidades políticas, culturales y religiosas diferentes que explican, en buena medida, la distancia que existe entre los dos países y la complejidad de sus relaciones. Esta diferenciación exige una mayor atención a iniciativas de sociedades civiles.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Cooperation, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Algeria, Spain, and North Africa

24. Strange Intimacies: Indo-Afghan Relations and the End of the War on Terror

Author:: Mou Banerjee
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Riding the Afghan tiger has always been an incredibly risky venture, as history is witness, and getting off safely has almost always been impossible. There is no reason to believe that the new political dispensation in Afghanistan will not experience or exercise more violent changes in the near future. This is a tinderbox situation, and as always, Afghanistan is serving as a proxy for external neo-imperial ideologies and political maneuvers. This genealogical pattern is not unfamiliar to historians—Afghanistan served the same purpose in the nineteenth century between Britain and Russia, in the twentieth century between the USSR and the United States at the height of the Cold War, and in the twenty-first century between the so-called enlightened and liberal Western world order led by the United States and the dark forces of “jihadi” terrorism. China, India, and Pakistan are perhaps setting the board for a new iteration of this eternal “Great Game.”
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and India

25. The Sino-French Relationship At 60: China’s Losing Bet On A Reset

Author:: Juliana Bouchard
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Against a background of increasingly fraught relations with the European Commission, China has been doubling down on its outreach to member states, with France chief among them. The two countries have been gearing up to the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relationship in January 2024 with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. These have included high-level visits by President Emmanuel Macron in April, Economic Minister Bruno Le Maire in July, diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne in late October, and most recently Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna (FMPRC, November 22). On the Chinese side, Premier Li Qiang traveled to Paris in June to take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. However, this year also saw Paris deal some blows to China’s economic ambitions, with Macron being one of the driving forces behind Brussels’ ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles and revamping its own EV purchase credits to exclude Chinese-made models (Service Public, October 10). During Bonne’s visit, Wang Yi framed his expectations for the anniversary in no uncertain terms, calling on China and France to “revisit the original intention (重温建交初衷)” of their bilateral ties and “consolidate and reset (巩固和再出发) the relationship” (FMPRC, October 30). Paris’ appetite for meeting Beijing halfway in “resetting” the relationship is far less certain. Most likely, China’s lofty ambitions for a reset will be met with more ambiguity from France, continuing its diplomatic outreach to safeguard economic opportunities in China, all the while pushing for more assertive policies within Brussels to achieve its vision of “strategic autonomy.” While some scholars are not entirely immune to the “dual-faced (两面性)” nature of French diplomacy (Fudan Development Institute, March 2), a prevalent view—or hope—among officials in Beijing is that Macron’s vision of strategic autonomy is primarily about asserting an independent foreign policy from the United States. However, in reality, strategic autonomy also informs France’s own de-risking agenda toward China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and France

26. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:: Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

27. Money Alone Is Not Enough: The Future Of The China-Argentina Relationship

Author:: Román D. Ortiz
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Observers assessed the outcome of the first round of Argentina’s presidential elections held on October 22 as good news for the Chinese government (VOA, October 26). Against the odds, Sergio Massa, the Peronist candidate and current minister of economy, emerged on top, despite his overseeing an annual inflation rate of almost 140 percent. Meanwhile, Javier Milei, the libertarian opposition candidate, took the second place (Yahoo Noticias, October 23). These two politicians will compete for the presidency in the second round of the election scheduled for November 19. At first glance, the victory of Massa should be an encouraging sign for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since it keeps open the possibility that the China-friendly Peronist party remains in government. However, a more granular analysis suggests two alternative outcomes: First, Milei is likely to be the eventual winner after the second round of voting, which would make the new occupant of the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace) a politician who has called the PRC an “assassin” and who plans to freeze relations with Beijing. Second, if Massa wins the presidency, his more moderate Peronism is far from the Third-World foreign policy promoted by the outgoing president, Alberto Fernandez, and his vice-president and former president, Cristina Fernandez. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, Beijing’s desires to increase political influence over Buenos Aires, which have focused particularly on its defense policy, are likely to be curtailed. A decrease in political influence with Buenos Aires would deal a serious blow to the Chinese strategy in Latin America, in which Argentina plays a critical role. Argentina is the only large country in the region to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also exports food, minerals, and oil needed by the Chinese industrial sector. Argentina’s expansive territory represents a natural platform to project power within South America and to the South Atlantic. Buenos Aires’s geopolitics makes it particularly attractive for Beijing, which is exploring opportunities to secure rights for a naval base on the west coast of Africa in order to gain access to the Atlantic. Argentina also forms a key part of PRC efforts to consolidate its hegemony over the Global South. Specifically, the PRC views Argentina as a counterbalance to Brazilian regional hegemony, which motivated China’s interest in Argentina joining the BRICS grouping of countries, against Brazilian opposition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

28. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:: Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Vietnam

29. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

30. Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency

Author:: Suyash Desai
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Soon after Xi Jinping assumed charge as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman in November 2012, he set the stage for a sweeping military restructuring. On February 1, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved away from the old Soviet-inspired Military Regions (MR) system to the U.S.-inspired Theater Command (TC) model. Under this new model, the seven Military Regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou—were reorganized into five geographic TCs, each with a specific “strategic direction” (战略方向). [1] Following the force restructuring, the three TCs that concern India are the Western Theater Command (WTC) along with Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (TMD and XMD), the Southern Theater Command (STC) and the Central Theater Command (CTC). WTC’s 76th and 77th Group Armies (GA) under the PLA Army’s (PLAA) jurisdiction are mandated to ensure the security of China’s land boundaries with Central Asian states, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The TMD and XMD were retained to oversee security on the Chinese border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh, respectively. In addition to the PLAA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Logistic Support Force (JLSF) are also significant services under the WTC command, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) plays a minor role at Pangong Tso in the Aksai Chin region. Elsewhere, PLAN forces under the STC’s jurisdiction are responsible for securing Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also possibly in the Indian Ocean Region and the Western Pacific Ocean. The CTC is mandated to protect the capital but also acts as an anchor to provide additional troops to other theaters in case of a contingency, including WTC. This is an important division of responsibilities for the Chinese armed forces after Xi’s recent military reforms. [2] However, recent developments have highlighted that the STC’s 75th Group Army could also play an important role in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial integrity in Tibet, especially in the eastern sector bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the troops from the STC’s 75th Group Army could be used for rotation in the Tibetan theater, and the 75th GA’s artillery could be mobilized during a contingency with India. The four major reasons that the STC’s 75th GA could play such a role are improving connectivity between Tibet and the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, minor changes to the 75th GA’s force composition, recent military exercises by STC’s 75th GA in Tibet and historical precedent.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

31. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

32. The Emerging Era of Minilateralism in Indian Foreign Policy and Its Impacts on South Asian Politics

Author:: Attiq ur-Rehman
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The contemporary trends of Indian foreign policy cannot be studied without understanding the extension of New Delhi’s strategic collaborations with different stats beyond its traditional bilateral and multilateral cooperative frameworks. The prevalence of a minilateral approach to New Delhi's foreign relations has started focusing on creating different trilateral and quadrilateral engagements with diverse states to address the emerging security challenges of contemporary global power politics. These security challenges are fundamentally linked with the emerging role of China in the international system and New Delhi’s longstanding confrontational ties with Beijing. The position of the United States, and its strategic support to New Delhi, cannot be ignored in the evolving India-China confrontations in economic and strategic domains. The continuation of cooperation against common security threats originating from China has witnessed a bilateral Indo-US strategic collaboration against China in the broader Asian balance of power. Thus, the increasing shadows of minilateralism on Indian foreign policy cannot be treated separately from South Asian regional politics, where India has created a security dilemma parallel to introducing various new trends in the regional arms race of South Asia. This new strategic alignment of New Delhi with the international community tries to counter the increasing role of China in the South Asian region, where Pakistan provides a gateway to China for its South Asian entry. Therefore, the central theme of this paper revolves around the newly evolved era of minilateralism in New Delhi's foreign relations and their impacts on the politics of nuclearized subcontinent due to Islamabad's strong trading ties with China. This paper is an academic endeavour to provide a comprehensive understanding of New Delhi's increasing reliance on minilateralism and its relevance with the decades-long India-Pakistan rivalry.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Regional Security, and Minilateralism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, and India

33. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Socio-Cultural and Political Implications for Pakistan Amid Covid19 and the Way Forward

Author:: Mubeen Adnan and Reema Murad
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Through the ‘game changer’ project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is aiming to stabilize its western part by promoting investment and economic development in its neighbour to the West, Pakistan, which will lead to a boost in the Pakistani economy through investments in infrastructure and construction of gas and oil pipeline. There is also the aim of reducing extremism in the Xinjiang region. However, there are several social, cultural and political changes that the project has the potential to bring about in Pakistan. This research work has made an attempt to understand the variousimplications of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor on Pakistan as well as how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted CPEC and the path ahead as the world slowly transitions out of COVID-19. This research paper has used secondary sources in order to answer these pertinent topics. Major opportunities which Pakistan and China have gained through this ChinaPakistan economic Corridor as well as some challenges are also discussed.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Opportunity
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

34. Deciphering Pakistan Navy’s Role in CPEC Security: A Comprehensive Security Approach

Author:: Shabana Fayyaz and Nabeel Hussain
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Contemporary geo-political and geo-economics potentialities creates new horizons for the bilateral relations between states. These potential arrangements require security as a pre-requisite, both traditional and nontraditional domain. Pakistan Navy is dealing with these security threats from a comprehensive security approach. Through Task Force-88 and Task Force-150 as well as the Force Protection Battalion (FPB) for the security of CPEC from foreign actors, it has made enormous efforts to protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from new challenges and threats. This demonstrates that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Pakistan Navy might accomplish compressive security through joint efforts. The protection and defence of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and the maritime-based economy are also enshrined in Pakistan's maritime doctrine. The Pakistan Navy's active engagement in Pakistan's security sector has also opened doors for the improvement of bilateral ties between various countries through the AMAN Exercises, a global collaboration of 45 nations to combat rising security threats.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Non-Traditional Threats, and CPEC
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and South Asia

35. Impacts of Saudi-Israel Relations on the Middle East: An Analysis

Author:: Zahid Yaseen, Muhammad Muzaffar, and Kinza Tariq
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This qualitative study aims to analyze the impact of Saudi-Israel relations on the Middle East. The study also focused on the reaction of Arab countries to their bilateral ties and incidents that have arisen in the Middle East as a direct result of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The deteriorating condition of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia wreaked havoc throughout the region. The United States plays a pivotal role in the politics of the Middle East; therefore, a nation that is willing to operate as the United States' right hand was sorely needed in the region. Israel, a country that is not recognized on a global scale, has set up shop in that vacated seat. Together, they aid proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which contributes to instability in the region. The only thing that could diminish the damage would be a concerted effort by Muslim states against Israel.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Instability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

36. NATO's Strategic Concept: Implications for Greece and Türkiye

Author:: Nikolaos Lampas
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: This article analyses the impact of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept on its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean and its implications for Greek-Turkish relations. We analyse the application of NATO’s new strategic concept in the Eastern Mediterranean by focusing on the case study of Greek-Turkish tensions and NATO’s role in de-escalation efforts. The case study of Greek-Turkish relations is vital for two reasons. Firstly, because of NATO’s renewed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and secondly, because the complicated relationship between the two countries has the potential to disrupt NATO’s unity. The findings of this article suggest that while NATO’s intention is to adapt to evolving security challenges, its new strategic concept has done little to de-escalate the tensions between Greece and Türkiye. Despite the Alliance’s commitment to collective defence and conflict resolution, the longstanding disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean have persisted, often with increased intensity. In conclusion, NATO’s new strategic concept acknowledges the burgeoning complexities in the Eastern Mediterranean, yet falls markedly short of introducing effective measures to de-escalate the longstanding tensions between Greece and Türkiye. While the document perceptively addresses the need for heightened engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean and highlights the myriad security challenges, including territorial disputes, migration issues, and the competition for energy resources, it lacks a clear actionable framework for mitigating the discord between these two member states.
Topic:: NATO, International Security, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Turkey, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean

37. Historical relations between Brazil and Paraguay: negotiations and quarrels behind Itaipu Dam

Author:: Camilo Pereira Carneiro Filho and Tomaz Espósito Neto
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: In the context of Brazil-Paraguay historical relations, the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam on the Paraná River – on the border between the two countries – was one of the most important initiatives (in political, economic and energy terms). The events between Brazil and Paraguay involving the Itaipu project are part of South America's geopolitics. In this sense, the present article will focus on the negotiations that preceded and continued throughout the construction of the plant and the treaties and main events and agreements that established the criteria for the operation of the hydroelectric power plant. The Itaipu Treaty, signed in 1973, provides for the revision of financial clauses by 2023. Thus, the present work aims to examine the relations between Brazil and Paraguay throughout history and analyze the impacts of the Itaipu Dam on this relationship. This article is qualitative research, from the perspective of International Relations and Political Geography, enriched with cartography created by the authors with Arc GIS software.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Dams
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, and Paraguay

38. The Indonesia-Australia partnership to counter radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia

Author:: Ali Maksum and Hafidz Ridha Try Sjahputra
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Indonesia and Australia have always been helpful partners since Indonesian Independence in 1945. However, the relationship was worsened after Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005 as well as Australian embassy bombing in 2004 that killed many Australians. Thus, using Australian perspective, this article attempts to examine the response of Australian government in dealing with terrorism problems in Indonesia as well as the feedback from Indonesia. The research reveals that given the fact that Australia has many interests in Indonesia added with the geographical proximity, it is naturally urged to resolve the terrorism issues in Indonesia. The study found out that Australia proposed some programs to Indonesia due to its domestic interest and international factors. At the same time, Indonesia was also the main beneficiary of Australian counter terrorism policy.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, Partnerships, and Radicalization
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Australia

39. La Politica de Francia en el Norte de África y África Occidental: Nuevas Narrativas, Viejas Legitimidades

Author:: Lucía G. del Moral
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: La política francesa en el Norte de África y África Occidental se caracteriza por su carácter continuista con pocos elementos novedosos en la última década. La llegada del Presidente Macron al Elíseo estuvo marcada por una reafirmación del compromiso con África (2017-2022) que ha tenido resultados limitados. El artículo examina la posición de Francia hacia África en el marco de las relaciones de cooperación establecidas a través de diversos instrumentos bilaterales y multilaterales. Primero, el artículo estudia el carácter unilateral de la política francesa en África y su relevancia como actor con capacidad de influencia sobre las dinámicas regionales. Segundo, se analiza la posición de Francia en el marco Vecindad Europea y su postura en relación a la reconfiguración de la política regional. Por último, el artículo profundiza en dinámicas regionales que modulan o condicionan la respuesta de Francia hacia el la región norte y occidental de África, con especial relevancia de la creciente rivalidad entre Argelia y Marruecos como eje vertebrador de las relaciones internacionales en la región.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: France, North Africa, and West Africa

40. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

41. Understanding the Baku-Tehran Relationship

Author:: Nina Miholjcic
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Even though Azerbaijan and Iran have maintained cordial ties over the years, this has been punctured by evidently turbulent periods of constrained diplomatic and political rhetoric, which has produced occasional volatility in the bilateral relationship. Ever since Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, Baku and Tehran have remained cautious and circumspect in their interactions whilst managing to avoid open conflict. Such vigilance is due for the most part to the effects of contrasting foreign policies, divergent choices of allies and foes, different constitutional arrangements, and contrary ethnic‑ and identity‑based perceptions and postures. Such and similar points of friction explain why Azerbaijan and Iran continue to be wary of one another in their bilateral communication and diplomatic relations.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

42. Time to Get U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations on Track Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region. This new geopolitical reality creates challenges and opportunities for the United States. Azerbaijan’s victory in the war means that NATO member Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus, and by extension Central Asia, is on the rise. If Washington and Ankara can get their bilateral relationship back on track, Turkey’s ascendancy in the region can benefit broader U.S. strategic interests. In the aftermath of the conflict there is also an opportunity for America to increase and deepen regional economic and energy cooperation. However, Moscow now has troops—either by invitation or by occupation—in all three countries of the South Caucasus and in Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian. From the American point of view, this does not help bring stability or security to the region. Azerbaijan is in a strategic region where many U.S. geopolitical interests converge. Since 2001, Azerbaijan has proven to be a reliable partner for America against terrorism as well as in the war in Afghanistan. With the new geopolitical reality in the region, U.S. policymakers would be remiss to ignore this limited window of opportunity for improving Washington’s relationship with Baku.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

43. Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

Author:: Filip Grzegorzewski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Indo–French Defence Cooperation in the Light of Regional Security Balance in South Asia

Author:: Mukesh Shankar Bharti
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to describe the regional security challenges to India in South Asia. Since the partition of India in 1947, the country has continuously been under external threat as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism. For this purpose, the article highlighted the core hotspots where India has major border issues with China in the Himalayan terrain. India has been facing a bigger security challenge from China and Pakistan in the South Asia region. This article analyses the defence ties between India and France in the context of security. India's neorealist approaches expand its strategic partnership in global politics. Therefore, India has been getting strategic support from the French side whenever India seeks support in a critical situation. The article uses the methods of case study and discourse analysis to answer the question and find out the study's relevance. As a result of severe security threats, India had to negotiate the purchase of defence equipment from France. India had to buy Rafael fighter jet, submarine and other heavy military weapons. Indo-French relations are stronger than in the past and will develop as friendly relations in the future.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: South Asia, Indonesia, Asia, and France

45. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:: Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:: Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

47. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:: Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

48. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

49. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

50. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS