Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: North Korea / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. North Cranks up Nukes—and Slams Down the Phone

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

3. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:: Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

4. La política sin sol. Organizaciones cristianas y relaciones intercoreanas bajo el gobierno de Moon Jae-In, 2017-2022

Author:: María del Pilar Álvarez
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: La llegada de Moon Jae-In a la presidencia generó grandes expectativas entre las iglesias cristianas vinculadas a la Política del Sol. Recuperando categorías analíticas para el estudio de las redes trasnacionales de advocacy, este artículo examina a través del análisis cualitativo de documentos oficiales, sitios oficiales de internet y entrevistas semi-estructuradas realizadas a los miembros de las iglesias, el rol del cristianismo en las políticas de unificación bajo el gobierno de Moon JaeIn. El artículo sostiene que, frente a la negativa del gobierno de Moon de rehabilitar las acciones directas de la sociedad civil surcoreana en el Norte, las iglesias que apoyaban al gobierno redefinieron sus repertorios de acción y marcos normativos sin romper sus vínculos con el gobierno, mientras que las iglesias que se oponían al presidente reforzaron el activismo bumerang para presionar y denunciar al gobierno.
Topic:: Religion, Transnational Actors, Christianity, and Unification
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. Dominating the Superpower: A Bounded Rationality Approach to Nuclear Proliferation and Inhibition in the U.S. / North Korea Dyad

Author:: Sercan Canbolat and Stephen Benedict Dyson
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Leadership, and Perception
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. Missile Defense in South Korea: Will President Yoon Heed China’s Concerns?

Author:: Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Earlier this week, some residents of Seoul, South Korea, received an emergency alert to prepare for a potential evacuation following military reports that North Korea had fired a projectile southward (Yonhap, May 31). The alerts, which stemmed from an errant North Korean satellite launch that sparked grave but fleeting alarm, underscore the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) growing apprehensions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic and cruise missile development and testing, coupled with its expanding nuclear arsenal (NK News, January 1). In addition, North Korea’s long-range artillery systems remain a persistent threat, which not only endanger counter-force targets in South Korea, but also threaten counter-value targets, in particular Seoul, the nation’s capital and largest metropolis.
Topic:: Weapons, Missile Defense, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

7. China’s Interests in North Korean Denuclearization: Reducing the Northeast Asian Security Dilemma

Author:: Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The existential North Korean nuclear and missile threats negatively impact the Asia-Pacific security environment for the United States, South Korea, Japan and Australia. In response, these countries have taken countermeasures to defend themselves against the growing danger from North Korea. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities indirectly worsen China’s “security dilemma” by spurring the U.S. and its allies to devote greater resources to maintaining a strong security presence in Northeast Asia. This situation is illustrated by Beijing’s consistent criticism of Seoul for allowing the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system in South Korea since 2017. Although South Korea has sought to reassure China that the system is aimed at counteracting the threat from North Korea, Beijing has maintained that the presence of the U.S. THAAD in Korea “clearly undermines China’s strategic security interests” (PRC Ministry Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], August 10, 2022). Although China has been accused of not putting enough effort into the denuclearization process, achieving success in eliminating nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would serve China’s security interests in several ways, including by removing a powerful justification for the U.S. and China’s neighbors to devote resources to regional security. In part due to North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, South Korea, Japan and Australia have all recent strengthened their respective missile development programs. In 2021, the United States also lifted the restrictions it had imposed on South Korea limiting the range and payload of its ballistic missiles. According to previous South Korea president Moon Jae, this has removed “security shackles”—allowing South Korea to regain its missile autonomy (Korea Herald, May 22, 2021).
Topic:: Weapons, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

8. Sweden’s Peacekeeping Contributions through the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Author:: Gabriel Jonsson
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper investigates what role Sweden, by participating in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) since 1953, has played to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. What specific contributions has the NNSC done? How important are they in comparison to other factors that have preserved peace? These issues are analyzed by comparing the tasks of the NNSC, as defined by the Armistice Agreement, and the Commission’s work. Consideration is also given to the Commission’s composition and whether its role has changed throughout the years or not. North Korea’s policy to dismantle the NNSC in the 1990s is included, as are the Commission’s responses and the subsequent reorganization of its work.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Peace, and Military
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, Poland, Switzerland, Sweden, United States of America, and Czechoslovakia

9. Tying Human Rights to U.S.-DPRK-ROK Negotiations

Author:: Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: For over three decades, the United States and the international community has been attempting to engage North Korea diplomatically, aiming for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. The Kim family regime has been committing crimes against humanity, but human rights concerns have been discounted by U.S. and other negotiators, fearing they would be an obstacle to a negotiated solution to the grave military and security challenges Pyongyang poses. North Korea has breached each and every one of the international obligations it has assumed, from imembership in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework to the Six Party Talks to the 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While its negotiating counterparts have neglected human rights concerns in multilateral and bilateral talks, North Korea has continued to develop and test its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It is time for a new paradigm, that brings human rights into the conversation, in a bilateral or multilateral setting.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Appeasement
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

10. Getting North Korean Human Rights Right, Now and for the Future

Author:: George Hutchinson
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the agency, dignity and rights of the individual, North Korea’s collectivist notion of freedoms are conditioned to preserve and perpetuate the Kim regime, resulting in the denial of human rights for North Koreans. Pyongyang’s defensive outbursts and angry rhetoric in defense of its distorted definition of sovereignty has deeply affected South Korea’s policy approach over the issue of North Korean human rights. Sensitive to Pyongyang’s feelings, South Korea’s progressive camp prefers to engage with North Korea in the wishful hopes that relations will gradually improve. The conservative camp at times uses the Kim regime’s sensitivity to dial up pressure on issues such as denuclearization. Progressives are willing to concede aid and benefits up front to get to inter-Korean engagement while conservatives make these concessions conditional. Neither approach has alleviated the brutal denial of human rights in North Korea. This paper explores South Korea’s “wicked problem” of partisan treatment of North Korean human rights through careful examination of present and past administrations and concludes with recommendations for a middle ground safe enough so that neither progressives nor conservatives feel they have strayed too far outside of the partisan boundaries of their respective camps
Topic:: Human Rights, Authoritarianism, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

11. North Korea’s Plan for Unification by Federation: What It Really Means

Author:: Tara O
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea has long pursued “unification by federation.” This has been a non-kinetic option of dominating the entire Korean Peninsula under North Korea’s Kim Family Regime’s totalitarian rule and creating a socialist society. Kim Jong-un even described this as the “One state, Two Systems” formula that China uses for Hong Kong. In Kim Il-sung’s Three Great Charters for Motherland Unification, the Koryo Federation Unification Scheme is one of the charters. The prerequisites to “unification by federation” include abolishing the National Security Act, dismantling the National Intelligence Service, legalizing pro-North Korea groups, and withdrawing U.S. Forces Korea--all to occur in South Korea. Kim Ilsung’s other two charters have a similar theme of expelling the U.S. military from South Korea. Over the years, North Korea has used different terms, such as Koryo Federation and Low-Level Federation. Surprisingly, South Korean Presidents Moon Jae-in, Rho Moo-hyun, and Kim Dae-jung have supported “Low-Level Federation.” This paper explains in detail what unification by federation entails, its history, and its ramifications. Unification through federation is dangerous, because it is about a unified Korea that is not free.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Socialism, Unification, and Federation
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

12. China’s Role in Korean Security Issues

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China’s great power over North Korea eroded when COVID-19 control measures ended most trade with the Kim regime. Moreover, China’s conflicts with various countries mean Beijing cannot afford to alienate any friend, and Kim Jong Un knows that. Beijing is still influential in Seoul, but it lost much of its clout when the conservative-leaning candidate prevailed in the March 2022 presidential election. China will also suffer a loss in standing because it is paying less attention to Korean affairs and is closing itself off to the world.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Elections, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

13. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:: Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

14. Gender and Migration from North Korea

Author:: Erin Engstran, Caitlin Flynn, and Meg Harris
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Women make up more than 80 percent of North Korean migrants to South Korea. This paper provides a gendered analysis of their migration and offers recommendations to address the systematic oppression and abuse of North Korean migrant women and girls. Gendered human rights abuses and societal shifts in gender roles due to famine contributed to women leaving in record numbers. On the journey, often via China, women face human trafficking fueled by China’s skewed sex ratios, sexual violence, and the threat of extradition back to North Korea where defectors are imprisoned, tortured, or killed. Even those who successfully complete the journey suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, discrimination, and difficulty adjusting into South Korean society. Interventions and policies must acknowledge the gendered dimension of migration to effectively address the harm North Korean women and girls experience.
Topic:: International Relations, Gender Issues, Human Rights, Migration, Women, Refugees, Gender Based Violence, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

15. Searching for Legitimacy? The Motivations behind Inter-Korean Dialogue during the Mid-1980s

Author:: Stephen Ranger
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Throughout the history of inter-Korean relations, the process of engagement between 1984 and 1985 has been of little focus among studies. Yet it is worthy of close analysis as it occurred during a critical time when Cold War tensions were mounting with shifts in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the upcoming Summer Olympics in Seoul. This article reveals the way in which the complex international environment shaped inter-Korean dialogue, particularly within the context of how each side was also seeking support from the Soviet Union. Crucially, it will show that inter-Korean dialogue formed an important source of legitimacy for the two Koreas, both domestically and internationally. This has ramifications for today where the two Koreas are seeking out contacts with one another within a regional order increasingly being shaped by China.
Topic:: International Relations, Cold War, and Nationalism
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

16. Has the Ghost that Ruined the Country Been Resurrected? The Puzzle of South Korea’s Domestic and Foreign Policies

Author:: Jimmyn Pare
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Under changing dynamics such as US-China relations, the domestic and foreign policies of South Korea’s new government under President Moon Jae-in have shown favor to China and North Korea, which is somewhat contrary to previous administrations that maintained pro-American policies. This situation is very similar to the geopolitical circumstances of the Joseon Dynasty during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before Korea was occupied by Japan. This article analyzes and compares the geopolitical situations and Korea’s domestic and foreign policies of the two periods. By doing so, this article argues that policy makers should be more prudent when deliberating what should be achieved in order to enhance the future of Korea, rather than how to ensure their own personal legacy or ambition for political power.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Reunification
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

17. Enhancing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation through International Cluster: Implications for the Kaesong Industrial Complex

Author:: Hwy-Chang Moon and Wenyan Yin
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: In spite of the high potential of economic cooperation between the two Koreas, political tensions and international sanctions have discouraged the sustainability of economic outcomes. To overcome these political challenges, this article introduces two frameworks of international cluster and global value chains (GVCs) for developing effective and sustainable economic exchanges. These frameworks are applied to the case of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and analysis of the reasons for its failure is provided. This article then suggests two strategic solutions for the KIC: minimizing the role of North Korea to a few GVC activities, and encouraging more foreign companies’ investment. Unlike preceding studies that overemphasize the political challenges in inter-Korean economic relationships, we emphasize that an effective approach through internationalization can not only contribute to sustainable economic development but also ease political tensions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Business, Economic Cooperation, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

18. The two Koreas´ Relations with China: Vision and Challenge

Author:: EunSook Yang
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The relationship between China and the two Koreas can be considered as a friendship that is not completely reliable. North Korea and China have been considered strong allies by the outside world, but questions arise nowadays about whether that relationship is based on a true friendship. The relationship between South Korea and China is a somewhat ambiguous one. There exists a complex situation and dilemmas in that trilateral relation. This article examines the current trilateral relations between China and the two Koreas in order to draw the position of each other. For this purpose, we explore three different approaches: China´s position toward North Korea and South Korea; the position of the two Koreas toward China and their defence; and the regime survival of North Korea and the political and economic interests of South Korea. The analysis of the relationship between China and the two Koreas is based on the context of a shared history, culture and the rapidly changing international economic and political situation together with the regional security hazards caused by the nuclear weapons essays and missile tests of North Korea.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, History, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

19. Changing Roles of the EU and ASEAN on Peace in the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Sangmin Bae and Martyn de Bruyn
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Continuing tension and competition among Northeast Asian countries complicate the degree to which North and South Korea can actively garner support from regional powers. The involvement of regional powers has not been effective means to overcome the status quo. Bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States, while critical for tension reduction in the region, have not been able to produce an agreement. Instead, international institutions from outside the region may be able to help negotiate a peace agreement that brings acceptable levels of security to all parties involved. This article examines the past and future roles of international institutions located outside of the region -- notably the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Exploring the relations of the EU and ASEAN with the two Koreas, the article assesses their potential as mediators in the process of creating a lasting peace between the Koreas.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Peace, Strategic Competition, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

20. Why EU’s Multilateralism matters in Korea’s Peace Process?

Author:: Sunhee Park
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Despite South Korea’s expectations to gain the EU’s support during the 2018 momentum for peace on the Korean peninsula, the EU exhibited reluctance to lend its support. In light of this event, this study looks into why the positions of South Korea and the EU differ on the Korean peace process to gain a better understanding of the EU’s approach. Specifically, this study examines how, for the EU, the Korean Peninsula is a topic to be approached within the EU’s multilateral principle framework on external relations, unlike the approach taken by the United States. Through a review of the EU’s multilateral approach, this study suggests how South Korea may be able to request the EU to take a more active role, albeit a limited role due to the US’s powerful influence over the Korean peninsula, in supporting South Korea’s peacebuilding process such as the Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility.
Topic:: European Union, Multilateralism, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

21. Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:: Christopher Lawrence
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. Political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, History, Infrastructure, Crisis Management, and Normalization
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

22. Moon Jae-in: Putting North Korea at the Center

Author:: Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While President Moon Jae-in has a calmer demeanor than his mentor and friend, former President Roh Moo-hyun, there can be no doubt that his vision for transforming Northeast Asia is as far-reaching. While Moon has been more careful to assuage the U.S. president, less abrasive in his language toward Japan, and more strategic in reaching out to leaders in China and Russia, his strategy of putting North Korea at the forefront of regional realignment has similar geopolitical ambition. The objective is the rejuvenation of a reintegrated peninsula with the capacity to steer actions by all of the great powers rather than falling prey again to their machinations that are not in Korea’s interest.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

23. Partisans, Pilots, PSYOPS, and Prisoners: North Korea’s Vietnam Odyssey

Author:: James F. Durand
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper examines North Korea’s dispatch of pilots, psychological operations, and tunneling specialists to aid the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Growing American and South Korean involvement in Vietnam provided an opportunity for North Korea’s increasingly assertive military leaders to better understand their adversaries. Pyongyang’s secret deployment was facilitated by the “Partisan Generals,” who sought to fight the Americans in the sky, demoralize the South Koreans on the ground, and perfect the techniques of underground warfare. North Korea provided material assistance that was significant given its limited resources. Additionally, North Korea detained South Korean Prisoners of War captured by the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. English, Korean, and Vietnamese language materials are used throughout this paper.
Topic:: Cold War, Conflict, Vietnam War, Psychological Operations, and Prisoners of War
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, and United States of America

24. The Relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan: 1950 to 2018

Author:: Michael MacArthur Bosack
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United Nations Command is the multinational headquarters that led the allied forces in the Korean War. The command’s Military Armistice Commission supervises the Armistice Agreement. While the United Nations Command and its activities are common knowledge in the Republic of Korea, the command’s long-standing organization and functions in Japan are less well known. This relationship began in 1950 and is codified in the 1954 United Nations-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The command’s rear area headquarters, the aptly named United Nations Command-Rear Headquarters, has managed this relationship since 1957. After decades of few changes, the United Nations Command and its Sending States broadened traditional roles and missions from Japan beginning in the early 2000s. This led to expanded activities within the legal framework and security mandate governing the United Nations Command’s relationship with Japan, strengthening Japan’s ties with the command’s member states, and supporting the “maximum pressure” campaign against North Korea. This paper examines the relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan, beginning with the institutions and interests underpinning the relationship. Next, it describes the Status of Forces Agreement and how the relationship functions. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant policy issues, limitations to greater cooperation, and opportunities for expanded roles within the framework of the relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Military Affairs, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, United Nations, and United States of America

25. The North Korean Détente: Peace Prospects on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Jonathan Lim
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper conceptualizes the emerging détente within inter-Korean relations as evidence of tangible transformations within North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy, establishing how this phenomenon represents a unique and conclusive opportunity for peace and engagement. It contextualizes the inter-Korean and Singapore summits as foundations for the détente, before expanding upon the nature of the détente through the contrasting objectives of North and South Korea, and the transitional nature of domestic affairs in North Korea. The article establishes the bona fide nature of North Korea’s détente, as revealed by a direct connection between North Korea’s international diplomatic gestures vis-av-vis transitional domestic circumstances; involving incremental economic modernization and political liberalization under a shift in focus within Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin Line policy. This analysis departs from and orthodox Western interpretation of inter-Korean relations, providing a holistic analysis of inter-Korean affairs and North Korean domestic politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore

26. Overcoming US-North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach

Author:: Linus Hagström and Magnus Hagström
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The International Spectator
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Periods of mutual enmity in US-North Korean relations are typically interrupted by more conciliatory gestures. How can the many twists and turns in this relationship be explained and hopefully overcome so that more long-lasting détente is accomplished? Drawing eclectically on realism and constructivism, we conclude that a nuclear deal should address not only North Korea’s interests in security and regime survival, but also its status concerns. Applying the same theories to the other part of the dyad – the US – we conclude that it may now have material interests in ameliorating the relationship, but that such a development requires US foreign policy discourse to cease depicting North Korea as “irrational” and “evil”.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Realism, and Constructivism
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

27. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

28. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

29. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? The View from Russia

Author:: Artyom Lukin
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter provides an overview of Russian expert commentary found in Russia’s media during the run-up to the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and in its aftermath, covering the period of January to April 2019. The chapter also covers Kim’s first meeting with Vladimir Putin that took place in Vladivostok in late April. With regard to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, Russia’s commentariat traditionally splits into three groups. The first includes specialists who are more or less neutral toward North Korea. The second one is formed by experts who sympathize more with Pyongyang and tend to blame Washington and American allies for anything that goes wrong on the Korean Peninsula. The third group, now almost extinct in Russia, represents liberal and pro-Western pundits who loath the North Korean regime and view it as a major threat to international, and Russia’s, security. Similar to Western media, the Russian press has extensively covered the preparations for the Hanoi summit, the event itself, and its outcomes. The tone of the Russian reporting did not differ much from that of the world’s media. Most of the Russian commentators sounded moderately optimistic prior to the two-day summit, expecting that at least something would come out of it. That the second Kim-Trump rendezvous failed to produce any deliverables came as a somewhat disappointing surprise to most Russian observers. Still, the general mood remained cautiously optimistic even after Hanoi’s apparent failure, with the prevailing majority of Russia’s Korea watchers believing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington would continue and might eventually succeed. The Russian commentary on the Vladivostok summit was generally positive, hailing the symbolism of Moscow’s return to the major leagues of Korean Peninsula geopolitics. At the same time, many experts pointed out that, beyond displaying the decorum of the traditional Russia-DPRK friendship, the Kim-Putin summit produced modest outcomes.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, and North Korea

30. Japanese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Japanese coverage of the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un as well as the broader spectrum of international relations over North Korea has been intensive over the first months of 2019. Assessments of what to expect and then what really happened involve interpretations of North Korean intentions, the character of U.S. diplomacy, the role of South Korean diplomacy, the impact of China, and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Each development over this period has been scrutinized closely, often with an addendum: What does it mean for Japan? The fate of North Korea looms very large for a nation fearful of a missile attack from it, cognizant of the absence of any settlement after 1945 of its claims against Japan’s occupational conduct, and nervous about the regional balance of power and U.S. trustworthiness as an ally and nuclear umbrella, when the United States itself is quickly coming under threat from the North’s nuclear weapons. Below, the views on the political right range from Sankei Shimbun to the establishmentoriented Yomiuri Shimbun, and on the political left from Asahi Shimbun to Tokyo Shimbun. While editorials figure heavily into the analysis, much of the regular news coverage also serves to differentiate Japanese sources. What negative outcomes does Japan fear from the success or failure of ongoing diplomacy over North Korea? In recent coverage we can identify at least eight worrisome outcomes: 1) failure of the talks resulting in a war scare beyond what occurred in 2017; 2) suspension of U.S.-DPRK talks and China as well as Russia breaking with the UN sanctions regime, fueling prospects of three-way coordination with China taking the lead; 3) discord about how to proceed with damaging U.S.-ROK relations, weakening the U.S. military presence in South Korea at a cost to Japan’s defense; 4) South Korea splitting with the U.S. on the North and raising the specter of inter-Korean nationalism deemed hostile to Japan; 5) success of the talks based on “America First,” agreeing to a deal on denuclearization (as a process) that leaves Japan’s concerns about missiles and abductees aside, isolating Japan; 6) success of the talks leading toward reunification, also strengthening national identity versus Japan; 7) a new geopolitical framework replacing the talks, as the U.S. retreats from the region; and 8) a period of instability, where Trump only delays making decisions and Japan is left frustrated. Four general responses to the Hanoi Summit and its early aftermath could be discerned in Japanese publications: 1) Trump outfoxed Kim, has a strategy reassuring to Japan, and the outcome in sight is positive; 2) Trump erred in his diplomacy but has been brought to his senses and now will follow a course welcome in Japan, however uncertain the outcome; 3) the situation is growing more dangerous, Trump does not know what to do, and Japan has to keep its eyes on the other players; and 4) Trump will renew diplomacy, keeping Japan off balance in coordinating with the U.S. as Japan struggles with its isolation in this diplomacy. When anticipating what should come next, sources understandably suggest what their own government should do. Many in Japan emphasize the abductions issue and willingness to offer economic assistance when that along with denuclearization and missiles is addressed. One can discern how Abe Shinzo should proceed in diplomacy with each of the leaders active in the region. Of course, most attention centers on how he should deal with Trump or the alliance.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and North Korea

31. South Korean Print Media on Why the Hanoi Summit Failed and What Comes Next

Author:: Kimberly Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since the first historic summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last June in Singapore yielded a two-page joint agreement without a clear definition of or a timeline for denuclearization, expectations and misgivings further escalated for the second U.S.-DPRK summit, which was officially announced during Trump’s State of the Union address to be held on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam. As the dates approached, a hailstorm of news reports from Seoul hinted at the possibility of a “small deal” to be signed in Hanoi; North Korea would make progress on denuclearization, which would likely involve dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility and/or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in return, the U.S. would offer economic aid by easing sanctions, probably along with officially ending the Korean War and building liaison offices. This forecast partially stemmed from the political plight Trump faced in Washington due to the impending Mueller report with a Democrat-controlled House and the 2020 election nearing, meaning that he would have to show some progress in nuclear negotiations with Kim so as to break through the ongoing domestic challenge. Against this backdrop, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said at Stanford University1 in late January, “President Trump is ready to end this war [the Korean War]. It is over. It is done.” This was followed by remarks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during an interview2 with CBS in mid-February, “It’s our full intention of getting a good outcome in exchange for relieving those sanctions [economic sanctions.]” Such comments hailed the possibility of a deal quite favorable to Kim. News delivered just prior to the summit, that South Korean president Moon Jae-in and Trump shared a positive outlook for the meeting over the phone, hyped the likelihood of a promising result in Hanoi between Washington and Pyongyang. Moon, during the phone conversation3 with Trump, suggested his vision of inter-Korean economic cooperation as one of the “corresponding measures” that could be awarded to Kim, lessening the burden on Washington’s shoulders, if North Korea gives up its nuclear program and, according to the Blue House, Trump gave a positive response. Moon reportedly said that South Korea is “ready to take over the role of undertaking anything from reconnecting railways and roads between Seoul and Pyongyang to other inter-Korean economic projects.”4 Such an approach was brought up earlier during an interview which the special adviser to the South Korean president, Moon Chung-in, had with Joongang in January,5 right after Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address came out; he proposed incremental economic exchanges, limited to only between Seoul and Pyongyang, to bring about the North’s denuclearization, and said, “economic exchanges between the two Koreas can exceptionally be exempted from the target of UN sanctions as the two Koreas of the same ethnic group have a special relationship with each other.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

32. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. North Korea’s Sharp Power and the Divide Over Korean Identities

Author:: Aram Hur
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter examines the nature and motivations of North Korea’s sharp power toward South Korea. Unlike China or Russia, to secure long-term survival, North Korea ultimately needs cooperation from the rival democracy it seeks to undermine. I argue that this produces a particular North Korean brand of “Trojan horse” sharp power: the hijacking of South Korea’s value diplomacy apparatus to disseminate a dual narrative. Externally, North Korea aims to project soft power hand in hand with South Korea to the international community, while internally, it exploits South Korea’s nationalist divisions to its desired ends. I illustrate this strategy through in-depth case studies of North Korea’s most significant sharp efforts in 2018. The analysis contests a simplistic understanding of sharp power and shines a different light on the regime’s recent diplomatic efforts.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

34. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:: James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

35. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

36. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:: Robert Sutter
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

37. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

38. The Image of the North Korean in Contemporary South Korean Cinema

Author:: Roman Husarski
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Confidential Assignment (Kongjo, Kim Sung-hoon), released on January 18, 2017 between DPRK nuclear tests, tells a story of two special agents. One is from North Korea and the other one from South Korea, and they unite to fight against a common enemy. Extraordinarily, the North Korean agent is portrayed as more formidable than his South Korean counterpart who is unable to match him in every field. Also, the North Korean agent is portrayed by a Korean super star, Hyun-Bin. In this paper, I analyze two other similarly themed movies: The Net (Kŭmul, Kim Ki-Duk) and Steel Rain (Kangch’ŏlbi, Yang Wooseok). All of them were released recently and were huge commercial successes in South Korea. The aim of the following paper is to show and analyze the evolution of the image of North Korean characters in South Korean cinema. During the analysis, the question of how the change from villain to super hero was possible is answered. The way in which the movies talk about inter-Korean relations and how they portray both countries is particularly important to understand the current political sentiments in the Peninsula and how it can affect the Moon Jae-in presidency.
Topic:: Mass Media, Media, Conflict, Theater, and Cinema
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

39. North Korea’s Nuclear Program through the Lens of Strategıc Culture

Author:: Emine Akçadağ Alagöz
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper presents an application of the concept of strategic culture as a possible way to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program. The goal is to illustrate that the strategic culture approach is a useful method to understand North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear capability, demonstrating the link between culture and behavior through Alastair Johnston’s methodology. The question of the formation of a North Korean strategic culture will be scrutinized through scoring the speeches and written messages of three North Korean leaders in terms of the presence of key cultural assumptions. Then, it will accordingly suggest that North Korea’s strategic culture, affecting the practices of its security policy, leads this country toward an active defense strategy, which implies a credible nuclear deterrence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Kim Jong-un, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

40. National Security Strategy of Iran and North Korea

Author:: Muhammad Faisal and Rana Eijaz Ahmad
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: In the contemporary phase of international politics, national security strategy (NSC) is considered as a primary factor in the process of state-crafting. It addresses the key concerns; such as domestic, regional and global threats. It also focuses on the policy framework for the security of the state. In this age of uncertain geo-political environment, every nation-state has adopted a particular strategy in a certain strategic environment to minimize their strategic threats. Thus, the NSC is very important for enhancing the national security of the state. It also very helpful in maintaining the regional and global strategic balance. Contemporary formation of nation-state has defined some certain parameters for the formation of national security. These parameters are very important for achieving several particular objectives such as global strategic stability, regional hegemony and the survival of the political regime in the domestic political domain. The development of NSC has become more complex in the modern politico-strategic than the past ages. This research article finds the parameters of national security strategy which have been adopted by Iran and North Korea to maintain the strategic balance in the regional and global arena. The article concludes that Iran and North Korea must find an independent decision-making syndrome to accelerate the process of national security in the existing strategic domain.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

41. Can North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis Be Resolved?

Author:: G. Ivashentsov
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: TENSION around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear and missile weapon systems has become a new serious factor in global strategic sta- bility. Previously, during the cold war era, the only tool of control over strategic weapons was the relationship between Moscow and Washington. At present, the international situation has radically changed. New nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – regard- less of whether or not the original five members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledge them as such, are not under the control of either Washington or Moscow or Beijing: they act at their own discretion, as they see fit. The current polycentrism of nuclear proliferation is based on region- al rivalry. India has created its nuclear arsenal as a counterweight to China; Pakistan, as a counterweight to India; and Israel, as a shield against Arab states. None of these states, however, are seeking global supremacy and so their nuclear status is taken by the world community more or less in stride.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

42. The 10th Special Measures Agreement between the U.S. and South Korea: Analysis and Implications for Northeast Asia

Author:: Elton J. Chun
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United States and the Republic of Korea concluded the 10th Special Measures Agreement on February 10, 2019. The two countries agreed to a one-year agreement after difficult negotiations in which Washington demanded that Seoul increase the amount paid to offset the costs of stationing American forces in Korea. Since 1991, Washington and Seoul have concluded 10 Special Measures Agreements. Unlike the previous five-year agreement, the 10th SMA was a “stopgap deal” that covered a one year of bilateral defense budgets with an option of extending the agreement for an additional year; it was the first SMA negotiated by the Trump administration. This article examines the 10th Special Measures Agreement, exploring the history of defense cost sharing between the two countries, effects on South Korea, implications for coordinating policy on North Korea, and influences on Japan, Russia, and China. The article concludes with an assessment on how the 10th Special Measures Agreement and other factors will affect future agreements.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

43. Freeze and Advance: How North Korea Maneuvered to Get the Bomb and Prospects for Its Nuclear Future

Author:: George Hutchinson
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: U.S. administrations have opted to negotiate with North Korea in an attempt to curb its nuclear ambitions. Rather than producing their intended effect, past negotiations have inadvertently served as a vehicle for North Korea to methodically achieve its nuclear objectives. This paper presents evidence of North Korea’s decades-old drive to maneuver through negotiations while also advancing its nuclear development, including its resistance to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and its subsequent demands under the Agreed Framework which allowed Pyongyang to advance the clandestine portions of its nuclear program. The paper also explains, more specifically, how North Korea has used the negotiating process with the U.S. to achieve its objectives. Nuclear negotiations have followed a repeating cycle, with North Korea: (1) getting to the negotiating table; (2) agreeing to a freeze under a system of verification; (3) obstructing the verification process intended to monitor the freeze and then (4) blaming the U.S. for the ultimate collapse of the agreement while continuing to advance its weapons program. Finally, the paper uses the ‘repeating cycle’ framework above to assess events that have occurred during the Trump administration in order to predict probable future outcomes.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

44. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

45. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:: Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

46. Tensions in U.S.-Korea Economic Relations

Author:: Troy Stangarone
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Following a relatively successful period for U.S.-South Korea economic relations under the Bush and Obama administrations, Washington and Seoul have entered a new period of economic tension in the Trump administration. Unlike prior U.S. presidents, who placed a priority on negotiating fair rules in the United States’ economic relationships, President Trump has prioritized outcomes. As a result, one of his administration’s earliest moves was to renegotiate the KORUS Free Trade Agreement. While the results of the renegotiation were modest, they may help to expand the sale of American automobiles in the Republic of Korea in the long-run. The largest outcome of the negotiations may be to protect the Ford Motor Company from South Korean competition in the U.S. market as the company transitions to sales focused on light trucks. While the renegotiation has eased tensions for the moment, the prospect of economic engagement with North Korea, the Trump administration’s continued use of national security to erect trade barriers, and the emergence of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles could result in growing tensions in the relationship.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Free Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

47. The Evolution of Korean Studies in the Philippines

Author:: Michelle R. Palumbarit
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper examines the evolution of Korean Studies in the Republic of the Philippines. Despite a security relationship with the United Nations Command that dates to the earliest days of the Korean War, neither the government nor academic institutions considered establishing Korean Studies programs for nearly half a century. South Korean companies invested heavily in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations in the 1990s, leading to the arrival of entrepreneurs, tourists, and retirees. This created a demand for Korean language education to support the increased business activities and employment opportunities that accompanied Korean investment. Although the pattern of South Korean trade and investment activity in the Philippines was similar to its Southeast Asian neighbors, the establishment of Korean Studies in the Philippines occurred later than similar programs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Korean Studies programs in the Philippines paralleled the development of programs in other Southeast Asian nations with language training classes leading to broader studies of Korean history, economy, politics and culture.
Topic:: Education, History, Bilateral Relations, and Academia
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

48. International Collaboration Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

Author:: George Hutchinson
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The international community’s confrontation with North Korea reached crisis proportions in 2017, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches and its sixth nuclear test. In the wake of a series of high-level summits, tensions began to thaw in 2018. At the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to seek support from the international community to denuclearize. But the international community, led by the U.S. in concert with the United Nations Security Council, has already worked tirelessly over the past 26 years to coordinate efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have worked through the cycle of confrontation, crisis, discussions and agreements with North Korea. Nonetheless, all these agreements have ultimately fallen apart, allowing North Korea to advance its nuclear program. This paper focuses on two key questions: How has the international community contributed toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and what is its role in facilitating the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program? Ultimately, the success of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be measured by whether North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program. Fortunately, the international “tools” are on the table, but successfully denuclearizing North Korea will, in the end, be a matter of effectively enforcing existing international measures.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

49. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:: Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

50. Representing American Values and Interests in China

Author:: Terry Branstad
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: When I welcome visitors to the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Beijing, they often comment on a black-and-white photo of my first meeting with Xi Jinping. In the picture, the members of the 1985 Chinese agriculture delegation to Iowa stand calmly behind my desk, peering into the camera, as Xi Jinping stands unobtrusively to my right. Some visitors ask, “Ambassador Branstad, did you know this young man would become President of China?” Indeed, I did not—I treated him with the same Iowa hospitality with which I welcome all my guests. His importance as a rising leader of China, though, became increasingly apparent over the course of six gubernatorial visits I made to China during the subsequent 30 years. The same is true of U.S.-China relations. Today, I have the honor of representing the United States in the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world, one that we absolutely have to get right. During President Donald Trump’s November 2017 state visit to China, the President identified three priority tasks for the two nations’ relationship. First, work with the Chinese government to address the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Second, seek a more balanced and reciprocal trade and investment relationship. And third, partner with Chinese authorities to reduce the flow of illicit opioids from China to the United States. Each task presents its own unique challenges and opportunities.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North Korea

51. Redefining Success for the Trump-Kim Summit

Author:: Richard N. Holwill
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: A meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (KJU), the Supreme Leader of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), can be a success even if it fails to achieve President Trump’s announced goal: an end to the DPRK nuclear weapons program. This meeting starts by giving KJU one of his long-sought goals. It will, in effect, be more than a meeting. It will be a “summit” and will confer on KJU the status of the leader of a legitimate government. President Trump would be wise to redefine success. He should not fall into the trap of saying that success will be defined by a “denuclearization agreement.” While that should be a long-term goal, it will not happen at this meeting. Still, the summit will be successful if it produces a process that can lead to a substantial reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. This is not to say that an agreement on denuclearization is off the table. Rather, it is to recognize that these talks could present a framework for negotiation that would be very valuable, even if they will fall short of a nuclear disarmament accord. To understand the difficulty of reaching a nuclear arms agreement, we need only look at the way the two leaders speak about denuclearization. Each appears to define it differently. President Trump applies the term to nuclear weapons in the DPRK. KJU speaks of it as applying to the entire Korean Peninsula. He will argue that, if he must allow a meaningful verification regime, so must U.S. forces in South Korea.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

52. Juche Doctrine as the Official Ideology of North Korea and Effects on the North Korean Foreign Policy

Author:: Can Kakişim
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Juche, the official ideology of North Korea, is an original doctrine which influences every aspect of life and politics within the country. This ideology leads to one-man rule in the political area and highly statist and isolationist structure in the economic realm in North Korea. Effects of such an internal structure on the foreign relations of the country appear as the dominance of an uncompromising foreign policy philosophy. North Korea has a skeptical approach towards the external world and it pursues a military-first policy including nuclear armament in order to achieve its foreign policy goals and secure the continuation of Juche regime at home.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Ideology, Socialism, and Juche
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

53. Detecting patterns in North Korean military provocations: what machine-learning tells us

Author:: Taehee Whang, Michael Lammbrau, and Hyung-min Joo
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:: Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:: For the past two decades, North Korea has made a series of military provocations, destabilizing the regional security of East Asia. In particular, Pyongyang has launched several conventional attacks on South Korea. Although these attacks seem unpredictable and random, we attempt in this article to find some patterns in North Korean provocations. To this end, we employ a machine-learning technique to analyze news articles of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) from 1997 to 2013. Based on five key words (‘years,’ ‘signed,’ ‘assembly,’ ‘June,’ and ‘Japanese’), our model identifies North Korean provocations with 82% accuracy. Further investigation into these attack words and the contexts in which they appear produces significant insights into the ways in which we can detect North Korean provocations.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

54. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:: Jin Linbo
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

55. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:: Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:: International Relations, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

56. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:: John Delury
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Governance, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

57. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:: David Straub
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

58. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:: Chun In-bum
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

59. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:: Mark Tokola
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

60. Prospects for Regime Change in North Korea

Author:: Soyoung Kwon
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The view of convergence in terms of how former socialist countries change invites questions about cases of non-transition and their typological regime features. This paper examines the North Korean regime to assess its unique path of post-communist transition and analyzes behavioral explanations for the divergent outcome. A combination of institutional and behavioral features point to a countryspecific development, which may have taken a distinctive path due to different historical experiences, leadership features, legitimation, and political culture. This also invites a new comparative perspective on the remaining socialist countries in Asia in order to discuss the prospects and challenges of political change within the framework of transition from the authoritarian rule.
Topic:: Politics, Regime Change, Authoritarianism, Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-il
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

61. “The Best Possible Sanction:” Kim Jong-un and the Quest for Credible Nuclear Deterrence

Author:: Gary J. Sampson
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: In 2017, North Korea under Kim Jong-un has made significant strides toward the capabilities needed for a credible nuclear deterrent. This article analyzes the most recent achievements of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, including its September 2017 nuclear test and its three long-range missile tests in the latter half of 2017. Observers should not discount Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, other capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting require further development to achieve the full range of capabilities associated with a credible nuclear deterrent. Because of the high costs associated with the development of robust strategic intelligence and targeting capabilities, Pyongyang may be willing to settle for lower levels of capability in these areas, which may still be sufficient to guide nuclear attacks. As a result, policymakers must move to a bargaining strategy that acknowledges the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capability, marking a significant policy shift among regional allies. Pyongyang’s long-held desire to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its regional allies may be coming to fruition. Kim Jong-un has shrewdly played his hand from a position of weakness and succeeded where many others failed—a high-risk path upon which he still walks. China’s minimum credible nuclear deterrent may be a model for Kim Jong-un’s development of North Korean nuclear capability.
Topic:: Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Surveillance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

62. The United Nations Development Programme and the Two Koreas

Author:: Gabriel Jonsson
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper examines the United Nations Development Programme’s role in South and North Korea’s economic development. The UNDP is not only the UN’s lead agency for economic and social development, it is one of the few UN organizations to have worked with both countries in traditional bilateral arrangements, as well as a in multilateral initiative. Operating in South Korea from 1963 to 2009, the UNDP contributed to the nation’s economic development by complimenting the government’s policies. However, its role was minor compared to the government’s own actions. Nonetheless, South Korea has served on the UNDP board four times since its UN admission in 1991, raising the country’s diplomatic standing. After North Korea joined the UNDP in 1979, the organization’s work in the country focused on improving food production and supporting industrial development. These activities helped improve the economic crisis since the 1990s. In the 1990s, the UNDP provided humanitarian assistance and scholarships to develop human resources. Pyongyang officials restricted the UNDP’s work throughout the time it was active in North Korea. These violations led the UNDP to suspend operations in 2007. Since the early 1990s, the UNDP has supported the Tumen River Area Development Program, the only initiative that involved the two Koreas, as well as China, Russia and Mongolia. Although the UNDP facilitated initial contacts, it was unable to overcome longstanding animosities and disagreements. The successor Greater Tumen Initiative continues to languish.
Topic:: Economics, Government, United Nations, and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United Nations

63. The North Korean Air Force: A Declining or Evolving Threat?

Author:: Noam Hartoch and Alon Levkowitz
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim Jong-un era have strengthened the country’s military power, deterring South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, parallel developments aren’t occurring in the traditionally technical air and air defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization and deployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won’t be able to build a state-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its air force capabilities.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Weapons, Drones, Missile Defense, and Air Force
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, Poland, Soviet Union, New Zealand, and United States of America

64. UN Humanitarian Actors and North Korea’s Prison Camps

Author:: Roberta Cohen
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: When a typhoon struck North Korea’s northeast in September 2016, it flooded not only schools, health clinics, roads and agricultural lands, but also a reeducation through labor camp housing political prisoners. This presented a challenge to United Nations humanitarian agencies: should they overlook the plight of those in the flooded camp in the interests of working cooperatively with the government, or should they seek to gain entry to all disaster victims in line with the UN’s humanitarian principles? Their decision to ignore the imprisoned victims highlights the need for better integration of human rights concerns into humanitarian action through strengthened cooperation between human rights and humanitarian actors, backup from senior UN officials, and the application of the UN Human Rights Up Front approach to North Korea.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, and Political Prisoners
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

65. Considerations for Rescuing North Korean Political Prison Camp Inmates

Author:: Robert Collins
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Rescuing inmates from North Korea's vast political prison system presents significant challenges for American and South Korean political and military leaders. The lives of prisoners would be immediately threatened in the event of war or the collapse of the Kim Family Regime, as former camp guards who defected to the Republic of Korea have testified to this effect. The events that would threaten the prisoners' lives would occur at a time when the military assets needed for their rescue are in most demand. Defending Seoul and treating civilian casualties will remain priorities for military commanders, who will find it difficult to divert the specially trained troops, air support and logistical resources required to neutralize camp guards, secure the prisons, and provide immediate aid to the inmates. Yet, rescuing the inmates would provide benefits, including gaining the support from a wary North Korean population and legitimizing post-crisis reunification efforts. Because of the strategic implications of this decision, only the American and South Korean presidents could authorize such a mission.
Topic:: Human Rights, Regime Change, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Political Prisoners
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

66. Exported as a Commodity: North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched Overseas

Author:: Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea officially dispatches over 60,000 workers to a minimum of 20 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. The regime confiscates much of the USD 200 million earned by these workers annually. Despite the known exploitation and hardship, North Koreans continue to covet these positions, which provide rare opportunities to spend time outside the world’s most isolated dictatorial regime and send small amounts of money to their families at home. Only those deemed loyal to the regime as measured by North Korea’s songbun system have access to these jobs. Even those with “good songbun” frequently bribe government officials to secure one of the few positions available. Once overseas, workers labor under harsh and dangerous conditions that border on slavery. North Korea’s pervasive security apparatus continues to survey all activities while spouses and children serve as de facto hostages to prevent defections. The Kim Family Regime’s dispatch of workers amounts to exporting its subjects as a commodity. Efforts to address this issue must be based on applicable international standards. Governments bound by international agreements should first seek redress, as difficult as it may be, before terminating the contracts that cover North Korea’s overseas workers.
Topic:: Human Rights, Labor Issues, Economy, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

67. China and the Korean Peninsula: Arming Kim, Gutting Sanctions, Opposing THAAD

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China is playing a duplicitous game when it comes to North Korea. It proclaims it is enforcing Security Council resolutions when it is in fact not. The Chinese have overwhelming leverage over the North, but they will not use their power to disarm the Kim Family regime, at least in the absence of intense pressure from the United States. Beijing believes Pyongyang furthers important short-term Chinese objectives, and so views it as a weapon against Washington and others. Beijing’s attempts to punish Seoul over its decision to accept deployment of the THAAD missile defense system reveal true intentions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Weapons, Missile Defense, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

68. Japan, Chongryon, and Sanctions

Author:: James F. Durand
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: With nearly 900,000 long-term residents, Japan has one of the largest populations of overseas Koreans. Japan is unique in that it is the only country that further classifies its Korean residents by external political affiliation; i.e., those not adopting Japanese nationality are affiliated with the Korean Residents Union of Japan (Mindan) or the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), organizations that are linked to South and North Korea, respectively. The status of Korean residents in Japan, and both organizations supporting them, is a product of Japan’s complex relationship with the Korean Peninsula during the last century. American concerns about Japan’s Korean residents—both as an occupying power and a treaty ally—add another dimension to what should have been a domestic or bilateral issue between the Government of Japan, its Korean residents, and North or South Korea. Chongryon’s long-term financial, material, and technical support to Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs highlighted the differences between all governments. However, Pyongyang’s admission that it abducted Japanese citizens has brought about significant changes in the Japanese government’s policies toward North Korea and Chongryon. These include the suspension of ferry services between the two countries and limiting remittances to North Korea. As the Trump Administration considers tighter sanctions as part of its North Korean strategy, the history of the Japan’s relations with its proPyongyang residents provides a cautionary tale about the international community’s ability to use sanctions as a means to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile ambitions.
Topic:: Immigration, Sanctions, Weapons, Ethnicity, and Abductions
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

69. Managing a Nuclear-Armed North Korea: A Grand Strategy for a Denuclearized and Peacefully Unified Korea

Author:: Seongwhun Cheon
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea is South Korea’s grand strategy to protect the nation’s vital security interest in the short term and achieve peaceful unification in the long term. Its foundation rests on two pillars of containing the North’s military expansion and nuclear coercion, and promoting constructive changes in North Korean society. This strategy of management is neither appeasement based on unfounded optimism of the North Korean leadership nor an intimidation tactic to overthrow the Kim Family Regime. Under the assumption that genuine peace or national integration is not possible unless North Korea is denuclearized and its society transformed, it is a strategy that exercises full vigilance toward the North and applies all available means and methods to reduce political and military threats from Pyongyang. It also patiently encourages gradual and fundamental changes in North Korea as the ultimate path to a denuclearized and unified Korean peninsula. The management strategy understands that no dialogue with North Korea could resolve the nuclear problem at a single stroke, and thus, it keeps expectations low and objectives achievable. It does not anticipate a sweeping deal to denuclearize North Korea.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Grand Strategy, Peace, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

70. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:: Mark Halchin
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America

71. India: Policy Implications for the United States

Author:: Jon P. Dorschner
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: India has long been obsessed with its rivalry with Pakistan, and for many years India viewed Pakistan as its principal security threat. Pakistan continues to support terrorist attacks directed against India and India-controlled Kashmir, and is continually increasing its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems for nuclear warheads. Despite this, Indians have come to feel more self-assured and no longer see Pakistan as the country’s principal security threat.China now occupies this position. India no longer views itself simply as the predominant regional power in South Asia, but as an aspiring world power and is gearing up for what many in India believe is an inevitable conflict with its neighbor the Peoples Republic of China. India has embarked on an outreach program to solidify friendly ties to other Asian nations that feel threatened by China, and is devoting a lot of attention to the ASEAN states (particularly Viet Nam), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. There is increasing speculation that this relationship could develop into a formal alliance, especially if the United States becomes less active in Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Economy, Trump, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, North Korea, Kashmir, and United States of America

72. Unrest and Tests

Author:: Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: North Korea opened the final months of 2016 with a bang by conducting its fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9. It followed up with a series of rocket and missile tests, culminating the year with Kim Jong Un’s claim of an imminent long-range ballistic missile capability. Yet, political transition in South Korea and the United States proved the hallmarks of late 2016, suggesting potential shifts in the approaches on the Peninsula, while underscoring the firm commitment of the US and ROK to their alliance. The Park-Choi scandal led to massive protests the final two months of the year and an impeachment vote on Dec. 9 by the National Assembly, confusing political observers about the implications for South Korean political stability. Donald Trump’s surprise victory in the US raised questions among Koreans about US reliability as an alliance partner.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

73. Back to Diplomacy in 2017?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: South Korea’s hardline response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests earlier in the year, which led to a complete severing of all inter-Korean contact, meant there was effectively no relationship between the two Koreas in final months of 2016. With the stalemate in relations coupled with the political turmoil in both Washington and Seoul, Aidan Foster-Carter provides his analysis to help understand how we got here by looking back and, even more importantly, looking forward. While North Korea watches and waits, there is a worrying power vacuum in Seoul in the wake of “ChoiSunsil-gate.” The next move largely depends on how South Korea responds to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

74. Nuclear Test, Political Fallout, and Domestic Turmoil

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9 and the intensified test-firing of a range of missile types throughout 2016 underscored existing weaknesses in using dialogue and sanctions as a response. The timing of Pyongyang’s latest provocations coincided with the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and ASEAN-related meetings in Vientiane. President Park Geun-hye used the venues for sideline talks with President Xi Jinping and President Obama. The nuclear test directly challenged a nonproliferation statement adopted by East Asia Summit (EAS) members on Oct. 8, which urged North Korea to abandon its weapons programs. Following extended negotiations with the US, China finally joined the international community in adopting UN Security Council Resolution 2321 on Nov. 30. In addition to strains in the China-DPRK relationship, regional coordination on North Korea remains challenged by disputes between China and the ROK over THAAD and illegal Chinese fishing.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

75. Peninsula Tensions Spike

Author:: Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: North Korea tested President Trump’s new administration with a New Year promise of imminent ICBM capability and subsequent missile launches. Tensions rose to the highest level since 1993/1994 with missile launches, the assassination of Kim Jong Nam, and a possible ICBM on display at a military parade to celebrate the 85th anniversary of the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army. Washington offered Seoul assurances of support, sending Defense Secretary Mattis, Secretary of State Tillerson, and Vice President Pence in early 2017. Yet, Trump’s comments about sending an “armada” with the dispatch of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group led South Koreans to fear blowback if the US conducted a preemptive or preventive strike against DPRK facilities. South Korea saw deployment of the first stages of THAAD, but the missile defense system and broader policy differences with May 9 ROK presidential victor Moon Jae-in will be challenges for US-South Korea relations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

76. Can Moon Restore Sunshine?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The first four months of 2017 have been a momentous and tumultuous period for Korea. As of mid-May, the peninsula remains in a state of high anxiety and no little tension. A crisis? Maybe. Yet without counseling complacency, recent history suggests that that term tends to be over-applied to this part of the world’s recurring episodes of tension: amply chronicled down the years (for the present century) in successive issues of Comparative Connections. The reasons for this latest bout of tension are partly local but most global, or more precisely trans-Pacific. The local causes derive from both Koreas, if as usual mainly the North. During the past four months as in the previous five years, Kim Jong Un’s regime has shown little sign of a wish to lower tensions, mend fences, or even pursue normal relations with other states, friend or foe. Now in his sixth year in power, the third Kim remains unique as a 21st-century leader who in this era of globalization – and despite his own years of schooling in Europe – has neither ventured abroad nor met any other head of state or government, even on his home turf. The DPRK’s boasts of self-reliance may be mendacious on the economic front, where (as widely canvassed) Chinese sustenance remains vital. Yet diplomatically it does indeed stand alone; the more so as Pyongyang has begun bombarding even Beijing with the aggressive insults long hurled by Pyongyang at Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Kim seems to share the stance of Millwall FC, a notoriously ‘hard’ London soccer club whose fans chant: “No one likes us, we don’t care.” His father and grandfather were more subtle, at least in not picking fights Bruce Lee-style with all comers simultaneously. But just as success has long eluded Millwall, showing the finger to everyone can hardly work for Kim Jong Un long-term. It is not just words that North Korea lobs. This Kim has markedly accelerated the DPRK’s development of both nuclear weapons – an unprecedented two tests in 2016, after three in the decade from 2006 – and the ballistic missiles (BM) that might one day carry them. True to form, the first four months of 2017 saw half a dozen BM tests, not all successful. Yet contra many predictions, Kim has not (so far) marked the recent transitions of political power in two of his main foes – Washington first, and now Seoul too – with a nuclear test; unlike in May 2009 when Barack Obama faced that challenge, or February 2013 when a nuclear blast greeted both the re-elected Obama and the incoming Park Geun-hye. Still, with most of 2017 to go, it might be premature to seek to explain what may be a temporary non-event.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

77. Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Pyongyang tested regional and domestic politics on six separate occasions by conducting missile launches between February and April. The latest tests coincided with the Xi-Trump summit in Mar-a-Lago and Vice President Pence’s visit to South Korea. They also marked the 105th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung on April 15 amid intense speculation that North Korea might conduct a sixth nuclear test. In addition to supporting five UN Security Council statements on North Korea this year, Beijing on Feb. 18 announced a suspension of DPRK coal imports through December. DPRK military threats also catalyzed US-ROK plans to deploy THAAD, a source of mounting tension that affected all aspects of the China-South Korea relationship. Beijing’s retaliation took the form of restrictions from March on business and tourism. South Korea appealed to the WTO for redress and South Korean lawmakers passed resolutions condemning China’s retaliation. THAAD emerged at the center of domestic political debate in Seoul after Park Geun-hye’s ousting on March 10, following which PRC nuclear envoy Wu Dawei in April engaged major presidential contenders ahead of the May 9 elections. Beijing’s falling out with both Koreas presents a major challenge for coordinating regional policy with new administrations in Washington and Seoul.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

78. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:: James Walsh
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

79. A Chinese Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:: Cheng Xiaohe
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since the Korean War, North Korea (the DPRK) has endured sanctions imposed by the United States and other western countries, but the sanctions began to acquire a dramatic impact only in 2006 when North Korean ballistic missile blasts invited a punitive reaction from the UN Security Council. In addition to sanctions imposed by individual countries, for the first time, international organizations, notably the Security Council, passed punitive resolutions in an effort to rein in North Korea’s missile and nuclear development. In order to supervise implementation of the sanctions, the Security Council set up a committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 in 2006 (the sanctions committee), which now comprises all 15 members and makes its decisions by consensus. To North Korea’s dismay, as it continues to fight against western countries’ economic sanctions and military embargo, it now has to bear the brunt of sanctions from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Even so, it has been defying international pressure and pressing ahead with its missile and nuclear weapons programs. Despite tougher sanctions, North Korea is poised to possess missiles with nuclear warheads that could hit South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper explores the effectiveness of the sanctions, asking whether the North’s steady progress on nuclear and missile weapons demonstrates their failure.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

80. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-South Korean Relations

Author:: See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: How do Chinese national identity narratives affect Sino-South Korean relations? The Koguryo history war more than a decade ago was a turning point in bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1992, generating enduring competition over representations of history.1 In 2010, China’s commemoration of its entry into the Korean War raised early warnings in South Korea over Beijing’s hostile foreign policy orientation under Xi Jinping. Contrary to such expectations, however, the earliest summit agreements between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye after both took office in 2013 were on history cooperation as common victims of Japanese colonialism. Most notably in 2015, Park’s participation in Beijing’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II consolidated joint claims of what was called the best period in bilateral relations.2 This chapter assesses the impact of Chinese national identity on China-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations under the Xi and Park administrations since 2013. It examines Chinese constructions of national identity and their implications for the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino-South Korean relationship. Rather than promoting partnership, competing identities across these dimensions reinforce enduring differences over the region’s political, economic, and cultural order. These differences surfaced most saliently in 2016, following an initial period of engagement that corresponds with the downward trend in China-Japan relations since 2012. Managing them requires the very trust-building that both Beijing and Seoul have prioritized since 2013.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

81. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:: Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

82. Intro | Establishing Triangular Talks Among Washington, Beijing, and Seoul

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Of five alternative approaches to addressing the North Korean threat to stability in East Asia and beyond, this section is concerned with the possibility of just one—a diplomatic approach via Three-Way Talks among China, South Korea, and the United States. We single out this approach as the golden mean for reconciling the conflicting interests among the parties best positioned to reshape the calculus of Pyongyang. It represents the path to compromise. Among the alternatives, there is the Chinese appeal for a dual-track approach through Six-Party Talks, aimed at a peace treaty on terms attractive to North Korea and greatly transformative to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. This could hardly be called a compromise, since Seoul and Washington regard this as a win for Pyongyang and evidence that Beijing actually has been siding with Pyongyang. Another alternative is Strategic Patience, which is a misnomer for the policy of the Obama administration, but, in any case, refers mainly to reliance on increased deterrence as pressure is ratcheted up. In fact, Obama was seeking a pathway to three-way talks, giving China time to shift in that direction bolstered by new sanctions, while in 2016 also moving closer to a fourth approach: Unilateral Sanctions targeted at the Chinese firms assisting North Korea. A fifth option is Alliance Triangularity to force change in Pyongyang.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

83. South Korea’s Role in the UN Human Rights Council

Author:: Gabriel Jonsson
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: South Korea has been board member of the UN Commission on Human Rights and member of the UN Human Rights Council serving as Chairman of the latter in 2016. Both organizations have been characterized by politicization, which undermines their work. However, no such example was found related to their work on human rights in North Korea. Although South Korea’s position on North Korean human rights issues had been inconsistent previously, Seoul has consistently supported UN resolutions since 2008. North Korea has rejected criticism from the UN of its human rights record. Work by the UN and South Korea on the North Korean human rights issue has failed to improve the situation. Regardless, these efforts have increased global awareness of North Korea rights violations and exerted some pressure on Pyongyang to address the situation. South Korea strengthened its commitment in this area when the National Assembly enacted the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2016. Realists’ and liberals’ views of international cooperation form the theoretical framework of the study.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Cooperation, United Nations, and UN Human Rights Council (HRC)
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

84. North Korean Agriculture: Recent Changes and Prospects after Unification

Author:: Randall Ireson
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Modern farming in Korea has followed two divergent paths since the partition of the peninsula. Both countries substantially raised agricultural production in the 1970s, but policy decisions in North Korea created a situation in which the farm sector stagnated and ultimately failed when faced with changes in the 1990s. In addition to reviewing the technical and policy changes since the start of the food crisis, this paper examines the likely consequences of reunification on the North Korean farm sector. Structural changes would include the dominance of a market economy, dissolution of cooperative and state farms, and the need to recapitalize the entire farm economy. Organizational changes regarding land tenure, operation and management of formerly collective resources, and new roles for former North Korean agricultural guidance and research organizations would be challenging. Rural residents would face personal challenges of adapting to the requirements and thinking patterns of a market economy, coupled with the loss of close technical direction by the North Korean planning system. Although there are opportunities for enhanced farm productivity and economic well being at the household level, smoothly adapting to reunification would greatly depend on planning, policies and resources set in place for such an event.
Topic:: Agriculture, History, Famine, and Economy
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

85. Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea

Author:: Shawn P. Creamer
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The theater-level command relationships in the Republic of Korea are complex and nuanced. They are often misunderstood by American and South Korean military and civilian leaders. Available open source resources often focus on specific elements of the command relationships, sometimes over-relying on official rhetoric from the respective commands. These narratives don’t provide a complete picture of how these distinct organizations work together towards the common goal of defending South Korea from North Korean aggression. This paper consolidates and amalgamates relevant open source resources to provide clarity to what was previously an opaque understanding of the interconnected, yet distinct relationships between the four concurrently operating theater-level commands that have roles in defending South Korea. In particular, this paper dissects each command’s roles, its relationships with the commands, and guidance and direction governing each command.
Topic:: United Nations, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

86. Romanian Perspectives on Korean Unification: Regime Change and the Romanian Precedent

Author:: Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was a great admirer of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, attempting to duplicate the personality cult, national-Communism and other aspects of the North Korean dynastic totalitarian regime. Systematic human rights violations were common in both countries. Despite the relentless repression, indoctrination and surveillance, there are several factors that could potentially erode the Kim Family Regime’s grip on power, including informal marketization and increased information inflow from the outside world. As such, Romania provides an important precedent for the current situation in North Korea. Of particular note, understanding those factors that conferred legitimacy on the Romanian military enables a deeper appreciation of the military’s role in the anti-communist revolution and turbulent times that followed. Kim Jong-il learned from the Romanian experience, adopting a military first policy in North Korea. In contrast, Kim Jong-un has attempted to return some power to the Korean Workers Party. Kim Jong-un’s success in gaining the support of the country’s elites would be a key factor in avoiding a Romanian-style revolution and obliteration of the top leadership.
Topic:: Human Rights, History, Regime Change, Authoritarianism, and Capitalism
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Romania

87. China’s Uneven Response to THAAD and its Coercive Strategy Aimed at the ROK: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:: George Hutchinson
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance has arrived at a critical juncture. In July 2016, the countries jointly decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula to defend against North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China has long opposed an American-led, regional missile defense system, persistently warning South Korea against deploying THAAD. Since the deciding to deploy THAAD, the political landscapes in the U.S. and the ROK have changed dramatically. The new Donald J. Trump administration has signaled a change from the previous administration’s “strategic patience” policy, but details of the new approach have yet to emerge. North Korea, meanwhile, continues to aggressively test ballistic missiles and promote its nuclear weapons program. In South Korea, the impeachment and subsequent removal of Park Geun-hye triggered the need for a snap election, and a left-leaning candidate, Moon Jae-in, is leading in the polls. The election could mark a return of previous liberal administration policies that favored cooperation with North Korea. Additionally, Moon has signaled his opposition to THAAD. Nonetheless, the U.S. began deploying THAAD to South Korea in March 2017. China retaliated, implementing a series of economic, political, and military measures to pressure South Korea. This paper provides background on THAAD, analyzes the decision by Washington and Seoul to deploy the system to Korea, and examines Beijing’s concerns and coercive counterstrategy
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Military Strategy, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

88. North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Threats and the Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Author:: Sam-man Chung
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten South Korea and its neighbors. Pyongyang’s engineers are likely capable of producing a warhead small enough to place it atop a missile. As its ability to engineer warheads for flight and reentry improves, North Korea increasingly endangers the United States. Deterring Pyongyang is extremely difficult given North Korea’s conventional, unconventional, and cyber capabilities. South Korean and American strategists have reponspded by developing a tailored deterrence strategy to address specific threats. At the operational level, this is supported by the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan. Ballistic missile defense, including the ability to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missiles, is critical to the success of the tailored deterrence strategy. South Korea opted to develop its Korean Air and Missile Defense and Kill Chain system. These systems are independent of American ballistic missile defense systems. The Korean systerms were conceived and developed amidst plans to transfer Wartime Operational Control from the U.S. to South Korea. Because transfer has been postponted, there is less rationale for maintaing separate systems. Despite the official desire to keep these systems independent, South Korea needs to develop options for enhancing interoperability with American missile defense systems to support the tailored deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

89. Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Relations between China and North Korea have deteriorated during the last year, but Beijing has not fundamentally changed its approach toward its neighbor because that approach serves vital Chinese interests. If the regime of Kim Jong Un should look like it might fail—and there are several reasons why it could—Beijing’s leaders will undoubtedly do all they can to effect a rescue. The Chinese state, however, is not as stable or as capable as it appears, and it may not be in a position to lend needed assistance.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, and Political stability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

90. Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions

Author:: Kim Taewoo
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a longrange missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto "Nuclear-First Politics," thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea. However, the current international sanctions headed by the UNSCR 2270, along with unilateral sanctions, are unlikely to bear fruit in the foreseeable future due to China’s conflicting policies. Beijing’s attitude towards North Korean nuclear program has alternated between ‘pressure and connivance;’ its military relationship with the United States determining China’s position on sanctions. China’s alternating position prevents effective sanctions against North Korea. While the international community should endeavor to make sanctions concerted, strong and consistent, South Korea and the U.S. should think about a Plan B that includes presenting China the threat of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

91. The ROK–U.S. Alliance and the Third Offset Strategy

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin and Seongwon Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United States relies on its ability to project military power far forward of its shores in defense of national and allied interests. Yet the diffusion of technology, especially long-range and precision-guided munitions, poses profound challenges to this core assumption undergirding U.S. extended deterrence and alliance contingency response. The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking technological and operational innovations to deal with these unfavorable trends, largely through military modernization programs that are designed to preserve the United States’ capacity to deter aggression, dissuade adventurism, reassure allies, and defend allied and national interests in the event of conflict. Most analysis of America’s so-called “Third Offset Strategy” has focused on deploying leading-edge technologies to overcome China’s military modernization programs. Almost nothing has been written about a Third Offset Strategy through the prism of the Korean Peninsula. Yet the Third Offset Strategy can bolster the alliance’s response to North Korea, reinforce deterrence, and support regional security. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the analysis by assessing the emerging U.S. defense programs with respect to North Korea, Peninsula contingencies, and ROK–U.S. alliance cooperation on regional and outof-area security issues.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, South America, and United States of America

92. North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:: Yonho Kim
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD issue has become a political hot potato that could easily entrap major presidential candidates. To avoid any backlash, the candidates will refuse to choose between China and the U.S. while placing the alliance with the U.S. at the center of South Korea’s foreign policy.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

93. Analyzing Japan’s Role in Korean Security within the Framework of the Quasi-Alliance Model

Author:: James F. Durand
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper assesses Japan’s role in Korean security using the quasialliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliance model to analyze the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally.” A key assumption is that the third state serves as the “great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.” While historical issues affected relations between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policy changes produced distinct “abandonment” or “entrapment” responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances: shared perceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction. This paper analyzes America’s East Asia policies during the Bush and Obama administrations to assess Japanese and Korean reactions. Analyzed through the quasi-alliance model, American policies produced asymmetric responses in Japan and Korea, inhibiting security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Diverging views of China exacerbated inherent friction between Korea and Japan. Thus, Japan will play a limited role in Korean security.
Topic:: Security, Grand Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

94. The North Korean Economic System: Challenges and Issues

Author:: Bradley O. Babson
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The North Korean economic system is the product of a variety of influences that have shaped its evolution. To understand this system and its challenges today, it is necessary to appreciate North Korea’s unique history and dynamics of change, both internally and externally. These factors have shaped national economic policies and behavior of state and non-state actors in ways that are different than has been the case in other transition economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This paper reviews the evolution of the North Korean economic system under the terms of its three leaders; assesses the impacts of recent developments on the system, including UN Security Council Resolution 2270, closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and Seventh Party Congress; and discusses the fundamental challenges facing the economic system today and implications for future engagement policies by the international community. Despite its isolation and many difficult challenges, the North Korean economic system has proven more resilient and adaptive to changing circumstances than many outside observers have expected. A clearer understanding of the limits and opportunities for international economic engagement with North Korea should be a consideration in strategies to address the long-standing security challenges that North Korea poses to its neighbors and the world.
Topic:: Sanctions, Reform, Economic structure, Economic Development, and Engagement
Political Geography:: East Asia and North Korea

95. The Dispatch (Spring 2016)

Author:: David J. Bercuson, Jean-Christophe Boucher, J. L. Granatstein, David Carment, Teddy Samy, Paul Dewar, Roy Rempel, Eric Miller, Anthony Cary, Chris Westdal, Rolf Holmboe, Randolf Mank, Marius Grinius, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:: 03-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Global Exchange
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: The Dispatch (later called The Global Exchange) is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Spring 2016 issue includes articles on Canada's international reputation, foreign relations, defense policy and more.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, Peacekeeping, Cybersecurity, Weapons, Brexit, Nonproliferation, Syrian War, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Peace
Political Geography:: Britain, Russia, China, Canada, Israel, Asia, North Korea, Syria, North America, and Arctic

96. Summitry, Strength, and a Fourth Nuclear Test

Author:: Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:: 01-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The final months of 2015 saw hedging around South Korea’s relationship with China, strong support for the US-ROK alliance in the face of DPRK threats, a US-ROK summit, and heightened concern as North Korea prepared for a fourth nuclear test, which came on Jan. 6. With the US and South Korea watching closely for signs of a missile or nuclear test, North Korea marked the 70th anniversary of its Workers Party on Oct. 10 without incident. The US-ROK presidential summit appeared solid, with a joint statement against the North Korean nuclear and missile threats and shared concern over DPRK human rights violations. The US again took up the issue of DPRK human rights violations at the UN Security Council in December as reports of possible purges in North Korea continued to attract US and ROK attention. The US was pleased in late December by an agreement between South Korea and Japan on “comfort women.”
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

97. Pyongyang’s Bang Explodes Hope

Author:: Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:: 01-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2016 in Korea began with a bang. Though unlikely to be the hydrogen bomb it claims, North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 makes certain that inter-Korean ties will not get better any time soon. The last four months of 2015 saw disappointingly little progress on the six-point accord reached in late August to improve relations. The sole substantial outcome was a fresh round of reunions of separated families. However, no further reunions have been arranged or even discussed. Civilian exchanges did pick up to a degree, but this remained fairly light traffic, and wholly one-way; no North Koreans were reported as visiting the South. Even though the August accord specified holding high-level talks “at an early date,” such talks did not take place until December, and then only between vice ministers. It was hard to be optimistic that 2016 would prove any better, even before the DPRK detonation exploded such slim hope as might have remained. Clause 1 of August’s accord specified holding high-level talks “at an early date, to improve north-south ties and have multi-faceted dialogue and negotiations in the future.” Such talks did not take place until December, and then only between vice-minister level officials. Far from improving relations or leading to further dialogue, these two days of talks yielded absolutely nothing: no joint statement, nor any schedule to meet again. Predictably each side blamed the other. On this basis it was hard to be optimistic that 2016 would prove any better, even before Jan. 6’s DPRK detonation exploded such slim hope as might have remained.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

98. A Complex China-ROK Partnership

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The September China-ROK summit in Beijing catalyzed the resumption of trilateral talks with Japan in October and the launch of the China-ROK Free Trade Agreement in December. Beijing’s Korean engagement also included a visit to North Korea in October by Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan for 70th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The visit was credited with preventing a rocket launch by Pyongyang that had reportedly been planned to mark the anniversary. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s reached out to Beijing with a “friendship tour” to China led by Choe Hwi. Despite new initiatives to expand economic cooperation, Pyongyang’s apparent defiance of Chinese diplomatic efforts on denuclearization suggests further difficulties in Sino-DPRK relations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

99. Déjà Vu All Over Again … Only Worse!

Author:: Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:: 05-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: North Korea mixed things up a bit in early 2016, this time starting with a nuclear test – its fourth – and then following up a month later with a missile test/satellite launch; usually the order is reversed. Other than that it was déjà vu all over again, only worse. There were also a number of shorter-range ballistic missile launches and the usual threats (with graphic video), while the prospects for dialogue seemed to dim even further. Meanwhile, Chinese activities in the South China Sea (SCS) are being described by everyone (except Beijing) as further militarization of its artificial islands, as everyone (except Beijing) eagerly awaits the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a case the Philippines has brought against China’s SCS claims – Beijing has already preemptively rejected the Court’s jurisdiction, so no happy ending appears in store for anyone. The G7 also weighed in on the SCS issue, much to China’s dismay. It’s for certain the G20 won’t (since China is host this year). The AIIB is taking shape, with most worries not being realized. Finally, after eight months of listening to pundits predict that the Trump phenomenon was sure to fade, Donald Trump has become the “presumptive” Republican nominee. His opponent seems likely to be former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in what is shaping up to be a battle of the known versus the unknown (and largely unpredictable).
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

100. Fire, Ire, and Exercises

Author:: Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:: 05-2016
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: US and South Korean concerns spiked in early 2016 as North Korea demonstrated worrying advances in nuclear weapon and missile technology. Despite a rather placid New Year address, Kim Jong Un raised international alarm with the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6. A month later, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket, a direct violation of a UN missile ban. The US Congress passed more rigorous sanctions legislation, seeking to stem financial flows and punish second-party facilitators. On March 3, UN Security Council Resolution 2270 calling for tougher sanctions passed unanimously. Seoul added its own unilateral sanctions on March 8. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un’s display of a nuclear device and reentry technology, failed intermediate-range missile tests, and a successful submarine-launched ballistic missile test added to growing concerns. ROK President Park Geun-hye called for additional multilateral efforts. While North Korea is pushing back hard, some suggest its provocations and rhetoric may be for foreign consumption in the lead-up to the highly anticipated Party Congress in May, a first in 36 years.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

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