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41. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:
Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

42. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

43. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

44. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

45. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

46. 16 + 1: China’s Push Into Central and Eastern Europe Loses Momentum

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since its inception in 2012, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC; 中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo—Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), better known as the 16+1 or 17+1 initiative, has often been described as a security risk with the potential to divide European structures and make them serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC). The 16+1 is a Sinocentric economic cooperation initiative comprising China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which share only a mutual Communist past as a common denominator (in 2019, Greece, which is heavily indebted to China, joined, and the platform was briefly renamed to 17+1). Apart from several different formats such as inter-party dialogues and think tank conferences, the 16+1 holds annual summits attended by state heads, with Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and then Li Keqiang (李克强) the official highest-ranking PRC representatives in attendance. In comparison, two other, similar, Sinocentric regional platforms — China-CELAC Forum (中国-拉共体论坛, Zhongguo- Lagongti Luntan); and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC: 中非合作论坛, Zhongfei Hezuo Luntan) — are regularly attended by President and General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) (China-CELAC Forum, March 1, 2018). Thus far, FOCAC has generated the greatest level of interest from participating regional countries (China Brief, December 3, 2021). By contrast, several CEE countries have distanced themselves from the 16+1 platform: in 2021, Lithuania quit the group and this May, a Czech parliamentary committee urged the government to consider making the same move.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia

47. China and the Ongoing Political Crisis in Pakistan

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is closely monitoring the rapidly developing political crisis in Pakistan. The current upheaval stems from the introduction in Parliament of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Imran Khan, and his subsequent allegation that the motion is due to a foreign conspiracy to topple his government. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament), who is a member of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI) party, dismissed the no-confidence vote as a violation of Article 5 of the Constitution, which establishes loyalty to the state as the basic duty of every citizen (Dawn, April 3). Following the dismissal, President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly on the Prime Minister’s advice (The News , April 3). These developments are unfolding in the context of “letter gate,” which refers to Khan’s recent allegations that the no-confidence motion introduced by the opposition is driven by the efforts of a foreign power, which he later claimed was the US, to induce regime change in Pakistan. Yesterday, Pakistan’s Supreme Court declared both the Deputy Speaker’s dismissal of the motion again Khan, and the president’s decision to dissolve parliament unconstitutional. The Supreme Court restored the National Assembly and ordered it to reconvene on Saturday to hold a vote on the no-confidence motion (Dawn, April 7). China’s state-run media has reported extensively on the whole drama from the deputy speaker’s ruling to the Supreme Court’s verdict (Xinhua, April 8; NDTV, April 3).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Stability, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

48. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

49. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

50. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

51. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:
Harry He
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

52. The Geopolitical Consequences of COVID-19: Assessing Hawkish Mass Opinion in China

Author:
Joshua Byun, D. G. Kim, and Sichen Li
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
JOSHUA BYUN, D.G. KIM, and SICHEN LI examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes. Drawing on original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the global pandemic, they find that ordinary Chinese citizens are optimistic about China’s future global position, and that this optimism corresponds with the widespread perception that the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating China’s rise relative to the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Survey, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

53. When only China wants to play: Institutional turmoil and Chinese investment in Brazil

Author:
Niels Sondergaard, Ana Flavia Barros-Platiau, and Hyeyoon Park
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The political and institutional crisis in Brazil from 2015, fueled largely by corruption probes and lawfare, had severe repercussions within the Brazilian construction and energy sectors. While many international investors withdrew from Brazil in this period, Chinese investment surged. This article accounts for the particular characteristics of Chinese investments, such as sectorial complementarities, risk assessment, market size attraction, and state-drivenness, which may explain this development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Investment, and Institutions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

54. Divergencias chino-estadounidenses y reconfiguración de la política exterior latinoamericana. Introducción al número especial

Author:
Pablo Biderbost and Guillermo Boscán Carrasquero
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en la rivalidad creciente entre Estados Unidos y China en el contexto latinoamericano. Pretende ofrecer una visión comprehensiva del papel de estas potencias en la región y la adaptación que han debido realizar, en el contexto de su política exterior, los estados latinoamericanos. A tales efectos, se analizan dimensiones tanto vinculadas a la seguridad como a las relaciones comerciales entre estas naciones y los, en la actualidad, dos estados dominantes del escenario geopolítico internacional.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Trade, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, and United States of America

55. Aid and Technological Cooperation as a Foreign Policy Tool for Emerging Donors: The Case of Brazil

Author:
Kamil Yılmaz
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
There is a high concern that development assistance can be seen as national interest from the donor’s perspective. The book dwells on the specific case of Brazil and tackles the question of how a country like Brazil seeks power and influence by providing no-strings-attached foreign technical assistance. In the book, there are also some similarities and differences among Southern emerging donors like China, India and South Africa, concerning their take on foreign assistance. The book, as Farrias puts it, is mainly about foreign policy motivations and development assistance. In the particular case of Brazil, author asks what the foreign policy logic behind the no-strings-attached development assistance is. While answering the question, she gets help from a theoretical perspective, which is a combination of realism and constructivism. According to Farrias, development partnership between developing countries is understudied; and she wants to clear this gap with a specific case study. According to her, most studies deal with money-based cooperation, but from a developing country’s perspective, knowledge sharing is common. Hence, technical cooperation is ought to be explored, Farrias claims. According to Farrias, technical cooperation is mostly on non-controversial topics. She advocates that despite the weakness of development assistance, it is one of the most common foreign policy tools for developing countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Foreign Aid, Book Review, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:
China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Global South

56. Africa and the United States: Reengaging with Africa’s Prosperity in Mind

Author:
Carl Manlan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
With China as a dominant foreign power in Africa, the only option left for United States to engage with the continent is to follow its priorities: namely, prioritizing African youth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Youth, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

57. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

59. Fall 2021 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS SONG YANHUA, SHEN XINGCHEN, WANG YINGXUE INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE STRATEGIES DURING THE PANDEMICS THROUGH THE LENSES OF MOZI AND GALTUNG ............... 5 DAVIT AGHABEKYAN TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY AND IDENTITY: THE CRIMEAN ARMENIANS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA ........................... 24 KARINE MKHITARIAN PUBLICLY DECLARED POSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KARABAKH PROCESS: PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY ....................................................................................................... 43 LOUISA KHACHATRYAN MEDIA FRAMING AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA IN ARMENIA DURING THE 45-DAY ARTSAKH WAR ........................................................... 65 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................................... 84 ANNEX .................................................................................................................. 85
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Asia, and Armenia

60. A Soviet Diplomat’s Memories of Beijing 1973-1975

Author:
Simon Schuchat
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Editor’s Note: This excerpt from a Soviet diplomat’s memoir of his China service is translated by Simon Schuchat. The diplomat, Aleksei Arkadevich Brezhnev (1930-2008, no relation to Leonid Brezhnev), worked on Sino-Soviet affairs from 1953 until 1978, in Beijing and Moscow, including serving as acting head of the USSR embassy during part of the Cultural Revolution in China. In 1998 he published China: A Thorny Path to Neighborly Relations. Memoirs and Reflections, from which this excerpt is taken.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Memoir
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Soviet Union