Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: China / Topic: Diplomacy

1. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

2. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

3. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

4. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:: Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

6. La puerta de Latinoamérica: Las relaciones de Panamá con Estados Unidos y China, oportunidades y desafíos

Author:: Rodrigo Matías Martín and Guillermo Enrique Boscán
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este articulo analiza las relaciones de Panamá con China y Estados Unidos, las dos mayores potencias mundiales en la actualidad. En primer lugar, se revisan las relaciones que el país latinoamericano ha tenido con China desde la creación de Panamá como país, llegando hasta el cambio de reconocimiento diplomático en el año 2017, así como las nuevas relaciones con la República Popular China. Tras ello se analizan los desafíos que tiene Panamá en el contexto de sus nuevas relaciones diplomáticas. En la siguiente sección se revisan de igual manera las relaciones históricas entre Panamá y Estados Unidos, llegando hasta el día de hoy, y se analizan las oportunidades que ofrecen los Estados Unidos a Panamá.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Panama Canal
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, Panama, and United States of America

7. Reagan in China: Don’t Say Anything about the Turkeys

Author:: Beatrice Camp
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Twelve years after President Nixon’s historic opening to China, President Ronald Reagan visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in April 1984. The visit was a vast undertaking with an enormous entourage – Ambassador Arthur Hummel was reportedly stunned to hear that the president’s party would number over 800. For a politician like Reagan who had repeatedly criticized President Jimmy Carter for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, it was a huge move. For the Chinese, it was a very welcome symbol of acceptance. First lady Nancy Reagan accompanied her husband; some 600 journalists covered the trip. The Reagans toured historical and cultural sites in Beijing and attended a State Dinner at the Great Hall of the People before traveling on to Xian and Shanghai.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Stepping Up Our Climate Diplomacy

Author:: Charles Ray
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: At the opening of the COP27 summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on November 7, 2022, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres told the representatives of the countries attending that they faced a choice: work together to cut greenhouse gas emissions or condemn the planet to climate catastrophe. “Humanity has a choice,” Guterres said. “Cooperate or perish. We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot on the accelerator.” Guterres called for the world’s richest and poorest countries to work together to speed up the transition from fossil fuels, and for the wealthy to help with funding to enable poor countries reduce emissions and deal with the negative impacts that they have already suffered due to climate change. “The two largest economies—the United States and China—have a particular responsibility to join efforts to make this pact a reality,” he went on to say. Left unsaid, but understood by most, is that China and the U.S. are also the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. While the U.S. and much of the rest of the world are still preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rampant inflation, energy shortages, and the fallout from the Covid pandemic, the existential problem of climate change cannot be ignored.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

9. Secret Baseball in China

Author:: W. Robert Pearson
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: My wife Maggie, our two-year-old son Matthew, and I arrived in China in 1981 as part of a rapidly expanding cohort of American diplomats surging into the country following the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. We were excited to be in the early wave of American diplomats going back to China after 30 years of separation and enmity. We also were prepared for some difficult times, but could only anticipate what would be facing a young American diplomatic family in Beijing. China was just beginning its ascent from the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, and the reality of the past was all around us. The average annual income in China in 1981 was $100. The Beijing air was thick with coal dust, and our hotel room attracted rats while we waited months for permanent housing. One main dish at a Peoples’ Restaurant we visited was dumplings with coffee grounds. Our Chinese counterparts were both curious and cautious, delighted to be able to engage with us and also making excellent use of the impenetrable bureaucracy as necessary. Washington was eager to make headway, and we, as did many Americans, saw a genuine opportunity to open new doors for shared benefit. The sounds and sights, the scenes and senses were fascinating, and for us every day was challenging. We considered it the most important gamble for American diplomacy in the 20th century.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sports, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

10. Is there Eurasian Connectivity without Europe?

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Tucked between Russia, Iran, and China, Central Asia is now desperately looking for solutions to cushion the impacts of global tension on its fragile economies, which are deeply tied to sanctions against Russia and a local production slowdown as China recovers from its zero COVID policy. While European diplomacy has come at a crucial time, its Central Asian policy is ambiguous, and commitments misplaced. Central Asia is continuously perceived by the EU as a region in need of developmental assistance, which leads to European regional policies that focus on digitalization and climate issues. What Central Asia needs is the establishment of concrete logistical connectivity that will enable efficient flow of products across Eurasia.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Economics, European Union, Connectivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

11. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:: Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

12. Xi Jinping’s Hidden Goals for the PRC Law on Foreign Relations

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has promulgated a new law on foreign affairs to legitimize tough measures that Beijing is taking against the “bullying” of the “hegemonic West.” The statute, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which takes effect on July 1, will also anchor the supreme leader’s long-standing aspiration to build a China-centric global order that will challenge the framework established by the US-led Western Alliance since the end of World War II. The law also codifies the total control that Xi, who is Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), exercises on all policies regarding diplomacy and national security (People’s Daily, June 30; Xinhua, June 28). The law states that the PRC “stays true to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security, and endeavors to strengthen international security cooperation and its participation in mechanisms of global security governance.” It stresses Beijing’s right to “take corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” against acts that violate international law and norms and that “endanger China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The official Global Times said the statute was a response to “new challenges in foreign relations, especially when China has been facing frequent external interference in its internal affairs under the western hegemony with unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction” (The Global Times, June 28). The legislation legalizes measures such as counter-sanctions and blacklisting of foreign nationals and institutions in retaliation against similar measures that the US and other Western countries have taken against PRC firms (New York Times Chinese Edition, December 16, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Law, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

13. Taiwan’s Dwindling Diplomatic Allies

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amidst the drama surrounding Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s early April stopover in Southern California, where she met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvers around Taiwan that followed, it can be easy to forget why the Taiwanese President was transiting the U.S. in the first place. Tsai was returning home after a trip to Taiwan’s two remaining diplomatic allies in Central America, Guatemala and Belize, which was organized around the theme of “Meeting Democratic Partners, Fostering Shared Prosperity” (民主夥伴共榮之旅) (Office of the President, Republic of China [ROC] [Taiwan], March 29). Days prior to Tsai’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras, which had maintained official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) for 82 years, established formal ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], March 26). The move occurred despite U.S. efforts to dissuade Honduras. On March 18, the Biden administration dispatched senior envoy and special adviser for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, who is also well-regarded in Taipei, to Honduras in a last-minute effort to encourage the Xiomara Castro government to change course in derecognizing Taiwan (Taipei Times March 18). Under the government of Xiomara Castro, who took office early last year, Honduras has sought to pit Taipei and Beijing against each other in a bidding war for diplomatic recognition. While China has offered inducements, Taiwan has both rejected and called out the Castro government’s efforts to condition the continuation of the official relationship on major increases in financial assistance. Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina initially denied Taipei’s claims that Honduras had asked Taiwan for $2.5 billion but eventually acknowledged to the media that the Castro government had sought to obtain $2 billion in aid (ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Taiwan MOFA], March 23). However, he also claimed his country “never received a substantive response from the Taiwanese side” (TVBS, March 24). In a notice regarding these revelations and regretting the pending shift in recognition, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry warned Honduras not to fall prey to China’s “debt trap diplomacy” (Taiwan MOFA, March 23). Upon announcing the termination of relations with Honduras, Tsai cautioned Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies against following the same course, stressing that “we will not engage in a meaningless contest of ‘dollar diplomacy’ with China.” She also criticized the PRC’s efforts to employ “any and all means to suppress Taiwan’s international participation” (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 26). Earlier this week, the Tsai government averted another diplomatic setback with the election of Santiago Pena of the ruling conservative Colorado Party to the presidency in Paraguay. Pena’s opponent, Efrain Alegre, who led a broad center-left coalition, campaigned on switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC in order to facilitate Paraguay’s access to China’s large agricultural import market (Nikkei Asia, April 18). In a response to a congratulatory tweet from President Tsai, Pena stated that “we are going to continue strengthening our historic ties of brotherhood and cooperation between our countries” (Taiwan News, May 2). However, the Tsai administration is hardly free from the challenge of maintaining the ROC’s dwindling network of official relationships. Guatemala, which is Taiwan’s largest diplomatic ally, will go to the polls to elect a new president in late June. President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla, who has been a staunch supporter of maintaining close ties with the ROC, is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. According to long-time China-Latin America analyst R. Evan Ellis the prospect of “a victory by either a center-left-oriented candidate more open to working with the PRC such as Sandra Torres, or a right-oriented candidate such as Zury Rios, whose Presidency might deepen policy conflict with the Biden Administration, could present a small but not insignificant risk of Guatemalan diplomatic recognition of the PRC” (CEEP, March 7).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

14. A Preliminary Survey of PRC United Front Activities in South Korea

Author:: Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exercises influence over South Korea in multiple ways. Chinese influence operations against Seoul have been characterized as not subtle and even blatant compared to the more covert and subversive methods employed in other countries (China Brief, December 19, 2014). Indeed, the more overt and aggressive ways in which Beijing exercises influence were on full display when the PRC responded to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016 with boycotts, military exercises and diplomatic pressure (China Brief, March 31, 2017). Less well known, however, is how China employs other, more subtle means to influence South Korean politics and society. A general presumption exists that influence must be exerted overtly or in forms such as diplomatic protests or through sanctions, yet Beijing’s influence activities also take on a less pronounced and more obscured nature, which is commonly associated with its United Front activities. This article will provide a preliminary assessment of the local Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会) and the web of other United Front organizations that operate in South Korea. [1] This article does not seek to offer an exhaustive examination of these organizations, but to provide a preview of the key United Front apparatuses and their activities in South Korea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Diaspora, Soft Power, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

15. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

16. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

17. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

18. Restarting Educational Exchanges with China after the Cultural Revolution

Author:: John C. Thomson
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When I arrived in Beijing in June 1978, foreign diplomats were forbidden to visit any schools or universities and they had minimal contact with government organizations. Although both the U.S. and China were interested in resuming academic exchanges, the obstacles were daunting. I was assigned to the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), an unofficial organization representing U.S interests in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the absence of an official embassy. After establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in January 1979, I became part of the newly opened U.S. embassy in China, the successor to the Liaison Office. I am pleased to have worked directly on the restoration of U.S.-PRC educational exchanges after a hiatus of 30 years that followed the communist take-over in 1949.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Education, Foreign Exchange, and Cultural Revolution
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

19. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:: Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. U.S.-China Agricultural Dialogue in Des Moines Shows Potential for Improving Relations During a Critical Period

Author:: Kenneth M. Quinn
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Iowa’s connections with China—highlighted by a 1985 visit by a young Xi Jinping, now 37 years later General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the People’s Republic of China—make for an unusual and much-needed bright spot in today’s dismal U.S.–PRC relations. What better place than the leading agricultural state to look for collaboration in agricultural research and global development needed to face the global challenges of our time? In April 2022, Sino-American diplomatic relations took center stage in Iowa’s capital city, as three ambassadors—Nicholas Burns, the new Biden Administration envoy in Beijing, Qin Gang, the PRC ambassador to the U.S., and former U.S. ambassador to the PRC Terry Branstad—all participated in the U.S.-China Agricultural Dialogue that I co-organized and moderated.
Topic:: Agriculture, Diplomacy, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

21. An International Lifeline: Taiwan’s Parliamentary Outreach

Author:: Rup Narayan Das
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, China has made systematic efforts to internationally isolate Taiwan through a mix of coercion and diplomatic enticement. Taiwan, however, has broken through this isolation by engaging with other nations through robust parliamentary diplomacy in order to expand its international space and legitimacy. It is indeed an irony of contemporary history that although Taiwan fulfills the main requisites for statehood, such as territory, population and an effective governance structure, it is deprived of its rightful place in the community of nations multilaterally and also bilaterally at the behest of China. Most countries’ “One China” policies and state-to-state relationships with China preclude them from engaging in official interaction with Taipei, but the trend of parliamentary outreach between Taiwan and the rest of the world is gaining momentum. Such interactions provide opportunities for Taiwanese parliamentarians to interface with their counterparts from abroad, particularly with fellow democratic countries with which Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic relations. Moreover, these delegations have created something of an informal international parliamentary fraternity in support of Taiwan, which underscores a broader groundswell of goodwill in the international community. This article surveys some notable recent interactions in Taiwan’s expanding parliamentary diplomacy with the U.S. and other fellow democracies.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Parliament
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and United States of America

22. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

23. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

24. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

25. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

26. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

27. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

28. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:: William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

29. Small State Dilemma: Cambodia Between The Asean And China In The Indo-Pacific Context

Author:: Khath Bunthorn
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: As a small state, Cambodia viewed the ASEAN and China as almost equally important pillars of its foreign policy. Amid the intense strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Cambodia faced the dilemma of how to maintain the ASEAN centrality without diplomatic cost to its key ally China, and how to balance its national interest with regional interest. In this context, the article aimed to explain the importance of the ASEAN as a cornerstone of Cambodia’s foreign policy, examine the motivations of Cambodia’s deep political embrace of the Asian giant, and underline its implications for the Indo-Pacific from the lens of small state foreign policy. The article was based on qualitative, empirical analysis that comprises primary and secondary data pertinent to the current topic. The article concluded that Cambodia leaned more towards China than it did towards the ASEAN, thus weakening its centrality in driving the broader regional architecture and that domestic politics was the primary driving force of Cambodia’s foreign policy towards that direction. At this juncture, Cambodia should step back from the present degree of its strategic engagement with China and look for ways to diversify its relations with other major powers while getting back on the democratic path and upholding human rights.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Cambodia, Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN

30. Post-Pulwama Indo-Pak COnflict: Reconnoitering The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Author:: Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Jagmeet Bawa, and Balinder Singh
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Terrorism has emerged as one of the major challenges for the Eurasian regional peace, security, and cooperation. Keeping these challenges in perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established to eliminate the menace of terrorism, fundamentalism, and secessionism. Against this background, the main objectives of this paper are to examine how terrorism emerged as a major determining factor in the Indo-Pak relations and how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), was failed to play its effective role in the Indo-Pak conflict given the Pulwama terror attack. For this research, descriptive and analytical methods were used and the data was collected from secondary sources. The major findings of this article are that terrorism has emerged as one of the major determinants of Indo-Pak relations and the same has become a major challenge for the SCO to resolve the issue. Against the background of terror attacks, it was anticipated that the SCO would play a crucial role to pacify the situation. However, the role played by the SCO in this situation proved marked as a Whack-a-Mole.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

31. China's Development Assistance to the Western Balkans and Its Impact on Democratic Governance and Decision-Making

Author:: Ana Krstinovska
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans has been little researched and aid-funded projects are often mistermed as Chinese investments. This article aimed to shed light on specific ‘China Aid’ disbursement and management procedures by examining the signed agreements and contracted projects in five countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, N. Macedonia, and Serbia during the period 2000-2020. The objective was to determine the impact of China’s development assistance on democratic governance and decision-making. Attride-Stirling’s thematic networks tool was used to analyze the procedures in each project cycle phase and their compliance with the principles of good governance and aid effectiveness. The findings suggest that the assistance, shaped by Chinese rules in combination with Western Balkans domestic agency, is marked by the opacity of the procedures, lack of accountability, disregard for rules in public finance management, and public procurement. Moreover, China could use its grant and loan agreements to influence sovereign decision-making on issues that affect China’s interests. To conclude, although China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans could benefit the recipients’ economic development, it also constrains their democratic governance and decision-making and serves China’s foreign policy interests.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

32. China's Contribution to the Stabilization of 'Democratic' Afghanistan

Author:: Lukasz Jurenczyk
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China and Afghanistan established diplomatic relations in 1955. In the following decades of the Cold War, however, relations between the countries were limited, which was due to the main directions of the foreign policies of both countries. Afghanistan focused on balancing the influence of the USSR and the US on its territory. China, in turn, adopted a rotational stance towards superpowers, and in the region, it strengthened political, economic and military cooperation with Pakistan (Zaborowski 2012, 142). In the 1970s, China supported the pro-communist Shu’lai Javid (Eternal Flame) party operating in Afghanistan. Members of Parcham, the pro-Moscow wing of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), contemptuously described its members as Maoists (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 46). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Beijing allowed Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim fighters to pass through the Wakhan Corridor into Afghanistan to support the mujahideen insurgency there. At that time, political relations between states were maintained only at the consular level.By February 1989, the Soviets withdrew their troops from Afghanistan, and in September 1992 the last communist president - Mohammad Najibullah (09.1987-09.1992) was overthrown. However, this did not end the civil war, as individual mujahideen groups fought for influence in the country. The war destabilized not only Afghanistan, but also the border areas of neighboring countries, including the Western border of the PRC. In 1992, the President of Afghanistan - Burhanuddin Rabbani (06.1992-09.1996) tried to normalize relations with Beijing, but due to increasing military operations in 1993 China withdrew its diplomatic representation from Kabul. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 1996, the country fell into international isolation in which China participated. During the Taliban regime, Afghanistan hosted al-Qaeda, which trained around 1,000 Uyghur fighters in the camps there. In Beijing, this caused serious concern and encouraged the Chinese authorities to intensify security cooperation with Pakistan. According to leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), most of the security problems in the Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province were to be caused by neighboring Afghanistan. For example, the 1997 incidents in the province, known as the Yining riots, were considered to be Taliban-inspired (Cheema 2002, 308)
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Democracy, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Manifestations of Chinese Development Aid and Its Hidden Meanings

Author:: Anna Kobierecka
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China is one of the states focusing intensively on building its soft power and shaping its international image. However, China’s image is still negative and primarily based on stereotypes. In recent years, this country is willing to change such perceptions and present itself as an efficient, intensively developing, capable country that is much more than just a global production plant. The article aims to review China’s different manifestations of development aid regarding changing this type of public diplomacy and its meaning to the Chinese government. Is it only motivated by good intentions, or maybe its goal is to only provide an advantage to China? It is evident that owing to significant development, China needs to expand its economic contacts. However, the tested hypothesis states that behind Chinese development aid, political motivation is hidden as well. The research is based on content analysis of official documents and Foreign Ministry’s statements referring to development aid.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: China and Asia

34. Economic Sanctions as a Tool of China’s Hybrid Strategies

Author:: Rafal Wisniewski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to analyze the role of economic sanctions in the People’s Republic of China’s overall approach to achieving its security objectives in the international arena. During the last two decades, Beijing used this instrument on numerous occasions to exert pressure on a varied group of actors. China’s current strategy toward a range of disputes and conflicts it is engaged in (the South China Sea territorial disputes most prominently stand out) is often described using the popular vocabulary of “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone conflicts”. Putting the conceptual complications aside, the author agrees that the PRC’s approach can be viewed as part of a growing trend for great powers to employ what can be called “hybrid strategies” toward its opponents. As part of a broader category of economic statecraft, economic sanctions form an important element of this approach. Considering current scholarship on both “hybrid” (or “grey area”) warfare and economic sanctions, the article answers the question of why the PRC increasingly resorts to hybrid strategies (including economic coercion) and identifies the main characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions. It also provides preliminary conclusions on their effectiveness.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Territorial Disputes, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

35. A Soviet Diplomat’s Memories of Beijing 1973-1975

Author:: Simon Schuchat
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Editor’s Note: This excerpt from a Soviet diplomat’s memoir of his China service is translated by Simon Schuchat. The diplomat, Aleksei Arkadevich Brezhnev (1930-2008, no relation to Leonid Brezhnev), worked on Sino-Soviet affairs from 1953 until 1978, in Beijing and Moscow, including serving as acting head of the USSR embassy during part of the Cultural Revolution in China. In 1998 he published China: A Thorny Path to Neighborly Relations. Memoirs and Reflections, from which this excerpt is taken.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Soviet Union

36. Beijing Brushstrokes

Author:: Beatrice Camp
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: While studying Chinese in Taiwan in preparation for assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, I gave birth to baby William, our first child. Along the way, I learned a fair amount about Chinese birthing beliefs; our teachers at the Foreign Service Language School were happy to talk about the importance of fetal education and how my studying Chinese while pregnant would benefit the baby. A few days before my due date, my husband David dreamed I gave birth to a koala. David’s shock over having a furry animal for a son was compensated by the thrill of hearing the newborn utter a Chinese phrase. We had, after all, spent the previous two years struggling to master tones and characters. Not to mention that the little koala’s question of “gànmá” (干吗) or “whatever for?” seemed right on the money.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Culture, Language, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

37. William Rockhill, The Man Who Shaped China Policy a Century Ago

Author:: Peter Bridges
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Linguist, author, explorer, and diplomat, William Woodville Rockhill is best known as the author of the Open Door policy toward China put forth by the United States in 1899. In between his first diplomatic assignment in China and his later role as the top U.S. diplomat there, he trekked for months across North Asia, and recorded meticulous observations of climate, geography, and local people in a book published in 1894 by the Smithsonian Institution. In his two decades of service to the United States, Rockhill served both in Washington and as the American envoy to several major countries. He was, however, not just a diplomat. He lived a life uniquely diverse for an American of his or any day. When a boy, he moved with his widowed mother to France. In his teens he entered St. Cyr, the French military academy, where he found time to study Tibetan, the first American to do so. After St. Cyr he became an officer of the French Foreign Legion, and served in Algeria, where the French administration was taking stern measures to control the native Muslim majority.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and History
Political Geography:: China and Asia

38. China-India New Intricacies: Rivalry and Cooperation in a New Changing Global Context

Author:: Buddhi Prasad Sharma
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Borders, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

39. China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan: Partnership for Regional Peace

Author:: Mariam Tahir and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This paper examines the prospects of strategic partnership for regional peace between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan through their mutual geopolitical interests. Chinese involvement with Afghanistan serves as a key factor in the successful implementation of its economic outreach through Central and South Asian segments of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it helps to rebalance China’s economic and political aspirations. The paper also highlights the implications of China’s relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan to counter Indian influence in the region. The trilateral relationship between these countries is of paramount importance for regional peace and security. Afghanistan is the most unstable country in the region; however Chinese constructive engagement with Afghanistan through diplomatic, political, economic and security measures can usher into a new era of peace, progress and development for the entire region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

40. China’s Vaccine Diplomacy Amid COVID – 19 Pandemic: A Case Study of South Asia

Author:: Shabana Fayyaz and Tabinda Siddiqui
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: COVID-19 onset has questioned the proclaimed notions of Globalization such as shared prosperity and security across the board. The ongoing pandemic once again calls for collective action in men and material terms rather than erecting technology barriers and doubting the intentions of each other. This paper aims to address the following inter-related queries: What is the nature of China‟s health-based assistance to the South Asian states for mitigating the COVID-19 risks? How and why do the United States and India remain skeptical of Chinese anti COVID- 19 Vaccine efforts? And how do other South Asian states perceive Chinese contributions to deal with the ongoing Pandemic? And, finally what lessons can be learned from this divergent debate centered on: Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy? Comparison and contrast of the available information is employed as an analytical technique to determine the nature of skepticism surrounding the Chinese vaccination campaign in South Asia. Consulting data on three various accounts assisted to conclude the findings of this research paper. The findings of this study establish that Western and Indian skepticism, directed against Chinese health diplomacy in South Asia is motivated by their geopolitical contestations with China. In nutshell, the paper‟s main thrust is to stress the essential value of mutual cooperation in dealing with the Pandemic like COVID-19. There is a need to embrace the concept of „holistic security‟ in the highly interconnected world of today and tomorrow.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Globalization, Crisis Management, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and United States of America

41. Chinese Investments in Brazil: Economic Diplomacy in Bilateral Relations

Author:: Virginia Soledad Busilli and Maria Belen Jaime
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China has consolidated its status as a great power and strengthened its presence in different regions of the planet. In accordance with its economic development strategy, Beijing’s growing bond with Latin America is part of China’s need to guarantee access to raw materials and energy resources. In this framework and through economic diplomacy, China has strengthened its trade relations, as well as loans and investments in most of the region’s countries.Brazil is an example of this relationship pattern, as one of China’s most important partners and top investment destination in Latin America. It became Beijing’s top commercial partner in 2012. This paper will analyse the composition and evolution of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil between the years of 2004 and 2020. In order to do so, we will study the main projects carried out by the country, as well as the characteristics of the Chinese companies (state or non-state) that participated in the process, in order to understand their most important features. Likewise, we will analyse the articulation of the Chinese FDI with its trade flows. We will start from the premise that Chinese investments in Brazil are directly linked to Beijing’s strategic interests, while at the same time guided by market logics that try to maximise profits. In this vein, within the framework of the ‘going out strategy’,state companies play a fundamental role.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

42. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:: Lech Drab
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

43. A Solid Handoff in the U.S-India Relationship

Author:: Kenneth I. Juster
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: The conventional wisdom is that the foreign policy of Donald Trump’s Administration severely damaged relations with U.S. allies and partners. Commentators point to repeated criticism by the United States of friends in Europe and Asia, as well as the abrupt withdrawal from trade and other arrangements. But such critics overlook the U.S. relationship with India, which made significant advances and will be an area of substantial continuity in Joseph Biden’s Administration. The U.S.-India partnership has grown steadily since the turn of the century, with the past four years seeing major progress in diplomatic, defense, economic, energy and health cooperation. The strengthened bilateral relationship has become the backbone of an Indo-Pacific strategy designed to promote peace and prosperity in a dynamic and contested region. The longstanding U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific has underpinned the stability and remarkable economic rise of this region over the last 70 years. While the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been many years in the making, in the past four years the United States and India have turned it into a reality. For the United States, the Indo-Pacific agenda meant working with India to provide coordinated leadership in addressing the threat from an expansionist China, the need for more economic connectivity and other challenges in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Myanmar’s Foreign Strategy Toward China Since Rohingya Crisis: Changes, Outlook and Implications

Author:: Jaesoo Park
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Myanmar has crafted a neutral foreign policy since its colonial years to avoid leaning too much on any foreign power, but a spiraling political crisis at home is pushing it toward China as a buffer against international outrage. Myanmar faces charges of genocide against the Rohingya. China has backed Myanmar in the UN. In fact, China is in a similar situation. China is grappling with international criticism over the perceived repression of ethnic Uighur people. Myanmar is exposed to various words and loud in the international community. So Myanmar wants to improve relations with China and is turning into an active cooperative attitude as a strategy to secure a friendly army. This paper shows how the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China are changing, and how Myanmar’s foreign strategy toward China is approaching. Also, this article analyzes the outlook of diplomatic relations and the implications of the current situation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Rohingya
Political Geography:: China, Myanmar, and Indo-Pacific

45. Pakistan and CPEC Are Drawn Into the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:: Adnan Aamir
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were stunned in late November when a senior U.S. government official issued a strong verbal attack on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On November 21 in Washington, D.C., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs Alice Wells spoke at length about the CPEC at a public event, criticizing multiple elements of the $62 billion flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ambassador Wells cast doubt upon claims that CPEC will generate sustainable economic development in Pakistan and criticized the project’s cost escalations and non-transparent processes of awarding CPEC contracts to Chinese firms. She appealed to Pakistan’s citizens to ask tough questions of the PRC regarding the CPEC and China’s related projects in Pakistan (U.S. State Department, November 21, 2019). In the past, the U.S. government had raised concerns over CPEC and China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” but it had never presented such a direct and detailed set of criticisms. Ambassador Wells crossed that line—bringing the notoriously stalled out CPEC back under international scrutiny just after Chinese and Pakistani leaders had brokered a cautiously optimistic set of funding deals to jumpstart progress a month before (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), October 9, 2019). Chinese representatives were quick to respond to Ambassador Wells’s criticisms. The next day, PRC Ambassador to Islamabad Yao Jing(姚敬) said that he had been “shocked and surprised to see the remarks of Alice,” and that Ambassador Wells lacked accurate knowledge and had relied on “Western media ‘propaganda’” for her accusations. He called on the U.S. to “show your evidence, give me evidence” of specific cases of corruption related to the CPEC, and questioned whether Wells was taking potshots at the CPEC to score political points. Ambassador Yao challenged the U.S. to suit its actions to its words: “If there is any sincerity… [the U.S. should] come forward to invest in Pakistan. We [China] welcome U.S. investment in Pakistan.” (INP (Pakistan), November 22, 2019; VOA, November 22, 2019). In addition to refocusing negative attention on the CPEC, Assistant Secretary of State Wells’ speech drew a reluctant Pakistan further into the tumultuous U.S.-China political rivalry. Pakistan faces a balance of payments crisis and a severely weakened currency, which has led it to grow increasingly dependent on economic ties with China. At the same time, the Pakistani leadership has navigated a complex and multifaceted historic security and political partnership with the U.S. If, as Ambassador Wells’ statement seems to imply, Pakistan’s engagement with China is seen to come at the expense of its bilateral relationship with the U.S. – or vice-versa – then Pakistan’s delicate power balancing diplomacy will soon become even more tenuous.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. The Vatican Stays Away from the Hong Kong Crisis Due to Fears of Beijing’s Retaliation

Author:: Emanuele Scimia
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On January 9, in his annual message to diplomatic envoys accredited to the Holy See, Pope Francis voiced concern for the conflicts ravaging parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, and Ukraine, as well as for the increasing number of political crises gripping Latin America. However, not a single word was offered about the situation in Hong Kong (Vatican News, Vatican State Website, January 9). Serious socio-political unrest began in Hong Kong last June over a now-withdrawn extradition bill that, according to protesters, would allow the extradition of political dissidents to mainland China (China Brief, June 26, 2019). The pontiff has so far said nothing about the crisis in the city, much to the chagrin of many local Catholics. It seems that the Vatican has no intention of supporting the anti-government movement in Hong Kong, as such a move would hinder its attempts to improve relations with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Religion, Leadership, Catholic Church, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Vatican city

47. Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 7, 2019, infantry units of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the “Hand-in-Hand 2019” combined military exercise at Umroi in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. The fortnight-long exercise ran through December 20, and focused on counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban terrain: to include training evolutions such as cross-training on small arms, hostage rescue, and recognizing improvised explosive device (IED) traps. Approximately 130 personnel from each country participated in the exercise, with the PLA contingent consisting of troops stationed in Tibet (Indian Ministry of Defense, December 2, 2019; Global Times, December 8, 2019; China Military Online, December 23, 2019). It was in January 2001 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first expressed interest in cooperating with India in combating terrorism (The Hindu, January 14, 2001). Since then Beijing and New Delhi have taken several steps to facilitate such cooperation: the two sides have set up a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Mechanism, a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and a High-Level Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism and Security to facilitate such engagement. In addition to leadership-level discussions, officials are engaging in talks on a range of terrorism-related issues. In October 2018, the two sides signed an Internal Security Cooperation Agreement, which aims at strengthening cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and narcotics control (Business Standard, October 22, 2018). The “Hand-in-Hand” exercises were first set in motion in 2007, and the December 2019 training in Meghalaya represented the eighth round of these counter-terrorism exercises. Such events—as well as the joint agreements between the two governments—present a picture of India and China as closely engaged on counter-terrorism issues. The truth is quite different, however—and the two sides are far from “hand-in-hand” in their understanding of terrorism.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

48. Fair-Weather Friends: The Impact of the Coronavirus on the Strategic Partnership Between Russia and China

Author:: Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In June 2019, during a visit to the Kremlin by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation announced that they had “agreed…to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua, June 6, 2019). This continued the warming of bilateral relations nurtured by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have met at least 30 times during their respective tenures. The strengthening of ties has seen unusually relaxed encounters between the pair, such as when they made blini (traditional Russian pancakes) together in Vladivostok in September 2018 (People’s Daily, September 12, 2018). In more substantive terms, support from Chinese state-linked financial institutions has played a critical role in the construction of a new wave of Russian energy infrastructure, ranging from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project to the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline. However, the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak has opened a stress fracture in the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. After weeks of gradually escalating restrictions, reports emerged in late February that Moscow public transit drivers had been instructed to call police if they witnessed Chinese passengers using the transit system (Wangyi Keji, February 25). The PRC Embassy in Russia warned that such actions “will harm the good atmosphere for developing Chinese-Russian relations” (Novaya Gazeta, February 25). While China was initially restrained it its public criticism of Russian measures taken in the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, the decision of the PRC Embassy in Moscow to highlight the discrimination being faced by Chinese citizens in Moscow is a reminder of just how quickly tensions can arise between the two countries, even in the age of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

49. China-Iran Relations: The Not-So-Special “Special Relationship”

Author:: John Calabrese
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Over the years, unremitting hostility between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has created opportunities as well as dilemmas for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, presented mixed challenges and opportunities for the PRC. Beijing has sought to exploit the rift between Washington and Tehran without further fueling Sino-American tensions. For the past year, Washington and Tehran have been locked in an action-reaction cycle of escalation. This dangerous spiral reached new heights with the January 2 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani, which was followed by retaliatory Iranian missile attacks on two coalition bases in Iraq that injured dozens of American troops. Although both sides managed to pull back from the brink of war in early January, underlying tensions remain—as does the possibility of a more direct military confrontation. In what manner and to what extent has the current unstable situation affected China’s interests in, and relationship with, Iran? What is the likelihood that, as this latest round of high-stakes poker between Washington and Tehran continues to unfold, Beijing will seize it as yet another opportunity to profit from America’s entanglements in the wider Middle East?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

50. China’s Deepening Diplomatic and Economic Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar, which laid out a framework for ending the 18-year old conflict in Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, February 29). Despite skepticism in many quarters regarding the viability of the deal, the negotiations leading to the agreement have been supported by many international actors, to include the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On February 18, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽) commented on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations by stating that “China firmly supports the broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process [and] welcomes the news that the U.S. and the Taliban are expected to reach and sign a deal… China stands ready to step up cooperation with all parties to the Afghan issue and the international community for peace, stability and development in Afghanistan” (PRC Foreign Ministry Briefing, February 18). As the U.S plans to draw down its forces in Afghanistan—a key element of the February 29 deal—China is set to further deepen its involvement in Afghanistan (Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2019). Beijing wishes to achieve at least two key objectives. First, it wants once and for all to block any contact between the Taliban and ethnic Uighur Muslim militants seeking independence from China (China Brief, April 24, 2019). Second, the PRC wants long-term stability in Afghanistan in order to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—to the war-wracked country. Beijing sees Afghanistan as a primary link between the Central Asian republics and the CPEC (China Brief, December 10, 2019). To achieve its objectives, Beijing has pursued positive engagement with the Taliban movement that controls more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. These ties have increased over the past couple of years: for example, in 2019 Taliban representatives paid at least two visits to Beijing (in June and September) for talks with PRC officials (CGTN, June 20, 2019; Al-Jazeera, September 23, 2019).
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

51. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

52. China-Russia-Pakistan Strategic Triangle: Imperative Factors

Author:: Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi and Uzma Munshi
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China, a rising power and Russia, a great power of the past is currently pursuing the aspiration to regain its lost glory, are at the center stage of Asian geopolitics. Starting from the first decade of twenty first century, the extra tilt of Russia‟s moderate ally India towards the US is ringing alarm bells for China, Russia and Pakistan more or less with an equal spell. Indian tilt towards the US culminating in a nuclear deal between the two in 2008 (Baker, 2008), specifically, post nuclear deal strategic partnership provides the former with a punch to pose a challenge to its two sheer competitors Pakistan and China. In fact, this emerging engagement between Indo-US is based on their shared interest of complicating the security calculations of Pakistan and China. Thus, the strategic partnership between India and the US provides a significant variable to Pakistan to dramatically change the dimensions of its security and strategic relationship with Asian powers such as China and Russia. For Pakistan this partnership will provide it not only an option to maintain balance in the region vis a vis India but it will also provide it with an alternate to the US in the form of realigning its relationship with Russia and China. While shunning off increasing US sway in near abroad is in the interests of both China and Russia, so, this emerging strategic triangle will mutually reciprocate their respective interests. Although, India is obsessed with a desire to become regional hegemon independently pose a significant threat to regional balance and stability in South Asia, its strategic partnership with the US acts moderately as a force multiplier. So, for Pakistan being a major stakeholder in the regional affairs, prudence dictates to cultivate and enhance its strategic relationship with its time tested friend China as well with Russia. The current paper will attempt to access the imperative factors bringing China, Russia and Pakistan closer to form a strategic triangle. It will explore the political, geo-economic and geo-strategic areas of convergence for greater cooperation between this emerging triangle. What are prospects and challenges in the way of development of a strategic triangle between China- Russia and Pakistan that is emerging as a response to a direct threat from Indo-US strategic partnership to gain a hold over regional affairs?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

53. Analytical Review of Pak-China Strategic Cooperation 1950-2017

Author:: Muhammad Azhar Naeem and Abdul Majid
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The present study is aimed to provide analytical review of Pak-China strategic cooperation starting from 1950 to 2017. Pakistan started to establish her strategic relations with the outer world soon after her independence in 1947 in order to maintain balance of power in the region. Bilateral ties remained very encouraging from the beginning of Pak-China relations. However, bilateral ties touch its heights in the decade of 1960s. After 1960s, bilateral relation turned to diplomatic relations because of changing world scenario i.e. cold war, terrorism, One China Policy and change of world order. Still China helped Pakistan financially, technologically and assisted in developing nuclear program. In 21st century, relations became stronger of and both the nations started helping each other to materialize their goals in diverse fields. One such example is the implementation of (China – Pakistan Economic Corridor) CPEC which is expected to change the fate of both the countries in future.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

54. China Pakistan Ties: Challenges and Implications for the region (2013-2018)

Author:: Rabia Bashir
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China’s active role in South Asia is based on a “win-win” approach which is also beneficial for the economic progress of the regional states. China’s rapid economic integration represents its intention to maintain peace and stability in its vicinity. To hold its presence in the Indian Ocean region it is developing strong economic and trade ties with South Asian states. This region has become a center of attention where the interests of major powers China, India and the United States intersects. The joint venture of “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” strategically holds huge significance for China, Pakistan and major powers like India and the US being rival to China. This corridor will enhance the economic conditions of not only China and Pakistan but also the other developing and the landlocked states of CARs and Afghanistan.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

55. CPEC and Re-Orientation of China-Pakistan Relations

Author:: Muhammad Ikram
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The ̳One Belt One Road‘ term refers to ̳The Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt. This mega initiative was announced by Chinese president, Xi Jiping, in September 2013 during his official state visit to Kazakhstan. Pakistan is most important pillar of this Chinese initiative. Under the One Belt One Road framework, several corridors will be built in future. Whereas, with the development of OBOR, regional economies will boost up to $2.5 trillion and more than 4.4 billion population will get benefits across 65 countries. The Silk Road Economic Belt will link China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through the Persian Gulf and South East Asia and Indian Ocean. However, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will be built to connect the Pakistan's Port Gawadar with Chinese city of Kashagar in autonomous province Xinjiang. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is a game changer for the region and particularly for China and Pakistan, through the development of roads, railways, oil and gas pipe lines. Thus, the project brings wealth and prosperity across the region, particularly in Pakistan. But on the other hand, Pakistan is facing serious internal and external threats from terrorism and extremism since 2001. This work is an attempt to enlighten the prospects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and constraints in the way of this mega projects.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Peace, Economic Development, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

56. Beer-Pong Diplomacy: A Diplomat’s Guide to Drinking in China

Author:: Derek Sandhaus
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: It’s rare that I receive a summons to brief senior diplomats. You see I’m a writer and what is referred to as a “trailing spouse” in the U.S. Foreign Service. So when my diplomat wife informed me that the Consul General and his deputy would like to meet with me, no one was more surprised than I. When I learned what they had in mind it all made more sense: They wanted me to tell them how to drink, more specifically how to drink in the Chinese manner.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Culture, Memoir, and Alcohol
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

57. U.S.-China Relations and the Need for Continued Public Diplomacy

Author:: William A. Rugh
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: During the pandemic that swept the world in 2020, President Trump sought to focus major blame on China, where the virus first emerged. At a press conference on March 20, as American cases increased dramatically, he began to call it the “Chinavirus”, crossing out the word “coronavirus” in his prepared text. He continued to use that term, so criticizing China became a central theme in American “public diplomacy”. A new burden was added to the U.S.-China relationship, at the very time we need more, not less, mutual understanding.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. Big Business in a Multipolar World

Author:: A. Borisov
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The 20th Century went down in history as a century of ideologies and sharp confrontation of states belonging to different systems, the Soviet Union and the United States in the first place. The 21st century has already demonstrated a mounting geopolitical confrontation of great powers that drew international business interests into their whirlpool. It turned out that the main actors of world politics cannot agree on new prin- ciples of economic cooperation, free competition and respect for the spheres of interests – they have chosen the road of mounting worldwide tension.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. The First Contacts between China and Poland in History

Author:: Bi Wei
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Poland is one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties 70 years ago, both countries have conducted close cooperation in all areas and the bilateral relations have witnessed steady development. In particular, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, launched in 2013, got the positive responses and support from many countries, including Poland, which became an important partner for China to promote the construction of the initiative. This paper, from a historical perspective, reviews the first interaction between China and Poland in the period of Yuan Dynasty which is arranged in chronological order. The narrations mainly concentrate on accounts of the western expeditions by Genghis Khan and his descendants as well as the Battle of Legnica, during the period of which the Mongolia Empire was successively set up. Each entry will include a concrete description, highlighting where possible issues such as where the Mongolia went, why the expedition and its record are important. The paper also expounds the first record about Poland and the change of the name of Poland in Chinese literature so as to deepen the mutual understanding between two countries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

60. A Look at Taiwan's Cooperation with Paraguay (2009-2019)

Author:: Maria Antonella Cabral Lopez
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Taiwan's situation in the international system is particular and the recognition of other states is key to its survival. Paraguay has maintained diplomatic relations with this Asian country continuously since 1957. This research aims to describe the south - south cooperation of Taiwan with Paraguay during the period 2009 - 2019, a very important facet of the bilateral relationship between both parties. For this, a bibliographic-documentary research was used. In addition is important to mention the level of this was descriptive and primary and secondary sources were employed. Among the main results obtained, it can be seen that non-reimbursable cooperation projects are being adjusted according to five-year negotiations, that there is some continuity regarding the issues addressed by technical cooperation and the existence of other less known initiatives such as conferences and participation in fairs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South America, and Paraguay

61. Chinese Views of South Korea: Aligning Elite and Popular Debates

Author:: See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have experienced periods of conflict and cooperation since officially forging “partnership” relations in 1998. From a historical perspective, Korea was among the most willing participants of the Sinocentric tribute system and its underlying cultural hierarchy. Yet the 2003-2004 dispute over the ancient Koguryo kingdom’s identity marked the first major downturn in the China-ROK relationship since normalization. The rapid expansion of trade, at an average annual rate of 18 percent since 1992, has not prevented the two sides from fighting over political grievances. Most notably under the current Xi Jinping leadership, Beijing’s assertions of unprecedented friendship quickly turned into accusations of betrayal requiring economic punishment. Why and how did China’s policy toward South Korea shift so drastically after two decades of diplomatic normalization? To answer, we must focus on the expectations raised by China’s national identity for ties with South Korea. This study examines the evolution of Chinese views of South Korea with a focus on elite and popular narratives since 2013. Despite increased interdependence, these narratives point to China’s increasingly fragile political ties with Asian partners. Most importantly, China’s growing weight facilitates its strategic combination of economic and discursive tools of diplomacy framed by national identity. Recent tensions over the U.S.-ROK military alliance displayed Beijing’s denial of direct economic retaliation under the cover of public hostility, conveniently blurring the lines between state-led and voluntary actions. By hardening the identity dimensions of conflict, such strategies may only have long-term counterproductive effects of constraining Beijing’s political influence at home and abroad. The four sections below proceed as follows. First, I review two decades of China-ROK relations since the establishment of partnership ties in 1998. I identify two related trends: the intensification of political disputes despite trade, and China’s growing economic leverage in managing those disputes, keeping an eye on the role of national identity. Second, I assess the pessimistic turn in China’s domestic discourse on South Korea in the Xi Jinping period, using official, academic, and media sources. Third, I trace the interaction of elite and popular narratives, focusing on the 2016-2017 dispute over a U.S. missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). I briefly extend the discussion to public clashes over Hong Kong in 2019 to underscore the enduring impact of China’s major power and domestic political identities on China-ROK relations. To conclude, I consider the trajectory of bilateral relations under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Moon Jae-in, including the domestic and foreign policy implications of nationalist discourse.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Public Opinion, and Elites
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

62. The Case of United States Views of Its Ties with China

Author:: Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: U.S. views of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been hardening for at least two decades, from George W. Bush characterizing China in the 2000 presidential campaign and the first months of his presidency as a “strategic competitor,” to the Obama administration’s pursuit of a “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific in response to China’s growing assertiveness, to the Trump administration describing China’s rise as signaling the “return of an era of great power competition.” Does this trend reflect changes in U.S. self-conception and national identity? Evolving assessments of threat in light of Chinese behavior and what these imply about the regime’s intentions? A reaction to shifts in the overall balance of power between the two countries, perhaps a reflection of a declining superpower facing a rising challenge, “tragically” destined to participate in a “contest for supremacy in Asia” that will ineluctably result in a “Thucydides trap” or war of hegemonic transition? Or is it instead an inevitable clash between a liberal, democratic, rule of law capitalist hegemon and a resilient authoritarian challenger that is a communist dictatorship increasingly reliant on aggressive nationalism since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and evolving rapidly towards national socialism or fascism? While each of these perspectives provides some purchase on the recent developments in U.S. – China relations as seen from Washington, this chapter focuses on the role of national identity, arguing that identity is by no means the sole or best explanation, but that it is an important factor that should not be overlooked or underestimated.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

63. Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations: A Shared Imperative to Look Ahead

Author:: Robert F. Cekuta
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship remains important to both countries, but it is time to reevaluate and update how they engage with each other. The Second Karabakh War is the most visible of the reasons for such a reassessment, given Azerbaijan’s military successes, Russia’s headline role in securing the November 2020 agreement that halted the fighting, and the need to undertake the extremely difficult work of avoiding a new war and building a peace. But China’s high profile economic, diplomatic, and security activities across Eurasia, coupled with the results of the November 2020 election in the United States, have also significantly altered the diplomatic environment. Lastly, multinational challenges—such as the economic, social, and other ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic or the realities of climate change—make the need for revaluation, dialogue, and mapping out new directions in the two countries’ relations even more apparent.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Eurasia, and Azerbaijan

64. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

65. Italy Joins the Belt and Road Initiative: Context, Interests, and Drivers

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In March 2019, Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a broad and comprehensive, albeit not legally binding, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has triggered a significant debate—in Brussels as well as in Washington—about whether this decision signalled an Italian shift away from its historical pro-European and pro-Atlantic position, to a more nuanced position open to deepening strategic ties with China. The MoU is not definite proof of such a shift, and the Italian government has denied any strategic change. However, Italy is the first major European country, and the first Group of Seven (G7) member, to formalize its participation with the BRI project. As such, this development is particularly remarkable.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

66. Global Image of Pakistan: Significance of Public Diplomacy

Author:: Hafeez Ullah Khan
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This paper is an attempt to examine how is soft power and public diplomacy imperative conditions for Pakistan‟s international stature by examining the effective utilization of public diplomacy of the states like USA, Russia, China and India, public diplomacy of which have got a very significant position at the international stage. Based on an understanding of their Public diplomacy, the author seeks to explore what lessons and strategies should Pakistan take into consideration for the promotion of Pakistan‟s good image at the international front, and how Pakistan can be successful in achieving the positive results. The author has highlighted some serious recommendations as well.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and State
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Asia, North America, Punjab, and United States of America

67. Reporting on the Spread of HIV in China

Author:: David Cowhig
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Chinese physician Dr. Wang Shuping predicted the HIV epidemic among Henan peasant blood sellers and eventually raised the alarm all the way to Beijing when local and provincial authorities ignored the rapid spread of HIV among the sellers. This heroic and far-sighted woman became my most important informant on the HIV epidemic when I worked in the Environment, Science and Technology Section of U.S. Embassy Beijing 1996 – 2001.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Health, Public Policy, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, North America, and United States of America

68. Hong Kong — Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Author:: Dick Virden
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Watching the unfolding drama in the streets of Hong Kong, as police and protestors clash daily over the city-state’s future, brings back vivid memories of another, distant era when, for visitors like me, the then-Crown Colony was a tantalizing, intoxicating, mixture of East and West. It was more than half a century ago, in January of 1967, when I first stopped in Hong Kong en route to Bangkok for my initial assignment in the Foreign Service. I’d never ventured outside the United States before and was bowled over by the sights, sounds, and smells of this teeming island group off the tip of mainland China.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, Democracy, Protests, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, Hong Kong, and United States of America

69. A Rare Bloom in Beijing

Author:: May Johnston
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Chinese universities first reopened after the Cultural Revolution in 1977. Since 1949, no academic degrees had been awarded in China. The professors agreed with us that the time had come to invite specialists in American history and American literature to teach about our cultural patrimony rather than just teach English. Were we interested to learn about traditional Chinese opera, recently resurrected from the dead after the Gang of Four's departure? How did he, alone of all the officials I met in my two and a half years in Beijing, remain warm, curious, cheerful, open, enthusiastic, ever flashing a thousand watt smile and above all, so alive? I have photos of Ma grinning as he tried out my colleague's American motorcycle, Ma helping my two-year-old daughter with her chopsticks, Ma joking with the newly arrived Fulbright professors, who ended up relying on Ma as their interlocutor for every request or misunderstanding with the BeiDa authorities.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Education, History, Culture, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Africa, Hong Kong, and United States of America

70. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

71. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

72. Just a Dash? China’s Sharp Power and Australia’s Value Diplomacy

Author:: John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: When supporters of China’s President Xi Jinping point to his many accomplishments they highlight his impressive anti-corruption drive, the end of the one-child family policy, the intensive monitoring of social organizations and citizens, his reorganization of the party and its armed forces, the unilateral occupation and militarization of contested territories in the South China Sea, and the massive Belt and Road Initiative advanced under his administration. Among these larger accomplishments, one that is easily overlooked is his role in compelling the people and government of Australia to recalibrate their relationship with China. In particular, the actions of his government have triggered a major rethink on the place of values in Australian foreign policy and diplomacy.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

73. China's Sharp Power and South Korea's Peace Initiative

Author:: Kim Tae-Hwan
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: If we understand geopolitics as “representations of space” as well as “spatial practices,” then the Indo-Pacific region can be understood as a newly emerging geopolitical hotspot in which major powers are not only vying for the control of spaces, but also waging a war of discourse on values and worldviews, reconstructing geographical spaces in their own interest. Discourse on a nation’s visions and strategies are increasingly employed as a soft power instrument of foreign policy to persuade the international audience, both state and non-state actors. Sharp power is gaining ground in this peculiar context of geopolitical competition combined with the battle for values and ideas. China is at center stage in this geopolitics-cum-discourse game in the Indo-Pacific region. “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s messages to the world,” Xi Jinping exhorted his comrades in 2014, underscoring the importance of international discourse as a type of communicative soft power. But it is hard to distinguish sharp power from soft power solely in terms of the assets employed, as both utilize similar assets. The differences between the two are revealed only by looking into how those assets are mobilized in the real world. When actually put to use, sharp power is often mingled with soft and hard power, easily stretching into the realm of conventional security. This chapter delves into how Beijing has been creatively capitalizing on a hybrid approach, using both hard and sharp power in disseminating its message in narrative form. By putting a special focus on Beijing’s strategic moves made against the backdrop of the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, I examine the ways China combines its sharp and hard power in tackling security issues that its leadership considers as serving “core national interests.” I also address South Korea’s response to China’s sharp power offensive through the lens of inclusionary identity politics, which underscores the need for constructing a shared identity based upon a common vision, even on such critical issues as security. China’s sharp power certainly poses grave challenges to the liberal international order, but what makes Beijing’s value-based offensive sharpedged is essentially not the discourse per se, but the methods it employs in propagating its narrative. Amidst the contending blocs of values between liberalism and counter-liberalism, South Korea, resorting to peace diplomacy as a non-great middle power, should play the role of a reconciler to avoid the clash of values and ideas, if not civilizations. Below, I argue that South Korea’s peace diplomacy should be ultimately aimed at designing its diplomatic trajectory of advancing counter-geopolitics in order to mitigate geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

74. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Sharp Power Versus Values Diplomacy in Indo-Pacific

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the Trump era, there has been a surge of interest in the upsurge of sharp power as a disruptive force in international relations and the precipitous decline in the role of diplomacy based on values as an ennobling factor in bilateral and multilateral relations. Geostrategic fears and trade protectionism have taken center stage as strains are exacerbated by interference in internal affairs on an unparalleled scale and are rarely ameliorated by reassuring affirmation of shared values. The two principal actors in the Indo-Pacific battle between sharp power and values diplomacy are China and the United States. The first chapter in Part II deals directly with the standoff between the two, principal antagonists. In the following chapters, U.S. allies on the frontlines are covered: South Korea, which was battered by Chinese vilification over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment; Japan, a target of China only recently treated less harshly as Xi Jinping agreed to an official state visit by Abe Shinzo; and Australia, the most conspicuous example of China’s use of sharp power. A final case covered in the chapters to follow is: North Korea, which in 2018 found new ways of using sharp power against South Korea. While authors vary in how they interpret the new concept of “sharp power” and in which country’s value diplomacy they emphasize, this collection of five cases offers a foundation for generalizing about this struggle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Trade, and Sharp Power
Political Geography:: China and Indo-Pacific

76. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:: Robert Sutter
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

77. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

78. The “22 vs. 50” Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights

Author:: Roie Yellinek and Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On July 8, 2019, a group of 22 states issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which condemned China’s mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. [1] In the letter, the signatories expressed their countries’ concerns about “credible reports of arbitrary detention in large scale places of detention” in the region and “widespread surveillance and restrictions” targeting Uyghurs and other minorities. The letter (hereafter “First Letter”) called upon the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to uphold its national laws and international commitments, and to “refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang” (UNHRC, July 8). Just four days later, on July 12, 2019, another group of 37 states issued a competing letter to the UNHRC that backed the PRC’s policies in the Xinjiang region (Xinhua, July 13). This letter (hereafter “Second Letter”) asserted that “the work of [UNHRC] should be conducted in an objective… non-confrontational and non-politicized matter,” and expressed “firm opposition to relevant countries’ practice of politicizing human rights issues, by naming and shaming, and publicly exerting pressures on other countries.” This Second Letter commended “China’s remarkable achievements” in “protecting and promoting human rights through development.” The letter further “call[ed] on relevant countries to refrain from employing unfounded charges against China,” and urged the UNHRC to approach the Xinjiang situation “in an objective and impartial manner… with true and genuinely credible information” (UNHRC, July 12). One signatory state, Qatar, subsequently withdrew its support. [2] However, by the time the Second Letter was re-issued later in July, representatives of thirteen additional states and the Palestinian Authority had added their support, bringing the total number of signatories to fifty. [3] This letter exchange between 22 critics and 50 supporters of the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has leveraged its economic and political influence over other voting members at the UNHCR to advocate for its own positions, and to weaken legal and procedural frameworks of the international human rights regime.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, International Cooperation, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

79. Back to the Russia-U.S.-China “Triangle”?

Author:: S. Trush
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: FOr SeVeral MONThS, the world expert community has been actively discussing the obvious resurgence of the russia-the U.S.-China “triangle.” This happens every time when the key, or even “sacral,” prob- lem of international interaction – the problem of security – comes to the fore. The high level of confrontation inside two of the three sides of the “triangle” – the U.S. vs. russia and China vs. the U.S. – predetermined this resurgence against the background of donald Trump’s non-orthodox and unyielding foreign policy. he brought to the white house his “no-nonsense” approach to add more prominence to the traditional efforts of american pragmatists to keep russia and China apart. his obvious preference for Moscow and his clear intention to rely on it to oppose China were defused by an unprece- dented attack launched against him by the anti-Trump opposition inside the United States. due to the internal balance of power, russia was cho- sen as the potentially most promising target with the best foreign policy dividends perfectly suited to the task of either pushing the president out of the white house or at least, narrowing down his political leeway. This attack and the fairly painful Korean issue created a pause in the america-China relations obvious in the first year of the new administra- tion that ended late in 2017 by the “tough and realistic” description in the National Security Strategy of the United States of “revisionist powers of russia and China.... that challenge american power.” This launched an aggressive trade war with China; today, it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the exacerbated systemic confrontation with China over economic, technological and military leadership.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. The EU in Search of Itself

Author:: V. Chernega
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: ELECTIONS to the European Parliament that took place on May 23-26, 2019 reflected the far from simple processes that have been unfolding in the European Union for several years now. They confirmed the desire of a fairly big number of voters to see new people among the political elites. The Right and Left centrists that had dominated the parliament for many years lost their traditional majority and, therefore, the chance to elect the chairman among themselves. This was not the only surprise. First, in their zeal the mainstream media controlled by the liberal elites devoted to the ideas of European integration that demonized the Eurosceptics as dangerous populists forced the voters to mobilize and close ranks to a much greater extent than before (51.2% against 42% in 2014). Second, unexpectedly, the Greens, the majority of which belonged to the Left camp, demonstrated good results: they came second with 20.5% of votes in Germany and third in France with 13.5%. It should be said that they partly owed their success to the United States that had left the 2016 Paris Agreement. Contrary to expectations, however, it was not a breakthrough even if Eurosceptics gained more seats than in 2014: 173 against 140 (24% of the total number of 751 seats). This means that even if they manage to form a faction, the decisive impact on the political course of the European Parliament will remain outside their reach. In an absence of a clear major- ity, however, they got a chance to influence new laws and decisions. Theoretically, they might form temporal alliances with other forces. So far, deputies of other parties who look at them as a threat to unfolding integration reject the very idea of such alliances. It seems that they are determined to close ranks to prevent Eurosceptics from filling the impor- tant posts of deputy chairman and chairs of the main commissions. They became even more determined in demonizing the movement.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Elections, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

81. Reflections on a Summer of Discontent in Hong Kong

Author:: Kurt W. Tong
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: The summer of 2019, with all its compelling political drama, will certainly be remembered as a pivotal moment in the history of Hong Kong. In the end, however, will 2019 will be remembered as a tragic turning point, heralding Hong Kong’s increasing instability and irrelevancy in the coming years? Or, optimistically, will future historians see this year as a moment when Hong Kong’s key stakeholders, inside and outside the city, were sufficiently reminded of the city’s special value and characteristics to do what is necessary to keep its “one country, two systems” dream alive? The answers to this set of questions will have important implications for the national interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Social Movement, Political stability, and State Formation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, Hong Kong, and United States of America

82. The Sino-U.S. Phase One Trade Deal Is an Imperfect Painkiller. What's Next?

Author:: Jude Blanchette and Qiu Mingda
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: After two days of intense talks with United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer, Chinese Vice Premier Liu He and his delegation crossed the street to the White House on the afternoon of October 11th to meet with President Donald Trump for the first time since the negotiations collapsed in May. The visit marked the 13th round of the bilateral trade talks and concluded with an announcement from the Oval Office of a “phase one” agreement. According to President Trump, this included China’s commitment to purchase $40-50 billion of U.S. agricultural products and a pledge to strengthen its intellectual property protection regime domestically. Moreover, Beijing would make still-unknown adjustments to how it manages its currency, the renminbi. For its part, the United States delayed a scheduled tariff hike on $250 billion of Chinese goods from 25% to 30% on October 15th. In addition, the Treasury Department would potentially review its previous decision to designate China a currency manipulator. All in all, it seemed to mark a turning point in the bilateral tensions. According to a tweet from President Trump two days later, this was the beginning of a larger deal that would be spread over three phases and that would benefit American farmers and potentially put an end to the trade hostilities between the two nations. In short, he tweeted, “the relationship with China is very good.” Though he acknowledged that the actual terms of any deal are still being worked out, the President repeatedly expressed optimism that he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping could ink a deal by mid-November during their meeting at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Santiago, Chile. Unfortunately, such confidence is misplaced. The decided lack of details on the scope, timing and mechanics of the phase one announcement is an indication of just how preliminary the agreement is. Second, Beijing remains unwilling to make more substantive concessions on core structural issues, ranging from its preferential treatment of its state-owned enterprises to a credible commitment that it will protect the intellectual property of foreign companies. Finally, even if phase one comes to fruition, this won’t do much to reduce the uncertainty that likely will define the U.S.-China relationship for years to come, as both countries begin to openly acknowledge that they are entering a period of prolonged strategic rivalry.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

83. Working hand in hand to create a brighter future for China and Poland

Author:: Liu Guangyuan
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Ambassador Liu Guangyuan’s keynote speech at the conference on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

84. Climate Change: Conflict and Cooperation (Full Issue)

Author:: Meagan Torello, Rafael Leal-Arcas, Caitlin Werrell, Francesco Femia, Carmel Davis, Ziad Al Achkar, Ang Zhao, Buddhika Jayamaha, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, William Reno, Molly Jahn, Therese Adam, Peter J. Schraeder, Juan Macias-Amoretti, and Karim Bejjit
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: In the first issue of our 20th volume, the cooperative and conflictual nature of climate change in international relations is explored. Rafael Leal-Arcas analyzes the necessity of a symbiotic relationship between bottom-up and top-down negotiations to implement clean energy consumption. Following, Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia begin this issue's dialogue on climate change and security. Carmel Davis discusses the effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa's ability to develop and subsequently mitigate conflict. Similarly, Ziad Al Achkar outlines the economic, environmental, and security threats in the Arctic as its ice continues to melt. Zhao Ang then discusses China's ability and incentives to pursuing a greener economy. Following, Buddikha Jayamaha, Jahara Matisek, William Reno, and Molly Jahn discuss the security and development of climate change implications in the Sahel region. The main portion of this issue proudly concludes with the Journal's interview with former Swiss Ambassador Therese Adam on climate change negotiations and the great potential for civil society engagement. Following the climate change portion of this issue, we feature a special sup-topic: Africa Rising. Here, Peter Schraeder discusses the effects of President Donald Trump's foreign policy in Africa. Juan Macías-Amoretti analyzes the role of Islam in Moroccan politics, while Karim Bejjit concludes with a discussion on Morocco's growing relationship with the AU.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Islam, Regional Cooperation, Conflict, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, Asia, North Africa, Switzerland, Morocco, Sahel, and Global Focus

85. Structural Dissonance: The U.S.-PRC Defense Relationship, 1979-1989

Author:: Eric B. Setzekorn
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In the decade between U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 and the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) pursued a military engagement policy with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The 1979-1989 U.S.-PRC defense relationship was driven by a mutually shared fear of the USSR, but U.S. policymakers also sought to encourage the PRC to become a more deeply involved in the world community as a responsible power. Beginning in the late 1970s, the U.S. defense department conducted high level exchanges, allowed for the transfer of defense technology, promoted military to military cooperation and brokered foreign military sales (FMS). On the U.S. side, this program was strongly supported by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who worked to push skeptical elements in the U.S. defense bureaucracy. By the mid-1980s, this hesitancy had been overcome and the defense relationship reached a high point in the 1984-1986 period, but structural problems arising from the division of authority within the PRC’s party-state-military structure ultimately proved insurmountable to long-term cooperation. The 1979-1989 U.S.-PRC defense relationship highlights the long-term challenges of pursuing military engagement with fundamentally dissimilar structures of political authority.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, and North America

86. Representing American Values and Interests in China

Author:: Terry Branstad
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: When I welcome visitors to the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Beijing, they often comment on a black-and-white photo of my first meeting with Xi Jinping. In the picture, the members of the 1985 Chinese agriculture delegation to Iowa stand calmly behind my desk, peering into the camera, as Xi Jinping stands unobtrusively to my right. Some visitors ask, “Ambassador Branstad, did you know this young man would become President of China?” Indeed, I did not—I treated him with the same Iowa hospitality with which I welcome all my guests. His importance as a rising leader of China, though, became increasingly apparent over the course of six gubernatorial visits I made to China during the subsequent 30 years. The same is true of U.S.-China relations. Today, I have the honor of representing the United States in the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world, one that we absolutely have to get right. During President Donald Trump’s November 2017 state visit to China, the President identified three priority tasks for the two nations’ relationship. First, work with the Chinese government to address the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Second, seek a more balanced and reciprocal trade and investment relationship. And third, partner with Chinese authorities to reduce the flow of illicit opioids from China to the United States. Each task presents its own unique challenges and opportunities.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North Korea

87. Redefining Success for the Trump-Kim Summit

Author:: Richard N. Holwill
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: A meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (KJU), the Supreme Leader of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), can be a success even if it fails to achieve President Trump’s announced goal: an end to the DPRK nuclear weapons program. This meeting starts by giving KJU one of his long-sought goals. It will, in effect, be more than a meeting. It will be a “summit” and will confer on KJU the status of the leader of a legitimate government. President Trump would be wise to redefine success. He should not fall into the trap of saying that success will be defined by a “denuclearization agreement.” While that should be a long-term goal, it will not happen at this meeting. Still, the summit will be successful if it produces a process that can lead to a substantial reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. This is not to say that an agreement on denuclearization is off the table. Rather, it is to recognize that these talks could present a framework for negotiation that would be very valuable, even if they will fall short of a nuclear disarmament accord. To understand the difficulty of reaching a nuclear arms agreement, we need only look at the way the two leaders speak about denuclearization. Each appears to define it differently. President Trump applies the term to nuclear weapons in the DPRK. KJU speaks of it as applying to the entire Korean Peninsula. He will argue that, if he must allow a meaningful verification regime, so must U.S. forces in South Korea.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

88. U.S.-Nepal Relations: Leveraging Operational Efficiencies to Achieve Our Objectives

Author:: Alaina B Teplitz
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Abstract:: Nepal, that mythical Shangri-La nestled in the Himalayas, has long captured the hearts and imaginations of Americans. In the 70 years since the United States established formal relations with the erstwhile hermit kingdom, Nepal has seen dramatic socio-economic progress—often stemming from its partnership with the United States. But in many ways, it still remains under-developed, fragile and vulnerable. As the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu celebrated the 70th anniversary of our partnership in 2017, we pursued a dozen month-long campaigns around today’s policy objectives to highlight our historical collaboration and leverage this retrospective to draw attention to the need for further progress. Combining diplomatic engagements and public events targeted at thought leaders and policy leaders, our campaigns moved forward our shared U.S.-Nepali priorities. As the U.S. government revisits its approach to the Indo-Pacific region and new Nepali leaders form what promises to be the country’s first multi-year government in decades, we now face a unique opportunity to advance our mutual objectives of a stable, prosperous Nepal that is a robust partner of the United States. Coming at the same time as potential adjustments to foreign affairs budgets and staffing, Embassy Kathmandu is reorganizing how we do business to improve our effectiveness, find efficiencies and enhance our focus on an agenda that delivers results. Rather than organize ourselves by the agency that pays our salary, we have structured our unified U.S. government team according to what each unit is doing. Our interagency Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) Teams—co-chaired by section chiefs from separate agencies and physically co-located within the chancery—have designed common strategies for how the U.S. Embassy intends to pursue major objectives and coordinate approaches, as well as explicitly identifying those nice-to-pursue efforts that limited staffing or resources require relegating to the back burner. Through action plans, each ICS Team identifies strategic, impactful and tangible targets to achieve each year—institutionalizing best practices from our 70th anniversary campaigns to sustain meaningful progress toward our goals. As the stakes and challenges facing U.S. diplomacy continue to grow, Embassy Kathmandu is using the strategic opportunity that current U.S.-Nepal relations offer to develop a proof of concept for how a 21st century embassy can organize our people and operations to maximum effect.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and Nepal

89. Challenges for the Republic of China: Diplomatic Relations within Latin America after the Regime Rotation in 2016

Author:: Elisa Hsiu-chi Wang
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Due to the policy of “diplomatic truce” during the presidency of Ma Ying-Jeou, and the good will of mainland China, from 2008 to 2016, generally speaking, the number of ROC’s diplomatic allies remained stable, except in November 2013, when Gambia cut its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 20, 2016, some changes are expected in cross-Strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, given the reluctance of President Tsai to express her support to the 1992 Consensus, and the previous reactions of Mainland China. Nowadays, among the 20 ROC diplomatic allies, 11 are located in Latin America. This article tries to respond to the following questions: Is it possible to go back to the bilateral diplomatic competition for recognition by different ally countries, like that maintained during the governments of Lee Tenghui and Chen Sui-bian? Will Mainland China intend to seize more countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to press Tsai for closer cross-Strait relations? Will the Taiwan´ diplomatic allies in Latin America turn to Mainland China, accepting its offers and incentives?
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Latin America

90. Why India Won’t Play Its ‘Tibet Card’

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Upon coming to power in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) adopted a more muscular approach to China than its predecessors. As part of this, it was not averse to using the Dalai Lama and the CTA to gain leverage in its dealings with China. Its recent move to put distance between itself and Dharamsala reflects an understanding that playing the ‘Tibet card’ brought India no benefits. In fact, the failure of the BJP’s four-year gambit reaffirms what many Indian diplomats and scholars have been saying for decades: there is no ‘Tibet card’ for India to play.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Tibet

91. Relearning the Art of Nation State Diplomacy

Author:: Mike Anderson
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: American foreign policy is complex, and its application by diplomats and military practitioners is challenging in the diverse nature of the current environment. Military and diplomatic advisors during the post-9/11 period have concentrated on non-state threats, conditioning them to resort quickly to military options. In the face of emerging state competitors such as the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, a broader range of options beyond only military force is required. This generation of policy advisors must unlearn some of what they have learned over the course of the last fifteen years of conflict, as they shift from dealing with non-state actors to addressing the resurgence of near-peer statecraft based on national security threats. These threats have been long ignored during the war on terror. The diplomatic craft represented during the Cold War must be embraced by both the military and diplomatic personnel in practice, and emphasized by the uniformed armed forces and professional diplomatic advisors to policy and decision makers.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

92. Abraham Lincoln, Hillary Clinton, and Liu Xiaobo

Author:: Beatrice Camp
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Celebrating the bicentennial birthday of our 16th president seemed like a fairly safe event for our Shanghai consulate to undertake, considering that Abraham Lincoln was popular in China and former President Jiang Zemin was well known for quoting from the Gettysburg Address. And, of course, Lincoln provided us an opening to talk about “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Sometime after we decided on the program, the State Department announced that Hillary Clinton would travel to Beijing on her first trip as Secretary of State to highlight the importance of the U.S.-China relationship for the new administration. Shanghai wasn’t on her itinerary and yet, somehow, our consulate preparations to hold a 200th birthday party for Abraham Lincoln in February 2009 almost threw a wrench into this important SecState visit.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Government, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. Rethinking Soft Power in Light of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Mustafa Yağci
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper investigates how China appeals to other countries by utilizing soft power in ensuring their participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to revive ancient Silk Road through infrastructure, trade, finance and other linkages. By employing a behavioral and contextualized explanation for soft power, this investigation reveals that Chinese state actively pursues a soft power-oriented economic diplomacy for BRI and relies on hard power resources for its effectiveness. Furthermore, China takes advantage of the power vacuum in the global economy and embraces a liberal economic vision for the international system in its diplomatic activities emphasizing the importance of globalization, free trade, infrastructure investment, and win-win cooperation in achieving high levels of economic development. While China frames BRI mainly in terms of economic development purposes, China’s soft power appeal to other countries is likely to have important political and security implications for the international system.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Soft Power, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Diplomacy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

94. The Challenge of the South China Sea: Congressional Engagement and the U.S. Policy Response

Author:: James M. Scott
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Maritime territorial disputes in Asia are increasingly contentious, with competing claims and confrontations among numerous states of the region carrying significant implications for the relations among the countries of the region, between the U.S. and the region, and for the broader US-China relationship. This analysis examines the politics of the U.S. approach to the challenge, focusing on the role of Congress as a factor shaping the U.S. response. After establishing an analytical framework that directs attention to legislative-executive interactions and the domestic political/institutional context, it assesses the consequences of this context for U.S. policies and approaches to the problem. The analysis reveals the sequence and dynamics of congressional engagement, by which members moved from indirect and non-legislative approaches to direct and legislative approaches to narrow the boundaries and the shape the direction of US foreign policy. It concludes by addressing the implications for the U.S. approach and the relationships among the key parties.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, and Maritime
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

95. Sino-American Preventive Diplomacy During the Cold War

Author:: Bertrand G. Ramcharan
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: From the advent to power of the Chinese Communist Party on October 1, 1949 to the historic visits of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971-72, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) were bitter enemies during the Cold War. China and the U.S. fought a war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and the two countries nearly came to war again on five different occasions: over Vietnam in 1954 and 1965, and over Taiwan in 1954-55, 1958-59 and 1962. However, the two sides were wary to come to blows again and each side engaged in efforts to help avoid this. However, the dangers of miscalculations, recklessness, or accidents were ever present. During the Korean War there was much talk in American circles about using nuclear weapons. A concerned British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, after consulting his French counterpart, went to see President Truman to help reduce the risks of this happening. The full records on this have never been published, but there is an authoritative account on the outcome from a senior American official.1 In 1959, President Eisenhower, concerned about the danger of continuing PRC provocations over Taiwan, sent a message to Chairman to Premier Mao via Premier Khruschev. The minutes of Premier Khruschev’s discussion with Chairman Mao make for fascinating reading.2 Another situation involving the use of preventive diplomacy occurred during the Polish crisis of 1956 when the CCP made strong representations to the CPSU against the escalation of military forces against the Polish demonstrators. There were thus seven situations (two with Korea, three with Taiwan, one with Vietnam, and one with the USSR) that attracted preventive diplomacy and a notable range of methods of preventive diplomacy applied. Among these one can mention the following: overt and covert communications from one side to the other; diplomatic messages; ambassadorial talks; and third party intercessions. This study will be approached from the perspective of the concept of preventive diplomacy while having regard to the concept of historical analogy.
Topic:: Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Korean War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

96. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:: Mark Halchin
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America

97. India: Policy Implications for the United States

Author:: Jon P. Dorschner
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: India has long been obsessed with its rivalry with Pakistan, and for many years India viewed Pakistan as its principal security threat. Pakistan continues to support terrorist attacks directed against India and India-controlled Kashmir, and is continually increasing its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems for nuclear warheads. Despite this, Indians have come to feel more self-assured and no longer see Pakistan as the country’s principal security threat.China now occupies this position. India no longer views itself simply as the predominant regional power in South Asia, but as an aspiring world power and is gearing up for what many in India believe is an inevitable conflict with its neighbor the Peoples Republic of China. India has embarked on an outreach program to solidify friendly ties to other Asian nations that feel threatened by China, and is devoting a lot of attention to the ASEAN states (particularly Viet Nam), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. There is increasing speculation that this relationship could develop into a formal alliance, especially if the United States becomes less active in Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Economy, Trump, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, India, North Korea, Kashmir, and United States of America

98. China’s New Afghan Diplomacy: Awakening from Inertia or Exception to Old Habits?

Author:: Abdur Rehman Shah
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For decades, China has pursued a policy of hands-off diplomacy towards regional and international affairs, while narrowly focusing on internal development. Beijing’s recent approach to the Afghanistan conflict, however, has been a major shift. Getting Pakistan’s full support to help end the Afghan insurgency is a possibility given that the U.S. and Afghan governments have utterly failed to bring it to a close. China’s change may signal a shift in China’s “non-interference” approach. However, despite its early activism in the form of outreach to major actors—hosting the Taliban for talks, participation in Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) and now Russia-led talks—China’s Afghan diplomacy has not produced any desirable results to alter Pakistan’s approach towards the Afghan insurgency. One explanation for this lackluster approach is that Pakistan has successfully stemmed the flow of cross-border militants toward China. Furthermore, post-2014 uncertainty in Afghanistan rather than strategic alterations prompted the shift of China’s Afghanistan policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Asia

99. The Run-up to Xi Jinping’s State Visit

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Preparations for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the US in September were the primary focus of the US-China relationship from May to August. The seventh Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in June in an effort to tee up agreements for the summit. Friction increased on a range of issues, including China’s artificial island building in the South China Sea, Chinese cyber hacking against US companies and the US government, and repressive laws and actions undertaken by the Chinese government, some of which are likely to have negative repercussions for future US-China people-to-people exchanges. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to China at the end of August to finalize deliverables for the summit amid reports of a possible Obama administration decision to impose sanctions on China for cyber-enabled theft of US intellectual property before Xi’s arrival.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

100. China Prepares for Rocky Relations in 2017

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser and Alexandra Viers
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Summits between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping in September and November helped to keep tensions in check in the last four months of 2016. Despite persisting differences over how much pressure to impose on North Korea after Pyongyang conducted its fifth nuclear test, the US and China agreed on a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution. The US Navy conducted another freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. A Chinese Navy vessel snatched a US drone, claiming it was threatening the safety of the Chinese ship and its crew, and returned it to the US five days later. Incremental progress was made on trade disputes at the 27th annual US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the election of Donald Trump as the next US president threatened to inject significant uncertainty into US-China relations as Trump received a phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and suggested that he might use Taiwan as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from China on other issues.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Leadership, Maritime, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS