Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 3 Years and within 25 Years / Topic: Diplomacy

1. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

2. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

3. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

4. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:: Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

6. La puerta de Latinoamérica: Las relaciones de Panamá con Estados Unidos y China, oportunidades y desafíos

Author:: Rodrigo Matías Martín and Guillermo Enrique Boscán
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este articulo analiza las relaciones de Panamá con China y Estados Unidos, las dos mayores potencias mundiales en la actualidad. En primer lugar, se revisan las relaciones que el país latinoamericano ha tenido con China desde la creación de Panamá como país, llegando hasta el cambio de reconocimiento diplomático en el año 2017, así como las nuevas relaciones con la República Popular China. Tras ello se analizan los desafíos que tiene Panamá en el contexto de sus nuevas relaciones diplomáticas. En la siguiente sección se revisan de igual manera las relaciones históricas entre Panamá y Estados Unidos, llegando hasta el día de hoy, y se analizan las oportunidades que ofrecen los Estados Unidos a Panamá.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Panama Canal
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, Panama, and United States of America

7. Reagan in China: Don’t Say Anything about the Turkeys

Author:: Beatrice Camp
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Twelve years after President Nixon’s historic opening to China, President Ronald Reagan visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in April 1984. The visit was a vast undertaking with an enormous entourage – Ambassador Arthur Hummel was reportedly stunned to hear that the president’s party would number over 800. For a politician like Reagan who had repeatedly criticized President Jimmy Carter for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, it was a huge move. For the Chinese, it was a very welcome symbol of acceptance. First lady Nancy Reagan accompanied her husband; some 600 journalists covered the trip. The Reagans toured historical and cultural sites in Beijing and attended a State Dinner at the Great Hall of the People before traveling on to Xian and Shanghai.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Stepping Up Our Climate Diplomacy

Author:: Charles Ray
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: At the opening of the COP27 summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on November 7, 2022, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres told the representatives of the countries attending that they faced a choice: work together to cut greenhouse gas emissions or condemn the planet to climate catastrophe. “Humanity has a choice,” Guterres said. “Cooperate or perish. We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot on the accelerator.” Guterres called for the world’s richest and poorest countries to work together to speed up the transition from fossil fuels, and for the wealthy to help with funding to enable poor countries reduce emissions and deal with the negative impacts that they have already suffered due to climate change. “The two largest economies—the United States and China—have a particular responsibility to join efforts to make this pact a reality,” he went on to say. Left unsaid, but understood by most, is that China and the U.S. are also the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. While the U.S. and much of the rest of the world are still preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rampant inflation, energy shortages, and the fallout from the Covid pandemic, the existential problem of climate change cannot be ignored.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

9. Secret Baseball in China

Author:: W. Robert Pearson
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: My wife Maggie, our two-year-old son Matthew, and I arrived in China in 1981 as part of a rapidly expanding cohort of American diplomats surging into the country following the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. We were excited to be in the early wave of American diplomats going back to China after 30 years of separation and enmity. We also were prepared for some difficult times, but could only anticipate what would be facing a young American diplomatic family in Beijing. China was just beginning its ascent from the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, and the reality of the past was all around us. The average annual income in China in 1981 was $100. The Beijing air was thick with coal dust, and our hotel room attracted rats while we waited months for permanent housing. One main dish at a Peoples’ Restaurant we visited was dumplings with coffee grounds. Our Chinese counterparts were both curious and cautious, delighted to be able to engage with us and also making excellent use of the impenetrable bureaucracy as necessary. Washington was eager to make headway, and we, as did many Americans, saw a genuine opportunity to open new doors for shared benefit. The sounds and sights, the scenes and senses were fascinating, and for us every day was challenging. We considered it the most important gamble for American diplomacy in the 20th century.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sports, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

10. Is there Eurasian Connectivity without Europe?

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Tucked between Russia, Iran, and China, Central Asia is now desperately looking for solutions to cushion the impacts of global tension on its fragile economies, which are deeply tied to sanctions against Russia and a local production slowdown as China recovers from its zero COVID policy. While European diplomacy has come at a crucial time, its Central Asian policy is ambiguous, and commitments misplaced. Central Asia is continuously perceived by the EU as a region in need of developmental assistance, which leads to European regional policies that focus on digitalization and climate issues. What Central Asia needs is the establishment of concrete logistical connectivity that will enable efficient flow of products across Eurasia.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Economics, European Union, Connectivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

11. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:: Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

12. Xi Jinping’s Hidden Goals for the PRC Law on Foreign Relations

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has promulgated a new law on foreign affairs to legitimize tough measures that Beijing is taking against the “bullying” of the “hegemonic West.” The statute, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which takes effect on July 1, will also anchor the supreme leader’s long-standing aspiration to build a China-centric global order that will challenge the framework established by the US-led Western Alliance since the end of World War II. The law also codifies the total control that Xi, who is Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), exercises on all policies regarding diplomacy and national security (People’s Daily, June 30; Xinhua, June 28). The law states that the PRC “stays true to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security, and endeavors to strengthen international security cooperation and its participation in mechanisms of global security governance.” It stresses Beijing’s right to “take corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” against acts that violate international law and norms and that “endanger China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The official Global Times said the statute was a response to “new challenges in foreign relations, especially when China has been facing frequent external interference in its internal affairs under the western hegemony with unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction” (The Global Times, June 28). The legislation legalizes measures such as counter-sanctions and blacklisting of foreign nationals and institutions in retaliation against similar measures that the US and other Western countries have taken against PRC firms (New York Times Chinese Edition, December 16, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Law, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

13. Taiwan’s Dwindling Diplomatic Allies

Author:: John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amidst the drama surrounding Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s early April stopover in Southern California, where she met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvers around Taiwan that followed, it can be easy to forget why the Taiwanese President was transiting the U.S. in the first place. Tsai was returning home after a trip to Taiwan’s two remaining diplomatic allies in Central America, Guatemala and Belize, which was organized around the theme of “Meeting Democratic Partners, Fostering Shared Prosperity” (民主夥伴共榮之旅) (Office of the President, Republic of China [ROC] [Taiwan], March 29). Days prior to Tsai’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras, which had maintained official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) for 82 years, established formal ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], March 26). The move occurred despite U.S. efforts to dissuade Honduras. On March 18, the Biden administration dispatched senior envoy and special adviser for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, who is also well-regarded in Taipei, to Honduras in a last-minute effort to encourage the Xiomara Castro government to change course in derecognizing Taiwan (Taipei Times March 18). Under the government of Xiomara Castro, who took office early last year, Honduras has sought to pit Taipei and Beijing against each other in a bidding war for diplomatic recognition. While China has offered inducements, Taiwan has both rejected and called out the Castro government’s efforts to condition the continuation of the official relationship on major increases in financial assistance. Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina initially denied Taipei’s claims that Honduras had asked Taiwan for $2.5 billion but eventually acknowledged to the media that the Castro government had sought to obtain $2 billion in aid (ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Taiwan MOFA], March 23). However, he also claimed his country “never received a substantive response from the Taiwanese side” (TVBS, March 24). In a notice regarding these revelations and regretting the pending shift in recognition, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry warned Honduras not to fall prey to China’s “debt trap diplomacy” (Taiwan MOFA, March 23). Upon announcing the termination of relations with Honduras, Tsai cautioned Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies against following the same course, stressing that “we will not engage in a meaningless contest of ‘dollar diplomacy’ with China.” She also criticized the PRC’s efforts to employ “any and all means to suppress Taiwan’s international participation” (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 26). Earlier this week, the Tsai government averted another diplomatic setback with the election of Santiago Pena of the ruling conservative Colorado Party to the presidency in Paraguay. Pena’s opponent, Efrain Alegre, who led a broad center-left coalition, campaigned on switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC in order to facilitate Paraguay’s access to China’s large agricultural import market (Nikkei Asia, April 18). In a response to a congratulatory tweet from President Tsai, Pena stated that “we are going to continue strengthening our historic ties of brotherhood and cooperation between our countries” (Taiwan News, May 2). However, the Tsai administration is hardly free from the challenge of maintaining the ROC’s dwindling network of official relationships. Guatemala, which is Taiwan’s largest diplomatic ally, will go to the polls to elect a new president in late June. President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla, who has been a staunch supporter of maintaining close ties with the ROC, is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. According to long-time China-Latin America analyst R. Evan Ellis the prospect of “a victory by either a center-left-oriented candidate more open to working with the PRC such as Sandra Torres, or a right-oriented candidate such as Zury Rios, whose Presidency might deepen policy conflict with the Biden Administration, could present a small but not insignificant risk of Guatemalan diplomatic recognition of the PRC” (CEEP, March 7).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

14. A Preliminary Survey of PRC United Front Activities in South Korea

Author:: Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exercises influence over South Korea in multiple ways. Chinese influence operations against Seoul have been characterized as not subtle and even blatant compared to the more covert and subversive methods employed in other countries (China Brief, December 19, 2014). Indeed, the more overt and aggressive ways in which Beijing exercises influence were on full display when the PRC responded to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016 with boycotts, military exercises and diplomatic pressure (China Brief, March 31, 2017). Less well known, however, is how China employs other, more subtle means to influence South Korean politics and society. A general presumption exists that influence must be exerted overtly or in forms such as diplomatic protests or through sanctions, yet Beijing’s influence activities also take on a less pronounced and more obscured nature, which is commonly associated with its United Front activities. This article will provide a preliminary assessment of the local Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会) and the web of other United Front organizations that operate in South Korea. [1] This article does not seek to offer an exhaustive examination of these organizations, but to provide a preview of the key United Front apparatuses and their activities in South Korea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Diaspora, Soft Power, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

15. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

16. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

17. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

18. Restarting Educational Exchanges with China after the Cultural Revolution

Author:: John C. Thomson
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When I arrived in Beijing in June 1978, foreign diplomats were forbidden to visit any schools or universities and they had minimal contact with government organizations. Although both the U.S. and China were interested in resuming academic exchanges, the obstacles were daunting. I was assigned to the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), an unofficial organization representing U.S interests in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the absence of an official embassy. After establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in January 1979, I became part of the newly opened U.S. embassy in China, the successor to the Liaison Office. I am pleased to have worked directly on the restoration of U.S.-PRC educational exchanges after a hiatus of 30 years that followed the communist take-over in 1949.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Education, Foreign Exchange, and Cultural Revolution
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

19. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:: Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. U.S.-China Agricultural Dialogue in Des Moines Shows Potential for Improving Relations During a Critical Period

Author:: Kenneth M. Quinn
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Iowa’s connections with China—highlighted by a 1985 visit by a young Xi Jinping, now 37 years later General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the People’s Republic of China—make for an unusual and much-needed bright spot in today’s dismal U.S.–PRC relations. What better place than the leading agricultural state to look for collaboration in agricultural research and global development needed to face the global challenges of our time? In April 2022, Sino-American diplomatic relations took center stage in Iowa’s capital city, as three ambassadors—Nicholas Burns, the new Biden Administration envoy in Beijing, Qin Gang, the PRC ambassador to the U.S., and former U.S. ambassador to the PRC Terry Branstad—all participated in the U.S.-China Agricultural Dialogue that I co-organized and moderated.
Topic:: Agriculture, Diplomacy, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

21. An International Lifeline: Taiwan’s Parliamentary Outreach

Author:: Rup Narayan Das
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, China has made systematic efforts to internationally isolate Taiwan through a mix of coercion and diplomatic enticement. Taiwan, however, has broken through this isolation by engaging with other nations through robust parliamentary diplomacy in order to expand its international space and legitimacy. It is indeed an irony of contemporary history that although Taiwan fulfills the main requisites for statehood, such as territory, population and an effective governance structure, it is deprived of its rightful place in the community of nations multilaterally and also bilaterally at the behest of China. Most countries’ “One China” policies and state-to-state relationships with China preclude them from engaging in official interaction with Taipei, but the trend of parliamentary outreach between Taiwan and the rest of the world is gaining momentum. Such interactions provide opportunities for Taiwanese parliamentarians to interface with their counterparts from abroad, particularly with fellow democratic countries with which Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic relations. Moreover, these delegations have created something of an informal international parliamentary fraternity in support of Taiwan, which underscores a broader groundswell of goodwill in the international community. This article surveys some notable recent interactions in Taiwan’s expanding parliamentary diplomacy with the U.S. and other fellow democracies.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Parliament
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and United States of America

22. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

23. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

24. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

25. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

26. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

27. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

28. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:: William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

29. Small State Dilemma: Cambodia Between The Asean And China In The Indo-Pacific Context

Author:: Khath Bunthorn
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: As a small state, Cambodia viewed the ASEAN and China as almost equally important pillars of its foreign policy. Amid the intense strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Cambodia faced the dilemma of how to maintain the ASEAN centrality without diplomatic cost to its key ally China, and how to balance its national interest with regional interest. In this context, the article aimed to explain the importance of the ASEAN as a cornerstone of Cambodia’s foreign policy, examine the motivations of Cambodia’s deep political embrace of the Asian giant, and underline its implications for the Indo-Pacific from the lens of small state foreign policy. The article was based on qualitative, empirical analysis that comprises primary and secondary data pertinent to the current topic. The article concluded that Cambodia leaned more towards China than it did towards the ASEAN, thus weakening its centrality in driving the broader regional architecture and that domestic politics was the primary driving force of Cambodia’s foreign policy towards that direction. At this juncture, Cambodia should step back from the present degree of its strategic engagement with China and look for ways to diversify its relations with other major powers while getting back on the democratic path and upholding human rights.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Cambodia, Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN

30. Post-Pulwama Indo-Pak COnflict: Reconnoitering The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Author:: Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Jagmeet Bawa, and Balinder Singh
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Terrorism has emerged as one of the major challenges for the Eurasian regional peace, security, and cooperation. Keeping these challenges in perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established to eliminate the menace of terrorism, fundamentalism, and secessionism. Against this background, the main objectives of this paper are to examine how terrorism emerged as a major determining factor in the Indo-Pak relations and how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), was failed to play its effective role in the Indo-Pak conflict given the Pulwama terror attack. For this research, descriptive and analytical methods were used and the data was collected from secondary sources. The major findings of this article are that terrorism has emerged as one of the major determinants of Indo-Pak relations and the same has become a major challenge for the SCO to resolve the issue. Against the background of terror attacks, it was anticipated that the SCO would play a crucial role to pacify the situation. However, the role played by the SCO in this situation proved marked as a Whack-a-Mole.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

31. China's Development Assistance to the Western Balkans and Its Impact on Democratic Governance and Decision-Making

Author:: Ana Krstinovska
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans has been little researched and aid-funded projects are often mistermed as Chinese investments. This article aimed to shed light on specific ‘China Aid’ disbursement and management procedures by examining the signed agreements and contracted projects in five countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, N. Macedonia, and Serbia during the period 2000-2020. The objective was to determine the impact of China’s development assistance on democratic governance and decision-making. Attride-Stirling’s thematic networks tool was used to analyze the procedures in each project cycle phase and their compliance with the principles of good governance and aid effectiveness. The findings suggest that the assistance, shaped by Chinese rules in combination with Western Balkans domestic agency, is marked by the opacity of the procedures, lack of accountability, disregard for rules in public finance management, and public procurement. Moreover, China could use its grant and loan agreements to influence sovereign decision-making on issues that affect China’s interests. To conclude, although China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans could benefit the recipients’ economic development, it also constrains their democratic governance and decision-making and serves China’s foreign policy interests.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

32. China's Contribution to the Stabilization of 'Democratic' Afghanistan

Author:: Lukasz Jurenczyk
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China and Afghanistan established diplomatic relations in 1955. In the following decades of the Cold War, however, relations between the countries were limited, which was due to the main directions of the foreign policies of both countries. Afghanistan focused on balancing the influence of the USSR and the US on its territory. China, in turn, adopted a rotational stance towards superpowers, and in the region, it strengthened political, economic and military cooperation with Pakistan (Zaborowski 2012, 142). In the 1970s, China supported the pro-communist Shu’lai Javid (Eternal Flame) party operating in Afghanistan. Members of Parcham, the pro-Moscow wing of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), contemptuously described its members as Maoists (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 46). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Beijing allowed Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim fighters to pass through the Wakhan Corridor into Afghanistan to support the mujahideen insurgency there. At that time, political relations between states were maintained only at the consular level.By February 1989, the Soviets withdrew their troops from Afghanistan, and in September 1992 the last communist president - Mohammad Najibullah (09.1987-09.1992) was overthrown. However, this did not end the civil war, as individual mujahideen groups fought for influence in the country. The war destabilized not only Afghanistan, but also the border areas of neighboring countries, including the Western border of the PRC. In 1992, the President of Afghanistan - Burhanuddin Rabbani (06.1992-09.1996) tried to normalize relations with Beijing, but due to increasing military operations in 1993 China withdrew its diplomatic representation from Kabul. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 1996, the country fell into international isolation in which China participated. During the Taliban regime, Afghanistan hosted al-Qaeda, which trained around 1,000 Uyghur fighters in the camps there. In Beijing, this caused serious concern and encouraged the Chinese authorities to intensify security cooperation with Pakistan. According to leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), most of the security problems in the Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province were to be caused by neighboring Afghanistan. For example, the 1997 incidents in the province, known as the Yining riots, were considered to be Taliban-inspired (Cheema 2002, 308)
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Democracy, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:: Lech Drab
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

34. A Solid Handoff in the U.S-India Relationship

Author:: Kenneth I. Juster
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: The conventional wisdom is that the foreign policy of Donald Trump’s Administration severely damaged relations with U.S. allies and partners. Commentators point to repeated criticism by the United States of friends in Europe and Asia, as well as the abrupt withdrawal from trade and other arrangements. But such critics overlook the U.S. relationship with India, which made significant advances and will be an area of substantial continuity in Joseph Biden’s Administration. The U.S.-India partnership has grown steadily since the turn of the century, with the past four years seeing major progress in diplomatic, defense, economic, energy and health cooperation. The strengthened bilateral relationship has become the backbone of an Indo-Pacific strategy designed to promote peace and prosperity in a dynamic and contested region. The longstanding U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific has underpinned the stability and remarkable economic rise of this region over the last 70 years. While the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been many years in the making, in the past four years the United States and India have turned it into a reality. For the United States, the Indo-Pacific agenda meant working with India to provide coordinated leadership in addressing the threat from an expansionist China, the need for more economic connectivity and other challenges in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Manifestations of Chinese Development Aid and Its Hidden Meanings

Author:: Anna Kobierecka
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China is one of the states focusing intensively on building its soft power and shaping its international image. However, China’s image is still negative and primarily based on stereotypes. In recent years, this country is willing to change such perceptions and present itself as an efficient, intensively developing, capable country that is much more than just a global production plant. The article aims to review China’s different manifestations of development aid regarding changing this type of public diplomacy and its meaning to the Chinese government. Is it only motivated by good intentions, or maybe its goal is to only provide an advantage to China? It is evident that owing to significant development, China needs to expand its economic contacts. However, the tested hypothesis states that behind Chinese development aid, political motivation is hidden as well. The research is based on content analysis of official documents and Foreign Ministry’s statements referring to development aid.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: China and Asia

36. Economic Sanctions as a Tool of China’s Hybrid Strategies

Author:: Rafal Wisniewski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to analyze the role of economic sanctions in the People’s Republic of China’s overall approach to achieving its security objectives in the international arena. During the last two decades, Beijing used this instrument on numerous occasions to exert pressure on a varied group of actors. China’s current strategy toward a range of disputes and conflicts it is engaged in (the South China Sea territorial disputes most prominently stand out) is often described using the popular vocabulary of “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone conflicts”. Putting the conceptual complications aside, the author agrees that the PRC’s approach can be viewed as part of a growing trend for great powers to employ what can be called “hybrid strategies” toward its opponents. As part of a broader category of economic statecraft, economic sanctions form an important element of this approach. Considering current scholarship on both “hybrid” (or “grey area”) warfare and economic sanctions, the article answers the question of why the PRC increasingly resorts to hybrid strategies (including economic coercion) and identifies the main characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions. It also provides preliminary conclusions on their effectiveness.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Territorial Disputes, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

37. A Soviet Diplomat’s Memories of Beijing 1973-1975

Author:: Simon Schuchat
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Editor’s Note: This excerpt from a Soviet diplomat’s memoir of his China service is translated by Simon Schuchat. The diplomat, Aleksei Arkadevich Brezhnev (1930-2008, no relation to Leonid Brezhnev), worked on Sino-Soviet affairs from 1953 until 1978, in Beijing and Moscow, including serving as acting head of the USSR embassy during part of the Cultural Revolution in China. In 1998 he published China: A Thorny Path to Neighborly Relations. Memoirs and Reflections, from which this excerpt is taken.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Soviet Union

38. Beijing Brushstrokes

Author:: Beatrice Camp
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: While studying Chinese in Taiwan in preparation for assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, I gave birth to baby William, our first child. Along the way, I learned a fair amount about Chinese birthing beliefs; our teachers at the Foreign Service Language School were happy to talk about the importance of fetal education and how my studying Chinese while pregnant would benefit the baby. A few days before my due date, my husband David dreamed I gave birth to a koala. David’s shock over having a furry animal for a son was compensated by the thrill of hearing the newborn utter a Chinese phrase. We had, after all, spent the previous two years struggling to master tones and characters. Not to mention that the little koala’s question of “gànmá” (干吗) or “whatever for?” seemed right on the money.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Culture, Language, and Memoir
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

39. William Rockhill, The Man Who Shaped China Policy a Century Ago

Author:: Peter Bridges
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Linguist, author, explorer, and diplomat, William Woodville Rockhill is best known as the author of the Open Door policy toward China put forth by the United States in 1899. In between his first diplomatic assignment in China and his later role as the top U.S. diplomat there, he trekked for months across North Asia, and recorded meticulous observations of climate, geography, and local people in a book published in 1894 by the Smithsonian Institution. In his two decades of service to the United States, Rockhill served both in Washington and as the American envoy to several major countries. He was, however, not just a diplomat. He lived a life uniquely diverse for an American of his or any day. When a boy, he moved with his widowed mother to France. In his teens he entered St. Cyr, the French military academy, where he found time to study Tibetan, the first American to do so. After St. Cyr he became an officer of the French Foreign Legion, and served in Algeria, where the French administration was taking stern measures to control the native Muslim majority.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and History
Political Geography:: China and Asia

40. China-India New Intricacies: Rivalry and Cooperation in a New Changing Global Context

Author:: Buddhi Prasad Sharma
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Borders, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

41. China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan: Partnership for Regional Peace

Author:: Mariam Tahir and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This paper examines the prospects of strategic partnership for regional peace between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan through their mutual geopolitical interests. Chinese involvement with Afghanistan serves as a key factor in the successful implementation of its economic outreach through Central and South Asian segments of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it helps to rebalance China’s economic and political aspirations. The paper also highlights the implications of China’s relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan to counter Indian influence in the region. The trilateral relationship between these countries is of paramount importance for regional peace and security. Afghanistan is the most unstable country in the region; however Chinese constructive engagement with Afghanistan through diplomatic, political, economic and security measures can usher into a new era of peace, progress and development for the entire region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

42. China’s Vaccine Diplomacy Amid COVID – 19 Pandemic: A Case Study of South Asia

Author:: Shabana Fayyaz and Tabinda Siddiqui
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: COVID-19 onset has questioned the proclaimed notions of Globalization such as shared prosperity and security across the board. The ongoing pandemic once again calls for collective action in men and material terms rather than erecting technology barriers and doubting the intentions of each other. This paper aims to address the following inter-related queries: What is the nature of China‟s health-based assistance to the South Asian states for mitigating the COVID-19 risks? How and why do the United States and India remain skeptical of Chinese anti COVID- 19 Vaccine efforts? And how do other South Asian states perceive Chinese contributions to deal with the ongoing Pandemic? And, finally what lessons can be learned from this divergent debate centered on: Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy? Comparison and contrast of the available information is employed as an analytical technique to determine the nature of skepticism surrounding the Chinese vaccination campaign in South Asia. Consulting data on three various accounts assisted to conclude the findings of this research paper. The findings of this study establish that Western and Indian skepticism, directed against Chinese health diplomacy in South Asia is motivated by their geopolitical contestations with China. In nutshell, the paper‟s main thrust is to stress the essential value of mutual cooperation in dealing with the Pandemic like COVID-19. There is a need to embrace the concept of „holistic security‟ in the highly interconnected world of today and tomorrow.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Globalization, Crisis Management, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and United States of America

43. Chinese Investments in Brazil: Economic Diplomacy in Bilateral Relations

Author:: Virginia Soledad Busilli and Maria Belen Jaime
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China has consolidated its status as a great power and strengthened its presence in different regions of the planet. In accordance with its economic development strategy, Beijing’s growing bond with Latin America is part of China’s need to guarantee access to raw materials and energy resources. In this framework and through economic diplomacy, China has strengthened its trade relations, as well as loans and investments in most of the region’s countries.Brazil is an example of this relationship pattern, as one of China’s most important partners and top investment destination in Latin America. It became Beijing’s top commercial partner in 2012. This paper will analyse the composition and evolution of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil between the years of 2004 and 2020. In order to do so, we will study the main projects carried out by the country, as well as the characteristics of the Chinese companies (state or non-state) that participated in the process, in order to understand their most important features. Likewise, we will analyse the articulation of the Chinese FDI with its trade flows. We will start from the premise that Chinese investments in Brazil are directly linked to Beijing’s strategic interests, while at the same time guided by market logics that try to maximise profits. In this vein, within the framework of the ‘going out strategy’,state companies play a fundamental role.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS