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421. The State Response to a Mystery Viral Outbreak in Central China

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December, a mysterious outbreak of infectious disease emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan (Hubei Province). The epicenter of the outbreak was the Wuhan Huanan Seafood Market (武汉华南海鲜批发市场, Wuhan Haixian Pifa Shichang), which was closed by officials in Wuhan on January 1 pending further investigation of the origin of the disease (see accompanying images). As of January 11, public health officials in Wuhan stated that there were a total of 41 identified cases of infection, among which two persons had been discharged from treatment, seven were seriously ill, and one person had died; 739 other persons were identified as having contact with those infected, and were to be subject to medical observation (Wuhan Health Commission, January 11). Chinese researchers have identified the pathogen as a previously-unknown strain of coronavirus. This a large family of viruses—including the common cold, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)—that are zoonotic in origin (i.e., transferred via human-animal contact) and cause respiratory illnesses with widely varying levels of severity (WHO, undated). The viral outbreak in Wuhan inspired inevitable comparisons to the SARS pandemic that originated in southern China and swept through the country (and spread to other countries) in two waves in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. It also follows on the heels of other recent infectious zoonotic disease incidents in China, such as a minor outbreak of pneumonic and bubonic plague in Inner Mongolia in November 2019 (AFP, November 28). The Wuhan coronavirus outbreak affords an opportunity to observe and compare the government’s handling of this latest public health crisis alongside those that have occurred in recent years. It also illustrates the continued contradictions faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in attempting to improve its capacity for governance, while also maintaining a monopoly over the public dissemination of information.
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

422. New Wine Into New Wineskins: The Evolving Role of the PLA Navy Marine Corps in Amphibious Warfare and Other Mission Areas

Author:
Ying Yu Lin
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Historically, the Marine Corps was not a branch greatly valued by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The explanation for this had much to do with the PLA’s mission priorities: the PLA has looked to the Taiwan Strait as its main focus area for amphibious warfare, and the PLA Army (PLAA) has traditionally held the primary role in this functional area, with the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) operating in a secondary role. The former Nanjing Military Region—since reorganized as the Eastern Theater Command (China Brief, February 4, 2016)—has amphibious mechanized units that were subordinate to the PLAA 1st and 73rd Group Armies (now reorganized as the 72nd and 73rd Group Armies, respectively) (China Military, December 2, 2018). The amphibious mechanized units of the PLA Army feature heavier firepower and greater mobility than the PLAN Marine Corps (which originally consisted of only two brigades, the 1st and 164th, both subordinate to the South Sea Fleet). The PLAA amphibious forces focused on “big island” targets: these “big island” targets obviously included Taiwan, the PLA’s top priority scenario for resources and contingency planning. By contrast, the PLANMC was oriented largely towards the defense of islands or reefs in the South China and East China Seas. As the PLAN has become increasingly stronger in recent years, its efforts to field greater numbers of modern warships—and the deployments and training of these ships—have attracted ever-greater attention. In line with the expansion of its parent service, the PLAN Marine Corps has also grown, in terms of both numbers and missions, to align with China’s growing overseas interests. The two original brigades of the Marine Corps have been augmented in recent years by six more—four combined arms brigades, a special operations brigade, and elements of a shipborne helicopter aviation brigade—based in multiple locations along the length of China’s coastline (China Brief, February 1, 2019). Only in recent years has the PLA as a larger institution started to rethink the value and use of the Marine Corps—a change resulting from the PLAN’s improvements in capability, and China’s growing national power and increasing overseas interests. Recent training exercises provide some indication of likely future missions for the PLAN’s larger and more capable Marine Corps branch.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China and Asia

423. The Vatican Stays Away from the Hong Kong Crisis Due to Fears of Beijing’s Retaliation

Author:
Emanuele Scimia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On January 9, in his annual message to diplomatic envoys accredited to the Holy See, Pope Francis voiced concern for the conflicts ravaging parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, and Ukraine, as well as for the increasing number of political crises gripping Latin America. However, not a single word was offered about the situation in Hong Kong (Vatican News, Vatican State Website, January 9). Serious socio-political unrest began in Hong Kong last June over a now-withdrawn extradition bill that, according to protesters, would allow the extradition of political dissidents to mainland China (China Brief, June 26, 2019). The pontiff has so far said nothing about the crisis in the city, much to the chagrin of many local Catholics. It seems that the Vatican has no intention of supporting the anti-government movement in Hong Kong, as such a move would hinder its attempts to improve relations with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Religion, Leadership, Catholic Church, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Vatican city

424. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 1: The Belt-and-Road Initiative and the Middle Income Trap

Author:
Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders have prudently planned for the slowing economic growth that China now faces. CCP officials plan to transition China from its current export-led growth model to one driven by indigenous innovation, and one in which China’s rising global prominence confers to it many of the same advantages traditionally enjoyed by the United States (such as low borrowing costs and influence within international institutions). Although U.S.-China relations have become further fraught amid the trade war, many prominent China hands nevertheless assert that Beijing’s long-term economic plans do not run counter to U.S. strategic interests. [1] However, many of China’s planned foreign economic initiatives—to include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), global value chain advancement, and renminbi (RMB) internationalization—will come at U.S. expense. Policymakers in both Washington and Beijing should accordingly expect U.S.-China tensions to persist beyond the Trump administration. China’s need for new growth vehicles is twofold: its economic size has not translated into global influence, and its current economic model is losing steam. First, China’s transformation into the world’s second-largest economy has yet to yield equivalent influence in the international system. Beijing’s sway in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, lag behind China’s status as the largest trade partner and foreign investor for much of the world. The United States, by contrast, has leveraged its economic status to maintain effective control of the Bretton-Woods institutions, to obtain low borrowing costs, and to exercise punishing sanctions programs against unfriendly governments. Second, Chinese growth has seen a secular decline over the last decade (see figure 1). The official projected GDP growth rate for 2020 is 6.1 percent (Xinhua, November 30, 2019), but some Chinese officials have hinted that they expect lower sub-6 percent growth in 2020 (South China Morning Post, November 14, 2019). This is a noteworthy signal, for CCP discourse has previously identified the benchmark of 6 percent GDP growth as necessary to avoid social unrest (China Brief, March 22, 2019).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

425. The CCP Response to the Wuhan Coronavirus: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Ryan Oliver
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (冠状病毒, guanzhuang bingdu) emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan. The precise origin of the coronavirus remains unclear, although experts agree that it is zoonotic and likely originated at a now-closed marketplace that sold seafood and other animal products for consumption. After initial submissions to the World Health Organization (WHO) on December 31 reported that an unknown pneumonia virus had infected 59 people in Wuhan, cases soon began to surface in other Chinese cities (WHO, December 31). The disease—now officially designated “2019-nCoV”—has spread beyond China’s borders and is now present in 16 other countries. As of January 28, the Wuhan coronavirus has resulted in 4,599 confirmed cases of infection and 106 fatalities (Phoenix News, January 28). Faced with another spreading epidemic, the central government has responded with more speed and transparency than during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2004. Wuhan and several other cities in Hubei province have imposed quarantines that limit public transportation, and have initiated measures to isolate these cities’ populations. Major cities like Beijing and Shanghai have also imposed restrictions to manage the flow of travelers. Officials also closed many tourist sites and postponed or canceled many Lunar New Year events nationwide, while extending the New Year holiday for three additional days in support of response efforts (Xinhua, January 26). Questions remain as to how effective these control measures can be in limiting the movement of people in and around China—particularly in light of the size of the cities in question, and the mass exodus of holiday travelers typical for this time of year. Besides these quarantine measures, efforts to isolate and slow the spread of 2019-nCoV have also included sending significant financial and medical resources to Wuhan and other affected areas. In addition to the deployment of medical teams from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s National Health Commission has dispatched over 1,000 personnel in six medical teams from across the country to the Wuhan area (World Journal, January 26). The China Development Bank has issued a 2 billion yuan ($288.3 million) emergency loan, while the Ministry of Finance has allocated 1 billion yuan ($144.2 million) towards combating the 2019-nCoV virus (Sina, January 25). Alongside the official response from Beijing, China’s private sector—including companies such as Tencent, JD.com, Lenovo and Xiaomi—has also offered contributions of funds and medical supplies (SCMP, January 25).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

426. The “Democratic Life Meetings” of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 26 and 27, China’s central leadership held a “democratic life meeting” (民主生活会, minzhu shenghuo hui) for the full membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo (Xinhua, December 27, 2019). This has become an annual end-of-year tradition for the Politburo, with similarly-designated meetings held in late December of each year from 2015 to the present (see accompanying chart). Official press treatment of the meetings since 2015 has consistently emphasized the authoritative position of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, invariably stating that he “presided over the meeting and delivered an important speech” (主持会议并发表重要讲话, zhuchi huiyi bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua) to the other assembled members.
Topic:
Politics, Leadership, State Building, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

427. Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 7, 2019, infantry units of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the “Hand-in-Hand 2019” combined military exercise at Umroi in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. The fortnight-long exercise ran through December 20, and focused on counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban terrain: to include training evolutions such as cross-training on small arms, hostage rescue, and recognizing improvised explosive device (IED) traps. Approximately 130 personnel from each country participated in the exercise, with the PLA contingent consisting of troops stationed in Tibet (Indian Ministry of Defense, December 2, 2019; Global Times, December 8, 2019; China Military Online, December 23, 2019). It was in January 2001 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first expressed interest in cooperating with India in combating terrorism (The Hindu, January 14, 2001). Since then Beijing and New Delhi have taken several steps to facilitate such cooperation: the two sides have set up a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Mechanism, a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and a High-Level Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism and Security to facilitate such engagement. In addition to leadership-level discussions, officials are engaging in talks on a range of terrorism-related issues. In October 2018, the two sides signed an Internal Security Cooperation Agreement, which aims at strengthening cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and narcotics control (Business Standard, October 22, 2018). The “Hand-in-Hand” exercises were first set in motion in 2007, and the December 2019 training in Meghalaya represented the eighth round of these counter-terrorism exercises. Such events—as well as the joint agreements between the two governments—present a picture of India and China as closely engaged on counter-terrorism issues. The truth is quite different, however—and the two sides are far from “hand-in-hand” in their understanding of terrorism.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

428. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 2: Renminbi Internationalization and International Economic Institutions

Author:
Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Complications surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the dangers of the “middle-income trap,” are not the only factors impacting the international economic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, poor capital efficiency is not the only feature of the Chinese economy that frustrates the country’s policymakers. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has roughly doubled in the last decade, but Beijing’s pull in the international monetary and financial system remains lackluster. This lack of progress stems in part from the dollar’s centrality around the world, as well as U.S. dominance in international economic institutions. Beijing’s economic planners have long advocated against the dollar while attempting to increase the global role of the PRC’s own renminbi (RMB) currency. While past efforts stumbled, RMB internationalization and increased Chinese influence will directly confront U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

429. How the Wuhan Epidemic Has Dented Xi Jinping’s Authority and Prestige

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In his telephone conversation with President Trump on February 6, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed confidence that Beijing can beat the coronavirus outbreak, and asserted that “the fact that China’s economy will be better in the long run will not change.” But at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) a few days earlier, Xi expressed fears about the adverse impact that the Wuhan pneumonia epidemic could have on China’s reform and open door policy (RTHK.hk, February 7; HK01.com, February 6; Ming Pao, February 4). Of even greater concern to the CCP leadership, however, is the sustainability of state power and Beijing’s ability to “uphold stability” (维稳, weiwen) in Chinese society. Much of this hinges on the performance of Xi—who is also state president, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the “life-long core” of the party leadership. That Beijing has failed to contain the alarming spread of the virus, however, demonstrates that Xi is facing the gravest crisis since he came to power in late 2012. It is clear that Xi is still in solid control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the regular police, and the police state surveillance apparatus. Both central CCP officials and supportive foreign dignitaries are projecting confidence. While visiting Beijing in late January, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praised China’s efforts against the coronavirus disaster, saying that Chinese authorities had displayed “Chinese speed and Chinese efficiency” (People’s Daily, January 29). After an unusual period of public absence in late January and early February, Xi has reappeared to assert his leadership and to declare a “people’s war” against the epidemic (Xinhua, February 11).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

430. The CCP’s New Leading Small Group for Countering the Coronavirus Epidemic—and the Mysterious Absence of Xi Jinping

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The “2019-nCov” virus epidemic that first appeared in December in the central Chinese city of Wuhan continues to sweep throughout the country: as of February 11, there were over 43,000 official reported cases of persons who had fallen ill from the virus, and over 1,000 reported deaths (Johns-Hopkins CSSE, February 11). Aside from the human toll, the epidemic has resulted in large regions of Hebei Province being placed under quarantine, which is placing a severe strain on the Chinese economy. The crisis is also presenting a severe test of governance for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—which, after being caught flat-footed in December and early January, is scrambling to stop the spread of the disease and to mount an effective medical response for those already affected. The second half of January saw a dramatic change in the posture of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) central government towards the epidemic. For the first three weeks of January, PRC state media organs downplayed the seriousness of the 2019-nCov outbreak, while emphasizing a steady stream of positive news stories: such as the successful achievement of government goals for poverty reduction, preparations for Lunar New Year celebrations, and the exalted status of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping as “People’s Leader” (人民领袖, renmin lingxiu) (China Media Project, January 30). This changed around January 20-21, when Xinhua outlets shifted to coverage of the epidemic by reporting on Xi’s “important directions” (重要指示, zhongyao zhishi) for responding to the viral outbreak (Xinhua, January 20). This was followed in turn by the announcement of special meetings focused on the crisis: State Council meetings on January 20 chaired by PRC Premier Li Keqiang, and on January 23-24 by Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan (PRC Government, January 20; PRC Government, January 24); and a Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) meeting on January 25 chaired by Xi Jinping (PRC Government, January 25). Then, on January 26 state media unveiled a newly-formed policy-making and coordination body at the top echelon of the CCP: the “Central Leading Small Group for Work to Counter the New Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic” (中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组, Zhongyang Yingdui Xin Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu) (hereafter, “Coronavirus Leading Small Group,” or CLSG). In an unusual move for such a high-profile policy issue, Xi Jinping did not take direct ex officio control of the CLSG—instead delegating the chairmanship to the nominal #2 figure in the party-state hierarchy, State Council Premier Li Keqiang (李克强). Per commentary in state media, the purpose of the new body is to operate “under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, strengthening unified leadership and unified direction for prevention and control of the national epidemic” (Xinhua, January 26).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia