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Begin New Search Political Geography Afghanistan Content Type Journal Article Journal Journal of Military and Strategic Studies

1. Chad C. Serena. It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Author:
Danny Garrett-Rempel
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In his book, It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation, Chad C. Serena attempts to analyze the organizational inputs and outputs of the Iraqi insurgency in an effort to arrive at a better understanding of what part these features played in both its initial success and eventual failure. The thesis of Serena's book is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals due to the fact that many of the insurgency's early organizational strengths later became weaknesses that degraded the insurgency's ability to adapt (4). Serena employs a blend of technical analysis, in his assessment of the inner workings of complex covert networks, and empirical examples, which he draws from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach is successful in providing insight into the nature of the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency as well as in laying a framework for the future study of similarly organized martial groups.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Iraq

2. John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The US at War in Afghanistan and Iraq. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

Author:
Megan Johnson
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
From Kabul to Baghdad and Back, written by John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, chronicles the conflicts that the United States undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This book sets out to discuss the strategic and operational actions the United States took in its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, paying close attention to the critical decisions that wentinto planning each of the combat operations and how those decisions affected the outcomes in each of the respective campaigns. Methodically researched and well written, the authors provide in-depth analysis and valuable insight into the complex nature of fighting a two-front war. While the book is not a complete or all-inclusive study of the successes and failures of America’s decade-long war, the authors present a clear analysis of how conducting a two-front war affected the outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Their premise is that much would have been different in America’s war in Afghanistan had the choice not been made to simultaneously go to war with Iraq. This book is full of great detail and covers a topic that is massive in scope and complexity, giving the reader much to absorb and ponder. The layout of the book, however, makes it more manageable with each chapter broken down further by subtitles. The selected bibliography and extensive footnoting of the book are valuable assets and ensure the reader access to a plethora of additional resources.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

3. Spencer C. Tucker, ed. US Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy, and Compromise (2 volumes). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009.

Author:
Bruce E. Stanley
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Spencer C. Tucker is currently a senior fellow in military history at ABC-CLIO Publishing in Santa Barbara, California. Dr. Tucker has written or edited over 30 books and encyclopedias focusing on military and naval history and is the senior editor for the two-volume encyclopedia US Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy, and Compromise. Tucker, along with ten assistant editors and a vast array of scholars, presents a comprehensive account of United States leadership in war from the American Revolution to the latest conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

4. Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era

Author:
Gerhard Gross
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Historians and military figures, especially British and American individuals, again and again raise the question of why the German army was - at least for a time - so successful in battle in the world war era despite its inferiority in materiel and personnel. In addition to tactical capabilities, the explanations given often include the operational capabilities of the German land forces. While Geoffrey P. Megargee and Shimon Nahev are critical in their assessment of the Wehrmacht's operational achievements because of specific German command and control problems and Naveh points out that there is no coherent theory behind Germany's operational thinking, others emphasize the outstanding operational capabilities of the German army. Edward N. Luttwak describes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as follows: “In fact it was an operation very much in the German style: elegant, full of risks, and most profitable.” Robert M. Citino goes even further. He draws a direct line from the Schlieffen Plan to Desert Storm, the most successful American military operation since World War II. The key to success lay in the decision to wage a war of maneuver, which was well-planned and thought-out, as well as the establishment of clear points of main effort - a fact any German officer is aware of. Both writers suggest that the Germans had a timeless art of command and control, the main factors of which – the establishment of points of main effort, risk awareness, speed and maneuver – were broadly adopted by American and Soviet officers. In this paper, I will present a short outline of the development of operational thinking in the German army in the world war era.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Germany

5. Don't Expect Much from Japan in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Japan is an Indian Ocean power of long standing. Ten years ago, in a post-9/11 show of solidarity with the United States and to exercise a more muscular foreign policy, Tokyo committed vessels of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, or MSDF) to the coalition naval contingent supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. JMSDF tankers resupplied coalition warships, while Aegis destroyers guarded against air and surface threats in the Arabian Sea. Japanese seamen posted impressive statistics for this naval enterprise. The Japan Ministry of Defense reported that JMSDF vessels supplied about 137 million gallons of fuel oil and some 2.8 gallons of water to customers from about a dozen countries, including the United States, Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany. Tokyo spent over $110 million on the logistics mission in its final two years according to Defense Ministry spokesmen, even as demand for such support dwindled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Britain, Afghanistan, United States, Japan, India, France, Arabia, Germany, and Tokyo

6. The Patrol: Seven Days in the Life of a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan

Author:
Ryan Flavelle
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Nothing can prepare a person for the reality of bloody, concussive warfare. . . . Those who like war are aptly named warriors. Some, like me, are fated never to be warriors, as we are more afraid of war than fascinated by it. But I have the consolation that I have walked with warriors, and know what kind of men they are. I will never be a warrior, but I have known war.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Canada

7. Military Responses and Capabilities in Canada's Domestic Context Post 9/11

Author:
Chris Madsen
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
If the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on New York City and Washington D.C. were a rude wake-up call for potential security threats to continental North America, the reaction on part of Canada has been measured and typically cautious. The acts were of course immediately condemned and temporary refuge given to thousands of travellers stranded by closure of airspace over the United States until declared safe. The federal government and most Canadians extended sympathy and offers of assistance to their closest neighbour and main trading partner. Close cultural and economic ties between the two countries ensured as much. Unease, however, set in about the tough talk and next progression characterized by President George Bush's now famous “You're either with us or against us” speech. Canada's then Liberal prime minister decided not to send the Canadian military wholeheartedly into the invasion of Iraq, though deployment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan duly became a major commitment. Reassuring the United States of Canada's reliability and loyalty as a partner was imperative. To this end, the federal government tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focused on security issues, and better coordinated intelligence gathering and information sharing activities across government agencies and with principal allies. Canadians convinced themselves that any possibility of a 9/11 scale terrorist attack on Canada was unlikely, and even if one was planned or happened, the effect would be minimized by the pro-active measures of authorities. Selected use of security certificates and arrest of home grown Islamic terrorists, the so-called Toronto 18, apparently showed that the police and intelligence agents were up to the task. The threat of terrorism, if not eliminated, could at least be managed and thwarted when required to provide a reasonable level of safety to the Canadian state and society. Ten years on, the course of events has shown the chosen policy decisions to have been mostly sound. Though the highest leadership of Al Qaeda remain at large and defiant as ever in their stated resolve to attack the West, Canada has not yet experienced a major terrorist incident since 9/11.
Topic:
Economics and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, New York, Washington, Canada, and North America

8. Intervening for Peace? Dilemma's of Liberal Internationalism and Democratic Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Author:
Philip Martin
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the post Cold War era, the international community has found cause to intervene in extremely volatile environments in order to restore normalcy and order. These situations are characterized by failed states, civil wars, and ethnic extremism. When doing so, the principles of liberal democracy and inclusive governments are frequently invoked as necessary components of the conflict-to-peace transition. Indeed, the idea that elected governments must accompany the broader objectives of stabilization and statebuilding underpins much of what peacebuilders actually do.Yet, despite the large sums of money spent and attention given to them, interventions which aim to facilitate the transition of fragile or failed states to inclusive, democratic governments rarely succeed. What explains this discrepancy?
Topic:
Cold War, Government, and Reconstruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

9. Fear and Loathing in Afghanistan?

Author:
Terry Terriff
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The passing tempest towards the end of June that led to the relief of US General Stanley McChrystal as commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan was both fascinating and disturbing. Much of the initial focus of the public debate focused on whether Gen. McChrystal should or should not be relieved because of the apparent distain of his command staff for their civilian leadership. The apparent split in opinion among media commentators on this question apparently existed even within the administration of President Barak Obama, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly admitted he advised the president that Gen. McChrystal should be kept in post lest removing him slow down or even halt the momentum of the new counterinsurgency strategy. The revelations in the Rolling Stone article, ‚The Runaway General‛, put President Obama in a ‚damned if he did and damned if he didn't‛ position; on the one hand the president ran the risk of appearing weak if he did not dismiss Gen. McChrystal, while on the other hand he ran the risk that the removal of the general could have an adverse impact on success in Afghanistan for which he would ultimately be blamed. The President, however, demonstrated considerable political deftness in accepting Gen. McChrystal's resignation and nominating Gen. David Petraeus, currently heading up Central Command, to replace him.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

10. Contemporary Threats to Canada and the Canadian Forces

Author:
Scott Fitzsimmons
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Over and above the widely acknowledged threats of international terrorism and the Afghan insurgency, Canada and the Canadian Forces face a number of pressing threats from state and non-state actors, which range from the physical to the fiscal. This paper highlights threats posed by private security contractors in Afghanistan, pirates off the Horn of Africa, foreign states in disputed areas of the Arctic, and the current economic downturn within Canada. Each section of the paper highlights one or more specific threats posed to Canada and/or the Canadian Forces and discusses existing and proposed attempts to address these threats.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, and Canada