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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Content Type Commentary and Analysis

1. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:
Michele Nones
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Climate Change in Japan’s New Defence and Security Strategies

Author:
Alistair D B Cook
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Japan has taken concrete steps to integrate climate change into its defence and security strategy going forward, and to provide the necessary budget for implementing the relevant measures needed in mitigating the impacts of this threat. This may signal a more prominent leadership role for Japan on climate security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Environment
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

3. European Security and Defence: Don’t Get Your Hopes Up Just Yet

Author:
Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“2022 will be the year of European defence”.[1] These were the words of European Council President Charles Michel in October 2021. When he gave his speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award Ceremony in Aachen, no one expected that his statement would materialise in the way it did. Yes, headway was to be expected with the adoption of the Strategic Compass and European countries demonstrating commitment to investing more in defence cooperation. Although there is still a world of difference between ambitions and reality, the degree of progress accomplished in the past twelve months was not foreseen.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Characterising Turkey’s policy towards Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an easy task. Elements of both support for Ukraine and neutrality have emerged in the past year. An analysis of the fundamentals of Turkey–US relations and Russia–Turkey relations is thus helpful.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Karolina Muti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

8. Japan’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative: Strengthening Japan’s Defense and Global Normative Power

Author:
Seunghee Oh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Seunghee Oh, a research professor at Seoul National University Institute of Japanese Studies, suggests that Pyongyang perceives the current global order as a “new Cold War” and views strengthening trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as hostile to its national interest. In response to North Korea’s moves, Japan prioritizes multilateral initiatives to strengthen its security ties with other partners in the region and the globe. Dr. Oh further claims that as Tokyo assumes the presidency of the G7 Hiroshima Summit this year and has been elected as a non-permanent member of the 2023-24 UN Security Council, Japan is well-positioned to criticize North Korea as an international norm violator and proactively address the North Korean problem and utilize it to enhance its global leadership.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Cold War, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and North Korea

9. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:
Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

10. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:
Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

11. How Would Europe Defend Itself?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Achieving greater European defensive autonomy is unlikely to be quick or easy. While there are alternatives, adapting NATO to this end is arguably the most realistic path. Pointing out the significant challenges to European defensive autonomy should not be construed as an endorsement of the status quo. Contending demands for limited U.S. military resources in Asia and elsewhere augur a reduced U.S. role in NATO regardless of Europe’s capacity to defend itself. Given current deficiencies with European capabilities and the failure of many NATO members to meet basic funding obligations, significant spending increases are likely needed to actualize greater independent European military capabilities. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full defensive autonomy among all 29 European members. In particular, defense of the Nordic-Baltic region could be an important test case. Nuclear issues will be particularly difficult to navigate. Reliance on either British or French nuclear forces as NATO’s primary deterrent comes with important challenges. Likewise, retaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella absent U.S. ground forces in Europe could prove unworkable. Russia’s capacity to rebound long term and pose a more robust threat to Europe should not be discounted. This underscores the importance of working through the difficult issues associated with European defensive autonomy in the current strategic window of Russian weakness.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

12. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

13. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

14. Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Author:
William Walldorf
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Due to an overly broad definition of threat, the United States currently commits far too many military resources to counterterrorism, especially in Africa. The United States is pursuing military action against at least thirteen terrorist groups in Africa, but only one of those groups has the “global reach” to be a threat to Americans. Consequently, the U.S. military is fighting a slew of counterinsurgency—not counterterrorism—wars in Africa today, a strategy that borders on nation-building. Counterintuitively, U.S. security assistance, training, and military activity in Africa since the 2000s has inadvertently aided the growth of terrorist groups in the region. Most concerning, U.S. policy today could be helping to inspire the next generation of global jihadists tomorrow, intent on attacking the United States and its closest democratic allies. U.S. military activity in Africa has expanded significantly over the past decade and a half and this trend will likely continue even further without an intentional course correction. The potential for further mission creep and overexpansion is high. Washington should wind down direct military activity and close most military bases in Africa, while also curbing security assistance to local regimes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa and United States of America

15. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

16. A Treaty Change for the European Defence Union

Author:
Nicoletta Pirozzi
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine was a turning point for European security and led the European Union and its member states to take important steps in the field of defence. The EU decided to use common funding to equip the Ukrainian government with arms and ammunition through the European Peace Facility for a total of 3.6 billion euro,[1] Germany allocated additional 100 billion euro to its defence budget,[2] Denmark joined the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[3] Finland entered NATO[4] and Sweden is willing to follow it soon. Time seems to be ripe for bold decisions on European defence, which would also need to consider a reform of existing provisions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe

17. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

18. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

19. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

20. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

21. Bases, Logistics, and the Problem of Temptation in the Middle East

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The wisdom of making wars easier depends on the wisdom of the wars. Rapid military response to all global trouble may sound good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Maintaining the ability to use rapid military force in the region has become an end unto itself, unmoored from any clear vital strategic interest. Closing bases will make wars more challenging to start, which will help spur public debate about potential interventions due to the transparent upfront costs required. This will give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option in the region. This recommendation is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s logic. Democracy’s benefit for foreign policymaking is its ability to consider many options and give more time to think through various proposals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

22. Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the Status Quo

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China. The imperative to avoid a conflict with China should take priority for U.S. leaders. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China’s choosing. The Taiwanese obviously have the strongest interest in deterring a Chinese invasion of their island. Regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have the next-strongest interests in preserving stability in East Asia. These actors should do the heavy lifting in deterring China. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. Working with others, Taiwan has the capacity to inflict severe costs upon Beijing in the event of an armed attack. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others might convince Beijing that the various costs of invasion—economic sanctions, opprobrium, military balancing—outweigh the benefits and thus deter China from invading. America’s role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable and the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding One China policy. This is the best chance of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, Status Quo, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

23. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

24. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

25. At the End of Its Tether: U.S. Grand Strategy of Advancing Democracy

Author:
David C. Hendrickson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Over the past several decades, the United States has made the advance of democracy its great purpose in foreign policy. The Biden administration’s rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is the old habit in new form. U.S. leaders market this goal as consonant with the U.S. liberal tradition, but it in fact offends the nation’s founding ethos, especially in relegating state sovereignty and national independence to secondary status. In the older teaching, accepted even by liberal internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt, free institutions were to expand by example, not by force. After the Cold War, U.S. efforts to push states into becoming democracies by instruction, war, and sanctions have been an abject failure, in large part because they offended against the principle of national independence. Defining U.S. efforts today as the defense of democracy obscures vital problems in the U.S. alliance system, including its expansionist tendencies, its unfair sharing of burdens, and the risks it poses of a major war that would be detrimental to U.S. security. The U.S. should reject the revolutionary policy of regime change and return to the respect for national independence once embedded in the U.S. diplomatic tradition. Overturning autocratic governments is an aim that is antithetical to peace, the most favorable environment for the growth of liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Cold War, Democracy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. War Is a Choice, Not a Trap: The Right Lessons from Thucydides

Author:
Michael C. Desch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap, and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. China faces important geographical and technological obstacles to expanding its hegemonic position in the region. Thucydides’ fundamental lessons for the contemporary United States in its rivalry with China is that democratic Athens erred when it sought primacy by expanding its empire during the Peloponnesian War; today we do not need to preserve a position of primacy in East Asia but can instead rest content with maintaining a balance of power. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, War, History, Alliance, and Geography
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Spheres of Influence in a Multipolar World

Author:
Andrew Latham
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Throughout the modern era, great powers have routinely staked out geographic zones within which they have limited the autonomy of weaker states—often as buffer zones between themselves and potential adversaries or rival empires. Since the nineteenth century, these geopolitical spaces have typically been referred to as spheres of influence. The specific configuration of such spheres depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During moments of multi-polarity, multiple great powers will attempt to assert spheres of influence; during the Cold War era of bipolarity, the international order was defined by two superpower-dominated spheres; during the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. Given this, it was inevitable that the return of multipolarity from the 2010s on would result in the crystallization of a new, multipolar, configuration of spheres of influence—one involving multiple great powers each asserting their own sphere. The relevant question now, therefore, is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how Washington should manage this development in ways that are both realistic and conducive to U.S. interests. The most realistic answer to this how question is to adopt a differentiated strategy that recognizes that, while the U.S. will not be able to prevent spheres of influence as a feature of international order tout court, it may be able to thwart specific spheres in certain specific circumstances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Multipolarity, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

28. Semiconductors Are Not a Reason to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could cause a major disruption of the global semiconductor supply chain. This has led some to claim that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in order to maintain its supply of advanced chips. Fears that China could seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically are overblown. Interdependence cuts both ways; if China invaded Taiwan, it would be cut off from the vital inputs controlled by the U.S. or its allies, and therefore unable to resume chip production under new management. Others fear Taiwanese chips could be disrupted during a Chinese blockade or a protracted conflict and tend to recommend bolstering U.S. capabilities to deter China. However, there are strong reasons to doubt the U.S. can ultimately deter Beijing if it feels that force is its only option for national reunification. Further efforts by the U.S. to deter China may only present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen, and precipitating the very conflict the U.S. seeks to prevent; a war between the U.S. and China would be exponentially costlier than any potential semiconductor supply shock resulting from a cross-strait invasion. Instead, the U.S. should seek to dial down the temperature with Beijing in order to maintain the political and territorial status quo and buy the time needed to diversify its own semiconductor supplies by onshoring or “allyshoring” chip manufacturing. The U.S. should therefore avoid provoking Beijing unnecessarily, and reaffirm the substance of the One China Policy while seeking to develop a longer-term settlement with Beijing over the future of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

29. Who Is an Ally, and Why Does It Matter?

Author:
Natalie Armbruster and Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In addition to the 51 allies the United States is obligated by treaty to defend, it has a number of quasi-allies: states the United States is not committed to defend but to which it provides a substantial degree of military and political support. By creating uncertainty about U.S. commitments both at home and abroad, quasi-allies’ ambiguous status creates dangers for both the United States and the quasi-allies. For the United States, the danger is entanglement; having quasi-allies can pull the United States into trouble outside its core interests, creating needless cost, risk, and even war. Quasi-allies may suffer a kind of moral hazard; they may falsely believe they have U.S. military protection and fail to secure themselves sufficiently or become emboldened and dangerously provoke adversaries. U.S. leaders should be more wary of these dangers and avoid loose talk and policy acts that imply a commitment to non-allies’ defense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Italians and Defence at the Time of the Ukraine War: Winds of Change

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2022, Italians have become more concerned about tensions between Russia and the West – but not more pro-American. They rather largely trust the European Union as a security actor, or lean towards an autonomous national defence policy – quite a change for the Italian public opinion. Italians are mostly supportive of military operations abroad and do not rule out the use of force, especially when national security is directly at stake, thus confirming the post-Cold War evolution of Italy’s strategic culture.[1] Notably, in the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the majority in favour of defending a NATO ally under attack has risen by 9 per cent, showing an unprecedented awareness of the importance of Euro-Atlantic collective defence. These are the main novelties in Italians’ views of defence issues at a time marked by a full-fledged war in Europe and its multiple consequences for national interests, as highlighted by the 2022 edition of the periodic IAI-LAPS survey on Italy’s foreign and defence policy.[2]
Topic:
Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

31. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

32. European Defence: Time to Act

Author:
Alessandro Azzoni
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has renewed momentum on the long-standing debate on EU defence, convincing many that the time for concrete steps to meet this ambition – the building of a united European defence grounded in its own strategic and technological autonomy – has finally come. Talks have been ongoing for some 68 years – that is, since the French parliament sunk the European Defence Community project back in 1954. The manifest broadening of public consensus for the idea of European defence is not enough. Thorough technical assessments will be needed to identify priorities and strike an acceptable balance between reducing duplications, optimising expenses and the inevitable transfer of some elements of strategic and operational “sovereignty” in the military domain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Defense Industry, Procurement, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Europe

33. Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
This explainer begins by recounting how an American-led NATO, a key element in U.S. global primacy, lived on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat it was meant to deter—and, if necessary, defeat. The next section highlights the implicit bargain that has sustained NATO: U.S. preponderance in Europe, achieved by the American willingness to serve as the continent’s indispensable protector, in exchange for Europeans’ freedom to spend more on butter and less on guns. Next comes a set of proposals to move NATO from burden sharing, a perennial point of contention within the pact, to a more far-reaching change, burden shifting, an idea that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made even more feasible and prudent. The explainer concludes by assaying the prospects for burden shifting and challenging prominent counterarguments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

34. Don’t Fear Vacuums: It’s Safe To Go Home

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran,” President Biden said this July in defense of his administration’s continued commitment to the Middle East.1 His comments reflect a widely held misconception: that a U.S. military exit from the Middle East would empower U.S. adversaries, and thus somehow make Americans less secure.2 U.S. leaders and pundits have expressed similar fears about the danger of creating vacuums by leaving Syria, Afghanistan (before U.S. exit of course), and even Africa, where only smatterings of U.S. troops are stationed.3 Vacuum fears also fuel more general warnings against surrendering influence in the developing world. Chinese investments via its Belt and Road Initiative—a massive set of infrastructure-development loans—for example, are said to exploit a vacuum the United States should compete to fill. Chinese trade in South America, or Russian port calls there, are said to reflect a failure to exert U.S. influence.4 The burgeoning idea behind these claims is that “great power competition,” which once seemed a useful rationale for exiting conflicts and lingering endeavors of the global war on terror, demands winning an open-ended, ill-defined contest for influence with Russia and China in the greater Middle East and developing world, or what is now sometimes called the global south.5 Vacuums that could be said to follow a U.S. exit—not the terrorists or insurgents U.S. forces were deployed to fight—are the new justification for staying.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

35. What the Quad Is, Is Not, and Should Not Be

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since its establishment in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad) has transformed into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern—particularly the rise of China. The U.S. has pushed for this transformation. Quad members speak of the group as a forum for issues in the Indo-Pacific ranging from COVID-19 and climate change to emerging technologies. But China, Asia’s biggest power, is integral to addressing each issue. In early 2021, the group’s leaders signed a joint statement reiterating the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific—a reference to what all four members regard as China’s illegitimate claims in the South and East China Seas. Indo-Pacific Quad members also have disputes with China: India over its shared border with China; Japan over China’s sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands; and Australia over worsening ties, including onerous trade restrictions and tariffs.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, and United States of America

36. Phantom Empire: The Illusionary Nature of U.S. Military Power

Author:
Richard Hanania
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has become a “Phantom Empire,” a country that appears to be powerful because it has a robust military presence abroad but cannot use garrisoned forces to achieve geopolitical objectives. More than 225,000 U.S. troops and DoD personnel are stationed abroad in more than 150 countries. The largest deployments are to wealthy U.S. allies (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) capable of defending themselves. U.S. leaders often justify military commitments by arguing they preserve “influence.” But because American leaders are committed, in most cases, to maintaining troops abroad as a good in and of itself, the U.S. squanders most of its leverage to influence hosts. Threats to withdraw troops are not credible, making them irrelevant for most U.S. geopolitical goals. The sources of U.S. power and influence are ultimately rooted in economic prosperity and soft power. A foreign policy that cultivates these sources of strength over maintaining military commitments would better achieve U.S. geopolitical goals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

37. The Folly of a Democracy-based Grand Strategy

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
President Biden’s Summit for Democracy exacerbates regime security fears in states such as Russia and China, further destabilizing relations and making it more difficult to advance U.S. interests. U.S. policymakers may claim democracy promotion and regime change are clearly different policies. But years of excessive pursuit of both to prop up U.S. hegemony mean Russia, China, and other non-democracies perceive them as part of a unified U.S. threat to their regimes. China and Russia’s fears for their regime security may be overwrought, but regardless, they encourage those states to collaborate more with each other; resist diplomacy with the United States on other issues, such as arms control; and crack down on dissidents and civil society. Viewing U.S.-backed democracy promotion as a tool of regime change, China and Russia do more to suppress democracy at home and work to undermine it abroad. The U.S. alleviating all of China and Russia’s apparent concerns is impossible and unnecessary; indeed, some regime insecurity is welcome for its restraining influence. But to advance its own interests, the United States should find ways to diminish piqued regime security fears. To reduce regime security fears, especially in China and Russia, the United States should separate democracy promotion from its grand strategy—democracy promotion is not a security priority. Democracy promotion is good but starts at home, by being an exemplar of liberal values.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

38. Military cooperation between Serbia and the USA: dynamically under the public radar

Author:
Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Military cooperation between Serbia and the United States is the topic of the latest analysis by BCBP researcher Maria Ignjatijevic. Serbia and the United States have had intensive cooperation in the field of security and defense for years, members of the armed forces have participated in over 70 military exercises in the last ten years, and the United States is one of the largest donors to the Serbian defense system. However, if we follow only media reports in Serbia, the intensity of this cooperation will not be so obvious. Defense cooperation with Russia gets far more space in the media than activities with the US and NATO members. Thus, for example, the military exercise “Slavic Shield” completely occupied the public’s attention before and after its organisation in October 2019. Although undeniably a significant activity between the two armed forces, to which Russia brought its S-400 and Pantsir systems, it gained a disproportionately large space in the media compared to other exercises that took place that year with other partner countries. Apart from the image being sent to the public through media and various foreign policy moves, a very dynamic and practical defense cooperation with all partners takes place behind the scenes. The United States is one of Serbia’s important partners in the field of defense, and cooperation with the US Department of Defense has been achieved in various fields. Every year, Serbia and the US conduct about 100 different bilateral activities. In the eyes of the Serbian public, perception of relations with the United States, and especially perception of military cooperation, is burdened by the NATO intervention in 1999. In order to avoid losing political points at home and endangering relations with Russia, the political elite in Serbia avoids talking about cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, and the pro-regime media report accordingly. Regardless of the fact that military cooperation is often used as a foreign or domestic policy tool, it is important to discuss the practical aspects of this cooperation, benefits for Serbia and the US, their defense systems, but also the citizens. At the online discussion “Serbia and the USA: Together we are safer”, specific examples of military cooperation between Serbia and the US and practical benefits for our defense system and its members from this cooperation were discussed. Defense cooperation between Serbia and the United States takes place on several levels, through joint exercises, cooperation with the Ohio National Guard, a student exchange program, as well as donations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, North America, and United States of America

39. The Militarization of Cyberspace? Cyber-Related Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act

Author:
Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
With Congress struggling to pass stand-alone cybersecurity legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is now the primary vehicle to pass all matters of cybersecurity legislation. Because the annual defense bill typically requires provisions to have a tie to national security, other cyber issues, like those pertaining to criminal justice, tend to be excluded. As a result, the authorities and resources awarded to Department of Defense (DoD) cyber mission far outpace those provided to civilian agencies responsible for partnering with state, local, private, and international partners. With ransomware and cyber incidents at an all-time high, Congress should either include a new title in future Defense bills to bolster US cyber enforcement and civilian agencies’ capabilities or pass a cyber-omnibus bill to fix policy gaps and provide commensurate funds to federal and local agencies to combat malicious cyber activity. In this paper, we analyzed the last five NDAAs (2017-2021) to chronicle Washington’s reliance on the NDAA to shepherd through a wide swath of cybersecurity legislation. We found that: Members of Congress included 290 cyber-related provisions in the past five NDAAs, with the past two NDAAs accounting for 60% of those provisions. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA contained 380% more cyber-related provisions than the FY 2017 NDAA. The 179 cyber-provisions included in the past two NDAAs far outpace the 14 cybersecurity bills that the 116th Congress passed (two of which were those NDAAs). Across 13 categories, three of the top four were aimed at the DOD core cyber missions, such as changing organizational processes and structures, protecting DoD assets, and engaging with foreign partners while deterring nation-state adversaries. In FY 2020, the number of non-DoD-related cyber provisions began increasing, such as supply-chain security and industrial policy, critical infrastructure protection, and election security. The provisions in these NDAAs helped improve US offensive cyber capabilities, implement measures to deter cyber adversaries, and shore up our cybersecurity defenses, all of which are needed. But because cybersecurity is a multifaceted issue that expands beyond national security and touches on criminal justice, workforce development, private-sector collaboration, and privacy issues, Congress must ensure it takes a holistic approach when creating cybersecurity laws.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. To Patch or Not to Patch: Improving the US Vulnerabilities Equities Process

Author:
Josh Kenway and Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The process that determines when and how the US government discloses unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities to relevant companies or withholds them for government purposes lacks sufficient accountability, transparency, and public trust. Malicious actors do not hesitate to exploit “zero-day vulnerabilities,” or vulnerabilities that a company has had zero days to patch, with Chinese-based hackers most recently using a zero-day in Microsoft Exchange Servers to infect hundreds of thousands of systems.1 Yet, the government also uses zero-days to carry out activities that are in the nation’s interest and, as a result, does not tell the impacted software or hardware vendor about the vulnerability. In this case, the government determines that the benefit of not disclosing the vulnerability outweighs the consequence of a bad actor potentially exploiting the vulnerability for nefarious purposes. In 2010, the US government created the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) to convene federal agencies that represent a range of national interests—including security, intelligence, foreign policy, commerce, and civil rights and liberties protection—to weigh distinct perspectives on how vulnerabilities should be patched or briefly kept open for law enforcement, intelligence gathering, or military purposes. However, the VEP is not codified in law and has failed to deliver greater transparency around government retention of vulnerabilities nor ensures accountability for the government’s decisions. Congress and the Biden administration should address deficiencies with the VEP to increase transparency, strengthen accountability, build public and industry trust, and establish a world-leading model for decision-making around what to do about high-value vulnerabilities. This paper details seven steps for the Biden administration to enhance transparency and accountability in the VEP while preserving government priorities, as well as flexibility for the defense of democratic values and institutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Transparency
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

41. 2021 Reader’s Guide to Understanding the Proposed US Cyber Enforcement Budget

Author:
Aaron Clarke
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Cyber attacks in the United States continue to devastate and disrupt day-to-day operations in the private and public sectors. Marked by events like the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline that created gas shortages and increased prices, cybercrime impacts everyday citizens, even if they are not directly targeted by an attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that in 2020 there were “over $4 billion in cybercrime losses reported to the U.S. government.”1 This growing cybersecurity threat has only been exacerbated by the rise of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and exposed network vulnerabilities from those working from home during the pandemic.2 In response to this influx of cyber attacks, the Biden Administration has taken steps to both bolster the federal government’s ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks as well as protect its own systems.3 The Department of Energy (DOE) and DHS have both made cybersecurity a top priority in their latest initiatives. President Biden called on DOE to launch a 100 day plan aimed at preventing disrupted services for electric utilities, and DHS announced a series of 60-day “sprints” to support private and public partners against ransomware.4 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act also created the first U.S. National Cyber Director, tasked to lead the implementation of U.S. cyber policy and strategy, and rapidly improve cybersecurity defense capabilities. Although ransomware attacks have spiked, the federal government has made inroads on combatting cyber criminals. The Cyber Enforcement Budget for FY2022 should continue funding and seek to build on the key improvements and actions taken by the Biden administration. In this guide, we will look at the budget implications for cyber enforcement, recommendations for Congress, and provide a detailed breakdown of the proposed budget’s funding allocations. Specifically, we recommend that Congress should: Restore the $15 million of funding cut from the State Homeland Security Program. The program provides critical grants to states that require recipients spend at least 10% of their grants on cybersecurity needs. Require an alignment of cybercrime goals and outcomes across law enforcement agencies within the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. Ensure that federal agencies are prepared to implement President Biden’s cybersecurity executive order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Budget, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. Cooperation or Coercion? The Views of US Opinion Leaders on Foreign Policy Approaches

Author:
Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Joshua W. Busby, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Monten
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Following four years of former President Donald Trump’s “America first” foreign policy, President Joe Biden is seeking to reorient the US approach to world affairs, placing much greater emphasis on international cooperation. This reorientation has already been evident in Biden’s decisions to return the United States to the Paris climate agreement, extend the New START arms control treaty with Russia, remain in the World Health Organization, reengage with the United Nations Human Rights Council, and commit to rejoining the Iran nuclear deal if Iran returns to complying with it. To what extent do Democratic, Republican, and Independent foreign policy professionals support Biden’s international agenda? The results of the 2020 Chicago Council on Global Affairs-University of Texas at Austin survey of more than 900 US executive branch officials, congressional staff, think tank scholars, university professors, journalists, and interest group representatives indicates there is substantial support among leaders of different political persuasions for a greater emphasis on cooperation and less reliance on coercion in foreign policy. However, this consensus also has a partisan tilt: Democrats and Independents are far more likely to agree on cooperative foreign policy approaches the United States should use, while Republicans are more comfortable with coercive measures. Taken together, these findings suggest that Biden should be able to attract strong support for his foreign policy from Democratic and Independent members of the foreign 2 policy community but will find it much more difficult to gain Republican backing for many of his international initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Economy, Business, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and North America

43. For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
2021 Chicago Council Survey data show a majority of Americans support a range of US policies towards Taiwan: recognition as an independent country, inclusion in international organizations, and a US-Taiwan free trade agreement. Tensions between Beijing and Taipei are running high. Chinese intimidation of Taiwan has increased since 2016, demonstrated by naval drills in the Taiwan Strait, incursions into Taiwanese airspace, and economic coercion targeted at Taiwanese industries. In turn, the United States has sold advanced weapons to Taiwan and normalized US warship transits nearby. While past administrations have not made formal commitments to defend Taiwan, the just-completed 2021 Chicago Council Survey finds that for the first time, a slim majority of Americans now favor sending US troops to defend Taiwan if China invades.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Public Opinion, Free Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Americans Remain Committed to South Korea, View North Korea as an Adversary

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
2021 Chicago Council Survey data show that a majority of Americans hold favorable views of South Korea and would support defending the country from a North Korean attack. Under the Biden administration, US relations with South Korea have returned to more solid ground. The May summit between President Joseph Biden and President Moon Jae-in was seen as a success, and negotiations over costs for stationing US troops in Korea were resolved. However, North Korea’s launch of a long-range cruise missile and subsequent ballistic missile test might signal a new phase of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The 2021 Chicago Council Survey finds the American public continues to hold positive views of South Korea, while majorities of Americans identify North Korea as an adversary. But while Americans support using US troops to defend South Korea, there is little support for taking military action to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

45. President Biden: Try for a Double Play on Iran and Afghanistan

Author:
Jon Greenwald
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
Southwest Asia is increasingly dangerous. Negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program appear stuck near a breakpoint. With the Kabul government’s precipitous collapse, President Biden’s courageous decision to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan has gone badly. Each situation threatens grave consequences for the administration. Together they suggest more deadly chaos looms from the Middle East to China’s borders. Iran is an important common factor, central to the first case, important in the second due to geography and potential leverage. The concurrence of threat – but also perhaps opportunity – justifies a new strategy for dealing with it that cuts across both situations. Joe Biden said before taking office that it was a priority to restore the nuclear deal that was working well until Donald Trump took the U.S. out. He pledged to conclude the endless war in Afghanistan. Today neither objective appears promising. Iran has more enriched and closer to weapons level uranium than when the original deal was signed. U.S. officials acknowledge that negotiating time is limited and, by implication, that military action may be required to keep the president’s pledge never to allow an Iranian bomb. As the Taliban takes over Afghanistan, Washington is focused as it should be on safely extracting U.S. citizens and the many thousands of Afghans whose lives are at risk for having helped the Americans over 20 years. Soon, however, there will be new proposals, including preparations for off-shore responses to what many anticipate will be a revival of the kind of civil war that ravaged Afghanistan in the 1990s. Any reasonable proposal should include at the least a significant diplomatic component in which Afghanistan’s neighbors, Iran prominent among them, apply their weight to persuade the Taliban to rule more moderately than it did its first time in power and in particular to keep out international terrorists. Most acknowledge that a key weakness of that approach is U.S. inability to work with Tehran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

46. The “Scandinavian model” of military conscription: A formula for democratic defence forces in 21st century Europe?

Author:
Sanna Strand
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2017, Sweden reactivated military conscription, only seven years after all-male conscription first was deactivated and an all-volunteer force introduced. While conscription has been critiqued in Europe after the end of the Cold War for being inefficient, unfair and ultimately unmodern, many European countries now appear to be reconsidering conscription or some form of mandatory national service. Others are attempting to update their draft systems by making them more inclusive and attractive. Sweden therefore provides an important case study for understanding how such a shift is motivated and how public support can be gained or strengthened for a modernized conscription model that is considered fit for the 21st century. This policy analysis thus sheds light on Sweden’s new conscription, modelled after the Norwegian version. It finds that this “Scandinavian model” was successfully implemented because it entailed a reimagination of conscription by the Government and defence officials rather than a return to traditional models. This was achieved by consistently arguing that this model was 1) gender-neutral and 2) selective and competitive, and therefore in principle still voluntary. As such, the Scandinavian model holds considerable military and political promise to ensure the armed forces’ access to competent and motivated soldiers, while at the same time garnering high levels of support among both politicians and the population. However, this model also entails inherent tensions and challenges to full implementation that policy-makers and military representatives need to consider when advocating for it: Most prominently, the analysis suggests that the model and its public support is dependent on continued efforts by the armed forces to become an inclusive and attractive professional and educational institution for all. These efforts may include marketing the armed forces in ways which signal that a diversity of young people is welcome and valued within the institution. Yet, it must also include efforts at institutional change and concrete policy initiatives. With regards to gender equality, it is pivotal to ensure that the drafting and selection process – but also the work environment within the armed forces – does not discriminate against women as a group. This entails making sure, for example, that women conscripts are provided with fitting uniforms and equipment. Moreover, given that the model is dependent on making military service competitive and therefore attractive to young people, attempts by the Government to considerably increase the number of people selected for service each year may pose a threat to the ambition of keeping military service voluntary in principle. Countries interested in increasing public support for conscription and implementing a gender-equal, democratic and ultimately modern draft system by adopting the Scandinavian model should therefore pay close attention to these challenges and tensions emerging in the Swedish context.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Democracy, Legitimacy, Equality, Gender, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Scandinavia, and Baltic States

47. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:
Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

48. PTSS Virtual Global Alumni Community of Interest Workshop: The Impact of the COVID–19 Pandemic on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Author:
James K. Wither
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
This paper presents the findings of a George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) Counterterrorism (CT) Virtual Global Alumni Community of Interest (COI) workshop held on January 20-21, 2021. The objectives of the workshop were as follows: Analyze the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on terrorism and CT nationally and internationally. Identify the extent to which the pandemic has created vulnerabilities that terrorists have been able to exploit to mount attacks and/or attract new recruits. Explore the extent to which the pandemic might make societies more vulnerable to terrorism and irregular warfare in the longer term and the reasons why this could happen. Formulate policy recommendations for the global counterterrorism community from the perspective of GCMC CT Alumni. The virtual workshop was structured around four panels, each with two alumni panelists with practical or academic expertise on the selected topics. GCMC CT faculty acted as panel moderators. The panels examined the impact of the pandemic on terrorist financing as well as terrorism and CT in the Middle East, the Americas, and the Sahel in Africa. Thirty selected global alumni took part in the workshop and raised additional questions and comments after the formal panel sessions. Initially, planning for the COI took place in spring 2020, when it was wrongly assumed that the worst of the pandemic would be over by 2021 and assessments of its impact would, therefore, be relatively conclusive. However, given the continued threat posed by COVID-19, with countries around the world still suffering from its impact, the assessments below must be regarded as interim. Therefore, the workshop made no specific policy recommendations. Marshall Center CT faculty members, along with their colleagues at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), have researched the impact of the pandemic on terrorism since March 2020.1 The COI followed a survey of alumni on the impact of the pandemic on terrorism and CT conducted in October 2020.2 Over four hundred military and civilian counterterrorism practitioners responded to the survey from Europe, North and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Unsurprisingly, many of the conclusions from the recent workshop are similar to impact statements in the earlier survey.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. The AUKUS Partnership: A Wake-up Call for Europe

Author:
Gabriele Abbondanza
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Now that some dust has settled over the surprise announcement of AUKUS on 16 September, it is possible to analyse the implications of this partnership not just for its members, but for Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, European Union, Partnerships, Maritime, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

50. Europe’s Strategic Compass: Merits and Shortcomings

Author:
Riccardo Perissich
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Europe’s “Strategic Compass” proposes a number of initiatives to enable the EU to act in the security and defence domain and confront the many challenges impacting European interests. The document, prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the responsibility of Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative and Vice President of the Commission, will be debated by defence and foreign ministers over the next few months and subsequently adopted as an official strategy statement sometime during the French Presidency of the European Council next year.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, Military Affairs, European Union, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

51. Manufactured Crisis: “Deindustrialization,” Free Markets, and National Security

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Both the American left and right often use “national security” to justify sweeping proposals for new U.S. protectionism and industrial policy. “Free markets” and a lack of government support for the manufacturing sector are alleged to have crippled the U.S. defense industrial base’s ability to supply “essential” goods during war or other emergencies, thus imperiling national security and demanding a fundamental rethink of U.S. trade and manufacturing policy. The COVID-19 crisis and U.S.-China tensions have amplified these claims. This resurgent “security nationalism,” however, extends far beyond the limited theoretical scenarios in which national security might justify government action, and it suffers from several flaws. First, reports of the demise of the U.S. manufacturing sector are exaggerated. Although U.S. manufacturing sector employment and share of national economic output (gross domestic product) have declined, these data are mostly irrelevant to national security and reflect macroeconomic trends affecting many other countries. By contrast, the most relevant data—on the U.S. manufacturing sector’s output, exports, financial performance, and investment—show that the nation’s total productive capacity and most of the industries typically associated with “national security” are still expanding. Second, “security nationalism” assumes a need for broad and novel U.S. government interventions while ignoring the targeted federal policies intended to support the defense industrial base. In fact, many U.S. laws already authorize the federal government to support or protect discrete U.S. industries on national security grounds. Third, several of these laws and policies provide a cautionary tale regarding the inefficacy of certain core “security nationalist” priorities. Case studies of past government support for steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and machine tools show that security‐​related protectionism and industrial policy in the United States often undermines national security. Fourth, although the United States is not nearly as open (and thus allegedly “vulnerable”) to external shocks as claimed, global integration and trade openness often bolster U.S. national security by encouraging peace among trading nations or mitigating the impact of domestic shocks. Together, these points rebut the most common claims in support of “security nationalism” and show why skepticism of such initiatives is necessary when national security is involved. They also reveal market‐​oriented trade, immigration, tax, and regulatory policies that would generally benefit the U.S. economy while also supporting the defense industrial base and national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, COVID-19, Free Market, and Deindustrialization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

52. Artificial Intelligence and National Security

Author:
Levan Bodzashvili
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The purpose of the following article is, on the one hand, to introduce the current trends in the utilization of artificial intelligence in the field of national security and defense and, on the other hand, to initiate a research discussion in order to determine the necessity and the feasibility of the use of artificial intelligence for small countries like Georgia. We will also seek to define its importance at the strategic level in terms of ensuring integration and military compatibility. The article also incorporates strategic initiatives of a recommendatory nature which should be discussed in the security sphere as well as at the level of research organizations and the government. Artificial intelligence (AI) is the fastest growing field of technology which is already one of the top priorities in the national security strategies of most countries. The reason for this is that artificial intelligence technologies can alter the ways war is conducted.1 It enables defense, military, cyber security, intelligence and counterintelligence, information and cyber operations, logistics, manufacturing and strategic management/control of autonomous military vehicles. It has already been used by the United States, Israel, China, Russia and many other countries. Artificial intelligence also plays an important role in anticipating and planning national and geopolitical events such as, for example, the program of the director of the United States Intelligence Agency (IARPA)2 which conducts constant research in this area as well as more than 140 operational and research projects of the Central Intelligence Agency which use artificial intelligence. An important and also revolutionary project is SAGE3 which was developed by the Universities of Fordham, Stanford and Columbia in conjunction with the Intelligence Agency and which predicts geopolitical events through artificial intelligence-based projections. High-precision algorithms enable the predicting of events which is a crucial factor in reinsuring national security risks and threats.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

53. Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Arms Production to Enhance Defense Capabilities for the Georgian Military

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Some defense economists argue that the full-scale self-sufficiency of the defense industry, which can also be termed defense autarky, may not be necessary for future wars. Due to weapon systems becoming increasingly sophisticated and highly technological, producing these systems requires the growing importation of components and sub-systems for the manufacturing of indigenous and advanced weapons and equipment; even the United States defense contractors import components and sub-systems from many different foreign countries. “The transformation of arms production has created opportunities for many states. Through defense industrial partnerships, recipient states can now exploit foreign component technology and technical knowledge to produce advanced military systems.” Therefore, no country has a comprehensive domestic defense-industrial base (DIB) because all countries rely on technology imports. Even though defense autarky is not necessary, some countries with strong or moderate economies are still trying to develop an autonomous DIB to decrease the influence of arms supplier countries. However, even countries with developed economies have weaknesses in designing, developing and producing advanced weapon systems because they “suffer from shortages of skilled personnel and sufficient scientific and technical infrastructure to pursue breakthroughs and applied research in many critical defense technologies.”
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Georgia

54. The COVID-19 Pandemic and European Security: Between Damages and Crises

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic will negatively affect the defence field from a budgetary, industrial and politicostrategic point of view, particularly in Europe. Depending on the pandemic’s duration, its economic consequences and national and EU responses, effects may range from contained damages to a much wider European security crisis.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Crisis Management, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

55. Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption – Public Opinion on Security

Author:
Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The main finding of this study is that the Serbian public have conflicting views on national and personal security and their relationship with the country’s institutions. On the one hand, people instinctively recognise that the main security threats are internal and are related to poor governance – such as organised crime and corruption and low levels of trust in institutions that serve the interests of politicians – which is why they rely on themselves and their own good conduct, from which they derive a sense of personal security. On the other hand, under the influence of media messaging and dominant narratives about threats to national security, presenting a maelstrom of great power rivalry and adversarial actors in the region, they continue to believe that hard power is the best response to security issues. Therefore, they see solutions mainly in the continued strengthening of the country and investment in the security sector. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is diametrically opposed to the threats and risks defined by the official National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy adopted last year. Both documents place (the relatively unlikely events of) armed aggression and separatist tendencies within the country in first place on the list of threats to Serbia’s security – threats that only appear in the lower half on the list of priorities in the eyes of the public, who see human security issues as the priority problems. This discord between public perception and the strategic documents is a consequence of the almost complete lack of public debate during the adoption process of these documents. At the same time, it is testimony to the wrongheaded priorities of Serbia’s security policy, which is clearly at odds with the needs of the public, even though the National Security Strategy cites their subjective feelings in defining national security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Corruption, Crime, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

56. Republicans, Democrats Divided over Federal Spending Priorities

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Results from the 2020 Chicago Council Survey, conducted July 2-19, 2020, reveal bipartisan support for increased federal spending on a number of domestic priorities, including education, healthcare, and Social Security. But beyond that, Republicans and Democrats are divided on a range of spending issues, including defense, immigration enforcement, and federal aid to state and local law enforcement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Immigration, Law Enforcement, Budget, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

57. Republicans, Democrats Split on Increasing US Defense Budget

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
On December 8, the House voted to pass the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authorizing a total of $740.5 billion in defense appropriations and continuing a trend of defense spending increases. The bill, passed by a margin large enough to override a threatened veto from President Trump, includes pay increases for US servicemembers, mandates the renaming of ten US military bases currently named after Confederates, and has a notable focus on competition with China. The 2020 Chicago Council Survey finds that the US public overall tends to prefer to maintain current levels of defense expenditures. But a plurality of Democrats, younger Americans and the college-educated favor cuts to the US defense budget, while a plurality of Republicans favor expanding it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, Budget, Political Parties, and Survey
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

58. “Germany’s EU Presidency 2020: The Security Dimension and EU-NATO Cooperation”

Author:
Ralf Roloff
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
On July 1, 2020, Germany assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second half of 2020. How Germany manages the EU Council presidency will be of utmost importance for the future of the European Union as well as for the transatlantic relationship. The German EU presidency faces two major challenges: first, containing the coronavirus crisis and working towards a European economic recovery and second, initiating a lasting dynamic towards European solidarity, and autonomy. How are the two challenges intertwined with security questions? Germany intends to promote closer EU-NATO security cooperation. The coronavirus pandemic has tested this envisaged cooperation, but also offered new opportunities. Hence, what is the pandemic’s impact on Germany’s ambitions for EU-NATO cooperation? On July 2, 2020, the Marshall Center brought together a group of experts and alumni from Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and the United States in a virtual workshop designed to share their expectations for Germany’s EU presidency as well as generate ideas about how to lay the groundwork for strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and EU-NATO cooperation going forward. The following takeaways are informed by the discussion.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

59. The Australia–India Strategic Partnership: Accelerating Security Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific

Author:
Dhruva Jaishankar
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
India and Australia have successfully managed to overcome prior inhibitions about security cooperation. Since 2000, the two countries have significantly improved their strategic coordination, military interoperability, and maritime cooperation, motivated by China’s rise and behaviour, faltering regional security institutions, and uncertainty about the United States’ role. Today, India–Australia security relations comprise regular military exercises, professional exchanges, operational coordination, and nascent defence technology cooperation. But the two countries’ different capabilities, priorities, and strategic circumstances will have to be overcome if relations are to deepen. Future priorities should include institutionalising bilateral and multilateral coordination mechanisms, improving military interoperability, deepening defence technology collaboration, and broadening relations to give ballast to the security relationship.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, India, Australia, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

60. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

61. Avoiding “Cuba-sur-Calais” and Other Misadventures on Brexit Island

Author:
Roderick Parkes
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
British political institutions have shown resilience during the Brexit crisis. London apparently believes it has the scope to put EU talks behind it and recalibrate its position in the world. The British government is carrying out an integrated review of defense, aid, and foreign policy and preparing its presidency of the COP26 climate talks and G7. By contrast, its neighbors are gripped by the notion of Britain’s further constitutional deterioration. Their perceptions could well become self-fulfilling.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Politics, Brexit, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Britain and Europe

62. Special Commentary: COVID-19: Shaping a Sicker, Poorer, More Violent, and Unstable Western Hemisphere

Author:
Dr. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic will have profound and enduring negative effects on Latin America and the Caribbean, significantly impacting the security, interests, and strategic position of the United States. Department of Defense and other US senior leaders should begin planning now to mitigate or manage the consequences. The effects of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean, as in many other parts of the developing world, will be far more significant than is commonly anticipated for two reasons. First, the virus will likely play out across the region over an extended length of time owing to a variety of factors discussed later. Second, the pandemic’s mutually reinforcing health, economic, social, and political effects will combine to wreak far more havoc than anticipated in analyses that only consider disease propagation or effects on commerce. Together, these two dynamics of COVID-19 will leave a Latin America that is far sicker, poorer, beset by crime, violence, social unrest, and political instability than today. It will also leave a region with expanded People’s Republic of China (PRC) commercial presence and political influence, even while being more resentful of it.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Latin America and Caribbean

63. Special Commentary: Post-COVID Transformation: DOD Goes into the Matrix?

Author:
Nathan Freier, Robert Hume, Al Lord, and John Schaus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
These are complex, turbulent, and uncertain times to be sure. The Department of Defense (DOD) is at an important inflection point. COVID-19 has irrevocably altered the dynamics of international security and reshaped DOD’s decision-making landscape. As a result, DOD will have to adapt to significantly different strategic circumstances post-COVID than those assumed operative in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS18). We recommend that DOD recognize this to be true, seize the initiative, create opportunity from crisis, and recraft defense strategy to re-emerge from COVID as a stronger, more hypercompetitive institution. The past is definitely prologue in this regard. DOD’s current strategic circumstances mirror those of the immediate post-9/11 period. The wars that followed 9/11 forced a substantial strategic course correction on DOD. By 2003, it was clear that the azimuth set in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR01) was fundamentally compromised by the stark reality of the Iraq and Afghan wars and the wider “Global War on Terrorism.” There was corporate recognition at the time that the path described in QDR01 was not likely to position the American military for the demands of the post-9/11 environment. Just as war reshaped DOD’s strategic agenda then, COVID-19 will change the dynamics of great power rivalry and the defense choices associated with it going forward as well. By itself, we suggest this necessitates a thoughtful re-examination of the assumptions and approach described in NDS18. To use a pop culture analogy, DOD’s current situation is reminiscent of “Neo’s choice” in the dystopian movie The Matrix. In the film, rebel leader Morpheus offers protagonist Neo the choice of a red pill or a blue pill. The red pill extends to Neo an unvarnished view of “the matrix” and its broader and more difficult set of governing facts. The blue pill, on the other hand, returns Neo to his prior blissfully naïve existence plugged into a land of computer make-believe. The blue pill is all about doubling down on a comfortable yet already discredited past. The red pill offers Neo the opportunity to boldly enter a difficult but nonetheless transformational future. In the end (spoiler alert), Neo chooses red. Like Neo, DOD has its own difficult “red or blue” choice on the near-horizon. COVID forced the issue. DOD’s choice is between prudent risk-taking, transformation, and increased hypercompetitiveness (red) on the one hand, and status quo, steady decline, and inevitable loss of position in key regions and domains on the other (blue). As in the case of Neo, we suggest that DOD choose the former (red pill) transformational option.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

64. Assessing Europe’s Efforts to Oppose Islamist Extremism

Author:
Robin Simcox
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Determining precisely what factors lead to radicalization is a pressing challenge. In fact, beyond the violent Islamist threat, the influence of political Islam and varying shades of Salafism are also growing across Muslim communities in Europe. This, too, has harmful social consequences. The scale of the problem facing Europe was exacerbated by the decision made by Germany in 2015 to open its borders to refugees fleeing conflicts in Muslim-majority countries. While security threats undoubtedly entered with the refugee flow (or individuals were radicalized and became threats once in Europe), the refugee issue has also introduced social and cultural questions relevant to overall cohesion and integration in Europe. This essay looks at these issues from the perspective of four European countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and France. Islamist terrorists have attacked each country in the last two years, and each has taken differing approaches to preventing extremism and facilitating integration. Dozens of conversations with government officials from across Europe have informed my conclusions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Ideology, and Islamism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, and Sweden

65. Assessing Europe's Space Dependency and Its Implications

Author:
Guilhem Penent
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
It is a classic exercise to imagine what today’s world would be like if all satellites were shut down. The exact consequences of such a scenario, which is not unlikely given the inherent vulnerability of space systems to natural, accidental and deliberate interferences, are however difficult to appreciate, even for specialists. In the smartphone age, much of what we take for granted is provided by space technologies. They are so effective at delivering essential, though unseen, services (e.g. positioning, navigation and timing signals, geographic information data, and broadcasting relay and amplification) that many aspects of our modern society have become reliant upon them. As emphasized by Florence Parly, the French minister for the armed forces, in last September: “From rural to urban areas, from the very small to the large companies, every day, more than 10 satellites on average accompany us and help us in our daily lives.”
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Space, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

66. Securing Borders Against Traveling Terrorists: Challenges, Best Practices, and Recommendations

Author:
Tom Welsh
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Ten alumni of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center’s (DKI APCSS) Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (CSRT) course and fourteen alumni of the George C. Marshall European Center’s (“Marshall Center”) Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) course participated in a first-of-its-kind collaborative CT-COI in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany to discuss and exchange ideas, share best practices, and make recommendations for securing national borders against traveling terrorists. Participants heard from eleven alumni representing nine countries and FRONTEX on current border security challenges and how these challenges are being addressed. The COI concluded with the following observations and recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Global Focus

67. Italy's Defence Expenditure: What Impact on EU Defence Cooperation?

Author:
Andrea Aversano Stabile and Paola Sartori
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 15 October 2018, the Italian Ministry of Defence released its Plurennial Programmatic document (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale, DPP) outlining Italy’s defence expenditure forecasts until 2020.[1] The DPP was eagerly awaited this year, especially in light of the defence cuts announced by the current government, which is already embroiled in a difficult negotiation with the EU over Italy’s increasing budget deficit. Coming at a time when the EU is devoting increased effort and resources to boost its defence cooperation and the US Trump administration is admonishing its European allies for not paying their share to defend Europe through NATO,[2] Italy’s envisioned defence cuts are likely to cause some concern in Brussels and Washington. Ultimately, these may also increase scepticism as to Rome’s reliability as a key European partner in the defence realm.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, Budget, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, and European Union

68. Reinforcing Indonesia-Australia Defence Relations: The Case for Maritime Recalibration

Author:
Evan A. Laksmana
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
A maritime realignment of Australia–Indonesia defence relations could shape the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture and provide an additional strategic hedge for both countries. One of the key prerequisites for the implementation and sustainability of the newly announced Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is the stabilisation of bilateral defence relations. To achieve such sustainability, bilateral defence engagement should focus on joint maritime challenges. Canberra should formulate long-term plans to assist the modernisation of Indonesia’s armed forces with a focus on maritime security operations, and should increase the number and scope of maritime exercises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

69. Shared Responsibility and Comprehensive Security in the MENA Region

Author:
Petra Weyland
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Insecurity in the MENA region has been growing significantly over the last two decades. Much has been done to counter this trend through direct military engagement, procurement of weapons, training, humanitarian and development aid, and engagement in security partnerships. In spite of these tremendous efforts, the regional, national, and especially the human security situation has worsened. Violent extremism is evidence of this. U.S. Special Forces executed Osama bin Laden years ago, but al-Qaida is changing its face and (re-)appearing in many different places. The Isis Caliphate was destroyed, but its survivors are gaining a foothold on both shores of the Mediterranean, conceiving new forms of violent radicalism. Today we have to admit that by and large the efforts to improve security in the region have failed, a fact that is hard to accept, regardless of the reasons for this failure. The current situation not only has a tremendous negative impact on the MENA region and its future but also an increasingly adverse effect on neighboring countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Europe. Obviously, “more of the same thing” is not the correct strategy to apply. But how can the security policy approach to the region and the existing partnerships around the Mediterranean be recalibrated? This is the most crucial, the most pragmatic, and the most reasonable question to ask. The answers require bold, unconventional, out-of-the-box thinking and innovative approaches. It is precisely this question that the Marshall Center’s September 2017 Rome workshop put on the table. The most significant result of the debate was: before any new tools to counter security threats can be devised, efforts must focus on those who are (or should be) responsible for designing and implementing these tools: the security partnerships. The Rome workshop participants agreed that the main reason for the inefficiency of countermeasures lies in the very nature of existing security partnerships, which have many shortcomings and low effectiveness. Therefore, before investing in “more of the same thing,” a serious effort must be made to revise and redesign these partnerships. This is going to be a long and difficult process, not least because of diverging geopolitical interests. It is clear that any input that helps rebuild these partnerships is a contribution to a shared strategic vision. The Rome workshop proposed the concept of “shared responsibility” as a new strategic approach to security partnerships that encompasses the two shores of the Mediterranean as well as for the regional partnerships. It goes without saying that such a strategic vision needs to be developed on the basis of a clear, realistic, and shared situation analysis. The strategic workshop in Rome carved out the contours of both, which now must be fleshed out in a follow-up workshop.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and North Africa

70. The Tunnel Tension: Potential Trajectories of Escalation Between Israel and Hezbollah

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
As Israel’s Operation Northern Shield continues, with the aim of dismantling the tunnels discovered on the Lebanese border, the Israeli policies mark a remarkable shift in confronting Hezbollah’s threats. The operation comes as part of a series of parallel measures, employing a tactic different from the military escalation scenario, which cannot be completely ruled out in the future with the aim of launching a preemptive strike. However, with no variables yet to enhance such scenario, the Tel Aviv tactic will focus on linking the party’s new threat and escalation with the latter, along with Iran, on the Syrian front, on the belief that the party's new approach stems from the interactions of the equation itself. On the other hand, Hezbollah has reacted in a similar way, based on calculations that do not lean toward engaging in mutual escalation, albeit threatening of military “surprises” as part of a defensive strategy. Among those “surprises” is deploying the new and unconventional techniques of its missile capabilities, which have been developed by its expertise on the Syrian ground and with the help of Iran. Apart from these expected messages, Hezbollah has, since the discovery of tunnels, questioned Tel Aviv's account of the issue. Hezbollah's various media platforms have focused on attributing the escalation to the Israeli internal developments, amid the crisis facing Netanyahu's government, after the withdrawal of former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman from the government coalition.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Borders, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

71. Dancing for the Cameras while Europe and Syria Burns

Author:
Matthew Crosston
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had a brief visit at the White House on Wednesday, April 12, 2017, which was followed by all of the typical press conferences and media interviews expressing new found agreement and harmony. It is yet another example in the Presidency of Donald Trump where explicitly bold and brash campaign trail criticism ended up not just softened but utterly reversed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

72. Global Priorities in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Practitioner Perspectives

Author:
Sam Mullins and James Howcroft
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
This research note reports the results of a pilot questionnaire on priorities in terrorism and counterterrorism, which was completed by seventy-five security-sector professionals from more than fifty countries who attended the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, from July to August, 2017. The results reveal that these practitioners consider terrorism to be one of the most serious threats to stability in their countries. Participants were especially concerned with jihadist terrorism and were more or less equally concerned with lone actors versus foreign fighters. The majority identified online versus offline methods as most important to terrorist recruitment, however this difference of opinion was not large. Looking to the future, they viewed hacking/cyber attacks by terrorists as particularly likely. In terms of counter-terrorism (CT), intelligence agencies were seen as playing the lead role, while cooperation between domestic CT agencies was seen as the biggest challenge. In contrast to this, terrorist use of encrypted communications was seen as least challenging. Participants were evenly split in their views on political negotiations with terrorists, but displayed a comparatively high degree of optimism about the prospects of deradicalization. Nevertheless, they also appeared to hold a government-centric view of CT, seeing relatively little role for civil society and non-governmental organizations. Border control was viewed as the capability most in need of further development.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

73. How to Secure Mosul Lessons from 2008—2014

Author:
Michael Knights and Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
IN EARLY 2017, Iraqi security forces (ISF) are likely to liberate Mosul from Islamic State control. But given the dramatic comebacks staged by the Islamic State and its predecessors in the city in 2004, 2007, and 2014, one can justifiably ask what will stop IS or a similar movement from lying low, regenerating, and wiping away the costly gains of the current war. This paper aims to fill an important gap in the literature on Mosul, the capital of Ninawa province, by looking closely at the underexplored issue of security arrangements for the city after its liberation, in particular how security forces should be structured and controlled to prevent an IS recurrence. Though “big picture” political deals over Mosul’s future may ultimately be decisive, the first priority of the Iraqi-international coalition is to secure Mosul. As John Paul Vann, a U.S. military advisor in Vietnam, noted decades ago: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last.”
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, International Security, Reconstruction, and ISIS
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

74. Why doesn’t hail protection in Serbia work?

Author:
Miroslav Mijatović
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Applying the "PRO-CURE" methodology for assessing the procurement expediency, Miroslav Mijatovic of Podrinjski Anti-Corruption Tim Loznica, conducted a study on the procurement of anti-hail rockets in Loznica in 2014 and 2015. In this study the author has also provided an overview of the overall state of hail protection in Serbia, as well as recommendations for improvement of this system.
Topic:
Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Serbia

75. Evaluating the Post-Cold War Policy of the United States

Author:
Jonathan Dean
Publication Date:
11-1999
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Adviser on International Security Issues, Union of Concerned Scientists, presentation to the PDA symposium Ten Years After the Wall: Trends in post-Cold War U.S. Security Policy held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 11 November 1999.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Cold War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America