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561. The Academic Jobs Crisis: A Forum

Author:
Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
The U.S. academic job market is in total freefall. As the American Historical Association’s (AHA) 2020 jobs report bluntly stated, “History Ph.D.s who graduated in the past decade encountered fewer opportunities and more competition on the academic job market than any cohort of Ph.D.s since the 1970s.”1 And this was before the COVID-19 pandemic, which, the 2021 jobs report noted, has resulted in numerous “program closures, enrollment declines, and faculty layoffs.”2 It’s not an exaggeration to say that, even if things improved tomorrow (which they won’t), there will be several “lost generations” of historians who will never secure stable academic employment. The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) is well aware of these depressing and disturbing trends. Under the leadership of past-SHAFR presidents Barbara Keys and Kristin Hoganson, the organization recently established a Jobs Crisis Task Force to begin to deal with the new material and structural realities of U.S. higher education.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Higher Education, Academia, and Diplomatic History
Political Geography:
United States

562. Unpacking US Cyber Sanctions

Author:
Allison Peters and Pierce MacConaghy
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity poses one of the greatest threats to America’s national, economic, and personal security. Yet, the perpetrators of these crimes largely operate with pure impunity and face little consequences for their actions. This is particularly the case for cybercriminals who cost the US economy anywhere from $57 billion to $109 billion in 2016 alone.1 Since 2015, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions (e.g., asset freezes, travel bans) on over 300 individuals and entities in response to malicious cyber activity.2 Many of these sanctions were issued under the cyber-related sanctions program administered by the Department of Treasury and established by a series of Executive Orders under Presidents Obama and Trump and bills passed by Congress.3 Sanctions have largely been imposed on individuals with ties to Iran, Russia, and North Korea, and, in about half of these cases, sanctions have followed indictments. An overwhelming majority of these sanctions have targeted individuals with suspected links to government entities and, only recently, have cyber sanctions targeted cybercriminals.4 As targeted sanctions increasingly become a tool deployed by the US government to punish malicious cyber actors, it remains unclear whether they are having an impact in changing behavior. Research on the impact of sanctions more broadly indicates that sanctions can be an effective tool to impose consequences on bad actors and change their actions when employed multilaterally, as part of a coherent strategy, and effectively messaged.5 However, imposing sanctions on malicious cyber actors without continuously reassessing their impact and the expected reciprocal actions by the target(s), risks a number of potentially negative outcomes. While Congress introduced legislation in the 116th Congress to impose new or codify existing cyber-related sanctions into law,6 it has not exercised the necessary oversight over the Executive Branch’s strategy in issuing cyber-related sanctions and determining their efficacy. With other countries now following America’s lead in issuing these sanctions, the time is ripe for the new Congress to push for an inter-agency, holistic assessment of the impact of US cyber-related sanctions.7 And with cybercrime increasingly threatening all sectors of the US economy, Congress must call for an evaluation as to whether sanctions on non-state cybercriminals should increasingly be used.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cyberspace, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

563. Taking Action on Cyber Enforcement: Assessing US Legislative Progress in the 116th Congress

Author:
Michael Garcia and Pat Shilo
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The 116th Congress experienced events like no other in American history, including unprecedented levels of malicious cyber activity. Global estimates say that ransomware attacks have increased by 148% since February 2020, with many US hospitals and schools falling victim and having their operations suspended.1 Leading up to and during the pandemic, Members of the 116th Congress responded and drafted cybersecurity legislation, introducing 316 bills to tackle the issue—a 40% increase from the previous Congress. This memo presents a comprehensive analysis of the cybersecurity legislation introduced in the 116th Congress and is a successor to our memo assessing the cybersecurity legislation in the previous Congress. Unlike the 115th Congress, the two chambers of the 116th were each under the control of a different party. Still, more than half of the introduced bills were bipartisan, including 85% of the bills signed into law. However, only 11% of the introduced bills focused on imposing consequences for the human actors behind cyberattacks, such as imposing sanctions or strengthening laws to prosecute criminals to hold them accountable for their actions. Following the trend of past congresses, most of the bills focused on protecting data and securing critical infrastructure. But while defending data and infrastructure is important, the lack of legislation to address the challenges of imposing consequences on the human actor suggests that Congress should prioritize introducing and passing bipartisan legislation that reduces the impunity with which malicious cyber actors, particularly cybercriminals, act. Here are the main takeaways from the bills introduced last Congress: Cybersecurity-related legislation increased by 40% since the 115th Congress. Of the 316 bills introduced, 14 became law, with nine related to appropriations or agency authorizations legislation. However, only 36 of the 316 bills introduced in the 116th Congress, and just three of the 14 provisions signed into law, focused on imposing consequences on the human actors behind cyberattacks. Cybersecurity remains a largely bipartisan issue. Over 50% of all legislation and 85% of all bills signed into law had a bipartisan co-sponsor.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

564. The Militarization of Cyberspace? Cyber-Related Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act

Author:
Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
With Congress struggling to pass stand-alone cybersecurity legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is now the primary vehicle to pass all matters of cybersecurity legislation. Because the annual defense bill typically requires provisions to have a tie to national security, other cyber issues, like those pertaining to criminal justice, tend to be excluded. As a result, the authorities and resources awarded to Department of Defense (DoD) cyber mission far outpace those provided to civilian agencies responsible for partnering with state, local, private, and international partners. With ransomware and cyber incidents at an all-time high, Congress should either include a new title in future Defense bills to bolster US cyber enforcement and civilian agencies’ capabilities or pass a cyber-omnibus bill to fix policy gaps and provide commensurate funds to federal and local agencies to combat malicious cyber activity. In this paper, we analyzed the last five NDAAs (2017-2021) to chronicle Washington’s reliance on the NDAA to shepherd through a wide swath of cybersecurity legislation. We found that: Members of Congress included 290 cyber-related provisions in the past five NDAAs, with the past two NDAAs accounting for 60% of those provisions. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA contained 380% more cyber-related provisions than the FY 2017 NDAA. The 179 cyber-provisions included in the past two NDAAs far outpace the 14 cybersecurity bills that the 116th Congress passed (two of which were those NDAAs). Across 13 categories, three of the top four were aimed at the DOD core cyber missions, such as changing organizational processes and structures, protecting DoD assets, and engaging with foreign partners while deterring nation-state adversaries. In FY 2020, the number of non-DoD-related cyber provisions began increasing, such as supply-chain security and industrial policy, critical infrastructure protection, and election security. The provisions in these NDAAs helped improve US offensive cyber capabilities, implement measures to deter cyber adversaries, and shore up our cybersecurity defenses, all of which are needed. But because cybersecurity is a multifaceted issue that expands beyond national security and touches on criminal justice, workforce development, private-sector collaboration, and privacy issues, Congress must ensure it takes a holistic approach when creating cybersecurity laws.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

565. To Patch or Not to Patch: Improving the US Vulnerabilities Equities Process

Author:
Josh Kenway and Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The process that determines when and how the US government discloses unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities to relevant companies or withholds them for government purposes lacks sufficient accountability, transparency, and public trust. Malicious actors do not hesitate to exploit “zero-day vulnerabilities,” or vulnerabilities that a company has had zero days to patch, with Chinese-based hackers most recently using a zero-day in Microsoft Exchange Servers to infect hundreds of thousands of systems.1 Yet, the government also uses zero-days to carry out activities that are in the nation’s interest and, as a result, does not tell the impacted software or hardware vendor about the vulnerability. In this case, the government determines that the benefit of not disclosing the vulnerability outweighs the consequence of a bad actor potentially exploiting the vulnerability for nefarious purposes. In 2010, the US government created the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) to convene federal agencies that represent a range of national interests—including security, intelligence, foreign policy, commerce, and civil rights and liberties protection—to weigh distinct perspectives on how vulnerabilities should be patched or briefly kept open for law enforcement, intelligence gathering, or military purposes. However, the VEP is not codified in law and has failed to deliver greater transparency around government retention of vulnerabilities nor ensures accountability for the government’s decisions. Congress and the Biden administration should address deficiencies with the VEP to increase transparency, strengthen accountability, build public and industry trust, and establish a world-leading model for decision-making around what to do about high-value vulnerabilities. This paper details seven steps for the Biden administration to enhance transparency and accountability in the VEP while preserving government priorities, as well as flexibility for the defense of democratic values and institutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Transparency
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

566. 2021 Reader’s Guide to Understanding the Proposed US Cyber Enforcement Budget

Author:
Aaron Clarke
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Cyber attacks in the United States continue to devastate and disrupt day-to-day operations in the private and public sectors. Marked by events like the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline that created gas shortages and increased prices, cybercrime impacts everyday citizens, even if they are not directly targeted by an attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that in 2020 there were “over $4 billion in cybercrime losses reported to the U.S. government.”1 This growing cybersecurity threat has only been exacerbated by the rise of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and exposed network vulnerabilities from those working from home during the pandemic.2 In response to this influx of cyber attacks, the Biden Administration has taken steps to both bolster the federal government’s ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks as well as protect its own systems.3 The Department of Energy (DOE) and DHS have both made cybersecurity a top priority in their latest initiatives. President Biden called on DOE to launch a 100 day plan aimed at preventing disrupted services for electric utilities, and DHS announced a series of 60-day “sprints” to support private and public partners against ransomware.4 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act also created the first U.S. National Cyber Director, tasked to lead the implementation of U.S. cyber policy and strategy, and rapidly improve cybersecurity defense capabilities. Although ransomware attacks have spiked, the federal government has made inroads on combatting cyber criminals. The Cyber Enforcement Budget for FY2022 should continue funding and seek to build on the key improvements and actions taken by the Biden administration. In this guide, we will look at the budget implications for cyber enforcement, recommendations for Congress, and provide a detailed breakdown of the proposed budget’s funding allocations. Specifically, we recommend that Congress should: Restore the $15 million of funding cut from the State Homeland Security Program. The program provides critical grants to states that require recipients spend at least 10% of their grants on cybersecurity needs. Require an alignment of cybercrime goals and outcomes across law enforcement agencies within the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. Ensure that federal agencies are prepared to implement President Biden’s cybersecurity executive order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Budget, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

567. Are we facing a wave of conflict in high-income countries?

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Daniel Mack, Céline Monnier, Nendirmwa Noel, Paul von Chamier, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The recent wave of violent protests and unrest across the developed world – the storming of the US Capitol during the electoral college process and the riots in the Netherlands, among others – questions the assumption that high-income countries have become immune to large-scale internal political violence. Are we facing a new wave of high-income conflict? At a minimum, increased violent unrest, political assassinations, and domestic terrorism in the next ten years seem possible, unless governments focus on avoiding impunity and establishing shared understanding of facts, reducing inequality and prejudice, and building institutional resilience. This analysis examines whether these recent events augur a wider shift in conflict risk to high-income countries, akin to the shift seen from low to middle-income countries 20 years ago. Given these events, this analysis systematically reviews conflict risks in high-income countries, as well as offers a framework that has been widely applied in the developing world to examine the risk factors for violent conflict in wealthy countries, including second generation impacts of COVID-19.
Topic:
Conflict, Protests, COVID-19, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

568. How can we work towards economic recovery for all? Financing for Development: the issues, challenges, and opportunities in 2021

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Karina Gerlach, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
2021, we all hope, will be the year of recovery. If COVID-19 vaccines are rolled out at scale, including in the developing world, global economic recovery will be large. But that in itself ensures neither that all countries will be included in the recovery, nor that all people within each country will see the gains. A rising tide, as we have seen only too well since US president John F. Kennedy first used the phrase in 1963, does not lift all boats. Elsewhere, CIC has analyzed the high demand for transformative policies in high- and low-income countries alike since the COVID-19 crisis began, including policies for domestic action on inequality and socioeconomic exclusion. This piece takes a more global view and considers how to ensure that all countries benefit, and examines the issues, challenges, and opportunities in financing for development. It looks first at the key political messages that explain why 2021 should be a year of urgent, ambitious global action for shared economic recovery; secondly at the measures under discussion (which are expanded in an annex); thirdly at the political interests at play; and fourthly at foreseeable scenarios for agreement. Last, we outline the calendar of relevant policy meetings this year and the challenge of orchestrating progress between them.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Finance, Multilateralism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

569. Restoring Civic Trust in the Post-Pandemic Era: What makes citizens trust governments?

Author:
Sarah Cliffe and Paul von Chamier
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
We are still engaged in a race against time of increasing urgency, not only in terms of flattening the pandemic curve in situations such as those India and many Latin American countries face, but also in restoring trust that government and international institutions can act, and act successfully, in face of 21st century crises. We are seeing both deeply negative and truly positive developments. Many parts of the world enter the depths of the third wave of the pandemic, with record highs in new daily infections, and in human suffering behind the numbers. Yet at the same time there is positive news: on medical innovation, on international liquidity, on tax cooperation, and on climate. The question is which will win out: can positive progress move fast enough to counteract the trust crisis? In 2020, CIC published a number of pieces on trust in high-, middle- and low-income countries and in international organizations. Last summer, trust in government had in many parts of the world increased: we made the argument that people were faced with a brutal reminder of what governments are for and hence had turned back to the state, but also warned that trust bubbles in crises often evaporate within a year if people do not see sustained and credible action. This analysis from the CIC team looks at what empirical research says about why trust matters for many different forms of political, social, and economic development—and why we should take declining trust seriously. The team also takes a look at what we know about the determinants of trust, in particular corruption, inequality, and history. Lastly, this analysis discusses the different policy options to restore and nurture trust.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Multilateralism, Economic Development, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

570. It’s Time to Go Back to Basics of Governance

Author:
Nanjala Nyabola
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity to re-evaluate the principles or ideas that are at the heart of theories of government, that is the fundamentals of governance and public theory. What is government for, but also what should government do and how. Engaging with the crucial philosophical questions of governance is integral to building back better: going back to basics is a major step in figuring out how to prevent mistakes from happening again. The social contract is one such principle: the idea of a social contract is central to answering the question of what governments are for: explaining why people obey laws, providing answers to why we live in societies, and why we abide by social rules and norms. Recognizing the ongoing debates, national and international, around the meaning and origins of the term social contract, this paper by Nanjala Nyabola tries to point to some of the important thinking from the south and from non-western sources and traditions that have helped shape modern understanding of social contract theory. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review, in such a short paper, but rather a selection that reflects the richness and variety of such sources and how they have impacted thinking throughout the ages. Overall, looking at ideas of social contracts outside Western philosophical tradition reminds us that it is not just about the form of the social contract or that all political organizations must be identical. These theories also remind us that compulsion and punishment are not a strong foundation for strong systems of governance. We have to create societies that people want to live in.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Fragile States, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Global Focus