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Begin New Search Topic Sanctions Political Geography United States of America Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

2. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. Hurricane Ian Highlights the Devastating Effects of the U.S. Blockade on Cuba

Author:
Mikael Wolfe
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
As Cuba reels from the ongoing effects of Hurricane Ian, a Havana-based Cuban scholar explains how the U.S. blockade has hampered Cuba’s recovery from Hurricane Ian and fuels ongoing mass emigration.
Topic:
Migration, Natural Disasters, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Hurricane, and Blockade
Political Geography:
Cuba, Latin America, Caribbean, and United States of America

4. CONTAINMENT 2.0: SANCTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL

Author:
David A. Lake
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The West is not imposing coercive sanctions on Russia to stop its current aggression. No one seriously expects that the sanctions will cause President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. NATO made clear before the war that its members will not defend Ukraine with military force. The European members have also, as expected, carved out exceptions to the sanctions regime for oil and gas so as not to impose too much pain on their own economies. Putin anticipated the general scope of the sanctions likely to be imposed on Russia and decided it was worth invading Ukraine anyways. While he may have been surprised by the extent of the sanctions and unity of NATO so far, this is not enough to alter his calculus. Indeed, he is doubling down on the original plan. He also knows that he has other weapons and forms of coercion against the West up his sleeve. Rather, we are seeing the birth of a possible Containment 2.0, a forced decoupling of Russia from the Western international economy. This is a long-term, not a short-term, strategy. The point is to undermine the Russian economy, stifle its technological progress, deny Russians a standard of living comparable to that of the West, and break support for the regime over time. In doing so, the West undermines Russia’s ability to compete militarily, aiming to forestall further Ukraines, and weakens Putin’s hand at home and abroad.
Topic:
NATO, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Containment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

5. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:
Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. Unpacking US Cyber Sanctions

Author:
Allison Peters and Pierce MacConaghy
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity poses one of the greatest threats to America’s national, economic, and personal security. Yet, the perpetrators of these crimes largely operate with pure impunity and face little consequences for their actions. This is particularly the case for cybercriminals who cost the US economy anywhere from $57 billion to $109 billion in 2016 alone.1 Since 2015, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions (e.g., asset freezes, travel bans) on over 300 individuals and entities in response to malicious cyber activity.2 Many of these sanctions were issued under the cyber-related sanctions program administered by the Department of Treasury and established by a series of Executive Orders under Presidents Obama and Trump and bills passed by Congress.3 Sanctions have largely been imposed on individuals with ties to Iran, Russia, and North Korea, and, in about half of these cases, sanctions have followed indictments. An overwhelming majority of these sanctions have targeted individuals with suspected links to government entities and, only recently, have cyber sanctions targeted cybercriminals.4 As targeted sanctions increasingly become a tool deployed by the US government to punish malicious cyber actors, it remains unclear whether they are having an impact in changing behavior. Research on the impact of sanctions more broadly indicates that sanctions can be an effective tool to impose consequences on bad actors and change their actions when employed multilaterally, as part of a coherent strategy, and effectively messaged.5 However, imposing sanctions on malicious cyber actors without continuously reassessing their impact and the expected reciprocal actions by the target(s), risks a number of potentially negative outcomes. While Congress introduced legislation in the 116th Congress to impose new or codify existing cyber-related sanctions into law,6 it has not exercised the necessary oversight over the Executive Branch’s strategy in issuing cyber-related sanctions and determining their efficacy. With other countries now following America’s lead in issuing these sanctions, the time is ripe for the new Congress to push for an inter-agency, holistic assessment of the impact of US cyber-related sanctions.7 And with cybercrime increasingly threatening all sectors of the US economy, Congress must call for an evaluation as to whether sanctions on non-state cybercriminals should increasingly be used.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cyberspace, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America