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1. Big Changes in United Arab Emirates Foreign Policy

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After a decade of activist policies in the region following the Arab Uprisings, Emirati foreign policy has undergone massive shifts in the past two years. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has de-escalated and normalized relations with four of the major, and competing, states in the region—Iran, Israel, Turkey and Qatar—as well as with Syria. The UAE is taking a more non-aligned and mediating position in regional and wider issues. The Emirati leadership has made significant progress in using their energy-derived wealth to diversify their economy and ensure retaining a leading position in the world economy in the post-fossil fuels era. Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy is driven, in part, by a perceived need to adapt to a multipolar, “post-American” reality in the region. The country has been irritated, but largely unmoved, by America’s attempts to enlist or coerce them into supporting its policies with respect to Russia and China. The UAE has gained from the crisis between Russia and the West. Oil prices have risen, Russian capital has flown into Emirati financial institutions and investments, and the country has seen a flood of hundreds of thousands of Russian visitors and new residents, leading to a real estate boom.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Leadership, Arab Spring, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
United Arab Emirates and Gulf Nations

2. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

3. Saudi-Houthi Talks Move Toward Ceasefire – The Yemen Review, March 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks regained traction over the course of March, and the announcement of a ceasefire is expected as Riyadh looks to wind down its direct military involvement in Yemen. At month’s end, Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi and his government were summoned to the Saudi capital to be briefed on the negotiations. Despite the flurry of activity, there has been little information given on how the Saudis intend to resolve some of the longstanding issues that have bedeviled earlier rounds of talks. The negotiations have not forestalled continued fighting, with clashes escalating clashes across multiple frontlines. The Houthis made gains in southern Marib and along the Al-Bayda-Shabwa border, and heavy fighting took place in Al-Dhalea and southern Hudaydah. Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, Minister of Defense Mohsen al-Daeri, and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz survived separate assassination attempts in Taiz governorate believed to have been undertaken by Houthi forces. The Houthi-controlled parliament in Sana’a has banned the payment of interest as a “usurious transaction,” in an attempt to Islamicize the financial sector. Implementation could have disastrous effects on Yemen’s faltering economy, contributing to its isolation and discouraging international investment. The law could rapidly limit the ability to finance basic imports and cut off access to foreign financing.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

4. Saudis Visit Sana’a as Warring Parties Conduct Prisoner Exchange

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks in Sana’a during Ramadan failed to produce a final agreement on a roadmap for final status peace talks and a permanent ceasefire. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) leaders in Riyadh were left out of the loop although the Saudis continued to insist that the Houthis co-sign any deal with the internationally recognized government. A major prisoner exchange took place in mid-April following a deal reached in March in which the government and Houthis agreed to the release of 973 detainees. Included among the prisoners released were former defense minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and Samira Marish, a woman accused of planning several bombings and assassinations on behalf of the Houthi movement. A senior government military commander, Faisal Rajab, was released in a separate deal following a mediation in Sana’a between an Abyan tribal delegation and Houthi officials. Fighting continued on several frontlines, most significantly in Marib governorate, where Houthi forces are trying to capitalize on their gains in March. On the economic front, the government-held port of Aden received a commercial ship without it being subject to inspection in Jeddah, and more than 500 types of goods were removed from a list of banned products, including fertilizers and batteries. The government is still struggling to cover the cost of public sector salaries after losing oil revenues following Houthi drone attacks late last year and Houthi pressure on importers to redirect shipments from Aden to Hudaydah, while the Houthi authorities drew in revenue from various informal taxes and duties imposed during Ramadan.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

5. A Southern Reshuffle – The Yemen Review, May 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Political news in May was dominated by the reorganization and resurgence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Seemingly sidelined by the Saudi-Houthi talks and the Kingdom’s support of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, the Emirati-backed group extended its influence through the recruitment of powerful politicians, an internal reorganization, and a conference resulting in a new ‘Southern National Charter.’ Saudi-Houthi negotiations appear to have stalled over disagreement on a number of long-standing issues, but the recent involvement of China could bring additional resources and leverage to the table. The STC’s revived fortunes have led to renewed political and military mobilization in Hadramawt. The Nation’s Shield forces, paid for and supplied by Saudi Arabia, but under the nominal control of President Al-Alimi, increased their presence in the governorate, and were visited by the Saudi coalition commander before assuming control of an important border crossing. For their part, STC-affiliated forces took up positions on the strategic Ataq-Al-Abr road linking Hadramawt and Shabwa, including a key stretch used by Islah-affiliated forces. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also stepped up its activity, conducting at least two drone strikes in Shabwa as it publicly condemned the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis launched their latest offensive in the economic war, banning the sale of domestically produced cooking gas in favor of imports. Imported gas is more expensive, but the brunt of the impact will be felt by the internationally recognized government and its production facilities in Marib. Having shut down the government’s oil exports and rerouted trade to deprive it of customs fees, the sanction will further cripple the government’s finances. It is already having trouble purchasing sufficient fuel to keep the lights on – May saw an extension of rolling blackouts in Aden as a Saudi grant has expired without extension. Summer sees the highest demand for electricity, but a number of generators in the interim capital have already shut down due to the shortage.
Topic:
Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

6. Temperatures, Tensions Roil Government – The Yemen Review, June & July 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Summer has been dominated by rising tensions among the Saudi-led coalition, as competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continues to undermine the internationally recognized government. The current phase of the rivalry is centered on Hadramawt, the vast eastern governorate bordering Saudi Arabia that has seen repeated bouts of political and military agitation. Saudi talks with the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) are currently on hold, hung up on now-familiar disagreements over the kingdom’s belligerent status and payment of public sector salaries. Perhaps stung by its lack of progress in the negotiations, Saudi Arabia announced new support for the government, totaling some US$1.2 billion. The funding rescued a government in financial crisis: battered by an effective Houthi blockade of oil and gas exports, it could not even afford to keep the lights on. Lengthening blackouts during the hottest months of the year and the cratering value of the Yemeni rial led to protests and political recriminations as the situation grew more desperate. But the faltering peace talks may also augur new rounds of violence. Houthi forces have deployed in increasing numbers outside Marib, and may yet renew their aspirations to capture the city and nearby oilfields. Foreign observers and senior Houthi military commanders have been on hand at maneuvers in the governorate. Tensions are also building on the Red Sea Coast, where the Houthis are mobilizing naval forces on islands near international shipping lanes. Pro-government forces have also moved to the sea, competing to occupy bases near the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

7. Saudi-Houthi Talks Resume – The Yemen Review, August 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The strategic city of Marib saw an increase in fighting on several fronts. The Houthis have been reinforcing their positions in the area, which they attempted to seize in a massive and costly offensive two years ago. Should negotiations break down, Marib is seen as a likely area of renewed contestation due to its oil and gas resources. A new counterterrorist campaign was launched in Abyan to target Al-Qaeda forces in the governorate. Named ‘Swords of Haws’, the operation is being conducted by an array of STC and pro-government forces. The campaign reported it had succeeded in securing the Rafd and Jenin Valleys, but had faced strong resistance from Al-Qaeda forces in Mudiya district. Frontline fighting on the border of Al-Bayda and Lahj rose significantly in August, including a particularly large Houthi assault on STC positions on August 26-27 that resulted in dozens of casualties. Two Doctors Without Borders employees were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Marib as they traveled from Seyoun. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the incident. An officer investigating last month’s killing of World Food Programme Moayad Hameidi was assassinated. The officer, a member of the Taiz Political Security department, had received death threats and demanded he halt the investigation. Five UN employees were released on August 11, after being held captive by Al-Qaeda for more than 18 months. The group was reportedly released after lengthy Omani mediation and the payment of a ransom, though the UN has disputed these claims. Houthi forces continue to besiege villages of the Bani Nawf tribe in Al-Jawf following the killing of a prominent local Houthi commander. A number of tribes have responded by calling for united action, others have sided with the Houthis.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

8. New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
AWashington Institute poll conducted from November 14 to December 6, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens measured how Saudi attitudes have shifted due to the Israel-Hamas war. According to responses, the Saudi popular attitude towards the outcome of the war is clear: the overwhelming majority (91%) express agreement with the statement that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” And as for the role of the broader Arab world, almost all (96%) agree with the proposal that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Polling during a war is likely to produce more volatile results as circumstances shift quickly on the ground—during the current polling period, for instance, the Israel-Hamas war had several major shifts, including a temporary ceasefire from November 24-30 and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s incursions into southern Gaza. However, comparisons with Saudi polling fielded in August can help provide a barometer as to just how sharply this conflict has, at least temporarily, shifted certain attitudes, and how little it has moved others. While Hamas as a movement remains unpopular among the majority of Saudis—in contrast to a new trend of widespread popular support in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—just 16% of Saudis say that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution to the conflict based on the 1967 borders.” Nor do most believe that Hamas’s attack on October 7 targeted Israeli civilians—the overwhelming majority of Saudis (95%) responded that Hamas did not actually kill civilians when asked about whether they believed the Hamas killing of civilians was against Islam. This view is widespread across the eight countries polled by TWI, and similar results appear in a recently released poll of Palestinians from PSR. There, the overwhelming majority reported that they had not seen any videos of Hamas members committing atrocities, and only 10% of Palestinians (17% of Gazans and 5% of West Bankers) stated that they believed that Hamas committed war crimes in the current war, in comparison to 95% who say the same about Israel. While the majority of Saudis continue to express a negative opinion of Hamas, the Israel-Hamas war has generated a significant boost in its popularity. There has been a thirty point shift in positive attitudes towards Hamas, from just 10% in August to 40% in November/December. Responses in the most recent poll, alongside those in 2014 and 2021, demonstrate the increased popularity Hamas achieves among some Saudis during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with its likely disappearance over time. In the aftermath of the 2021 Hamas-Israel conflict, for instance, five years of steadily decreasing popularity in Saudi Arabia suddenly reversed, though just to a quarter (23%) of the total population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Hamas, and Polls
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Gulf Nations

9. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

10. The UN-Mediated Truce in Yemen: Impacts of the First Two Months

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Key Trends: Both Saudi-led coalition airstrikes from fighter jets in Yemen and Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia stopped entirely. In the year leading up to the truce, ACLED records an average of more than 40 coalition airstrike events per week in Yemen,3 and an average of four Houthi drone and missile attacks per week in Saudi Arabia.4 Shelling across the main frontlines increased significantly, becoming the main form of political violence in Yemen. During the first two months of the truce, shelling, artillery, and missile attack events accounted for 55% of all political violence events, compared to 19% in the two months preceding the truce. While armed clashes between conflict parties remained at relatively high levels in April and May 2022, their lethality decreased considerably. The lethality of armed clashes was five times lower during the first two months of the truce than during the two months prior. April and May 2022 saw the lowest levels of reported fatalities since January 2015, but civilians suffered disproportionately from political violence. Although reported fatalities from civilian targeting decreased by more than 50% from March to April, their share of the total reported fatalities increased by more than 50%.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

11. The UAE Under Attack: A Foreign Policy Test

Author:
Moran Zaga
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
January 2022 was an exceptional month in Abu Dhabi’s history. For the first time, this peaceful city suffered casualties as a result of a direct airstrike on two strategic sites – a petroleum storage site and Abu Dhabi International Airport.[1] The January 17 attacks, associated with the Houthis in Yemen, were followed by several failed attempts to attack the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) capital again. After the initial shock, the UAE launched an international campaign, calling for a multinational response.[2] And indeed, a chain of Arab leaders arrived in Abu Dhabi through the same airport that was attacked just a few days earlier.[3] The goal of their visit was clear – to express their full support and affirm their countries' solidarity with the UAE, its leaders, and its people. For the UAE, these high-level visitors reinforced the Emirati message that it was not alone on this front. The expressions of solidarity with the Emiratis transcended the region - leaders from around the world reached out to the Emirati leaders with messages of support and through other diplomatic channels.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

12. Hizballah, Lebanon, and Reconciliation with the Gulf: The Impasse

Author:
Carl Yonker
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
On February 14, in Beirut’s southern, Hizballah-dominated suburb of Ghobeiry, Bahraini opposition groups marked the anniversary of the 2011 failed popular uprising in Bahrain. The gathering, organized by the Bahraini opposition group al-Wifaq, took place despite the Lebanese interior ministry’s orders to cancel it, which were issued in order to avoid offending Bahrain and its Gulf allies.[1] Lebanese ties with a quartet of Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – have been at an impasse since October 2021. The diplomatic crisis, which has yet to be resolved, was sparked by Lebanese Information Minister George Kurdahi's critical comments regarding Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen. At its core, however, the crisis in Lebanese-Gulf relations is a dispute over Hizballah and its growing political influence in Lebanon – a source of tension for several years.
Topic:
International Relations, Non State Actors, Hezbollah, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

13. A Tale of Two Normalizations: Israeli Normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Part I

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
The “Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel” was signed on September 15, 2020. On the same day, Bahrain and Israel signed their “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations.” Since then, bilateral relations between the two states and Israel have progressed speedily, with many more issue-specific agreements signed and economic relations with the Emirates burgeoning. The Negev Conference on March 28, 2022, which was attended by the U.A.E., Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as the United States, symbolized a maturing and coalescence of the regional normalization processes between Israel and conservative Arab states. This paper will address recent developments in the foreign policy of U.A.E. that impact the current status of relations with Israel, as well as recent developments in relations between the two states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, United States of America, Gulf Nations, and UAE

14. A Tale of Two Normalizations: Israeli Normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain – Part II

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Bahrain and Israel signed their “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations” on September 15, 2020; the “Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel” was signed on the same day. Since then, bilateral relations between the two states and Israel have rapidly progressed, with many more issue-specific agreements signed. The Negev Summit on March 28, 2022, which was attended by Bahrain, U.A.E., Egypt, and Morocco, as well as the United States, symbolized a maturing and coalescence of the regional normalization processes between Israel and conservative Arab states. A follow-up to the Negev Summit took place in Manama on June 27, 2022 and the steering committee, which was chaired by Bahraini Undersecretary for Political Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, formed working groups on security, health, education, tourism, food and water security, and energy.[1] A previous paper addressed recent developments in the foreign policy of U.A.E. which impact on the current status of relations with Israel, as well as recent developments in the two states’ bilateral relations. This paper will look at the context and content of relations between Israel and Bahrain, and analyze the overall state of normalization in the region at this stage.[2]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

15. Saudi Arabia’s New Nationalism: Embracing Jahiliyyah

Author:
Ilan Zalayat
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
For more than two-thousand years, the walled city of al-ʿUla has been laying peacefully in a northwestern oasis of the Arabian Peninsula. While in ancient times it was an important oasis on the Spice Route, in the modern era, only the approximately five-thousand inhabitants of this far-flung town on the Saudi periphery know it to be the home of well-preserved stone monuments made by Nabataean sculptors. Its relative anonymity stands in stark contrast to its world-renowned twin city in Petra of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. However, ever since the de-facto Saudi ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman (“MbS”), became Crown Prince in June 2017, Saudi Arabia has gone to great lengths to publicize forgotten al-ʿUla: The government has invested $15 billion on advertising and developing the site, attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors.[1] The government also used the site to host the Saudi reconciliation with Qatar in 2021. Al-ʿUla was also the setting for the first-ever movie that was shot and produced in Saudi Arabia.[2] The counterintuitive choice to feature pagan monuments as the new symbol of Saudi Arabia,[3] a country that has long touted itself as the custodian of Islam, epitomizes the kingdom's effort to reimagine its pre-Islamic history in a nationalist frame.
Topic:
Islam, Nationalism, History, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia and Gulf Nations

16. Powerful tool or passing trend? Meanings and practices of social accountability in the Arab world, and why they matter

Author:
Sylvia I. Bergh, Francesco Colin, Hicham Jadaoun, Intissar Kherigi, and Ward Vloeberghs
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Accountable governance has become a frequent demand by ordinary citizens across Arab societies. The region has witnessed a variety of bottom-up citizen-led initiatives in recent years, driven by widespread discontent at the uneven distribution of civil, political and social rights. Various countries have seen the emergence of “participatory” processes such as participatory budgeting, consultative committees, and social audits. These initiatives are often labeled as “social accountability initiatives”, a concept championed by civil society actors and donors alike, to empower citizens and bring about improved public services. What we mean by social accountability here is “any citizen-led action beyond elections that aims to enhance the accountability of state actors”. The concept was promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank, as a “short route to accountability” to strengthen the role of citizens as “service users” and generate greater government responsiveness. But beyond donor strategies, what does social accountability actually mean to local actors in the region? Is it an effective means to bring about improved governance? We studied such initiatives in Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco to examine how social accountability initiatives are being used by civil society actors in their strategies to make government more accountable to citizens. We found that the concept has many different meanings for people on the ground, and that civil society organizations in the region have developed a range of strategies for pressuring, coercing and cooperating with government to exact accountability. However, our study[1] also shows that doubts remain as to whether such initiatives can lead to systemic change in the region. [1] The study was based on a recent research project funded by the International Institute of Social Study (ISS) at Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), the Centre of Expertise on Global Governance at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, and Erasmus University College Rotterdam (EUC). It was presented at a recent seminar discussion. We are grateful to Louise Haagh, Elodie Hermsen, and Mark Prins for taking useful notes at this seminar.
Topic:
Civil Society, Accountability, Social Order, and Social Change
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Gulf Nations, and MENA

17. The Graveyard of Hubris – Yemen Annual Review 2021

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Through most of 2021, the armed Houthi movement appeared unstoppable. As their forces pushed relentlessly toward Marib city, the fall of the last government stronghold in the north began to seem inevitable. Rich in oil and gas, its loss would be a mortal blow to the spiraling economy and political legitimacy of the internationally recognized government. Along frontlines across the country, Houthi forces either held their ground or advanced, showing a cohesiveness, discipline and effectiveness unmatched by the motley array of armed groups opposing them. Houthi drones and ballistic missiles flew across the border into Saudi Arabia, and continued even in the face of retaliatory airstrikes, heightening the cost of conflict for the coalition. Houthi military efforts were buttressed by developments behind the frontlines and beyond Yemen’s borders. A significant threat to the movement emerged and vanished without the Houthis even having to respond. The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021 as a swan song of the Trump administration in Washington, but the decision was rescinded less than a month later by newly inaugurated US President Joe Biden after the United Nations and aid organizations testified it would paralyze humanitarian operations. For Houthi leaders, it was an affirmation of their strategy of holding the wellbeing of the civilian population hostage, giving the international community the poisoned choice of abandoning people in need or propping up the Houthi state. The group has been able to marshal humanitarian assistance to underwrite economic activity in the areas it controls, helping to legitimate its rule and freeing up resources for its war effort. Houthi security forces have successfully suppressed dissent, and an ever-growing number of children and adults are indoctrinated into the group through the rewriting of school curricula and religious teachings at mosques. The economy remained relatively stable in Houthi-held areas, even as searing inflation took hold elsewhere in the country. Its apparent success has furthered the group’s zealotry and sense of impunity, both on display in September with the public executions of eight men and a minor in Sana’a. In sum, the Houthis’ theocratic state-building project continued to gain steam through 2021. The Graveyard of Hubris – Yemen Annual Review 2021 - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/16768
Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

18. When Giants Strike – The Yemen Review, January & February 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Houthi threat to Marib that dominated 2021 set in motion a shift in strategy by Saudi Arabia that restored the vanguard role to the United Arab Emirates and its allied Yemeni forces. The turning point came in January when the UAE-backed Giants Brigades pushed Houthi forces out of Shabwa and entered southern Marib, forcing the Houthis to divert resources away from their campaign against Marib city. The Emiratis’ renewed influence prompted Houthi drone and missile strikes on Abu Dhabi, resulting in an intense and sustained round of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes on Sana’a and other parts of Houthi-controlled northern Yemen. While the risk of Marib and Shabwa falling to the Houthis has eased, the shifts within the anti-Houthi alliance and on the battlefield have set in motion a new phase of the war. The uncertainty this has created has been further compounded by fuel shortages, rising food prices and the prospect that Russia’s war on Ukraine will cut into humanitarian assistance to Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

19. Ramadan Truce Faces Uphill Struggle – The Yemen Review, March 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
March saw an escalation in cross-border attacks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, with Houthi missiles and drones targeting Saudi oil and gas infrastructure, and the kingdom responding with airstrikes on Houthi-held areas in northern Yemen. However, the month ended on a hopeful note, with the warring parties declaring that they were entering, for the first time in more than seven years of war, a nationwide cease-fire. The truce, which commenced on April 2, the first day Ramadan, is set to last two months and includes a halt to military operations and cross-border attacks, in addition to the easing of coalition restrictions that would reopen Sana’a airport to commercial flights and allow fuel tankers to resume deliveries to the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah. Despite multiple early accusations of violations, there is hope that the cease-fire will provide Yemenis a reprieve from both the fighting and the three-month long fuel crisis that has gripped the country. The cease-fire also provides breathing space for peace consultations among anti-Houthi parties, brought together in Riyadh in late March and early April under the auspices of the six-state Gulf Cooperation Council.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

20. Changing of the Guard– The Yemen Review, April 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The surprise resignation of long-serving President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the appointment of a new Presidential Leadership Council heralded a busy month of political and economic developments in Yemen, as a UN-brokered Ramadan truce largely held across the country. Hadi ceded his powers to a council of prominent military figures led by former Interior Minister Rashad al-Alimi at talks in Riyadh, in a move nominally brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The handover was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with little to no consultation of Yemeni political figures. In the interim capital Aden, the council was sworn in before a rare meeting of Parliament while support was rapidly voiced by the UN Security Council and the United States. The Houthis have characterized the new council as illegitimate and contrived by foreigners; they had made similar criticisms of Hadi’s administration. The Saudis and UAE committed US$3 billion in new funding for the government, earmarked for development and assistance to the Central Bank in Aden; the news has already increased the value of the Yemeni riyal in government-held areas. Though sporadic violence has continued, the military truce brokered by UN Special Envoy Hans Grunberg remained intact through the month of April. The resumption of flights from Sana’a International Airport, another component of the agreement, remained stalled, but the resumption of oil and gas imports via Hudaydah port has helped mitigate nationwide fuel shortages. There are fears that the Houthis may use the lull in violence to reinforce and re-maneuver their forces ahead of another assault on the oil-rich stronghold of Marib. And while the ascendance of the Presidential Leadership Council has been greeted with skeptical approval as an improvement over the Hadi presidency, there are concerns about the council’s ability to work together to meet the enormity of Yemen’s crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

21. Despite Headwinds, Truce Flies On – The Yemen Review, May 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Despite reports of violations from both the Yemeni government and Houthi forces, May saw the truce hold for a second month, leading to an agreement brokered by the UN special envoy’s office to extend it for another two months from June 2. In addition to the continued absence of air strikes around the country, commercial flights finally resumed between Amman and Sana’a on May 16 and between Cairo and Sana’a on June 1, after delays caused by a dispute over Houthi-issued passports. The main areas of ongoing tension are Marib and Taiz. UN-backed talks between the warring parties in Amman failed to reach agreement on reopening roads to the besieged city of Taiz, whose government-held areas continued to come under occasional Houthi attack. Marib governorate, whose capital is the last northern city still under full government control, saw occasional clashes. Political tension in the south threatened to undermine the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)’s message of unity. Forces loyal to PLC members Aiderous al-Zubaidi of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Tareq Saleh, head of the National Resistance Forces, faced off over an attempt by Saleh’s supporters to raise the national flag over Maashiq Palace on the anniversary of the 1990 unification of Yemen. On the economic front, renewed warnings that Yemen’s food insecurity crisis could see pockets of famine emerging in the coming months, in part because of plummeting wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.
Topic:
Food Security, Crisis Management, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

22. Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A truce between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement was extended on June 2 and has largely held, despite intermittent violence and unresolved issues from the original agreement. While the truce has succeeded in limiting violence and facilitated the reopening of Sana’a airport, negotiations over the besieged city of Taiz have devolved into recriminations, fueling concerns that the armed Houthi movement will renege on its commitment to reopen access to the city. UN-facilitated negotiations on lifting the blockade of major roads into the city continued into July. Yemen’s economic performance over the month of June was characterized by familiar patterns of fuel shortages and renewed depreciation of the rial in government-held territory. The slide was halted by news of a further US$400 million in pledged Saudi financial support, announced as Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alami visited Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced billions of dollars in economic support since the PLC took over executive responsibilities in early April, though it is unclear how much has been delivered as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are demanding institutional and governance reforms before allowing the Yemeni government to access most of these funds. Renewed fuel shortages in the south precipitated familiar scenes of long lines at petrol stations. Anger over price hikes and power outages during the height of summer, combined with a perceived failure of the government to implement timely economic reforms, sparked demonstrations in Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. The demonstrations overshadowed Al-Alami’s otherwise fruitful tour of regional capitals, where he secured promises of various forms of support from Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.
Topic:
Economy, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

23. Government Instability Overshadows Truce – The Yemen Review, July 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and the Southern Transitional Council boiled over in Shabwa in July, as political disputes over security posts devolved into clashes between their affiliated forces. Government efforts to assuage the parties were unsuccessful, setting the stage for a battle over the capital, Ataq city, in early August. The Shabwa tensions overshadowed agreement on a two-month extension of the UN-brokered truce between the government and the armed Houthi movement, though sporadic violations continued. A proposed six-month extension fell apart over disagreements on road reopenings, air travel and payment of public sector salaries. The Presidential Leadership Council announced a cabinet reshuffle at the end of the month, replacing the heads of four ministries. The new appointees were all southerners, approved by the STC, in a nod to the substantial power wielded by the movement. The government also appointed new governors of Hadramawt and Socotra; the latter is the STC’s top man on the island. Meanwhile, Houthi authorities continued to profit handsomely from the exorbitant cost of fuel in areas they control while also attempting to convince consumers that the Saudi-led coalition is to blame for sky-high prices at the pump.
Topic:
Leadership, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

24. Showdown in Shabwa Shakes Government – The Yemen Review, August 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and UAE-backed groups in Shabwa erupted into open conflict in August, with the Giants Brigades and STC-aligned Shabwa Defense forces driving Islah-aligned military and security forces from the governorate. The expulsion of Islah from Shabwa and the STC’s subsequent takeover of much of neighboring Abyan governorate raised questions about the ability of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to resolve tensions between anti-Houthi parties and the nature of any future peace deal. Despite being extended on August 2, the UN-brokered truce between the government and the Houthi movement saw its first major violation later in the month when Houthi forces attempted to take control of the last major government-controlled road out of Taiz city, prompting widespread international condemnation and the government’s withdrawal from UN-facilitated talks in Amman. Although the pledged Saudi-Emirati financial aid to the government remains stalled, the exchange rate in government-held territory has remained relatively stable, with the rial even appreciating somewhat following PLC head Rashad al-Alimi’s visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in the middle of the month. Despite this, and news of the resumption of grain shipments from Ukraine under a UN-backed deal, issues remain around food price affordability and fuel availability.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

25. Truce Expires as Internal Divisions Deepen – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The truce between the internationally recognized government and the armed Houthi movement, in place since April, was allowed to expire without renewal on October 2. The UN-facilitated agreement engineered the longest period of relative peace of the war. September saw intensive negotiations to extend and expand the truce, and optimism was high throughout the month, but talks broke down when the Houthis made an eleventh-hour demand for the payment of additional military salaries. Efforts to revive the agreement continue, and talks continue over public sector salaries, the reopening of roads, and flights out of Sana’a airport. There was no major resumption of hostilities after the truce expired, though low-level clashes remain frequent. The Southern Transitional Council continues to expand its control in the south. Following last month’s battle for Shabwa, the group has begun a nominally counter-terrorist campaign against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Abyan, and has engineered demonstrations and protests again the presence of Islah-affiliated forces in Hadramawt. Yemen’s dual currencies remained stable over the course of the month. The government continued its efforts to secure a long-promised funding package from UAE and Saudi Arabia, though the latter has now renewed an agreement to provide fuel for Yemen’s power plants. A fuel crisis in Houthi territory brought recriminations from both sides but was averted with the import of additional supplies. Seasonal rains in Yemen continue to cause massive flooding, which claimed a number of lives this month. The UN announced that it has secured enough pledged funds to begin the salvage of the FSO Safer, a deteriorating oil storage vessel posing a massive environmental risk in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Currency, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Weather
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

26. Houthis Target Southern Ports – The Yemen Review, October 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The UN-backed truce between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government was allowed to expire on October 2. Efforts to secure its further extension failed following a last-minute demand by Houthi negotiators to add military and security personnel to a payroll of public sector employees. The breakdown of the talks was followed by mutual recriminations, even as Saudi Arabia and the Houthis exchanged delegations on October 14, ostensibly to visit prisoners of war and discuss an exchange. Later in the month, the Houthis targeted two oil ports on Yemen’s southern coast with drones, striking the port of Nushayma in Shabwa on October 18-19 and the port of Al-Dabba in Hadramawt on October 21. The drone attacks followed warnings by senior Houthi official Mahdi al-Mashat that foreign energy companies were “looting Yemen’s sovereign wealth” and should cease operations. Though the facilities were undamaged, the attacks have disrupted exports as foreign ships stay away from Yemen’s coast. On October 31, Canadian oil producer Calvalley Petroleum Ltd. announced a suspension of oil production at Block 9 in Hadramawt due to the “current extremely challenging situation” and a lack of oil storage capacity. In response to the Houthi drone attacks, the government’s National Defense Council officially designated the Houthi movement a terrorist organization on October 23. It is unclear what ramifications the designation will have, as the government currently lacks a mechanism with which to enforce compliance. Saudi Arabia has privately urged caution to prevent derailing ongoing peace talks.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Drones, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Port
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

27. Govt Agrees Financial Aid as Houthis Target Oil Sector – The Yemen Review, November 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Hopes faded that the expired truce would be revived in November, as Houthi authorities dug in their heels over maximalist demands that caused the talks’ collapse and then upped the ante with a series of drone and missile attacks on southern ports. The attacks crippled oil and gas revenues, though International Monetary Fund, Saudi, and Emirati support has given the government the lifeline it needs for now. Following the international financial agreements, the government-run Central Bank of Yemen in Aden moved to increase its oversight of banking data. Though there has been no return to full-scale war, intense if low-level clashes were seen in Taiz, Lahj, and Hudaydah. Reports persisted of back-channel Houthi-Saudi talks, but they appear to have stalled for now over Houthi demands for salary payments. The talks could become problematic for the government if they go beyond the question of the truce and extend to a unilateral settlement, which would be contrary to its interests. Divisions continued to wrack the Presidential Leadership Council, whose head Rashad al-Alimi was the sole member to spend significant time in Aden when he returned in early December after a regional tour that included Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. The STC-Islah dispute, which has been at the heart of PLC wrangling, eased up slightly under UAE and Saudi pressure as their priority shifts to preventing a fiscal collapse after the Houthi strikes on oil facilities. This led to Alimi removing a key Islah military official in Hadramawt governorate, where STC-led protests were threatening to descend into violent clashes. The PLC’s Tareq Saleh strengthened his position as the scion of the Saleh family, leading government-backed celebrations to mark the death of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017. The opening of Al-Mokha airport raises the importance of his UAE-backed National Resistance forces, which guard a critical section of the Red Sea coast.
Topic:
Oil, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Financial Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

28. The Hazm Brigades

Author:
Raed Khelifi
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

29. The Myth of Stability: Infighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories

Author:
Andrea Carboni
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Six years after the coup that ousted President Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi and his government, the Houthi movement, otherwise known as Ansarallah, has strengthened its grip on northern Yemen. It currently rules over approximately 70% of the country’s population, and in 2020 mounted new military offensives in Al Jawf, Marib and Hodeidah. Domestically, the group has suppressed dissent and won complete control of what is left of the Yemeni state, appointing loyalists in civilian and military bodies and transferring powers from government institutions to a shadowy network of Houthi supervisors. A pervasive security apparatus, built on the ashes of Ali Abdullah Saleh-era intelligence bodies (UN Panel of Experts, 27 January 2020: 9), has focused on protecting the Houthi regime and monitoring the movements of suspected enemies, including humanitarian organizations. Among the successes boasted by Houthi officials is the restoration of security and stability in Houthi-controlled regions, which they contrast with the mayhem plaguing the areas under the authority of the internationally recognized government and allied coalition forces (Yemen Press Agency, 21 December 2019; Al Masirah, 21 July 2020; Ansarollah, 2 January 2021).
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Repression, Houthis, and Infighting
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

30. Houthi Forces Close in on Marib City – The Yemen Review, October 2021

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Many of the challenges facing humanitarian operations in conflict zones today are well known. Any package of assistance must survive the politics of individual donor countries before it even starts the journey down the pipeline to the United Nations and other aid agencies. From there, it navigates a maze of bureaucracy between headquarters and destination countries, often running the gauntlet between warring parties and local realities before hopefully making its way to people in need. Humanitarian operations, wherever in the world they occur, are almost certainly flawed. The politicized and financially constrained structures that international aid must traverse mean no single agency bears responsibility. While many individuals working within the humanitarian community certainly do their best to make the system work better where they can, it remains reasonable to expect that humanitarian aid does more good than harm. At a bare minimum, humanitarian aid should reduce the suffering of the most vulnerable. Whether that is the case in Yemen today is, at best, unclear. Last week, the Sana’a Center published a six-part report series examining UN-led humanitarian operations in Yemen since 2015, when the war escalated and the humanitarian emergency response began. While the UN regularly claims that Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the findings of the research would suggest that instead Yemen hosts among the world’s worst humanitarian responses. The fault lies first and foremost with the aid system and its leadership, both within and outside of Yemen. This stands in stark contrast to the tendency of senior leaders in the humanitarian effort to blame the failures of the response exclusively on the warring parties. Houthi Forces Close in on Marib City – The Yemen Review, October 2021 - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15660
Topic:
Houthis, Humanitarian Crisis, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

31. Coalition Falls Back in Hudaydah, Fighting Shifts South – The Yemen Review, November 2021

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A surprise decision by the UAE-backed Joint Forces to withdraw from areas south of Hudaydah city and the surrounding governorate shook up the military situation on Yemen’s Red Sea coast.[1] The largest members of the Joint Forces are the Giants Brigade, Tariq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces and the Tihama Resistance. The withdrawal, which began on November 9, saw the Joint Forces move out 15,000 fighters and abandon frontlines in Hudaydah city, home to Yemen’s busiest port, as well as in Al-Durayhimi and Bayt al-Faqih districts, and from the majority of Al-Tuhayta district. The frontlines had been active but largely static since the December 2018 UN-sponsored Stockholm Agreement, which ended a Saudi-led coalition push to take Hudaydah city. The UN and the Yemeni government said they had no advance notice of the withdrawal,[2] and it appeared as though the Joint Forces’ own units were confused about how it would be carried out. The process was disorganized, with units disputing the order of withdrawal with one another. Houthi forces took advantage of this, shelling Joint Forces positions and causing dozens of casualties, according to local military sources. Hundreds of Joint Forces fighters were captured by Houthi forces. The Joint Forces withdrew to the south, establishing a new defensive line from the Al-Himah area, in southwestern Al-Tuhayat district, to Hays district, about 40 kilometers to the east. The official explanation from the Joint Forces was that the withdrawal corrected what it called the “mistake” of remaining in defensive positions while frontlines elsewhere in Yemen needed support.[3] In effect, the terms of the Stockholm Agreement prevented the Joint Forces from making any serious attempt to advance in Hudaydah since 2018. Coalition Falls Back in Hudaydah, Fighting Shifts South – The Yemen Review, November 2021 - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894
Topic:
Development, Politics, Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

32. Between God and the Sugar Dates: Lessons for a "Geopolitical" EU from the US–Iran Crisis

Author:
Tommaso Emiliani
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The killing of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani by a US drone strike on 3 January 2020, followed by the Iranian retaliation on US military bases in Iraq, left many Europeans wondering how – if at all – the European Union can foster de-escalation in the Middle East. The EU is presently stuck between a deepening strategic rift with its US ally and its inability to advance its independent interests and policies vis-à-vis Iran. It is now clear that Europe cannot protect its relations with Washington while also salvaging the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iranian nuclear deal. Borrowing from an old Persian proverb, Europe cannot have both God and the sugar dates.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, United States of America, European Union, and Gulf Nations

33. Assessing Israel Katz’s First Year as Foreign Minister

Author:
Nimrod Goren
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
In February 2019, Israel Katz was named Israel’s interim foreign minister, and three months later his appointment became permanent. This ended a period of almost four-years without a fulltime foreign minister, during which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) significantly declined. A year into Katz’s term, an assessment can be made as to whether his appointment has strengthened the MFA and left a policy imprint. This, while taking into consideration the turmoil in Israeli politics since early 2019 and the understanding that deeper change requires a ministerial tenure longer than a year. This article sums up Katz’s first year on the job, based on media reports and information published by the MFA. It examines both intra-ministerial and policy aspects, and concludes that Katz is operating in Netanyahu’s heavy shadow, has failed to address the deep budgetary crisis faced by the MFA, and has focused on developing ties with Gulf States and combatting anti-Semitism.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Financial Crisis, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Gulf Nations

34. Saudi Arabia’s Policy in Africa : Vectors and Objectives

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Until recently, Saudi Arabia was the country out of the Gulf countries that had the greatest number of diplomatic missions in Africa. Although it is now outstripped by Qatar, which has been striving since the beginning of the Emirati-Saudi embargo that started in June 2017 to open a large number of diplomatic posts in Africa. The Saudi diplomatic network was formerly established in predominantly Muslim states (in the Maghreb, West Africa and in the Horn of Africa) and in South Africa. The kingdom can mainly rely on experienced diplomats, who have maintained a presence in Africa since the 1970s, boosted after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the desire to prevent a spread of Shiism on the continent. Nowadays, Saudi Arabia is also clearly involved in Africa as elsewhere, to counter the influence of its Qatari neighbor.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Islam, Soft Power, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

35. Coronavirus Threatens to Drive Wedge into US-Gulf Relations

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
It is early days, but first indications are that the global coronavirus pandemic is entrenching long-drawn Middle Eastern geopolitical, political, ethnic, and sectarian battle lines rather than serving as a vehicle to build bridges and boost confidence. Gulf states are taking contradictory approaches to the problem of ensuring that entrenched conflicts do not spiral out of control as they battle the pandemic and struggle to cope with the economic fallout.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

36. Gulf Security: The Arab Gulf States Have No Good Options

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic and its economic fallout may rewrite the security as well as the political and economic map of the Middle East. The crisis will probably color Gulf attitudes towards the region’s major external players: the US, China, and Russia. Yet the Gulf States are likely to discover that their ability to shape the region’s map has significantly diminished.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Security, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

37. A Difficult Mission: Will the appointment of Allawi as Prime Minister end the crisis in Iraq?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The attacks on some Iraqi demonstrators on February 3, 2020, on account of which a number of so-called "blue hats" were indicted, imply the persistence of the Iraqi political crisis, despite the appointment of Muhammed Tawfiq Allawi as head of the new government. Allawi, who was the former Minister of Communications, was officially appointed by President Barham Saleh at the beginning of February 2020. The announcement comes two months after the House of Representative accepted the resignation of Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the former Prime Minister of the Caretaker Government. However, according to the Iraqi constitution, the appointment of a new prime minister should have been selected from the ‘largest bloc’ within the Parliament and should have taken place within a maximum period of 15 days, following the resignation. What is worth noticing here is that the mechanism by which Allawi was nominated for Prime Minister resembles that of Adil Abdul-Mahdi. Identifying the largest bloc within the parliament was also overlooked, because of the consensus between the various political forces, particularly between the two the coalitions, Saairun ‘Alliance Towards Reforms’and the Fatah ‘Conquest Alliance’, which are occupying the largest number of seats in Parliament. This is actually contrary to what is affirmed by the Iraqi constitution in Article 76 thereof, which states that “the President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers…".
Topic:
Government, Constitution, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

38. Can Oman Survive Its Own Neighborhood After the Death of Sultan Qaboos?

Author:
Louisa Keeler
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The small Gulf state of Oman’s identity is closely—if not inextricably—linked with the person of Sultan Qaboos, who passed away on January 10 after nearly 50 years in power. He singlehandedly transformed the country from a sleepy, closed-off country comprising disparate groups to an interconnected, modern, and unified state that has proven itself an invaluable player on the international scene. Within Oman, his portrait is ubiquitous, and his name is on countless mosques, hospitals, and institutions throughout the Sultanate, a sign of both his revered status and proof of his impact on society. Now that he is gone, he leaves behind an untested successor who is not particularly well known to the international community. Qaboos’ presence will be missed during one of the tensest moments since 1979 between the United States, Iran, and the Arab Gulf states, countries which have relied on Oman as a badly needed messenger and facilitator for negotiations. If there was ever a good time for Sultan Qaboos to die, this was not it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, Monarchy, and Sultan Qaboos
Political Geography:
Oman and Gulf Nations

39. A Year after the Start of the Saudi-Emirati Blockade against Qatar. What Are the Consequences for West Africa?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On June 5th 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and agreed to isolate the Emirate via an air and land blockade. These countries decided to punish Qatar under the pretext of a speech the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, would have made on May 23rd, which reiterated the strong ties between his country and Iran.[1] The situation has been at a deadlock for a year, and Qatar refuses to apply the Emirati and Saudi Arabian list of the 13 demands. The latter mainly include the closure of the Al Jazeera TV station and the Turkish military base on its territory, downgrading diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as a total separation with movements such as Hezbollah or even the Muslim Brotherhood.[2] However, although this crisis only pits Persian Gulf countries against each other, apart from Egypt, both sides have tried to win support. Donald Trump has adopted the stance of the Saudi-Emirati side[3] – but the State Department under Rex Tillerson (2017-2018) has always remained cautious –, Europe remains neutral with no leader daring to choose one side rather than another. The confrontation was particularly marked in West Africa. Four countries in this area – Senegal, Mauritania, Chad and Niger – quickly downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar shortly after the start of the crisis. However, their strategy vis-à-vis this wealthy gas Emirate has changed considerably over the last twelve months, as Doha's efforts to obtain new support in the rest of West Africa has started to bear fruit.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, West Africa, Senegal, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Gulf Nations

40. Stockholm Declaration: Re-producing the Houthis in Yemen Under the Auspices of the UN

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Although the first round of Sweden talks led to soaring expectations that a change will take place in the course of the Yemeni crisis from the path of war to that of negotiation, its outcome is limited to the settlement of the humanitarian crisis, which the UN envoy underlined in his statement to the Security Council following the negotiations. The issues pertaining to the crux of the conflict will likely be addressed in the second round, scheduled at the end of next January, which should include the comprehensive framework for the settlement, as a road-map for shaping Yemen’s post-war future, and solving political and security issues. The outcome of the first round sought to neutralize the manifestations of the Houthi “militiation”, not to end it. It can also be argued that the outcome equates between the parties to the crisis in terms of tasks, implementation mechanisms and the formed committees under the auspices of the UN, a key indicator that risks transforming the Houthi movement into a major party in the Yemeni scene under the aegis of the UN.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Conflict, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

41. Turbulent Times: Possible Repercussions of the Attack in Ahvaz on Iran

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The attack in the city of Ahvaz which targeted the military parade organized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Iranian army on September 22, 2018, on the occasion of the so-called “Sacred Defense Week”, indicates that Iran is set to experience tough times on more than one front. This is the case given the fact that the attack coincides with the continued internal protests over deteriorating living conditions, due to the government’s failure to contain the various economic woes, and the growing pressure of the US sanctions, as the strongest batch, on November 4, looms large on the horizon.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Violence, Donald Trump, Hassan Rouhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

42. The Gulf’s Escalating Sectarianism

Author:
Lauren Baker
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
On January 2, Saudi Arabia executed 47 men, including prominent cleric and political activist Nimr al-Nimr. This sparked immediate backlash, especially among domestic and global Shiite communities. Unfortunately, such rising sectarian tensions are nothing new in the region. Although the media is quick to highlight the Sunni-Shiite divide, it generally points to this split as the root cause of conflicts. How are we to get beyond this primordialist rhetoric and study the real impacts and causes of sectarianism in the region? POMEPS Briefing 28, “The Gulf’s Escalating Sectarianism,” collects 16 pieces previously published by the Project on Middle East Political Science and the Monkey Cage to provide a more nuanced look of this divisive trend. There is a growing body of scholarship that places sectarianism within the study of comparative politics and international relations, rather than treating sectarian identity as an unchanging, essentialist trait. Authors in this collection demonstrate how political elites use sectarian language to legitimize authoritarian rule, consolidate power, and rally against internal and external foes. What appear on the surface as entrenched confessional divides are often more about political and economic power than religion. Interested readers should also look at the 2013 POMEPS Studies 4 “The Politics of Sectarianism,” much of which remains relevant today. Analysis of individual Gulf states’ domestic and geopolitical maneuvering supports this theoretical framework. In Saudi Arabia, the new leadership is able to refocus attention away from its international and domestic failures by increasing pressure on Shiite dissidents and provoking its main regional rival, Iran. And, in the wake of the nuclear agreement, the increasing Iranian influence gives Saudi Arabia another reason to amp up the sectarian vehemence. Meanwhile in Yemen, the labels of sectarianism fail to tell the whole story, while in Iraq and Syria violence in the name of sectarian identity continues to polarize and entrench both sides. The Arab uprisings challenged the traditional regional powers, and Sunni leaders continue to vie for prominence in this new order. Meanwhile, the increasing use of information technology and social media reinforces existing communities, while further polarizing users and citizens.
Topic:
International Affairs and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
Gulf Nations

43. The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011

Author:
Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This study documents the various forms and measures of political and economic assistance provided by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar to Egypt and Tunisia since the upheavals of 2011. It also analyzes the impact Gulf donor countries had on political and economic development within Egypt and Tunisia, particularly with regard to democratization and inclusive socio­ economic change. Economically, efforts undertaken by the Gulf states were inten­ ded to stabilize the two countries, for example by helping them overcome budget de cits. While their business investments are not trickling down to the economi­ cally marginalized segments of society, some of the Gulf­funded development projects have been geared toward fueling more inclusive growth. Due to limited coordination between Arab and Western donor countries, however, there has thus far been little alignment of projects taking place in the same sectors. As a result, the potential for synergies between these projects has remained untapped. In po­ litical terms, as was expected, the Gulf states did not engage in efforts to promote more democratization. Indeed, in Egypt the assistance provided by Saudi Arabia and the UAE even contributed to a return to the pre­2011 order. For Germany and its partners to engage the Gulf states more intensively on governance matters and to create incentives, deeper knowledge is required about how political decisions are made in the Gulf. This is also essential for developing Germany’s much­needed general strategy toward the Gulf states, which is currently lacking. The Deauville Partnership is a useful forum for improving and increasing future coordination.
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Gulf Nations