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81. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

82. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

83. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

84. Inclusion and Exclusion in International Ordering: An Interview with Glenda Sluga

Author:
Glenda Sluga and Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
The image of two men, sitting awkwardly across each other in a solemn conference table, suddenly sprouted everywhere in my Twitter feed last winter. As a terrifying war erupted over competing visions of eastern Europe’s place in the international order, this somewhat surreal picture of the rulers of France and Russia conferencing offered little respite. It was precisely at this time that I had the pleasure to converse with the incoming Toynbee Prize Foundation President Glenda Sluga about her most recent monographThe Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon (Princeton University Press). As the so-called international order comes under increasing pressure in Ukraine and beyond, Sluga’s timely book invites us to engage with the “two centuries of multilateral principles, practices, and expectations” to understand the promises and limits of our contemporary arrangements (p. xi). It places the recent meeting between Macron and Putin in the context of the rise and consolidation of “a new professional, procedural, and bureaucratic approach to diplomacy, based on the sociability of men” (p. 6). After all, our modern notions of international “politics” or “society” were forged in the aftermath of a previous European-wide conflagration that had France and Russia at its helm: the Napoleonic wars. Sluga’s account does not aim to blindly celebrate nor to categorically condemn this modern political imaginary of international ordering. Others have dismissed the post-Napoleonic diplomatic constellation as reactionary or have lauded it as protoliberal. Sluga, above all, is interested in questioning it. She invites us to: reflect on for whom this order has been built; push against the ways it narrows our perspective; and grapple with its inner tensions and contradictions (p. 282). At the heart of the book, I would suggest, lies a concern about the paradoxical record of European modernity: a project that “has offered an expansive horizon of political expectations but delivered a voice only for some” (p. 7). By taking women, non-Europeans, and “non-state” actors seriously as political agents, she shows how bankers, Jews, or ambassadrices were ironically crucial in the making of a system that came to exclude them from the historical record. And, unsurprisingly, these exclusions lead to tensions that threaten to upend international order from within and without—from 1821, 1848, or 1853 to 2022. In our conversation, we attempt to make sense of these paradoxes, contradictions, and ambiguities of international ordering.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, History, Exclusion, International Order, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe

85. Importance of Maintaining and Strengthening NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence: A Historical Overview

Author:
Megi Benia
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence is a core pillar of NATO’s defense and deterrence policy. At the same time, the Alliance, which is not a formal party to any arms control negotiation, has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance has been regularly conducting consultations in different fora - the North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee – to constantly address the ongoing challenges of the arms control architecture. Currently, NATO successfully maintains the balance between its nuclear deterrence and disarmament aspirations. However, it does not represent an easy task for the organization of 30 member states. Over the years, NATO has suffered from a serious nuclear identity crisis. Many Allies tried to increase the Alliance’s arms-control profile while others gradually opposed any further changes in this direction. The positioning of NATO in this regard has been constantly shaped by significant shifts in the international security environment. Despite the contested view on maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence, the Alliance managed to evolve as a nuclear alliance, effectively ensuring peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, European security faces the biggest security challenge since World War II when one state wages an unprovoked and unjustified war against another sovereign and independent state on the doorsteps of NATO, threatening the world with the use of nuclear weapons. In this unprecedented environment, it is important for NATO to maintain and further strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture to ensure peace and stability for generations to come. Therefore, this article will demonstrate a historical overview of the evolution of NATO as a nuclear alliance and the importance of strengthened nuclear deterrence and conventional defense capabilities.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe

86. Politics, War and Eastern Mediterranean Gas

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the past two months, there have been several significant, interlocking developments regarding Eastern Mediterranean gas. In January, the Biden Administration withdrew American support for the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek EastMed gas pipeline. In February, U.S. officials shuttled between Israel and Lebanon for another round of talks to resolve the question of the maritime border and the exclusive rights to exploit gas in their disputed waters. Most importantly, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in late February, has transformed the long-discussed European need to reduce its dependence on Russian gas (and oil) into an urgent priority. It has also exposed the disconnect between optimistic policies that anticipated an imminent shift to renewable resources and the reality that the developed world will, in the short- to medium-term, remain dependent on fossil fuels. Confronted with this new reality, does Europe's need to rapidly diversify its sources of energy increase the strategic value of Eastern Mediterranean gas? And can the Eastern Mediterranean contribute meaningfully to reducing Europe's dependence on Russian gas?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Politics, War, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and United States of America

87. Can we ever build a common European home? The perils and promise of an old idea

Author:
Zachary Paikin and Michael Kimmage
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of a ‘common European home’ inspired many different political leaders. This idea has now crumbled amid Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Historians will long debate what went wrong. For now, the West will have little choice but to inhabit a continental security context based on deterrence rather than romantic visions and shared identities. But Western governments should also not give up on the more flexible, accepting approach to European security and integration that animated the 1990s. The EU granting candidate status to Ukraine last June was a landmark event. But the EU cannot have an effective strategy for Ukraine without also having a strategy for Russia. Even with the continent afflicted by war, the aspiration of a common European home must not be discarded. This CEPS Explainer evaluates the principal lessons of the Ukraine War for European security and outlines a pathway to putting the continent back on the road towards a more inclusive order.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

88. Which kind of realism should drive Western support for Ukraine?

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Realist foreign-policy pundits have become synonymous with ‘neorealists’, who prefer a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war to restore stability to the relationship between great powers in the international system. However, realism cannot be treated as a monolithic theory of international relations. It includes also ‘classical realism’, which derives state conduct from domestic politics rather than international structure. This CEPS Explainer highlights several qualitative insights about the war derived from classical realism, which seem more relevant to the conduct of Western foreign policy. These insights make a convincing case for continuing and perhaps increasing the military support to enable Ukraine to liberate further territory. The first is the acknowledgement that the Western nations have a significant interest in enforcing the principle of non-aggression and restore deterrence to the European security system, which Russia seeks to overthrow. The second insight is into the psychology of the Kremlin’s escalation potential, which depends on the Russian people’s willingness to sacrifice and on diplomatic pressure exerted by China (and India). The third is that the military investment in Ukraine pays off with very high dividends and with the degradation of Russia’s fighting power as an additional benefit to NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Realism, International System, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

89. Walking out of the Woods: EU Industrial Policy between the Energy Crisis and Decarbonisation

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Europe is in the midst of a profound and complex energy crisis. This is not limited to the gas sector as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but involves all energy sources. French nuclear generation, for example, has fallen to a thirty-year low over the past year due to maintenance works and corrosion.[1] Due to extreme heat over summer, unprecedented drought has reduced hydropower generation as well as the possibility to import coal by river.[2] Oil has not been immune to turbulences either. The EU embargo on Russian crude oil finally began on 5 December 2022, coupled with a price cap at 60 US dollars/barrel generating uncertainty over future supply and prices. In February 2023, the second step of the embargo, on refined products, will kick in, with diesel potentially becoming the next chapter of the European energy crisis.[3]
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Institutions, Industry, Decarbonization, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

90. The EU vis-à-vis Turmoil in Burkina Faso: Towards Europeanisation?

Author:
Francesca Lenzi
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In late September 2022, Burkina Faso experienced its second coup in eight months. In the name of national security, Captain Ibrahim Traoré took control of the country on 30 September, deposing Paul-Henri Damiba, who had come to power through his own coup in January. Insecurity and the inability of the political class to deal with the jihadist threat are among the determining factors that led to two coups in such a short time. The coups unfolded in a context marked by competition between the European Union (EU) – initially led by France, the traditional European hegemon in the region – and Russia for influence in the Sahel.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Coup
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Burkina Faso