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61. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

62. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

63. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

64. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

65. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

66. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

67. Inclusion and Exclusion in International Ordering: An Interview with Glenda Sluga

Author:
Glenda Sluga and Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
The image of two men, sitting awkwardly across each other in a solemn conference table, suddenly sprouted everywhere in my Twitter feed last winter. As a terrifying war erupted over competing visions of eastern Europe’s place in the international order, this somewhat surreal picture of the rulers of France and Russia conferencing offered little respite. It was precisely at this time that I had the pleasure to converse with the incoming Toynbee Prize Foundation President Glenda Sluga about her most recent monographThe Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon (Princeton University Press). As the so-called international order comes under increasing pressure in Ukraine and beyond, Sluga’s timely book invites us to engage with the “two centuries of multilateral principles, practices, and expectations” to understand the promises and limits of our contemporary arrangements (p. xi). It places the recent meeting between Macron and Putin in the context of the rise and consolidation of “a new professional, procedural, and bureaucratic approach to diplomacy, based on the sociability of men” (p. 6). After all, our modern notions of international “politics” or “society” were forged in the aftermath of a previous European-wide conflagration that had France and Russia at its helm: the Napoleonic wars. Sluga’s account does not aim to blindly celebrate nor to categorically condemn this modern political imaginary of international ordering. Others have dismissed the post-Napoleonic diplomatic constellation as reactionary or have lauded it as protoliberal. Sluga, above all, is interested in questioning it. She invites us to: reflect on for whom this order has been built; push against the ways it narrows our perspective; and grapple with its inner tensions and contradictions (p. 282). At the heart of the book, I would suggest, lies a concern about the paradoxical record of European modernity: a project that “has offered an expansive horizon of political expectations but delivered a voice only for some” (p. 7). By taking women, non-Europeans, and “non-state” actors seriously as political agents, she shows how bankers, Jews, or ambassadrices were ironically crucial in the making of a system that came to exclude them from the historical record. And, unsurprisingly, these exclusions lead to tensions that threaten to upend international order from within and without—from 1821, 1848, or 1853 to 2022. In our conversation, we attempt to make sense of these paradoxes, contradictions, and ambiguities of international ordering.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, History, Exclusion, International Order, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe

68. Can we ever build a common European home? The perils and promise of an old idea

Author:
Zachary Paikin and Michael Kimmage
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of a ‘common European home’ inspired many different political leaders. This idea has now crumbled amid Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Historians will long debate what went wrong. For now, the West will have little choice but to inhabit a continental security context based on deterrence rather than romantic visions and shared identities. But Western governments should also not give up on the more flexible, accepting approach to European security and integration that animated the 1990s. The EU granting candidate status to Ukraine last June was a landmark event. But the EU cannot have an effective strategy for Ukraine without also having a strategy for Russia. Even with the continent afflicted by war, the aspiration of a common European home must not be discarded. This CEPS Explainer evaluates the principal lessons of the Ukraine War for European security and outlines a pathway to putting the continent back on the road towards a more inclusive order.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

69. Which kind of realism should drive Western support for Ukraine?

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Realist foreign-policy pundits have become synonymous with ‘neorealists’, who prefer a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war to restore stability to the relationship between great powers in the international system. However, realism cannot be treated as a monolithic theory of international relations. It includes also ‘classical realism’, which derives state conduct from domestic politics rather than international structure. This CEPS Explainer highlights several qualitative insights about the war derived from classical realism, which seem more relevant to the conduct of Western foreign policy. These insights make a convincing case for continuing and perhaps increasing the military support to enable Ukraine to liberate further territory. The first is the acknowledgement that the Western nations have a significant interest in enforcing the principle of non-aggression and restore deterrence to the European security system, which Russia seeks to overthrow. The second insight is into the psychology of the Kremlin’s escalation potential, which depends on the Russian people’s willingness to sacrifice and on diplomatic pressure exerted by China (and India). The third is that the military investment in Ukraine pays off with very high dividends and with the degradation of Russia’s fighting power as an additional benefit to NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Realism, International System, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

70. Walking out of the Woods: EU Industrial Policy between the Energy Crisis and Decarbonisation

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Europe is in the midst of a profound and complex energy crisis. This is not limited to the gas sector as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but involves all energy sources. French nuclear generation, for example, has fallen to a thirty-year low over the past year due to maintenance works and corrosion.[1] Due to extreme heat over summer, unprecedented drought has reduced hydropower generation as well as the possibility to import coal by river.[2] Oil has not been immune to turbulences either. The EU embargo on Russian crude oil finally began on 5 December 2022, coupled with a price cap at 60 US dollars/barrel generating uncertainty over future supply and prices. In February 2023, the second step of the embargo, on refined products, will kick in, with diesel potentially becoming the next chapter of the European energy crisis.[3]
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Institutions, Industry, Decarbonization, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe