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301. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

302. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

303. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

304. Bases, Logistics, and the Problem of Temptation in the Middle East

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The wisdom of making wars easier depends on the wisdom of the wars. Rapid military response to all global trouble may sound good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Maintaining the ability to use rapid military force in the region has become an end unto itself, unmoored from any clear vital strategic interest. Closing bases will make wars more challenging to start, which will help spur public debate about potential interventions due to the transparent upfront costs required. This will give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option in the region. This recommendation is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s logic. Democracy’s benefit for foreign policymaking is its ability to consider many options and give more time to think through various proposals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

305. Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the Status Quo

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China. The imperative to avoid a conflict with China should take priority for U.S. leaders. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China’s choosing. The Taiwanese obviously have the strongest interest in deterring a Chinese invasion of their island. Regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have the next-strongest interests in preserving stability in East Asia. These actors should do the heavy lifting in deterring China. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. Working with others, Taiwan has the capacity to inflict severe costs upon Beijing in the event of an armed attack. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others might convince Beijing that the various costs of invasion—economic sanctions, opprobrium, military balancing—outweigh the benefits and thus deter China from invading. America’s role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable and the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding One China policy. This is the best chance of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, Status Quo, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

306. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

307. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

308. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

309. At the End of Its Tether: U.S. Grand Strategy of Advancing Democracy

Author:
David C. Hendrickson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Over the past several decades, the United States has made the advance of democracy its great purpose in foreign policy. The Biden administration’s rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is the old habit in new form. U.S. leaders market this goal as consonant with the U.S. liberal tradition, but it in fact offends the nation’s founding ethos, especially in relegating state sovereignty and national independence to secondary status. In the older teaching, accepted even by liberal internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt, free institutions were to expand by example, not by force. After the Cold War, U.S. efforts to push states into becoming democracies by instruction, war, and sanctions have been an abject failure, in large part because they offended against the principle of national independence. Defining U.S. efforts today as the defense of democracy obscures vital problems in the U.S. alliance system, including its expansionist tendencies, its unfair sharing of burdens, and the risks it poses of a major war that would be detrimental to U.S. security. The U.S. should reject the revolutionary policy of regime change and return to the respect for national independence once embedded in the U.S. diplomatic tradition. Overturning autocratic governments is an aim that is antithetical to peace, the most favorable environment for the growth of liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Cold War, Democracy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

310. Implications of a Melting Arctic

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible, which in turn may affect three key issues in the region—militarization, maritime trade, and natural resource development. U.S. security interests in the Arctic remain deterring an attack on the United States and NATO allies and ensuring the lawful use of Arctic waters. The United States can secure both at minimum cost and risk. Greater accessibility does not increase threats emanating from the Arctic, so the United States does not need to do more militarily to ensure its security. Militarization absent threats could lead to a destabilizing security dilemma. Trans-Arctic maritime trade routes and natural resource development present potential economic opportunities; however, both still face significant challenges that limit their near-term viability. The United States should be vigilant to Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic and avoid overreacting or reflexively mirroring their behavior. A U.S. Arctic strategy built on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography, is the best avenue to protect U.S. interests and keep the Arctic at peace.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, Trade, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America