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242. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective
- Author:
- Hugo Krajnc
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
- Abstract:
- It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
- Topic:
- War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
243. The 3+3 Regional Cooperation and Georgia: What Is at Stake?
- Author:
- Soso Dzamukashvili
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- During the past decades, many initiatives have been proposed for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, mainly coming from Georgia and Turkey. In 1999, the then Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, conceived the idea of the ‘Peaceful Caucasus Initiative’ with an objective to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region. In the following year, a similar proposal was laid down by the then Turkish Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel, who intended to create the ‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’ initiative. Later in 2008, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, floated plans to establish the ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ that would bring the three states of the South Caucasus together with Turkey and Russia in order to tap the sustainable economic development of the region. In 2010, the then Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, promoted the idea of the ‘United Caucasus’ platform (Kaleji 2021). Despite coming up with a plethora of ambitious cooperation initiatives, none of the leaders managed to push their initiatives to come into motion.
- Topic:
- Security, Development, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Georgia, and South Caucasus
244. Major Non-NATO Ally Status - Chance for Survival Or A Vision Doomed to Failure?
- Author:
- Nino Lezhava
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- The ongoing war in Ukraine has confirmed that NATO as an institution of 30 members still lacks the readiness to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance, continuing to avoid confrontation with Russia.1 The unprecedented tragedy taking place in Ukraine was not a surprise and there were several lessons for the West to learn such as the August War in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the open letters and statements from Russia’s president drawing a new world order,2 Russian military drills and so-called peacekeepers in and around neighboring countries. Nevertheless, 14 years have passed since the NATO Bucharest Summit3 and Georgia and Ukraine are still paying for their independence and sovereignty with blood. Meanwhile, NATO’s promise of eventual membership for both countries is fading.4 Russia’s so-called “military operation” has revealed that the Kremlin does not need Casus Belli to start waging a full-scale war against independent countries and, now more than ever, Ukraine and Georgia5 need to strengthen their defense capabilities and search for an alternative foreign security policy until NATO provides well-deserved places for them. In this light, many believe that in the absence of NATO unity, the United States is the only strategic partner that can protect Ukraine and Georgia by designating them as Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA).6 Indeed, the impact of a timely provided designation could have a decisive political and practical role for Ukraine and Georgia’s security, especially when both countries7 are reliant on US defense sales and actively cooperate with the US while transforming their defense capabilities.8
- Topic:
- NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
245. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
- Author:
- Badri Belkania
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia
246. Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process: Opportunities and Barriers
- Author:
- Nino Chanadiri
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Armenia-Turkey relations have experienced numerous tensions over the decades associated with both the historic issues between the two nations and contemporary regional developments. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the mass killings of Armenians as a genocide1 in the Ottoman Empire during World War I has long been an important difficulty in bilateral relations. However, relations significantly worsened during the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s. As a response to Armenia’s capture of the territories surrounding NagornoKarabakh, Turkey closed the border with Armenia in 1993 in support of its ally Azerbaijan.2 The attempts to normalize relations did not have any fruitful outcome in the past decades which resulted in the two countries not having diplomatic or commercial relations for almost 30 years.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Armenia
247. Importance of Maintaining and Strengthening NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence: A Historical Overview
- Author:
- Megi Benia
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Nuclear deterrence is a core pillar of NATO’s defense and deterrence policy. At the same time, the Alliance, which is not a formal party to any arms control negotiation, has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance has been regularly conducting consultations in different fora - the North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee – to constantly address the ongoing challenges of the arms control architecture. Currently, NATO successfully maintains the balance between its nuclear deterrence and disarmament aspirations. However, it does not represent an easy task for the organization of 30 member states. Over the years, NATO has suffered from a serious nuclear identity crisis. Many Allies tried to increase the Alliance’s arms-control profile while others gradually opposed any further changes in this direction. The positioning of NATO in this regard has been constantly shaped by significant shifts in the international security environment. Despite the contested view on maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence, the Alliance managed to evolve as a nuclear alliance, effectively ensuring peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, European security faces the biggest security challenge since World War II when one state wages an unprovoked and unjustified war against another sovereign and independent state on the doorsteps of NATO, threatening the world with the use of nuclear weapons. In this unprecedented environment, it is important for NATO to maintain and further strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture to ensure peace and stability for generations to come. Therefore, this article will demonstrate a historical overview of the evolution of NATO as a nuclear alliance and the importance of strengthened nuclear deterrence and conventional defense capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe
248. War, Censorship and Public Opinion in Russia: Putin’s Struggle at Home and Abroad
- Author:
- Eka Javakhishvili
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s “special military operation,” as the Kremlin calls its full-scale war against Ukraine, has been underway for the second month in a row. However, the Russian army has not been able to cope with the combat tasks as effectively as Kremlin leaders originally planned. The incredible resilience and courage of the Ukrainian nation has fascinated the world but it has become an additional challenge for the Putin regime. In addition to the fact that the Russian government had to radically change its officially declared military objectives, it also faced the need to tighten measures to maintain control over the situation inside the country. At this stage, the Kremlin has to take effective steps both inside and outside of the country in order to fulfill Putin’s imperialist ambitions.
- Topic:
- Security, War, Public Opinion, Censorship, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
249. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War
- Author:
- Medea Ivaniadze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
250. Economic Consequences of Sanctions on Russia
- Author:
- Davit Shatakishvili
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, coupled with Western political support for Ukraine, was followed by a tough economic response through an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia set forth by the West. Their decision to do so seeks to make Russia pay an economic price for its military aggression, aiming to reduce its economic and martial capabilities, which are currently costing the lives of thousands of innocent people. The sanctions have already had quite severe economic consequences for Russia, but it is interesting to see whether they will achieve the West’s political goals and push President Putin to suspend the military aggression. Generally, a medium- to long-term period is required to see the effects of sanctions, and, currently, despite heavy economic losses, Russia is managing to coexist with the restrictions. Today, Russia is experiencing its biggest economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product in Russia will reduce by 11% in 2022 (World Bank, 2022), while the International Monetary Fund forecasts this figure to be 8.5% (IMF, 2022). According to some estimates, the economic scale of the reduction may even reach 15% (IIF, 2022). Clearly, this largely depends on the potential consequences of the sanctions already imposed and the possibility of enacting new sanctions, including in terms of energy embargoes. As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is almost twice as high. Consequently, we can get some idea of its scale. The losses caused by sanctions will become more visible and tangible over time, resulting in much more severe social and economic effects in the coming years. According to the International Finance Institute, Russia will have lost the wealth it generated over the last 15 years by the end of 2023 (IIF, 2022). One of the main reasons for this will be reduced domestic demand, and if the trade-related sanction package is expanded, exports will fall further than expected, which in turn will lead to a sharp decline in budget revenues. Clearly, the Russian military aggression has also caused global economic consequences, such as rising prices for basic consumer goods, disruption of supply chains, and delays in international trade. However, since invading Ukraine, Russia’s financial losses have been high. It is interesting to take a look at what actual consequences the Russian Federation has faced in terms of sanctions, and how the country will be able to continue coexistence with the restrictions and expand its own aggressive foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Economics, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe