Author: / Political Geography: Russia

401. Rewinding the Clock? US-Russia Relations in the Biden Era

Author:: Bobo Lo
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The escalating crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022 has returned US-Russia relations to center stage. Faced with the prospect of a new Russian military intervention, US President Joe Biden has re-engaged with Vladimir Putin in a manner reminiscent of the diplomacy of the superpower era. But this latest American attempt at accommodation raises more questions than answers. In the intervening three decades the world has changed out of all recognition, the international influence of the US-Russia relationship is much diminished, and their cooperation has sunk to historic lows. Can Washington and Moscow defy gravity and achieve some level of pragmatic engagement? There is good reason for skepticism. Neither side is truly invested in cooperation, but instrumentalizes it to other purposes. The Biden administration hopes to neutralize Russia in order to focus on the all-encompassing challenge of China. The Kremlin looks to undermine American influence as part of its project of promoting Russia as an independent global power. These goals are essentially irreconcilable. Looking ahead, the real question is not whether the United States and Russia can recalibrate their relationship to new “normal”, but whether they can avoid confrontation in an increasingly fluid and disorderly world.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Intervention, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

402. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:: Clément Therme
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, and Middle East

403. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:: Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

404. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action

Author:: Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

405. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:: Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:: War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

406. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?

Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

407. The Impact of Finland's and Sweden's Accession to NATO on the Security of the Alliance

Author:: Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the Alliance’s ability to conduct collective defence missions in the Baltic Sea region and to deter Russia. Therefore, the gains from the enlargement of the Alliance will far exceed the costs, which may include the need to create a new command responsible for missions on the Northern Flank of NATO. However, Türkiye’s opposition may prolong the accession process and increase the risk associated with the intensification of Russia’s provocative actions against the candidates.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Finland, North America, and Sweden

408. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

409. Eritrea as an Informal Representative of the Pro-Russia Forces in Africa

Author:: Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 2 March condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although this voice was isolated, Eritrea has become the informal representative of a larger group of states on the continent critical of the West. The possible enlargement of this pro-Russia bloc will depend on the financial and military ability of Russia to remain active in Africa.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Eritrea

410. Turkey's Role in the Russian-Ukrainian Negotiations

Author:: Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on 29 March in Istanbul demonstrates that Turkey is assuming the role of an intermediary. Its policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is backed by the majority of the Turkish public, which gives President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more freedom to manoeuvre. Acting as an intermediary in the conflict may allow Turkey an opportunity to start improving the strained relations with the European Union and the United States.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine

411. The Course of Cooperation between Russia and its Latin American Partners

Author:: Bartlomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: For the past several years, Russia has been strengthening ties with the authoritarian regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and has developed cooperation with other Latin American countries as an investor in the energy sector, a supplier of weapons and Sputnik-V COVID-19 vaccine, and in other areas. Most Latin American governments have condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but they have not imposed sanctions on Russia. It is in the EU’s interest to persuade its Latin American partners of the validity of the restrictions and to work together to mitigate the negative economic effects of the war.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Vaccine
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Cuba, Latin America, Nicaragua, and Venezuela

412. The International Dimension of the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption

Author:: Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The first Strategy on Countering Corruption, adopted on 6 December 2021, assumes that by making better use of existing international regulations and organisations, as well as by establishing new mechanisms, the U.S. will tighten global anti-corruption cooperation. The American goal is to limit the freedom to conduct financial operations by authoritarian states, mainly China and Russia, and at the same time to strengthen democratic countries and promote democracy. For Poland, this is an opportunity to tighten bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States.
Topic:: Corruption, International Cooperation, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

413. The Impact of the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine on the EU's Economy

Author:: Melchior Szczepanik
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: A spike in energy prices provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inhibit the economic rebound in the EU. Member States will have to face high inflation for longer than previously expected. Forced to increase spending, they also could postpone plans to reduce their debts. The conflict with Russia is mobilising the Community to speed up the development of renewable energy and reduce dependencies on third countries, especially authoritarian ones, in strategic sectors.
Topic:: Energy Policy, War, European Union, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

414. Belarus's Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: From the very beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities have sided with Russia, supporting it politically and militarily, including making its territory available to the Russian troops. In this way, Belarus is also an aggressor and, as a consequence, the EU and the U.S. have imposed further sanctions on it. Regardless of the attempts to engage in Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, Belarus will be negatively affected by the consequences of its government’s policy and the country, although formally sovereign, has ceased to be perceived as an independent entity in international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Sovereignty, War, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus

415. The EU's Prospects for Decoupling from Russian Gas

Author:: Maciej Zaniewicz
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine and cut-off of gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria have strengthened the arguments of supporters of EU independence from Russian gas. However, the prospect of a total embargo is still distant because of opposition from some countries, including Austria, Germany, and Hungary. As a result, the EU will focus on a gradual reduction in purchases of Russian gas, which will have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the sanctions against Russia. It is in Poland’s interest to strive for increasing the pace of diversification of gas supplies to the EU and reducing use.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Gas, and Energy Dependence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Poland, and Bulgaria

416. New Perspectives for Nuclear Energy in the EU

Author:: Maciej Zaniewicz and Zuzanna Nowak
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: EU countries opposing nuclear energy, mainly Austria and Germany, are trying to limit its development in the Union by using the dispute over the details of the “green taxonomy”. The Russian aggression against Ukraine, however, has strengthened the arguments of supporters of this technology. They present nuclear energy as a way to make Europe independent of Russian gas and oil imports while reducing CO2 emissions. The final shape of the delegated act supplementing the taxonomy and the date of its entry into force will significantly affect the future of new nuclear projects in the EU, including in Poland.
Topic:: Energy Policy, European Union, Carbon Emissions, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and Austria

417. Russia's Wartime Censorship and Propaganda

Author:: Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have introduced wartime censorship, forbidding the publication of content that does not conform to the official message of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This massive and unprecedented propaganda is leading to an increase in support for Vladimir Putin, and Russians protesting against the war are being brutally repressed and persecuted. The consequence is the strengthening of the totalitarian character of the Russian state and the emigration of Russians who do not support the war. The most significant element of the Russian war propaganda is that of “denazification”, a claim aimed also at Poland.
Topic:: War, Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Censorship
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

418. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

419. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:: Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

420. The Alliance of Civilizations and the Role of Spain

Author:: Ramon Blecua
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The crisis over Ukraine reinforces the view that, despite progress in many areas on the international agenda in recent years, the number of people affected by conflict and violence keeps growing. In the past 20 years, the number of forcibly displaced people has doubled, reaching over 80 million. According to United Nations data, over 60 percent of conflicts have relapsed in the last decade, a staggering figure that testifies of the difficulty of conflict resolution in this context. More than 80 percent of conflicts over the past 30 years involve militias and non‑state actors, while the more recent rise in transnational violent extremist groups has increased the challenges for conflict resolution. Civil wars are leading to more protracted conflicts with ethno‑cultural components, which complicate the traditional political approach. Existing multilateral mechanisms and diplomatic negotiations are increasingly ineffective, and a new toolbox for conflict resolution is more urgent than ever. The combination of great power competition, regional struggles for hegemony, and the proliferation of non‑state actors create interlocking and multi‑layered conflicts that impact international peace and stability. At the same time, these elements are challenging the traditional approaches whilst further putting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals at risk, as recognized inter alia by the latest Strategic Plan of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The international multilateral order is being questioned from many different quarters, while the wave of global protests shows the exhaustion of existing economic and political models, as well as the need for a new social contract. The impact of the pandemic and the measures taken to control it are also having a profound impact on these new political and economic dynamics, laying bare the growing inequalities of the new digital economy as well as the weakening of solidarity and common action. The increasingly intricate fabric of peace and conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved have made conflict resolution more complex, as stated in the December 2020 Concept on EU Peace Mediation. Terrorism and radicalization have become a more imminent security threat and tensions related to environmental degradation, irregular migration and forced displacement, are affecting the social fabric in fragile states in unprecedented manners.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Alliance, Multilateralism, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

421. Turkey’s Changing Posture on Russia and America

Author:: Hasan Unal
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: As of this writing, tensions between Russia and Ukraine appeared to continue unabated, despite the Putin‑Biden online meeting and the exchange of several messages between Washington and Moscow aimed at reducing them. The crisis has kept almost everyone guessing as to where all this is heading: will they subside or spiral out control? Will Russia invade Ukraine? If it does, how will America and its allies respond? As things stand at present, it sure seems as though Russia and the U.S. and its allies have gridlocked themselves into a crisis without any sensible way out. The former was emboldened by the feckless handling of the crisis by the Biden Administration such that Moscow now wants to dictate terms to America and NATO that amount to something like this: “give us proper, preferably written assurances that Ukraine and Georgia will not be admitted to NATO.” Team Biden, which has inadvisably goaded Ukraine against Russia for a second time in less than a year with its much‑hyped ‘America is back’ slogan cannot simply comply with the request. At the same time, America cannot stand up to Russia militarily in that part of the world. Moreover, neither the United States nor its NATO allies that have considerable military clout are prepared to make a promise to Ukraine regarding admission to NATO. Indeed, just as this edition of Baku Dialogues was going to press, the hectic diplomacy between NATO and Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and Russia on the other, climaxing in the latest meetings of 11‑12 January 2022, broke up with no agreement. This has given rise to further concern that the ongoing conflict is going to perpetuate. From Turkey’s perspective, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned insoluble— akin in not unimportant ways to the Turkish‑Greek dispute, with its clusters of psychologically combustible elements freely circulating across the board. Should Russia invade Ukraine, it would presumably trigger a harsh package of sanctions by both the EU and the U.S.; this would likely hurt Moscow considerably, albeit hardly enough to budge it from staying the course. Should the U.S. and NATO simply give in to Russia’s ultimatum, then this would amount to a complete surrender of the Western powers— particularly after the disastrous U.S. debacle in Afghanistan. At the same time, the likelihood that Russia will step back entirely from its position—that, in other words, it will calmly accept the prospect of the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO—is close to zero. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and the U.S.‑led West and Russia on the other, will perpetuate.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

422. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

423. How Russia Fights

Author:: Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

424. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:: Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

425. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

426. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

427. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

428. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

429. Environment in Times of War: Climate and Energy Challenges in the Post-Soviet Region

Author:: Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine has been devastating both politically and environmentally. On top of the environmental damage directly caused by military operations, the invasion has put an abrupt end to the EU-Russia “green cooperation”, which had previously raised many hopes. At the same time, it has also shifted international attention away from climate and environmental concerns, which are particularly acute in the post-Soviet region. This Report analyses some of the main climate change and environmental issues in the post-Soviet space, providing an initial assessment of the invasion’s impact. The bulk of the latest scholarly and policy production on these matters focuses on Russia — given the country’s geopolitical and energy relevance. However, this analysis finds that environmental disasters such as the desertification of the Aral Sea transcend state borders and require a broader approach both from an analytic and policy standpoint.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, War, European Union, Post-Soviet Space, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

430. China's Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: While the war in Ukraine is a game changer for international and in particular European security, China appears to be marching on. And, in some ways, it is true. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, under Xi’s leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests. The Report examines China’s current approach to foreign policy, and the drivers of the country’s shift away from tradition. What are the main characteristics of China’s foreign policy in the wake of the Ukraine war? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

431. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption

Author:: Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

432. Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas

Author:: Ricardo Hausmann, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolff, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:: Economics, Oil, Sanctions, Exports, Currency, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

433. Estonia as an Area of Russian Influence: Analysis and Synthesis of the Kremlin’s Methodology of Exerting Influence on Tallinn’s Political and Social Stability

Author:: Jacek Bil
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Russia's hostile actions against the Estonian state structures take the form of soft power, which can be observed in such areas as the activities of the Russian-speaking minority, media coverage, or through the use of coercion when it comes to fuel sales. This article presents qualitative methods of measuring Russian influence on Estonia. An observable trend in international relations is replacing hard power with soft power, commonly used against states within the sphere of interest of certain geopolitical entities. It is more difficult to identify the latter and prove it results from an aggressor's deliberate actions. Information warfare, including disinformation and propaganda, is one of the means Russia uses to exert political influence. By accepting the offer of a political and military alliance with the Western world, the Baltic States have become a threat to the Kremlin's imperialist aspirations. Russia's direct military actions against Estonia and the other Baltic states would have provoked a strong reaction and could even have led to military confrontation. However, the Russian government wishes to avoid it and, for the time being, limits itself to soft power measures.
Topic:: Hegemony, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, Foreign Interference, and Influence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

434. Russia Against Ukraine Before the European Court of Human Rights. The Empire Strikes Back?

Author:: Milena Ingelevic-Citak
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: In July 2021, Russia submitted its first inter-state complaint against Ukraine to the European Court of Human Rights. It was an unexpected and intriguing step of the Russian government, especially since many of the presented allegations are linked to the events that initiated the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Referring to the hostilities that began in 2014, the international community was, in principle, unanimous in assessing who the aggressor was. The focus of this research is the strategy of the Russian Federation in its recently initiated legal battle before the Strasbourg Court. This paper presents an attempt to outline the possible motives for taking such a step. Moscow's position on this case is particularly puzzling, as some of the allegations concern the Crimean Peninsula, widely recognized under international law as territory occupied by Russia. In spite of that, doubt arises about the strategic objectives of the Russian authorities in the conflict with Ukraine; the question is whether the actions taken by Russia fall within the scope of its previous strategy or if there has been a new turn in the matter. The first part of this paper outlines the background of the given conflict, the second details Russian policy after the annexation of Crimea, and the third, which is crucial for the formulating of conclusions, presents considerations on Russia's possible motivation and goals in filing a complaint to the European Court Human Rights. The research was conducted mainly based on the merits of the complaint, the statements of the representatives of Russia and Ukraine in the matter, the author's observations, and practitioners' considerations.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Regionalism, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

435. Don’t Leave the Russian People Behind

Author:: Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When McDonald’s opened its restaurant on Moscow’s Pushkinskaya Square in 1990, a line of thousands of Russians eager to have a taste of the West snaked around several blocks. The company’s recent decision to suspend its operations in Russia is a sad symbol of the rapid deterioration of Russia’s links to the West caused by Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. As we watch the increasingly horrific spectacle of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians dying in a senseless war, it may be difficult to think also of the Russian people. Nevertheless, in our support for Ukraine’s fight against its aggressor, we should not overlook their plight. Putin undoubtedly has supporters at home even as he engages in a war proving disastrous for his own country, but even more Russians are victims of a ruthless and relentless dictatorship. In the short term, they are unavoidably suffering as the global community levies harsh sanctions against the Putin regime. In the longer term, that same community should be prepared to offer the Russian people a way back. As a public diplomacy officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the early 1990s, I saw how many Russians welcomed the prospect of living as people in much of the rest of the world. In those years, a diplomatic tit-for-tat barred Russian nationals from working inside the embassy. American officers consequently not only carried out normal diplomatic functions, but also cleaned offices and cars. One great benefit of the do-everything-yourself period was answering all the phones ourselves, as it put us in direct contact with scores of average Russians. In the public affairs offices, we fielded calls from artists, writers, broadcasters, and educators proposing joint ventures with American counterparts. These budding entrepreneurs had mastered the term “joint venture” but not always the modalities required for a successful business partnership. Sadly, many of these ventures never materialized, but the ideas and enthusiasm were everywhere.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

436. Was NATO Expansion Really the Cause of Putin’s Invasion?

Author:: Ken Moskowitz
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: In March, 1999, while serving as the press attache at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, I hosted a full-day international conference to mark the 50 years since NATO was established. Speakers included the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council Volodymyr Horbulin, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, U.S. Principal Deputy to the Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States Ross Wilson, the chairman of the British parliamentary committee on national security, and Sergei Karaganov, a leading Russian expert on foreign policy and now a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin. One could argue that the goal of such a conference sponsored by the American Embassy was to promote NATO expansion, particularly to urge Ukraine to join the Western alliance. But that is not how I remember it. Typically, U.S. government public diplomacy like this does not bluntly advocate, but rather presents information or views that would be new to our local audiences. A more forceful NATO appeal for membership for eastern European countries, including Ukraine, emerged from the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

437. Europe at War

Author:: Robert Cox
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: For the moment as western Europeans watch the nightly media display of Russian brutality in Ukraine, many instinctively feel it’s a long way away. An echo of British Premier Neville Chamberlain’s dismissal of Hitler’s threats to Czechoslovakia in 1938 as a “quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.” One Czech emigrée saw the fatuousness of Chamberlain’s stance—Madeleine Albright. Balts and Poles, their memories fresh of Russian occupation, are clearly nervous. At greater distance, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians feel less threatened. French people show more concern with cost-of-living hikes—albeit driven by Russia’s actions. Yet the violence is happening on all Europeans’ doorstep. One false move, deliberate or careless, and NATO’s Article 5 activates. Perhaps. Let us look at the complexities of the context in which this war has come to pass.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

438. Putin’s Challenge to NATO and to the Global Enterprise

Author:: Thomas E. McNamara
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most powerful and destructive example in generations of a nation-state attempting to recreate its lost imperial history. This is not a defense of empire. It is Russia’s rejection of nationhood as a legitimate basis for sovereign existence in the world order. That this is being done by a major power with a long history of imperial ambition, expansion, and domination makes it a serious global issue. Putin’s actions are his rejection of the 20th century decline and extinction of empires and a challenge to the international order founded on and by nation-states.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

439. Remembering Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1991 Coup

Author:: Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Monday, August 19, 1991. The morning started like most of my days as a press officer at Embassy Moscow. I rose early, made coffee, and turned on the TV to check the news. The similarity of routine quickly vanished. Instead of the news, Soviet state TV was broadcasting the Swan Lake ballet, often a sign in the Soviet Union that something was amiss. Through the open window, I heard a strange, rumbling noise coming from the direction of the Ostankino TV tower, located just a few minutes from my apartment complex. I thought they might be having technical difficulties. Thirty-one years ago, there were no home computers or cell phones to help me unravel what was going on. I went to my car in the outside parking lot and started the half-hour drive south to the embassy. It was only then that I saw the Soviet military tanks, which rolled alongside the busy morning traffic past the embassy in central Moscow to their nearby destinations, including the “White House,” the Russian Parliament building, not far from the back of the embassy.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Coup, Memoir, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America

440. Ukrainians to Putin’s Empire: Hell No!

Author:: Dick Virden
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Watching Ukrainians bravely risk life and limb for their country, I’m reminded of what I saw during assignments as a diplomat in Poland and Romania. For more than four decades after World War II, those countries—and the others of Eastern Europe—were governed mainly by Soviet puppets. I recall friends tapping their shoulders to mock the epaulettes of collaborators playing for the other side. These were oppressed lands then. Political rights were scant, and stagnant economies made regime claims of a socialist paradise transparent nonsense. The government had long since lost the respect of the governed, what Chinese call the mandate of the people. U.S. policy in those days was to try to keep hope alive by quietly encouraging those opposed to the communist regime and using the leverage we had to help them gain greater space to operate. For example, our diplomats sought to identify independent-minded leaders to include in our Fulbright, International Visitor, and other exchange programs. We chipped away at the regime’s information monopoly through short-wave radio, personal contact, and distribution of uncensored material such as bootleg copies of Newsweek. And we appeared at events like the annual opening of the academic year at the Catholic University of Lublin, then the only independent institution of higher learning in Eastern Europe.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, Memoir, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America

441. The Russian Federation Dominance in the International Security Environment

Author:: Miroslaw Banasik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This article presents the research results, which set out to explain the mechanisms leading to the achievement of dominance by the Russian Federation in the international security environment. In the research process, the systemic approach was applied. Analysis and criticism of the literature, non-participatory observation and case study elements were used to solve the research problems. As a result, it was determined that the theoretical basis for the Russian Federation's achievement of international dominance is the concept of new generation war. The model of the strategic influence of the Russian Federation is directed at the shaping of the security environment and includes the synchronisation of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, indirect and direct effects, the blurring of the boundaries between war and peace and the application of pressure and aggression. The Russian Federation achieves strategic dominance through asymmetry, chaos, reflexive control, and strategic deterrence. Armed forces provide a key role in asserting dominance, focused on conducting offensive activities and inflicting losses with conventional and nuclear weapons.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Influence, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

442. Putin’s Next, Best Move – The Logic and Limits of Russian Action on Ukraine

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent, new US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. Nonetheless, a full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine is highly unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed below.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

443. And So Now… It’s War?

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

444. Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
Topic:: NATO, Weapons, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

445. Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Neither NATO nor US policy caused the Ukraine war. The invasion was Moscow’s unforced choice. But that doesn’t settle the issue of provocation. Although neither provocation nor “facilitation” amount to “cause,” such dynamics might have played a role in moving us toward this war. And knowing what role US or NATO policy may have played in bringing the world to this juncture can help illuminate ways to end the conflict (short of prosecuting it to its bitter end – however long that might take and at whatever cost it might entail).
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

446. The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

Author:: Charles Knight
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

447. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:: Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

448. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:: Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

449. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:: Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

450. Responsible Statecraft Correlates with UN Vote on Russian Invasion of Ukraine: An Application of the 2021 Peddling Peril Index

Author:: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: On March 2, 2022, the UN General Assembly convened in New York and voted 141 (in favor), 5 (against), and 35 (abstained), on the UNGA Resolution ES-11/1, condemning and demanding an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This invasion is a paramount shift in the status quo of peaceful relations on the European continent and will have repercussions throughout the world. The Institute decided to assess the vote in terms related to international norms of responsible strategic trade and associated behavior, using the results and findings in the 2021/2022 Peddling Peril Index (PPI), which ranks national strategic trade control systems. We could have selected other international normative comparisons, but we decided to use the PPI since national strategic trade controls are often correlated with more responsible state actions, and the PPI also measures adherence to a large number of international treaties and conventions. A central finding is that the vote is positively correlated with states' demonstrated commitment and implementation of international arms control, trade control, and financial practices. Countries that voted against the resolution or abstained from voting performed worse, on average, in the Peddling Peril Index.
Topic:: United Nations, Norms, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

451. Russian Military UAV Used in Ukraine Depends on Foreign Parts

Author:: Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Russia is well known to depend on foreign goods for its military equipment and industries. Recent Ukrainian social media reports illustrate the large fraction of foreign goods in Russia’s Orlan-10, a mid-range, gasoline-engine, propellor-driven reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) widely used by Russian military forces to pinpoint Ukrainian civilian and military targets for artillery strikes.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

452. The Russia-Ukraine War: Has Beijing Abandoned Pragmatic Diplomacy?

Author:: Justyna Szczudlik
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese diplomats contend that Beijing’s position on the “Russia-Ukraine conflict” (俄乌冲突 E wu chongtu) or the “Ukraine issue” (乌克兰问题, Wukelan wenti ) is “consistent and clear” (一贯的、明确的, yiguan de, mingque de) (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 5). However, China’s paradoxical stance on the Russia-Ukraine War underscores the difficulties that Beijing faces in carrying out sophisticated diplomacy. This has already had repercussions for China’s national interests and ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, any change of course by Beijing coming out of the recently concluded 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, appears unlikely. Throughout the Russia-Ukraine War, China has neither condemned Russia, nor endorsed Ukraine for its resistance and self-defense. However, official discourse indicates the PRC’s supportive posture towards Russia. For example, Beijing consistently accuses the West, primarily the U.S., of provoking Moscow through “constant eastward expansion by NATO” (北约不断东扩, beiyue buduan dong kuo). During his recent visit to Russia, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Li Zhanshu (栗战书) stated that China “understands and supports Russia” and echoed the Kremlin’s narrative that “the United States and NATO are expanding directly on Russia’s doorstep, threatening its national security and the lives of its citizens” (Twitter, September 13). Furthermore, in the first phone call between Chinese FM, Wang Yi (王毅) and his Russian counterpart Sergiei Lavrov following the 20th Party Congress, Wang said that China “firmly supports the Russian side, under the leadership of President Putin, to unite and lead the Russian people to overcome difficulties, eliminate disturbances, realize the strategic development goals and further establish Russia’s status as a major power on the international stage” (FMPRC, October 27). He also expressed China’s desire to deepen exchanges with Russia at all levels in order to promote international stability in a turbulent world.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Pragmatism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

453. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

454. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

455. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

456. US-Shaped World Order and Pakistan: Past, Present and Future

Author:: Syed Mohammed Ali and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This research paper critically analyses Pakistan‟s crucial and costly relationship with the United States of America, during the three eras of bipolar, unipolar and emerging multi-polar world order. It also contemplates that a new and balanced relationship, anchored in shared bilateral economic, political and security interests built simultaneously with the status quo, emerging and resurgent great powers is more beneficial and less risky for Pakistan in future than band wagoning with a single great power or offering its total security commitment against any other great power. Total alignment with a great power not only earns the threat of other great powers but also makes Pakistan more vulnerable against economic coercion in an interdependent global economy. It also argues that Thucydides‟ Trap is not a manifest destiny and can be avoided with astute statecraft rather than provocative and dangerous risk taking strategic competition.
Topic:: Power Politics, International System, Coercion, and Cooptation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, and United States of America

457. Pak-China Geostrategic Interdependence: Impact on Rising Economies of Asia

Author:: Ameena Nasim
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship during the last seven decades. Both the nations‘ leadership pronounced the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan as the ―All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖ and ―Iron Brother.‖ The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has a significant impact on the Asian strategic environment in particular and global politics. The Indian strategic enclave regards China-Pakistan‘s multifaceted relationship as a substantial obstacle for India‘s rise as a Great Power within the regional context. The study‘s primary objective is to critically examine impact on Asia‘s main actors such as India and Russia. So that one can profess about the dynamics of this relationship and implications of China and Pakistan‘s geo-strategic relations on the rising economies. A qualitative study with qualitative interviews and thematic analysis was applied to conduct this study. The analysis reveals that South Asian RSC has no change in the patterns of amity and enmity. The region continues to be conflictive, where their enduring rivalry and continued distrust shape enmity patterns between Pakistan and India. On the contrary, Pakistan and China‘s amity patterns can be seen growing in the longstanding strategic relationship and deep-rooted cooperation. The investigation discovers that on a bilateral level, several new factors in the post-9/11 era have molded Pakistan-China Strategic relations, which have intricate linkages with the regional and global security complexion.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Interdependence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, and Asia

458. The Army and Sea Control: Reconsidering Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-first Century

Author:: Nathan A. Jennings
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article argues that the U.S. Army, rather than the traditional maritime Services, has an emergent opportunity to increase relevancy by exercising sea control to guarantee American access to global markets in competitive spaces in the twenty-first century. In a strategic environment where adversaries are developing sophisticated defenses in-depth to negate American power projection, the institution has a unique capability to create forward positions of advantage with reimagined operational fires commands at scale—as the nucleus of Joint, interagency, and multinational teams—to protect economic prosperity and preserve coalition unity in Central Europe and Southeast Asia in particular, and across the world in general. Advocating for a shift in operational approach that subordinates tactical maneuver in support of operational fires, this article differs from previous scholarship by asserting that the Army should fully embrace sea control, rather than merely providing support to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, to better enable the Joint execution of American and coalition strategies in contested regions.
Topic:: Markets, Navy, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, Trade, Seapower, Army, and Marine Corps
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

459. The Black Sea Thread in Russian Foreign Policy and How the United States Can Respond

Author:: Adam Christopher Nettles
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article outlines the evolving geopolitical situation in the Black Sea in the context of Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. It establishes a historically rooted pattern in Russian strategy tied to the region that runs through most recent acts of Russian aggression against its neighbors. It illustrates how after each Russian conflict with its neighbors in the last 20 years Russia has gained more physical coastline on the Black Sea. It roots this behavior in a centuries-long pattern of Russian behavior grounded in practical and ideational motivations. Accordingly, it establishes that Russian aggression in the Black Sea is likely to be a persistent fixture of global great power competition for the near future. The author then proposes a sustainable solution to counter Russian aggression in the theater through U.S. support of the current trend toward increased European “strategic autonomy” within the bounds of the NATO alliance.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Navy, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Black Sea

460. Securitization of Disinformation in NATO’s Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis

Author:: Akın Ünver and Ahmet Kurnaz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help generate domestic awareness against foreign information operations globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats, and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as primary problems in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policies, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? Using computational methods, this article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, as well as more than 2,000 NATO texts, news statements, and publications since January 2014, presenting an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to investigate the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that NATO’s threat discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by the US’ political lexicon, and that the organization’s word choice changes based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study suggests that the recent disinformation agenda is, in fact, a continuity of NATO’s long-standing Russia-focused securitization strategy and their attempt to mobilize the Baltic states and Poland in support of NATO’s mission.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Elections, Disinformation, and Securitization
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

461. A (E)U-turn from Nord Stream 2 towards a European Strategic Gas Reserve

Author:: Daniel Gros
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The EU does not have an army. It thus cannot defend Ukraine from a Russian invasion, but it can at least put itself in a situation in which it does not depend on gas deliveries from a potential aggressor, a dependence that many argue would only become more severe with the formal opening of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline connecting Russia with Germany. Diminishing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas requires the creation of a credible European Strategic Gas Reserve for emergency situations. This cannot be achieved overnight but some first practical steps can be taken quickly and, importantly, cheaply. Such action, which should be spearheaded at the European level, would send a powerful signal that the EU is indeed willing to act and put its money where its mouth is, namely in the defence of its core values and strategic interests.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Nord Stream 2, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Germany

462. Sanction-proof or sanction-hit

Author:: Tinatin Akhvlediani and Willem Pieter De Groen
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: After President Vladimir Putin madly went ahead with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that sanctions will no longer have a deterring effect on the outbreak of war. However, imposing sanctions can still make this war very costly for Putin and perhaps make him and his inner circle reconsider continuation of the war and find a negotiated solution. The EU, together with its allies, has shown impressive unity in imposing severe sanctions against Russia, yet some options remain open for the EU to further exploit its economic leverage over Putin’s regime. This Policy Insight reviews the EU’s imposed sanctions against Russia and looks at the possibilities to increase their effectiveness, drawing upon lessons learned in the past.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

463. Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union

Author:: Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Veronika Movchan, and Artem Remizov
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: This paper responds to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request on 28 February 2022 for his country to accede to membership of the European Union. The European Council meeting at Versailles on 10-11 March endorsed the Council’s invitation to the European Commission to produce an Opinion on this request. The present paper is our Opinion on the position that we would like to see the Commission take. Since it comes at a time when Ukraine is being attacked in Russia’s genocidal war of choice, two quite different matters have to be addressed: first the fundamental political issues at stake for the whole of Europe, and second, the more technical modalities of the accession process.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

464. A transformational moment? The EU's response to Russia's war in Ukraine

Author:: Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Malorie Schaus, Willem Pieter De Groen, and Tinatin Akhvlediani
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: It is often said that the EU is forged in crisis. After weathering what feels like so many crises over the past 15 years, the EU’s swift and decisive response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has, for the most part, been welcomed as the EU finally getting a crisis right. In the first weeks of the war, the EU adopted an impressive series of sanctions, rapidly widening the net cast over growing numbers of targeted individuals and institutions. It has also provided over EUR 2 billion of ‘lethal aid’ to Ukraine to help it fight off the invaders, a notion that would have been absolutely unthinkable only a few short months ago. In advance of our 2022 edition of the annual CEPS Ideas Lab and harnessing our broad inhouse expertise, we gave our CEPS contributors a simple instruction for compiling this special report – to dive deep into their specialist areas and provide their perspective on whether the invasion and subsequent crisis is a true ‘game changer’ in terms of the EU’s immediate and ongoing policy response. Or, to put it another way, will 2022 be viewed by future historians as a year of genuine transformation, a transformation fuelled by the largest conventional conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War? The picture that emerges from the fog of war is a fragmented one. A general conclusion is that while there have been some positive changes in certain policy areas (such as migration, sanctions, energy and climate), the use of the term ‘game changer’ is as of yet unwarranted. The only real exception here, and where an alleged transformation can be argued is really starting to place, is in security and defence policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

465. Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty

Author:: Sinem Adar
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly salient weaknesses in its war against Ukraine have unsettled what was a delicate balance in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey is trying to reap the benefits of this unsettled situation by further intensifying cooperation with a region that it has long considered kin to itself due to linguistic and cultural affinities. These efforts dovetail with rehabilitation attempts of an ever-worsening Turkish economy in the face of an upcoming election in 2023 of historical decisiveness. Beyond these immediate triggers, lurking underneath Ankara’s renewed interest in the region is the post-Cold War strategic ambition to position Turkey as a logistics and energy hub connecting Europe and Asia. Yet skepticism within Europe over Ankara’s strategic orientation at a time of intense geopolitical confrontation and competition abounds. As such, it is necessary to soberly think about Turkey’s place within an emerging Eurasian space and the costs and benefits of engaging with Turkey.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

466. Which kind of realism should drive Western support for Ukraine?

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Realist foreign-policy pundits have become synonymous with ‘neorealists’, who prefer a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war to restore stability to the relationship between great powers in the international system. However, realism cannot be treated as a monolithic theory of international relations. It includes also ‘classical realism’, which derives state conduct from domestic politics rather than international structure. This CEPS Explainer highlights several qualitative insights about the war derived from classical realism, which seem more relevant to the conduct of Western foreign policy. These insights make a convincing case for continuing and perhaps increasing the military support to enable Ukraine to liberate further territory. The first is the acknowledgement that the Western nations have a significant interest in enforcing the principle of non-aggression and restore deterrence to the European security system, which Russia seeks to overthrow. The second insight is into the psychology of the Kremlin’s escalation potential, which depends on the Russian people’s willingness to sacrifice and on diplomatic pressure exerted by China (and India). The third is that the military investment in Ukraine pays off with very high dividends and with the degradation of Russia’s fighting power as an additional benefit to NATO.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Realism, International System, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

467. Understanding Russia’s perception of international agency in the context of the war against Ukraine

Author:: Andrey Makarychev
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated international politics in 2022 and this looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But how did we get to this point in the first place? The core argument presented here is that Russian foreign policy agency – the intention and the ability to act as transgressor and challenger to the liberal international order, defined as the space for norms-based multilateralism – played the key role in the full-fledged restart of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Taking a critical look at the five pillars of Russian agency, this inaugural CEPS Explainer concludes that the current model of Russia’s international agency is a precarious and vulnerable construct that is unlikely to survive the regime currently sat in the Kremlin.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

468. Russia’s War on Ukraine: Iran’s Growing Role and the Nuclear Threat

Author:: Alistair Taylor, Philip Breedlove, and Iulia-sabina Joja
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: In today's episode, Alistair Taylor sits down with experts from MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative to assess the trajectory of Russia's war on Ukraine. They discuss Russia’s growing attacks on critical infrastructure, its recent deployment of Iranian drones and their impact on the battlefield, the potential nuclear threat, and where things might be headed from here. Today's guests are General Philip Breedlove and Iulia-Sabina Joja. General Breedlove is a retired United States Air Force General who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of U.S. European Command. He’s the Distinguished Chair of MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative and a Distinguished Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. Iulia is a Senior Fellow and Director of MEI's Frontier Europe Initiative and Director of its "Afghanistan Watch" project. She teaches courses on European security at Georgetown and George Washington universities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

469. The Parallels of Ukraine and Syria

Author:: Charles Lister and Iulia-sabina Joja
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: Iulia-Sabina Joja and Charles Lister discuss the parallels between the wars in Ukraine and Syria, the similarities of Russia’s tactics in both conflicts, and what the recent history in Syria may signal for Ukraine in the months ahead.
Topic:: History, Syrian War, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Syria

470. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:: Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

471. The EU vis-à-vis Turmoil in Burkina Faso: Towards Europeanisation?

Author:: Francesca Lenzi
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In late September 2022, Burkina Faso experienced its second coup in eight months. In the name of national security, Captain Ibrahim Traoré took control of the country on 30 September, deposing Paul-Henri Damiba, who had come to power through his own coup in January. Insecurity and the inability of the political class to deal with the jihadist threat are among the determining factors that led to two coups in such a short time. The coups unfolded in a context marked by competition between the European Union (EU) – initially led by France, the traditional European hegemon in the region – and Russia for influence in the Sahel.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Coup
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Burkina Faso

472. Italians and Defence at the Time of the Ukraine War: Winds of Change

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In 2022, Italians have become more concerned about tensions between Russia and the West – but not more pro-American. They rather largely trust the European Union as a security actor, or lean towards an autonomous national defence policy – quite a change for the Italian public opinion. Italians are mostly supportive of military operations abroad and do not rule out the use of force, especially when national security is directly at stake, thus confirming the post-Cold War evolution of Italy’s strategic culture.[1] Notably, in the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the majority in favour of defending a NATO ally under attack has risen by 9 per cent, showing an unprecedented awareness of the importance of Euro-Atlantic collective defence. These are the main novelties in Italians’ views of defence issues at a time marked by a full-fledged war in Europe and its multiple consequences for national interests, as highlighted by the 2022 edition of the periodic IAI-LAPS survey on Italy’s foreign and defence policy.[2]
Topic:: Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

473. Russia’s Climate Action and Geopolitics of Energy Transition: The Uncertain and Unsettling Outlook following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Kamila Godzinska and Maria Pastukhova
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the outlook for Russia’s energy transition and created uncertainties on the global path towards net zero. In response to global economic shifts, Russia had begun taking steps towards decarbonisation, albeit without plans to depart from its hydrocarbon-based economic model in any substantial way. The new political, trade and financial environment induced by Russia’s act of aggression has damaged its potential to maintain the once-emerging momentum. Russia’s actions and the Western response are also reconfiguring global energy relations, with profound economic and geopolitical consequences that may, unless managed, undermine international cooperation on the energy transition and slow down progress on climate change mitigation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

474. Putin vs Monnet: European Resilience, Energy and the Ukraine War

Author:: Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the Ukraine war escalates with no end in sight, Europe’s resilience is put to test. Nowhere is this clearer than in the energy sphere, where the crisis first created the perfect timing for Russia’s invasion and then became weaponised against Europe in the broader confrontation with the West. In this confrontation, two interpretations of resilience come to the fore: Vladimir Putin and Jean Monnet’s, with the former emphasising pain endurance and the latter transformation through crisis. The jury is out on whether Putin or Monnet will win the day, and whether and how the European Union will prove and strengthen its resilience. But at the height of this crisis, my bet today is squarely on Jean Monnet.
Topic:: Climate Change, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

475. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

476. Sense and Nonsense behind Energy Price Caps

Author:: Daniel Gros and Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In official circles at the highest level, from the G7 to the European Council, a tense debate is taking place on what to do about spiralling gas and oil prices, which have either broken or have come dangerously close to breaking record territory. In Europe, a special meeting of the European Council on energy was originally scheduled for the fall, but is now being brought forward, while the European Commission is working on an emergency plan to prepare for a complete cut-off of Russian gas. Energy prices dominate the agenda of our leaders. Yet it is a confused and often confusing debate that is worth unpacking.
Topic:: Climate Change, Oil, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

477. The Russian Economy Is Muddling Through the Sanctions War

Author:: Oleg Buklemishev
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The transatlantic campaign of sanctions against Russia after its aggression of Ukraine is unprecedented in scale and scope, involving not only dozens of democratic states but also many non-state actors. It imposes considerable barriers and additional cost to the functioning of the Russian economy, which is bound to undertake deep restructuring with far-reaching consequences for production and consumption processes. The current appreciation of the rouble and inflationary slowdown are not signs of improvement but rather the direct effects of the stabilisation measures undertaken and, in fact, bode ill for further economic development. Numerous problems have started to surface this summer and optimistic assessments on the basis of initial resilience of the Russian economy look premature. Russia currently lacks a strategic plan of economic restructuring under the new environment. The future course of events will depend on whether the private sector leads this restructuring with minimal losses or the government imposes its normative prospective, tilting the result farther from economic equilibrium.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

478. Not Yet Time for Diplomacy. Lessons from Italy’s Ill-Conceived Peace Plan for Ukraine

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro and Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Few may have noticed, but Italy recently advanced its own diplomatic proposal for a resolution of the war in Ukraine. Rome’s ambitious peace plan[1] received little international recognition, although it was reportedly shared with the Quint – an informal consultation group comprising the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy – and formally presented to UN Secretary General António Guterres on 18 May 2022.[2] Crucially, the plan failed to impress the leaderships in both Ukraine[3] and Russia,[4] leading Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio to put it aside on the grounds that circumstances are not “ripe” for such an initiative.[5]
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

479. Can the West Afford to Let the World Go Hungry? Overcoming Challenges to Establishing a Humanitarian Corridor in the Black Sea

Author:: Isak Runarsson
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: While economic interdependencies do not prevent war, witnessed most recently by Russia’s naked war of conquest in Ukraine, the costs of war in a globalised world spread far and wide. Russia has taken the world’s food markets hostage by blockading Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. The resulting food price increases make a humanitarian crisis in the world’s poorest countries increasingly likely; this, in turn may lead to regime fragility and turmoil in the international system. The question of lifting the blockade by establishing a human corridor into the port of Odessa has recently been much discussed. There are challenges to any such effort, both strategic and operational. Yet a careful analysis reveals that the costs and risks of non-intervention are greater than the risks of intervening. An international naval force, co-led by the EU or its member states and Turkey is the best option for such a mission.
Topic:: Security, Food Security, Hunger, Maritime, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Black Sea

480. Gender Issues in Russia

Author:: Marina Pisklakova-Parker
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Gender inequality in the Russian Federation has been growing in the past few years due to the lack of a clear state policy addressing the problem and a rise in propaganda of so-called “traditional values”, which are patriarchal attitudes towards role division for women and men. This has resulted in the increased vulnerability of women, including the growth of violence against women, discrimination at work and lack of opportunities in politics. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, this patriarchal role division has made women even more vulnerable, doubling their load of household work and increasing domestic violence. Women’s organisations are at the forefront of providing services to victims of violence, educating the public and advocating for change. The recent so-called “special operation” in Ukraine has also demonstrated that women in Russia are actively protesting, organising themselves to help the Ukrainian people and building resistance.
Topic:: Women, Inequality, NGOs, COVID-19, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

481. The US–Italy Economic Relations in a Divided World

Author:: Adriana Castagnoli
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In 2021, bilateral trade returned to the sustained pace it had prior to the Covid pandemic. Direct investment also grew – crucially, not just Italian investment in the United States but the other way round too. While Italy’s economic ties with Russia and China remain potential hotspots, Rome has never questioned its Atlantic orientation. Nevertheless, possible austerity policies following sanctions against Russia could spread social discontent that populist parties can exploit for consensus purposes in the 2023 general election, rekindling anti-Americanism rooted in different segments of Italian society.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Policy, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Italy, and United States of America

482. Russian Youth: Their Attitude to the Ruling Elite and Political Processes

Author:: Denis Volkov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Young Russians are different from older generations. They are confident Internet users and thus have access to independent media and are exposed to free information and a variety of opinions. They show greater disillusionment with authorities, a greater degree of Westernisation of their tastes and more openness to the world. These differences are well observed in the results of the long-term sociological surveys undertaken by the Levada-Center, an independent polling centre in Moscow. Amidst the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West, Russian youth finds itself pressured between the Russian authorities on the one side, and sanctions from Western countries aimed at isolating Russia from the outside world.
Topic:: Sanctions, Public Opinion, Youth, Elites, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

483. The EU and the Ukraine War: Making Sense of the Rise of a “Geopolitical” Union

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: By ordering Russian armed forces into Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has arguably made the greatest blunder of his twenty-two-year long rule. The Russian president seems to have underestimated not just Ukraine’s capacity to resist the invasion, but also the resolve of the United States and its partners to oppose it.[1] If that is indeed the case, the greatest surprise must have come from the European Union.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

484. Russian Energy Exports and the Conflict in Ukraine: What Options for Italy and the EU?

Author:: Margherita Bianchi and Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Putin’s war on Ukraine has shaken the European Union to its core. Implications will be long lasting in numerous domains, but it is in the security and energy dimensions that concrete changes are already becoming evident as the EU fast tracks its strategy for energy diversification. The Russian invasion has drastically changed the European energy paradigm, with the new political absolute being a fast reduction of Europe’s overdependence on Russian gas. Diversifying energy supplies away from Russia is a means to tighten the economic noose around Putin, seeking to deprive the Kremlin of billions in energy revenue given that Russia continues to export oil, gas and coal to Europe at very high prices.
Topic:: Security, Sanctions, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

485. Russia–Ukraine Talks and the Indispensable Role of the US and Europe

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s imperialist war of conquest in Ukraine is about to enter its fifth week. Russia’s failure to shock and awe Ukraine’s government and armed forces into submission through a poorly executed Blitzkrieg has morphed into a slow and ever more brutal three-front campaign. While Russian forces struggle to make strides in the north and east, they have been more successful in the south, where they are about to deprive Ukraine from access to the Sea of Azov.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

486. The Mian Channu Incident and the Enduring Risk of Nuclear Escalation between India and Pakistan

Author:: Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In an international context characterised by increasing concern over the risk of nuclear war triggered by the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth noting that incidents in other regions could also lead to nuclear escalation, either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, and India

487. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

488. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:: Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

489. The differences between Western and non-Western US allies in the Ukraine war

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For mid-level regional powers, avoiding non-essential friction with a major power like Russia is seen as an imperative, particularly in a situation where consistent support from their US patron is by no means a given.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

490. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

491. Through the Lenses of Morality and Responsibility: BRICS, Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Author:: Goktug Kiprizli
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The aim of this article is to shed a broader light on the social identity of the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) whose growing economic power is the defining motive of their social construct in international relations. In line with this purpose, the article examines the BRICS nations’ positions concerning the moral aspect and the notion of responsibility for the nexus between climate change and sustainable development. This article argues that their statements and discourse on climate change and sustainable development forge the process of constructing a separate group identity for the BRICS partners. The articulation of moral appraisals and the notion of responsibility in the areas of climate change and sustainable development help the BRICS countries build their self-conception and self-categorization corresponding to their identity as emerging powers, so their actions are accomplished accordingly.
Topic:: Development, Sustainability, BRICS, Morality, Identity, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

492. The Russia-Ukraine War and addressing Africa's food security challenges

Author:: Stephen Buchanan-Clarke
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted and worsened systemic weaknesses in the current international food system which pose a disproportionate risk to African countries, and companies doing business in Africa, due in large part to their high dependence on fuel and food imports.
Topic:: Food Security, Business, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Ukraine

493. Pugwash note on the situation in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: We note with great concern the worsening situation in the ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The annexation of areas currently controlled by Russian military will exacerbate tensions as Ukraine seems determined to recover the occupied regions and is supported by several NATO countries. The situation is quite complex as armed hostilities continue unabated, and opposing security perceptions by the parties involved do not appear easily reconcilable. Despite the fact that prospects for a ceasefire look dim under this current situation, a ceasefire is a necessary step towards stopping this dangerous conflict which, while it is heavily affecting Ukraine, is also a very destabilizing element that threatens international security.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Global Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

494. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

495. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

496. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

497. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

498. Cutting Putin’s energy rent: ‘smart sanctioning’ Russian oil and gas

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Guntram Wolff, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Simone Tagliapietra, Axel Ockenfels, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ulrich Schetter
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In the wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, the most efficient way for Europe to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:: Oil, Sanctions, Gas, Vladimir Putin, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

499. How to make the EU Energy Platform an effective emergency tool

Author:: Walter Boltz, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Uncertainty about the supply of Russian natural gas is causing extremely high and volatile European gas and electricity prices. European Union countries may struggle to import sufficient volumes of natural gas at reasonable prices. During the summer, the imperatives are to fill storage sites sufficiently in a coordinated manner and to organise sufficient import volumes to replace a substantial share of gas that might no longer come from Russia. Coordination is essential to ensure that disruptions during difficult winter months do not lead to a break-up of the EU internal gas market with potentially serious political repercussions. One part of the EU response is establishment of an EU Energy Platform for the purchase of gas, LNG and hydrogen. This aims to pool demand to leverage the bloc’s economic clout, international outreach to reliable partners and efficient use of existing infrastructure. EU leaders have backed the plan but it has not yet been translated into a feasible scheme. The platform should be developed into an effective emergency tool to safeguard gas supply in case Russian flows stop. We detail two complementary proposals to achieve this. First, there should be EU-wide auctioning of remuneration for filling storage sites in specific regions. Companies would remain responsible for all stages of the value chain, benefitting from remuneration and in return offering the market operator some control over how this gas is released during winter months. Second, EU demand for additional LNG quantities, and the sourcing of this on international markets, should be coordinated through a platform, creating a transparent market for these volumes. These mechanisms would resolve the prevention paradox and prevent free-riding. If EU countries buy gas jointly, they will find it much easier to let markets allocate scarce volumes across borders in case of a complete stop to Russian supplies. . This would reduce the risk of energy market fragmentation, as well as the subsequent energy security, economic and political impacts of a shock that would hit member states very differently.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

500. Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Bobo Lo
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Putin’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the resilience but also the limitations of Sino–Russian partnership. Far from being an “arc of autocracy”, this is an interests-based relationship between strategically autonomous powers. Foreign policy coordination between China and Russia is limited by their different views of global order. Beijing is invested in a stable international system, albeit one skewed in its favour, whereas Moscow thrives on disorder and uncertainty. Xi Jinping aims to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while maintaining ties with the West. But Beijing’s balancing act will become harder to sustain as the war continues. The balance of power within the bilateral relationship has tilted sharply towards Beijing. Russia is more reliant on China than ever. The long-term outlook for the relationship is unpromising.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Conflict, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Ukraine

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