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1402. Putin Is the New King of Syria
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The U.S. withdrawal makes Russia the new arbiter of everyone’s interests, including Israel’s.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America
1403. Northern Syria and Israel
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel must adapt as quickly as possible to the evolving situation in northern Syria, while continuing to adhere to self-reliance and invest in its military.
- Topic:
- Civil War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
1404. Israel, Europe and Russia: A New Paradigm?
- Author:
- Emmanuel Navon
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel is expected by its European interlocutors to condemn Putin over his misdeeds, yet Israel wants to avoid frictions with Russia in order to maintain a free hand to operate against Iranian targets in Syria.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Foreign Interference, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
1405. Stakes and Outlook for the Ukrainian Presidential Election
- Author:
- Iris Muraz
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- Just one week before the Ukrainian presidential election, this article aims to highlight the main issues at stake in this vote in a country undergoing fundamental political change and marked by five years of undeclared war with Russia. After setting the scene in which the election is taking place, the aim will be to understand the main security, political, social and economic stakes (influence of armed conflict in the Donbass, social reform and expectations, power games between oligarchs) at the heart of the candidates’ electoral strategies. This will help us expose the complex set of interests of both economic and political stakeholders, bearing witness to a highly corrupt political system, which is impeding the implementation of reform in Ukraine initiated in 2014, and contributing to increasing mistrust amongst the population as far as their political elites are concerned. The aim will also be to place this election in the context of wider international mechanisms by analysing the view the EU and Russia have of this election. Finally, particular attention will be given to the role played by Ukrainian civil society in the next electoral cycle (legislative elections in October 2019 and local elections in 2020), and to the initiative of new dynamics in the country since the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014.
- Topic:
- Politics, Elections, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
1406. Russian Meddling in the United States: The Historical Context of the Mueller Report
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- One of the most significant—and most disturbing—aspects of the Mueller report is the confirmation that Russia attempted to influence the 2016 election, based on the Special Counsel’s exhaustive collection and review of intelligence. This campaign by a foreign adversary represents a serious threat to U.S. national security and is reminiscent of Moscow’s actions during the Cold War. As this CSIS Brief highlights, Moscow has long conducted an “active measures” campaign against the United States, including trying to manipulate U.S. domestic politics. U.S. policymakers now need a forceful response to Russia’s intelligence campaign.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Law, Elections, Election Interference, and Rigged Elections
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
1407. Beyond the Ballot: How the Kremlin Works to Undermine the U.S. Justice System
- Author:
- Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, and Arthur Nelson
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- he U.S. justice system is under attack as part of a long-term Russian effort to undermine the appeal of democracy and weaken the West. Via multi-platform disinformation operations, Kremlin-backed operatives work to exacerbate existent divisions within populations and increase overall mistrust and paranoia against democratic institutions. In the process, justice systems are portrayed as corrupt, inept, and hypocritical. This report describes the nature of this threat and proposes measures for countering it. The report focuses on activities by the Russian government, including the ways it feeds, is fed by, and amplifies domestic voices to weaken public confidence in the justice system. The insights gained by examining Russia’s efforts can and should inform our understanding of both threats from other nations and the challenges contemporary communications technologies pose to a healthy democracy generally.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Justice, Judiciary, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
1408. Russia’s Evolving South Caucasus Policy
- Author:
- Sergei Markedonov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The outbreak of fighting in April 2016 between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh introduced new uncertainty to the South Caucasus. Russia’s policies are crucial here, just as they are in the region’s other ethno-political conflicts, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This insider’s perspective on the Kremlin’s involvement in the South Caucasus highlights Russia's security concerns. The post-Soviet neighborhood's different conflict zones require a differentiated approach.
- Topic:
- International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1409. Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength
- Author:
- Paula J. Dobriansky
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- U.S. foreign policy officials have embraced economic sanctions as a tool of choice for American foreign policy. Decisionmakers have deployed sanctions against strategic adversaries and national security threats ranging from Russia to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and businesspeople who engage in corrupt activities. The appeal to both policy leaders and key constituent groups of the potent economic impacts of sanctions in several recent high-profile cases, particularly those of Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela, combined with broad bipartisan support for aggressive use of U.S. sanctions, suggests that the United States will favor this policy tool and be an active practitioner in the years ahead
- Topic:
- International Security and International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1410. Russia’s Energy Strategy
- Author:
- Tatiana Mitrova
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The fate of the “Russian Energy Strategy Up to 2035” paper—a key document defining the country`s strategic priorities in this critically important industry and submitted by Russia’s Energy Ministry every five years—illustrates well the contradictory predicament of Russia’s energy sector. In 2015, after two years of preparations, the latest version was submitted to the government, but national authorities have not approved it until now. Behind the scenes, many conflicting interests prevent the setting of a clear and coherent long-term vision.
- Topic:
- International Relations and International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1411. The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
- Author:
- Gaiane Safarova
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Like every country, Russia has a very specific demographic footprint; its fertility, mortality, and migration rates, as well as its age composition, all affect its performance domestically and on the world stage. Russia’s current demographics were shaped by its history, particularly crises like World War II, and its future will be deeply affected by conditions like its dropping fertility rate and aging population
- Topic:
- International Relations and International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1412. Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance?
- Author:
- Michel Duclos
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Russia and Iran are allies in Syria not out of mutual sympathy, but for pragmatic reasons. According to many reports, Iranian leaders—notably including Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Al-Quds force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC)—were instrumental in convincing Vladimir Putin to send his air force to Syria and save Bashar al-Assad’s skin in September 2015
- Topic:
- International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Iran
1413. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices
- Author:
- Elizabeth N. Saunders
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea
1414. How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95
- Author:
- M.E. Sarotte
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, and Clinton Administration
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States
1415. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market
- Author:
- Eliza Gheorghe
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and China
1416. The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conflict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful
- Author:
- Deborah Jordan Brooks, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas
- Publication Date:
- 02-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The world is experiencing a period of unprecedented demographic change. For the first time in human history, marked disparities in age structures exist across the globe. Around 40 percent of the world's population lives in countries with significant numbers of elderly citizens. In contrast, the majority of the world's people live in developing countries with very large numbers of young people as a proportion of the total population. Yet, demographically, most of the world's states with young populations are aging, and many are doing so quickly. This first-of-its kind systematic theoretical and empirical examination of how these demographic transitions influence the likelihood of interstate conflict shows that countries with a large number of young people as a proportion of the total population are the most prone to international conflict, whereas states with the oldest populations are the most peaceful. Although societal aging is likely to serve as a force for enhanced stability in most, and perhaps all, regions of the world over the long term, the road to a “demographic peace” is likely to be bumpy in many parts of the world in the short to medium term.
- Topic:
- Demographics, War, International Security, Democracy, and International Relations Theory
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Japan, China, Germany, and Global Focus
1417. Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical wins, strategic setbacks
- Author:
- Stanislav Secrieru
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Over the last few years, news about Russia’s conduct in the Western Balkans has resembled dispatches coming from the trenches of political and economic warfare: Moscow has slashed gas supplies, banned imports of agro-food products, conducted coordinated disinformation campaigns, nurtured nationalist organisations, deployed Cossack paramilitary groups, tested cyber defences and allegedly even tried to overthrow legitimate governments. This flurry of disruptive operations caught Europe by surprise and generated debate: does this resurgence herald Russia’s return to the region and if so, what is driving the comeback? What does Moscow want to achieve? What is the Russian modus operandi in the region? Is it confined only to coercion, as the headlines suggest, or is there a softer side to Russia’s power? Finally, looking retrospectively, did Russia’s approach bear fruit? This Brief addresses this set of questions in greater detail, with two key findings. First, Russia’s policy in the region is executed by a network of Russian state and non-state actors who are blurring the traditional lines between the public and private domains. This allows the Kremlin to tap into the resources of informal institutions and hide behind a fog of deniability. Second, Russia has raised the cost of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO by exploiting the region’s political and economic vulnerabilities. That said, although Moscow was able to slow down the process, it has hitherto failed to alter the region’s steady drift towards Western institutions, at least for now.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Balkans
1418. Hybrid Warfare and Deniability as Understood by the Military
- Author:
- Håkan Gunneriusson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- Russia and China are terraforming the maritime environment as part of their warfare. In both cases the actions are illegal and the performance is offensive to its actual nature. In the case of China, the practice is construction of artificial islands in the South Chinese Sea and in the case of Russia it is about the infamous bridge built over the Kerch strait, Ukraine. Neither Russia nor China expects an armed conflict with the West in the near future. That is a reasonable assumption, which is weaponized at the political-strategically level. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. China and Russia offer their authoritarian systems as a replacement and there are a lot of pseudo-democratic or even out-right authoritarian regimes on the sideline watching this challenge unfold. The article highlights the difference for the NATO-countries in logic of practice when it comes to the political social field on one hand and the military political field on the other hand. The article uses material from a previously unpublished survey made on NATO-officers then attending courses at NATO Defense College (NDC).
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, European Union, Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, and Hybrid Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
1419. Russia’s Promotion of Illiberal Populism: Tools, Tactics, Networks
- Author:
- Laura Rosenberger and Thomas Morley
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Understanding the rise of illiberal populism has been a focus of recent debate on both sides of the Atlantic. This “illiberal international” has many faces, often seemingly at odds: Donald Trump and Jill Stein in the United States, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Melenchon in France, la Lega and the Five Star Movement in Italy. A combination of internal and external factors drive these movements, including domestic forces such as income inequality and a sense of government irresponsiveness, and transnational trends like migration and technological change. At the same time, Russia and its leadership have sought to exploit and strengthen these movements as a means to weaken the West and gain relative power – by deepening societal polarization, amplifying divisive issues on which these movements feed, providing financial support, and connecting movements across borders. This paper does not analyze the internal drivers of these movements or transnational trends, but stipulates that they are important. It also does not examine the relative impact of internal versus external factors. Rather, this paper focuses on the role of the Russian government and its proxies in nurturing and shaping these movements as a means of destabilizing the West and advancing Russian foreign policy goals. This paper discusses three characteristics of the Russian government’s support for illiberal populist forces, and draws on examples of Russia’s promotion of such movements to illustrate patterns and pathways of influence. First, the Russian government uses a range of largely asymmetric tools to support a diverse set of actors across the transatlantic space, using similar tools in different combinations in multiple countries. Second, Russia uses cross-border networks as vectors of influence across the transatlantic space, often facilitated by Russian oligarchs or other figures close to the regime,1 who serve as transnational connectors of populist movements. Finally, while interactions between the Russian government, its proxies, and illiberal populists often use shared social, cultural, or religious values, for Russia these pathways are utilitarian means not ideological ends, and are aimed at forces on both sides of the ideological spectrum that further Russia’s agenda of upending the transatlantic status quo. These movements’ alignment with pro-Russian policies — anti-establishment, anti-European, anti-American agendas – rather than a particular political ideology, drive Russia’s support. This analysis has several implications for policy makers, including the need to break down stovepipes, work across sectors to develop a whole of society approach, and form transnational strategies to combat Russian government attempts to undermine democratic stability.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Political stability, and Populism
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1420. The ASD European Policy Blueprint For Countering Authoritarian Interference in Democracies
- Author:
- Kristine Berzina, Naďa Kovalčíková, David Salvo, and Etienne Soula
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In recent years, European democracy has been shaken by internal and external events. European nations and institutions are confronting numerous challenges like migration, nationalist extremism, and discontent with the political status quo. They also face challenges from a revanchist Russia that seeks to reestablish influence it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to weaken democracy across the continent, and from a rising China that aims to export its model of authoritarianism across the globe. The European Union and NATO have expanded their membership, bringing more European citizens into the Euro-Atlantic community, and yet a polarized European society remains ever more susceptible to interference from foreign authoritarian regimes’ attempts to undermine Europe’s stability, unity, and prosperity. The overall security threat to Europe has evolved. Europe’s adversaries are less likely to use conventional military power to fight today’s geopolitical battles and more likely to employ asymmetric tools to compensate for conventional military weaknesses—cyberattacks, information operations, malign financial influence, the subversion of political and social organizations, and strategic economic coercion. Regimes like Vladimir Putin’s Russia amplify divisive narratives to undermine public trust in democracy using a combination of state-controlled media outlets, government-sponsored online trolls masquerading as European citizens, and a network of sympathetic social media agitators. Authoritarian actors bring money into Europe licitly and illicitly to corrupt European leaders and peddle their influence in European politics and society. They use state assets as leverage to create economic dependencies that further authoritarian interests in Europe and advance their corroding influence across the continent. Finally, these regimes disrupt democracies’ ability to govern and function by conducting cyberattacks against government institutions, businesses, and media. Elections are a prime target of authoritarian attacks on democracy. The Russian government has interfered in elections and referendums in several European nations, and initial assessments of the May 2019 European Parliament elections revealed that Russian disinformation campaigns “covered a broad range of topics” to attack the EU, amplify localized polarizing content to influence public opinion, and attempt to suppress voter turnout. 1 But undermining elections is not the only goal. Authoritarian incursions into the daily lives of Europeans have increased since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, and they will grow by an order of magnitude as technologies evolve and more actors adopt these tools. By using these tools to exploit existing cleavages in democratic societies and vulnerabilities in democratic governments, authoritarian regimes are trying to weaken and distract Europe and its transatlantic partners in the United States and Canada from their regional and global responsibilities, and to diminish confidence in democracy as a viable form of government.
- Topic:
- NATO, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
1421. Massive Russian Financial Flows Through Moldova Show Small Jurisdictions Matter
- Author:
- Joshua Kirschenbaum and Sergiu Tofilat
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In 2014 the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) revealed a staggering Russian money-laundering operation perpetrated through Moldindconbank in Moldova, alternatively dubbed the Russian Laundromat1 or the Global Laundromat.2 Financial facilitators allegedly moved $20 billion from Russian banks to Moldindconbank over five years, where they “cleaned” the money using Moldovan court orders backing fraudulent claims that borrowers had defaulted on promissory notes. They then moved the proceeds to banks in Latvia and around the world. According to the OCCRP, Moldindconbank received $20 billion in potentially illicit inflows—a truly colossal sum for one small institution in one small country. Yet the real amount of Russian money that was laundered in Moldova through Moldindconbank or through other institutions during this period is very likely much higher. In 2017 The Guardian reported that Moldovan law-enforcement officials “believe the real total may be as high as $80 billion.”3 Our analysis of data in the 2016 Statistical Yearbook of the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) shows that the amount of Russian money that entered the country’s banks between 2010 and 2014 was approximately $75 billion. All this points to the inadequate response by Moldova’s government in the face of the staggering scale of the problem, to the possibility that similar illicit activity also occurred at other Moldovan banks, and to the importance of tracking cross-border payments. Most of all, the Moldovan experience shows that small jurisdictions matter, and that solutions must be comprehensive if they are to be enduring. Absent such solutions, private Russian actors and the Russian government will continue to exploit weak links in the Western financial system to conduct malign financial activity. In so doing, they will be able to export corruption, clean criminal proceeds, and facilitate interference operations.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Finance, Money, and Jurisdiction
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Moldova
1422. Avoiding the Band-Aid Effect in Institutional Responses to Disinformation and Hybrid Threats
- Author:
- Nina Jankowicz
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Since 2014, a variety of initiatives have been created in response to the rise of Russian interference in democracies. Some of the organizations, while created as answers to a real and increasingly exigent danger, began their work without a clear mandate or political will behind them. As a result, their work has not always been fully effective, falling subject to “Band-Aid Effect” in which the creation of new bodies to address the complex problem of foreign interference in democracies is viewed—whether by the convening institution, the media, or the public—in itself as a panacea. Through a study of six key unilateral and multilateral efforts in Europe to counter disinformation and hybrid threats, this paper identifies best practices and pitfalls in establishing such bodies. It assesses the extent to which they are integrated into meaningful policy- and decision-making processes, the extent to which they coordinate across government and with each other, and the extent to which they are meeting public-facing program objectives. The six efforts profiled in this paper are diverse in form and approaches, and they have achieved success in building awareness about the problem among the public and policymakers. They have also faced a variety of obstacles. Attempts to set up similar efforts can extrapolate from their experience the following best practices so as to avoid “The Band-Aid Effect” in building up new institutions.
- Topic:
- Democracy, Disinformation, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and United States of America
1423. The Russian Role in World Affairs: A View from Israel
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- It would undoubtedly serve Israel’s interest for Russia to draw closer to the US on a wide range of issues, and above all, on Iran.
- Topic:
- Hegemony, Strategic Stability, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
1424. The Fighting Continues in Northern Syria
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
1425. Russia-Israel Relations: Expectations and Reality
- Author:
- Micky Aharonson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Syria remains the main point of contention between the two countries.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
1426. The War in Donbas: Realities and Prospects of Settlement
- Author:
- Hanna Pashkova and Halyna Balanovych
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- National Security and Defence
- Institution:
- Razumkov Centre
- Abstract:
- The first section looks into some geopolitical aspects of the Russian intervention in Donbas; reviews goals and peculiarities of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine; studies the role and impact of the West in resolving the conflict; and assesses the “Donbas” policy of Ukraine. The second section describes the overall trends and processes in occupied territories in the military, economic, energy, political, information and environmental spheres. The third section provides possible scenarios of developments in the conflict zone and assesses chances and prospects of deploying the UN peacekeeping mission to Donbas. The fourth section offers conclusions, as well as a set of proposals for resolving the conflict in the East of Ukraine. The first
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, United Nations, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Donbas
1427. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? The View from Russia
- Author:
- Artyom Lukin
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This chapter provides an overview of Russian expert commentary found in Russia’s media during the run-up to the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and in its aftermath, covering the period of January to April 2019. The chapter also covers Kim’s first meeting with Vladimir Putin that took place in Vladivostok in late April. With regard to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, Russia’s commentariat traditionally splits into three groups. The first includes specialists who are more or less neutral toward North Korea. The second one is formed by experts who sympathize more with Pyongyang and tend to blame Washington and American allies for anything that goes wrong on the Korean Peninsula. The third group, now almost extinct in Russia, represents liberal and pro-Western pundits who loath the North Korean regime and view it as a major threat to international, and Russia’s, security. Similar to Western media, the Russian press has extensively covered the preparations for the Hanoi summit, the event itself, and its outcomes. The tone of the Russian reporting did not differ much from that of the world’s media. Most of the Russian commentators sounded moderately optimistic prior to the two-day summit, expecting that at least something would come out of it. That the second Kim-Trump rendezvous failed to produce any deliverables came as a somewhat disappointing surprise to most Russian observers. Still, the general mood remained cautiously optimistic even after Hanoi’s apparent failure, with the prevailing majority of Russia’s Korea watchers believing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington would continue and might eventually succeed. The Russian commentary on the Vladivostok summit was generally positive, hailing the symbolism of Moscow’s return to the major leagues of Korean Peninsula geopolitics. At the same time, many experts pointed out that, beyond displaying the decorum of the traditional Russia-DPRK friendship, the Kim-Putin summit produced modest outcomes.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Asia, and North Korea
1428. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries
- Author:
- Gilbert Rozman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
1429. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?
- Author:
- Gilbert Rozman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
1430. Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and Korean Strategies for Northeast Asian Cross-Border Energy Connectivity
- Author:
- Gaye Christoffersen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- In 2018, research was underway in Northeast Asia on several trilateral and multilateral initiatives for cross-border infrastructure connectivity involving China, Russia, both Koreas, and Japan. Infrastructure included railway lines, cross-border oil and gas pipelines, and power grids. Although most discussions of infrastructure group energy and railroad infrastructure together, energy infrastructure differs from rail transport due to a greater potential for asymmetrical dependence. Reviewing these projects, this chapter analyzes and compares the strategies of the five parties in the region that are exploring new connectivity.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and Korea
1431. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral
- Author:
- James D. J. Brown
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America
1432. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance
- Author:
- Stephen Blank
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea
1433. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea
- Author:
- Robert Sutter
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
1434. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy
- Author:
- Gilbert Rozman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea
1435. Iran Looking East: An Alternative to the EU?
- Author:
- Annalisa Perteghella
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- In February 2018, anticipating the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared a policy of “preferring East over West”, thus paving the way for deeper cooperation with Asian powers such as China, Russia, and India. Differently from the “Look East” policy promoted during the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the current Iranian strategy is not only functional to escape the US-led isolation, but it rather seems devoted to the consolidation of a block of power which can commit to security and economic schemes in alternative to the Western-dominated ones. This ISPI report aims to answer few crucial questions: Which are the major initiatives promoted within the Iran’s “Look East 2.0” strategy? To what extent will Tehran succeed in creating a solid Eastern block? What will be the influence of the wider geopolitical context? And finally, what role is left for the EU?
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Economy, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and India
1436. Russia and China: Anatomy of a Partnership
- Author:
- Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- While the “decline of the West” is now almost taken for granted, China’s impressive economic performance and the political influence of an assertive Russia in the international arena are combining to make Eurasia a key hub of political and economic power. That, certainly, is the story which Beijing and Moscow have been telling for years. Are the times ripe for a “Eurasian world order”? What exactly does the supposed Sino-Russian challenge to the liberal world entail? Are the two countries’ worsening clashes with the West drawing them closer together? This ISPI Report tackles every aspect of the apparently solidifying alliance between Moscow and Beijing, but also points out its growing asymmetries. It also recommends some policies that could help the EU to deal with this “Eurasian shift”, a long-term and multi-faceted power readjustment that may lead to the end of the world as we have known it.
- Topic:
- Partnerships, Economy, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Eurasia
1437. The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition volume deals with competition among regional and external players for the redistribution of power and international status in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on Russia’s renewed role and the implications for US interests. Over the last few years, a crisis of legitimacy has beset the liberal international order. In this context, the configuration of regional orders has come into question, as in the extreme case of the current collapse in the Middle East. The idea of a ‘Russian resurgence' in the Middle East set against a perceived American withdrawal has captured the attention of policymakers and scholars alike, warranting further examination. This volume, a joint publication by ISPI and the Atlantic Council, gathers analysis on Washington's and Moscow's policy choices in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ engagement in the countries beset by major crises.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Legitimacy, Engagement, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Middle East, North Africa, and United States of America
1438. A two-way challenge: Enhancing EU cultural cooperation with Russia
- Author:
- Domenico Valenza and Fabienne Bossuyt
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
- Abstract:
- At a time of cooling relations, culture is arguably the European Union’s most powerful instrument to shape positive long-term relations with Russia. Against a convoluted international and domestic background, EU cultural action in the country is at present supported through a variety of financial instruments and programmes. Stakeholders and cultural operators agree that EU engagement in the cultural sphere plays a vital role in breaking civil society isolation and fostering long-term openness in Russia. However, in spite of considerable improvements, EU action in the cultural realm has still underutilised potential.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, International Cooperation, Culture, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eurasia
1439. U.S. Grand Strategy Towards Russia 2001-2017
- Author:
- Martins Hirss
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- Objectives: U.S. foreign policy towards Russia is of the utmost importance for the national security of the countries on the NATO eastern flank. Grand strategies are among the analytical concepts for classification and analysis of U.S. actions in the international arena. This paper uses grand strategy classification framework to classify and analyse U.S. strategy towards Russia from 2001 to 2017. Methods: 36 speeches about Russia by U.S. Presidents George Bush and Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden from 2001 to 2017 were used in content analysis. U.S. grand strategy classification framework was used as the tool for coding and classifying different foreign policy elements within these speeches to identify different approaches towards Russia. Results: The content analysis allowed to identify nine stages in U.S. policy towards Russia from 2001 to 2017. The most significant shift during this period was in 2014 when after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine U.S. strategy towards Russia shifted from liberal internationalism towards primacy. Conclusions: Ideas of liberal internationalist and increasingly primacist grand strategies do influence U.S. foreign policy towards Russia. The grand strategy classification framework offers a valuable tool for analyzing, classifying and identifying different foreign policy stages in U.S foreign policy towards Russia.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Security, and Grand Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
1440. Russia's return to the superpower status
- Author:
- Mirosław Minkina
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- Objectives: The elite of Russian power and Russian society have never come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also did not accept the world order with the primary role of the United States. The purpose of this article is to characterize the policy of the Russian Federation, which is aimed at rebuilding the superpower position of this state, and to identify the reasons that clearly define Russia’s determination in this respect. Methods: Achieving the formulated goal will be possible by answering the question: Why does Russia strive to rebuild the status of the global superpower and what actions it undertakes in its policy? This question is the main research problem, which the authors of the article have taken up. In order to solve the indicated problem, theoretical methods will be used in the form of: source and literature criticiam, analysis, synthesis and inference. Results: Nobody negates the fact that Russia is still one of the largest countries in the world. Nonetheless, it is much smaller and weaker than the USSR. By means of assertive, not to say aggressive, and anti-western politics it demands to be recognized as a superpower eligible to decide on the international order. However, in the contemporary world, the territory decides about the superpower status to a much smaller extent. Conclusions: The foundations of the Russian superpower status are weak, and the popular anti-western narrative is not conducive to strengthening the Kremlin's position internationally.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Superpower
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
1441. Kaliningrad oblast in the military system of the Russian Federation
- Author:
- Marek Żyła
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- From the geopolitical point of view, the Kaliningrad Oblast, due to its exclave location, has become an area of strategic importance. Its strategic nature has been steadily increasing with the successive enlargements of the European Union and NATO. The geographical location and the army stationed in the area allow Moscow to control the situation in the Baltic Sea basin. This makes it possible, through the Euro-Atlantic location of most countries in the region, to influence European policies. In this way, Russia is playing a leading role in this part of the continent. From the point of view of the countries within the region, it is a global military power and a regional superpower. In this context, Kaliningrad exclave increasingly more frequently serves as a security policy tool. It is part of the ongoing threat to the Baltic States and Poland. Demilitarisation of the region, which is periodically demanded by neighbouring countries, is impossible for several reasons. The armed forces stationed there are a counterbalance to the expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organisation from Russia’s point of view. They serve to protect national interests and secure the affairs of the Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas in the immediate vicinity. They protect the Russian economic zone and access to the resources of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the military potential located in the Kaliningrad Oblast, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been a guarantee of continuity of Potsdam’s border solutions.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Training, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Kaliningrad
1442. Wargaming the cyber resilience of structurally and technologically different networks
- Author:
- Heikki Lantto, Bernt Åkesson, Marko Suojanen, Topi Tuukkanen, Simo Huopio, Juha-Pekka Nikkarila, and Mari Ristolainen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- Based on a review of different analytical frameworks, it is suggested to run a table top cyber wargame when trying to analyse the effects of closed national networks being imposed in the near future. The scope of the wargame is to extract results to show how the resilience of an open national network differs from a closed national network. It is self-evident that the formation process of resilience is different between the diverse systems. The proposed wargame is a two-sided cyber table top wargame. The wargame is based on at least two blue teams, at least one red team and a control team (namely a white team). One blue team is located in the closed national networks and its system relies on closed national network infrastructure. The other blue team operates its system within open network society. By designing, constructing and executing the proposed cyber wargame we argue it is possible to find these diff erences and similarities as well. Current research improves cyber situation awareness and proposes a direction to be followed when trying to understand the changing circumstances of the cyber space. It also suggests how the research resources could be directed when trying to improve the situation awareness of the closing process.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Networks, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
1443. Non-military determinants of the Russian Federation policy
- Author:
- Bogdan Grenda
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- This study analyses various non-military factors in shaping the security policy of the Russian Federation. This work undertakes to establish their substance, content and scope, and to draw the conditions and trends in the political, economic and social security of modern Russia in the context of its international ambitions, role and state security. In the work theoretical method analysis, synthesis, abstracting and generalization were used. Based on the results of the research, it was determined that the specificity of its location definitely exerts an adverse effect on Russian state security. The reconstruction of imperial Russia is among the key goals set forth by Vladimir Putin in Russia’s foreign and military policy. In fact, the entire economic, political and military activity of Russia is subordinated to this goal. With regard to the economic and social state, the dependence of the Russian Federation on the extraction and export of crude oil and natural gas is an obvious indication of the constraints of its economy. Moscow’s particular interests are formulated in official state documents, such as the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy. These documents identify not only external and internal threats to state security but above all indicate the means and methods of possible deterrence.
- Topic:
- Security, Natural Resources, Social Security, and Economic Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
1444. Hybridity – a ‘new’ method to accomplish dominance
- Author:
- Leszek Elak and Zdzislaw Sliwa
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The term ‘hybrid warfare’ proved to be very popular among academics, military thinkers and professionals leading to a variety of definitions and approaches. It was linked with the new generation concept popularised by Russian military thought. The essence of the hybridity is not new, as using a combination of military and non-military instruments is as old as mankind and is recognised but interpreted differently. The paper examines both the concept and its implementation based on case studies and theoretical considerations. It debates possible ways of using it to confront targeted nations by a combination of a variety of tools and approaches.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Hybrid Warfare, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Eurasia
1445. CHOOSING AN ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE
- Author:
- Danielle L. Lupton
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- It’s been over two months since the crisis between Ukraine and Russia escalated with the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018. Since then, the global news media has devoted little attention to the conflict and references to the dispute from senior American and European policy makers have grown increasingly sparse. Despite an immediate public condemnation of Russia’s actions by the EU and NATO, European and American leaders have yet to coordinate a significant response. In short, the reaction has been underwhelming. This is problematic for three reasons. First, Russia’s latest act of aggression has been interpreted by many as a test of Western resolve and America’s commitment to its European allies. A failure to present a united front carries reputational consequences for the United States, the EU, NATO, and other European powers as well as their leaders. Second, the conflict in Ukraine is ongoing and the humanitarian consequences for civilians of this “forgotten” war—not to mention for Ukrainian democracy itself—are dire. Third, a lack of response to such acts of aggression could further embolden Putin, not just in Ukraine, but also in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Ethics, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
1446. WHAT GAME OF THRONES CAN TELL US ABOUT RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
- Author:
- Betcy Jose and Christoph Stefjes
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- White House National Security Advisor John Bolton recently declared, “In this administration, we’re not afraid to use the phrase ‘Monroe Doctrine.’” The Monroe Doctrine harkens back 200 years to a policy that captures the idea that a hegemonic power holds dominion over a particular geographic region—its sphere of influence—where it serves as the sole arbitrator of the rules of the game. Bolton likely referred to the doctrine’s Roosevelt corollary where, “the United States was justified in exercising ‘international police power’ when there was unrest in Latin America.” In explicitly referencing this doctrine from the past, Bolton seemingly took a page from the playbook of the Game of Thrones’s (GoT) Night King, bringing back to life things once considered dead. As President Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “’The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over. The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states.’”
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, United Nations, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
1447. U.S. Claims of Illegal Russian Nuclear Testing: Myths, Realities, and Next Steps
- Author:
- Daryl G. Kimball
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- I n prepared remarks delivered at the Hudson Institute May 29, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, Jr., charged that “Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the ‘zero-yield’ standard outlined in the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).” Russia has vigorously denied the allegation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the accusation “a crude provocation” and pointed to the United States’ failure to ratify the CTBT. On June 12, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said, “we are acting in full and absolute accordance with the treaty ratified by Moscow and in full accordance with our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.” The DIA director’s remarks, and a subsequent June 13 statement on the subject, are quite clearly part of an effort by Trump administration hardliners to suggest that Russia is conducting nuclear tests to improve its arsenal, and that the United States must be free of any constraints on its own nuclear weapons development effort, and, indirectly, to try to undermine the CTBT itself—a treaty the Trump administration has already said it will not ratify. The challenges posed by the new U.S. allegations are significant and they demand a proactive plan of action by “friends of the CTBT” governments for a number of reasons.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
1448. Spies, Election Meddling, and Disinformation: Past and Present
- Author:
- Calder Walton
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Spies, election meddling, disinformation, influence operations, data har- vesting: at present, it seems barely a moment passes without another intelligence scandal breaking on our news feeds. Following Russia’s “sweeping and systematic” attack on the 2016 U.S. presidential election—which was intended to support Moscow’s favored candidate, Donald J. Trump, and undermine his opponent, Hillary Clinton—the media frequently labeled the operation “unprecedented.” The social-media technologies that Russia deployed in its cyber-attack on the United States in 2016 were certainly new, but Russia’s strategy was far from unusual. In fact, the Kremlin has a long history of meddling in U.S. and other Western democratic elections and manufacturing disinformation to discredit and divide the West. Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, has reconstituted and updated the KGB’s old Cold War playbook for the new digital age. This paper, an exercise of applied history, has two aims: first, to understand the history of Soviet disinformation, and second, to make sense of Western efforts to counter it during the Cold War. Doing so provides policy-relevant conclusions from history about countering disinformation produced by Russia and other authoritarian regimes today.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Cold War, Espionage, and Disinformation
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States of America
1449. Winter 2018 edition of Contemporary Eurasia
- Author:
- Ruben Safrastyan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Contemporary Eurasia
- Institution:
- Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
- Abstract:
- SECURITY ISSUES IN EURASIA ARTSRUN HOVHANNISYAN ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER IN FOCUS: COMPARISON OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF NEAR-PEER COMPETITORS, CURRENT ISSUES ...........4 TINA KHARATYAN THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF AZERBAIJAN: ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND POLICY IMPLICATION ...............21 HRANUSH DERMOYAN THE 2016 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: A RESULT OF CHANGING CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE IN TURKEY .........................41 LIANA HAYRAPETYAN RADICAL ISLAM IN RUSSIA: THE CASE OF TATARSTAN ..................61 THE ARAB WORLD IN TRANSITION ARAKS PASHAYAN SAUDI ARABIA-QATAR. FROM COOPERATION TO CONFRONTATION ................................................................................80 GOR GEVORGYAN THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE U. S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND EGYPT ..................................................................................90 MUSHEGH GHAHRIYAN THE KURDISH FACTOR IN IRAQ-GULF ARAB STATES RELATIONS .....................................................................100 SOUTH CAUCASUS: REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES LILIT GALSTYAN RUSSIA AND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: SPOILING THROUGH MEDIATION? ...................................................... 114 ZURAB TARGAMADZE CONFLICTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONALISM: CASE OF GEORGIA ...................................................................................133 KRISTINE MARGARYAN AZERBAIJAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ......................................................................................................................146
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Islam, Military Affairs, Weapons, Conflict, Coup, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, South Caucasus, and Asia-Pacific
1450. Russia politics: Quick View - Protesters across Russia call for election boycott
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1451. Russia politics: Russia in 2018: all quiet on the eastern front?
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political outlook
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1452. Russia/Ukraine politics: Quick View - Ukraine to resume gas imports from Russia
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
1453. Russia politics: Orthodox business
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1454. Russia/Ukraine politics: Quick View - Ukraine adopts controversial law on re-integration of Donbas
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
1455. Russia politics: Quick View - Russia prepares to host 2018 football World Cup
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1456. Russia/Ukraine politics: Quick View - Still no conclusion on Donbas, despite US-Russia meeting
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
1457. Russia/US politics: Quick View - US releases new Russia sanctions but declines to impose them
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States
1458. Russia politics: Quick View - Russia and Syrian regime intensify air strikes in Idlib
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1459. Russia politics: The approved challenger
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1460. Russia politics: Quick View - Latest polls show still strong support for Putin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1461. Russia politics: Quick View - Israel-Iran clash escalates in Syria, Russia's tack unclear
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1462. Russia/Ukraine politics: UN peacekeeping proposal in Donbas: much ado about nothing
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, and Recent developments
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
1463. Russia politics: Quick View - US Department of Justice indicts 13 Russians
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1464. Russian Non-Linear Warfare in Ukraine and Moldova: Lessons for Visegrad Countries
- Author:
- Sergiy Gerasymchuk
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Slovak Foreign Policy Association
- Abstract:
- Although the issue of hybrid war with its instruments and phases is well elaborated in the academic literature,the Russian invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea has introduced certain new aspects of hybrid and non-linear warfare to the international political and academic agenda. The author attempts to synthesze the existing definitions of hybrid warfare in the Western literature with the new generation warfare involving the Russian/Soviet concepts of deep operations, active measures and reflexive control, and non–linear war. By analyzing the so called Gerasimov Doctrine,the phases and sections of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine, and political developments in the Republic of Moldova, the author comes to the conclusion that the current situation in the Republic of Moldova can be characterized as the preparatory phase of a hybrid war that may shift into attack and stabilization phases in the following year when parliamentary elections are held in Moldova. In addition, the author argues that – despite a lack of certain key prerequisites for Russian hybrid war in Visegrad countries (such as a Russian ethnic population)– the V4 still faces the risk of a growing Russian influence, and that V4 countries can still be targeted by Russian non-linear warfare within the vulnerable spheres indicated. The author would like to express his gratitude to Alexander Duleba, Pavol Demeš, Juraj Marušiak, Kálmán Petőcz, and the SFPA team, for their consultations and advice
- Topic:
- International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1465. Russian Intervention in the US Presidential Elections: The New Threat of Cognitive Subversion
- Author:
- Yotam Rosner and David Siman-Tov
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The indictment filed by the United States Justice Department on February 16, 2018 against 13 Russian citizens and three Russian companies regarding attempts to promote the candidacy of Donald Trump for the US presidency, amounting to intervention in the country’s political system, is a phenomenon enabling interference in the “consciousness” of another country
- Topic:
- International Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1466. Russia politics: Former economy minister receives strict sentence for bribery
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, and Recent developments
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1467. Russia/Iran politics: Caspian Sea's legal status unlikely to be resolved
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, and Recent developments
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Iran
1468. Russia/Ukraine politics: Quick View - Court postpones ruling on Saakashvili's fate
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
1469. Russia/Belarus politics: Quick View - Belarus and Russia make little progress on visa-free issue
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Belarus
1470. Russia politics: Quick View - Russia agrees to resume flights to Cairo
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1471. Georgia/Russia politics: Pragmatic but principled
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Georgia
1472. Russia/Egypt politics: Quick View - Russia increases clout in Egypt with military, nuclear deals
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Egypt
1473. Russia politics: Pot shots
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1474. Russia politics: Quick View - Minimum wage increased ahead of presidential election
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1475. Ukraine/Russia politics: Calling a bully a bully
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics and News Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia
1476. Russia/Central African Republic politics: Quick View - Russian arms delivered in the CAR
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Central African Republic
1477. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America
1478. The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- The April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial, even happy, event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a “Declaration of Peace, Prosperity and Unification.” This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in “The Declaration” with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending “division and confrontation” on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task before them. Among the issues this review examines are the implications of various provisions in The Declaration for two great powers with long-standing interests in and influence on the Korean peninsula: China and the United States.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
1479. Risky Business: A Case Study of PRC Investment in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
- Author:
- Danny Anderson
- Publication Date:
- 08-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- China’s “New Silk Road” or “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) has reached Central Asia in resounding fashion. As a result, the republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have seen large increases in Chinese presence and investment. Although both countries have overlapping needs, the degree and character of PRC involvement in each has differed. PRC investment in Tajikistan is characterized by expensive loans on infrastructure investment and energy projects that the country may be unable to repay (Avesta.tj, December 25, 2017). Kyrgyzstan, while having hosted similar projects, is also attempting to move the country into the twenty-first century by improving its transportation and digital infrastructure (Tazakoom.kg). Development experts classify both countries as “high-risk” for debt distress given public debt projections (Cgdev.org). However, despite the risk of such an outcome, both countries appear inclined to welcome PRC investment with open arms, as a way of funding needed investment like power generation and logistical links with the outside world.
- Topic:
- Development, Infrastructure, Economic Growth, and Soft Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
1480. Looking into Eurasia - A review of 2017: the year in politics
- Author:
- Anne De Tinguy, Bayram Balci, David Cadier, Isabelle Facon, Clémentine Fauconnier, Marie-Hélène Mandrillon, Anaïs Marin, Dominique Menu, and Ioulia Shukan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
- Abstract:
- Looking into Eurasia : the year in politics provides some keys to understand the events and phenomena that have left their imprint on a region that has undergone major mutation since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: the post-soviet space. With a cross-cutting approach that is no way claims to be exhaustive, this study seeks to identify the key drivers, the regional dynamics and the underlying issues at stake
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Corruption, Crime, Economics, Globalization, Human Rights, Nationalism, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Territorial Disputes, Global Markets, Finance, Europeanization, Memory, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, and European Union
1481. What’s in a deal anyway: Idlib DMZ violations harm peace process
- Author:
- Nicholas Norberg
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
- Institution:
- The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
- Abstract:
- In the backdrop of negotiations over drafting Syria’s new constitution and a transition in UN representation on Syria, the conflict in Idlib continues to simmer. Unrest in Idlib and dissatisfaction there with the internationally-recognized opposition, the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), leaves residents of Syria’s northwest excluded from constitutional committee. This is significant because the constitutional convention is increasingly viewed as a precondition for advancing the larger peace process. The constitutional committee is no place to hammer out granular differences between warring factions in Idlib, but the course of events there hold significant implications for the future of the broader peace process.
- Topic:
- Peace Studies, Conflict, Syrian War, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, Middle East, United Nations, Syria, and Idlib
1482. Relearning the Art of Nation State Diplomacy
- Author:
- Mike Anderson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- American foreign policy is complex, and its application by diplomats and military practitioners is challenging in the diverse nature of the current environment. Military and diplomatic advisors during the post-9/11 period have concentrated on non-state threats, conditioning them to resort quickly to military options. In the face of emerging state competitors such as the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, a broader range of options beyond only military force is required. This generation of policy advisors must unlearn some of what they have learned over the course of the last fifteen years of conflict, as they shift from dealing with non-state actors to addressing the resurgence of near-peer statecraft based on national security threats. These threats have been long ignored during the war on terror. The diplomatic craft represented during the Cold War must be embraced by both the military and diplomatic personnel in practice, and emphasized by the uniformed armed forces and professional diplomatic advisors to policy and decision makers.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North America, and United States of America
1483. The Surprising Allure of Russian Soft Power
- Author:
- Nicolai N. Petro
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- The six Russian national security documents issued since Putin first became president in 2000 display a remarkable conceptual consistency. A careful reading of these documents, the most authoritative statements of Russia’s worldview publicly available, challenges several common Western assumptions.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Territorial Disputes, Ideology, and Soft Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America
1484. Russia and Turkey—Dalliance or Alliance
- Author:
- W. Robert Pearson
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- Russia and Turkey are dancing a complicated pas de deux—for separate and common reasons. The happy couple has captivated global attention. There are reasons today to anticipate greater collaboration between Turkey and Russia in Syria and against Europe and the United States. However, there are also significant contradictions that could weaken the prospects of cooperation between the two countries. For gains against Syrian Kurds and to fan nationalist flames domestically, Turkey may be ignoring longer term needs. Russia is the major partner in the arrangement and sees little reason to sacrifice its interests to please Turkey. One day this unequal relationship may cause Turkey to question its value.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, History, Bilateral Relations, and Military Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
1485. James and the Moscow Goons
- Author:
- Peter Bridges
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- Putin’s recent expulsion of hundreds of our colleagues serving at our embassy and consulates in Russia reminded me of my own service in Moscow in the 1960s. You may call this ancient history, though it doesn’t seem so ancient to me. Stalin had been in his grave for a decade, and dear Nikita Khrushchev was now in charge. Under Stalin, two and a half million people had been prisoners in the deadly Gulag camps. Thousands of poor haggard people had been released, and some of the system’s more notable deceased victims were even “posthumously rehabilitated.” The Gulag had officially been closed down in 1960—but an estimated three-quarters of a million inhabitants of the USSR were still in the horrid camps. And nothing had been done to lessen the role of the KGB, at least so far as we could see.
- Topic:
- Cold War, Diplomacy, Economy, and Memoir
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America
1486. Russian Forces in Syria and the Building of a Sustainable Military Presence: Towards a Restructuring of the Syrian Army?
- Author:
- Alimar Lazkani
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The Syrian Army has inherited a few of the norms and customs the French used for running army affairs following the French occupation. These did not include any provisions on regulating the army. After the Baa’th Party came to power, particularly after Hafez Assad had assumed office, the norms and customs guaranteeing minimum rights for army soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers faded gradually, leaving room for cronyism and allegiance to individuals and to the regime as the sole guarantor for the military to gain their rights. Leaders of military units became almost governors of their own units where nothing could take place without their blessings The Russians became fully in charge of the Syrian Army and started to instil rules and regulations that would ensure discipline and transform the army to a professional force capable of actual missions on the ground. Such rules included entrenching among Syrian soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers’ allegiance to Russian military officers and meant to subdue and prevent them from exercising their authority. This has established the Russians as the de facto leaders in the minds of members of the Syrian army. This has mainly shifted the responsibility for all the atrocities committed by the Assad forces under the Russian leadership to the Russians together with the regime’s officers and leaders. Despite their inability to make decisions, they are responsible, in terms of political structure and posturing, for all cases of genocide, chemical attacks, displacement, starvation and other violations. It has therefore become difficult in the Syrian context to separate between the Russian leadership and the Syrian Army, except in terms of differentiating between the leader and the follower, a divide that Russia has been working on consolidating in the media and in its diplomacy as an entity “assisting to achieve peace and combat terrorism”, while it undoubtedly deserves the description of “occupier” with its ability to run a lot of important issues on Syrian soil.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Genocide, Political structure, and Military Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria
1487. Russian Forces in Syria and the Building of a Sustainable Military Presence: What About Iranian-backed Syrian Militias?
- Author:
- Alimar Lazkani
- Publication Date:
- 07-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- There is constant talk of the “soft conflict” between Iran and Russia in Syria. Most research and media reports focus on the areas of influence and control of each party. Without going into the relationship between Iranian and Russian forces on Syrian soil, in which the Iranian of influence weakened following the entry of Russian troops, it is important to distinguish the nature of these two forces to help identify the characteristics of this conflict, which are not limited to areas of influence. In fact, there is a clear difference between Iranian and Russian interests as well as strategy on two major issues. The first is the relationship with Israel. While Russia sees Israel as a strategic ally in the region, Iran gains its regional legitimacy by emphasizing the continuity of conflict with it. The second is the way each party sees the future of Syria, and its own role in it. Iran is not capable of establishing a centralized state in Syria because of its ideological hostility to the Sunni majority there. Therefore, a state based on sectarian militias will be the cornerstone of Iran’s continued presence on Syrian soil as it has the capacity to manage militias with no national project. Russia, on the other hand, has a vision of a centralized state that is based on the fundamental pillar of a disciplined and dutiful army. Thus, the “soft conflict” involves not only the geographical divvying-up of Syria, but also fundamental matters related to the structure of Syria’s security and military system. This paper is the second part of a broader study of Russia’s policy of establishing a military influence in Syria. It will look at the Syrian militias that Iran has fostered and supported, and Russia’s approach in dealing with them on the ground. However, it does not consider non-Syrian militias on Syrian soil brought by the Iranians, such as Hezbollah, the Fatemiyoun, the Zainabiyoun, and other Shia militias because of their close association with Iranian politics and their temporary posting in specific conflict areas, making them a foreign presence on Syrian soil.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Military Intervention, Sunni, and Shia
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
1488. Europe Is the Key Player in Syria: An Alternative Template for Transition
- Author:
- Bassma Kodmani
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- As long as military means prevailed in deciding the fate of Syria, the European Union could not alone induce any decisive change in the dynamics of the conflict, and Assad was vindictively seeking to prove that the European Union’s ability to influence the conflict was nil. Assad’s luck was that Putin was determined to prevent his fall and threw his full weight behind him to maintain his rule. When the guns finally fall silent, should the key countries of Europe and the EU itself simply accept as “a sad reality” the fact that the Syrian regime is back in full control of the country? Will they channel funds for humanitarian, post-emergency and early recovery purposes through the State’s financial system knowing full well that European tax payers’ money might be massively diverted to end in the pockets of Assad’s family and the kleptocracy around him,1 and serve to pursue his sectarian scheme of changing the demographics of Syria along religious and ethnic lines? Framing the discussion in terms of accepting Assad and rehabilitating him or not is disempowering for the EU. It assumes that military force alone is what determines the outcome of the conflict and the political fate of the country. If it follows this rationale, Europe would be annihilating everything it stands for; it would serve as a helping hand in Assad’s strategy to bury the civil society groups it helped organize and silence the democratic forces and all those within the different sectors of society who want a Syria that resembles Europe in terms of its values and its political system on the other side of the Mediterranean. The EU’s declared position that there will be no reconstruction without political transition in Syria is an honorable one, but this position still needs to be operationalized if the EU is to turn it into a policy and use its full clout to shape the resolution of the conflict.
- Topic:
- Europe Union, Humanitarian Intervention, Military Intervention, and Economic Policy
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, Europe, and Syria
1489. Poland, US bases and geopolitical games
- Author:
- Robert Barić
- Publication Date:
- 08-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- Recent Polish proposal for financing permanent US military presence in Poland isn't motivated only to counter current Russian aggressive posture. This offer is a part of a wider Poland strategy for achieving long term security. In pursuing this strategy, Warsaw risks not only to undermine NATO cohesion, but also to deepen growing East-West divide inside the EU.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland
1490. Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: July-December 2018
- Author:
- Roee Kibrik and Nimrod Goren
- Publication Date:
- 07-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, International Affairs, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Jerusalem, Gaza, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus, and European Union
1491. The Impact of US LNG on Russian Natural Gas Export Policy
- Author:
- Tatianna Mitrova and Tim Boersma
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- The United States and Russia have long been the world’s largest natural gas producers, but they traditionally have not faced off in direct competition in that market. The United States was expected to become a net importer of natural gas, while Russia’s state-owned Gazprom took a prominent position in the European market. The boom in US shale-gas production changed that. While the United States had been trading gas regionally by pipeline for decades, the shale boom allowed for the export of US liquefied natural gas, putting the two gas giants in competition. Even before the first molecule of US LNG shipped, rising US production had diverted LNG destined for the United States into the European Union. Facing increased competition pushed Russia toward a more market-oriented strategy, with Gazprom adjusting its long-term oil-linked contracts that had previously been the backbone of Russian sales to European customers to use more hybrid formulae. This was just the beginning. After a slow start, the competition brought on by US gas is to a large extent shaping the Russian natural gas strategy in Europe and beyond. For Europe, rising gas competition from new suppliers has both economic and energy security implications. Globally, it is also raising questions about how Gazprom will compete in Asia, where demand is growing and gas suppliers are looking to place future production, as well as in other markets. Understanding how Gazprom will react to US gas is thus a critical economic and geopolitical question for LNG importers and exporters worldwide. In this paper the authors examine how Gazprom will maneuver in global markets under specific circumstances. It opens with a discussion of how the US and Russian gas sectors developed and interacted in the period before shale gas. The paper then examines how Gazprom’s gas trade has been impacted by new US production and what changes may be coming as US exports continue to increase. It finds that the advent of US LNG has already reduced Russian gas revenue, undermined its oil-linked pricing model, forced contract renegotiations and accelerated domestic gas market liberalization and LNG development. The authors argue that Russia is in a good position to defend its market share in Europe and looks at some of the strategies that could be pursued under various market scenarios, including the following: High Asian demand and low oil prices: If oil-linked gas prices were pushed below spot prices, Gazprom would not need to further adjust its pricing policy (as was the case in 2015–2017). In certain situations Gazprom might even limit supplies to drive prices up and increase its rent, becoming the price maker. Such a strategy would be utilized cautiously to avoid demand destruction and prompting new FIDs for new (US) liquefaction capacity. High Asian demand and high oil prices: In this scenario Gazprom’s position would be well served in the short to medium term by strong revenues. In the longer term, however, high prices will attract more competitors to the markets (and prompt new FIDs), so it is important for Gazprom to keep its own prices competitive and to keep the margin of the aggregators, which are supplying the European market, below their margin in Asia. There are already almost no “pure” oil-linked contracts left, and Gazprom in Europe mainly has hybrid pricing, but this scenario will require a more fundamental shift in the pricing, with the share of spot-indexed prices becoming dominant. Low Asian demand and low oil prices: Gazprom may be forced to keep prices for its long-term contracts below short-run marginal costs of US LNG. Gazprom might voluntarily move to completely spot-indexed prices, simultaneously trying not only to find new markets for its gas (both in Asia and in Europe) but also to stimulate new demand. The company would need more flexible and creative marketing, and it would seek to improve the efficiency of its operations, both internationally and domestically. Should Gazprom start to see its market share decline, Moscow could decide to liberalize the pipeline export monopoly, a decision that would make Novatek and Rosneft more powerful players. Low Asian demand and high oil prices: Russia would feel competitive pressure not only from the United States but also from all existing low-cost LNG suppliers like Qatar, which may have to switch to Europe and keep gas prices at a low level. Gazprom would have to engage in this price competition as well, flooding the market using spare capacities and driving the prices down to the level of its short-run marginal costs, which will disincentive US LNG aggregators to offtake their LNG. Gazprom has considerable underutilized upstream capacities and huge spare transportation capacities, allowing it to drive down European prices below the level acceptable for US LNG suppliers. This scenario hurts everyone on the supply side, and it is warranted to ask how long it could be upheld. The study finds that even in scenarios where Gazprom sees gas revenues driven down to 2009 or 2016 levels, this should not prove catastrophic for Russia. For Moscow, facing more competition in Europe is a new situation that Gazprom and decisions makers in the Kremlin will have to deal with. Under normal circumstances, competition between various sources of supply can result in net benefits for the end consumer. In addition, this paper demonstrates that the changes in the global gas market have forced Gazprom to adjust its business practices. However, the increased politization of natural gas in the United States carries a risk of inflamed tensions between Moscow and Washington.
- Topic:
- Globalization, Natural Resources, European Union, and Gas
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and Europe
1492. The Return of Political Warfare
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea
1493. Enhanced Deterrence in the North A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy
- Author:
- Heather A Conley
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Twenty-five years of relative calm and predictability in relations between Russia and the West enabled European governments largely to neglect their military capabilities for territorial defense and dramatically redraw Northern Europe’s multilateral, regional, and bilateral boundaries, stimulating new institutional and cooperative developments and arrangements. These cooperative patterns of behavior occurred amid a benign security environment, a situation that no longer obtains. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military incursion into eastern Ukraine, its substantial military modernization efforts, heightened undersea activity in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea, and its repeated air violations, the region’s security environment has dramatically worsened. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region have returned as a geostrategic focal point. It is vital, therefore, that the United States rethink its security approach to the region—what the authors describe as Enhanced Deterrence in the North.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Modernization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Northern Europe, Crimea, and Baltic Sea
1494. Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions
- Author:
- Suzanne Spaulding
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- This report, informed by a CSIS-convened Experts Group, calls for a whole-of-nation approach to address the threat to, and improve the resilience of, the country's democratic institutions. The report proceeds in four sections. First, it outlines the nature of the threat posed by the Russian government, building upon what Russia has done in other countries, as well as in the United States. The second section describes how technology has magnified this threat. The third section examines essential elements of a "National Strategy to Counter Russian and Other Foreign Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions." The final section is a call for action.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
1495. Russia’s National Oil Champion Goes Global
- Author:
- Edward C. Chow and Andrew J. Stanley
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- After the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was roiled by political and economic chaos, many state-owned assets were privatized based on political connections and corrupt practices. The oil sector was a particularly attractive, but by no means the only, target for these privatizations. By the end of the 1990s, almost all of Russia’s oil production was privately owned. In spite of continued nontransparency, the oil sector began to resemble a competitive market with private investors introducing Western technology, financial accounting, and operating and management practices. It also started to attract major foreign investments. The remaining state oil assets were managed by a sleepy state enterprise named Rosneft that, in spite of its name (Russian Oil), produced less than 5 percent of Russia’s oil. Today, majority state-owned Rosneft produces almost half of Russia’s oil. Its daily oil production of 4.6 million barrels, according to its last reported quarterly results, is double that of the world’s largest oil company by market capitalization, ExxonMobil, which last reported daily liquids production of 2.3 million barrels. Rosneft’s rapid rise coincided with the rule of Vladimir Putin, who first became president of Russia in 2000. Its production increases were built largely on the backs of controversial acquisitions of assets previously held by private companies such as Yukos, TNK-BP, and Bashneft. Rosneft’s acquisition spree accelerated after Putin’s close associate and Russia’s then-deputy prime minister Igor Sechin became chairman of its board of directors in 2004. Sechin left government in 2012 to take over as Rosneft’s chief executive officer. Rosneft’s board of directors is now chaired by former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Rosneft’s transformation as Russia’s national oil champion is consistent with Putin’s policy of regaining state control over the commanding heights of the Russian economy, which is more reliant on oil income today than the Soviet Union ever was. Rosneft is Russia’s largest taxpayer and contributed a quarter of government revenue in 2014. Until recently, Rosneft concentrated mainly on consolidating its dominance over the domestic oil patch. It is also Russia’s leading refiner and is increasing natural gas production for direct sales to domestic gas users, producing 67 billion cubic meters in 2016. In 2014, Russia was hit by the twin shocks of a global oil price collapse and Western economic sanctions enacted after its aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region and annexation of Crimea. These developments affected Rosneft severely since it involved the value of the commodity it produces and sells and restricted Rosneft’s access to international financing when it was heavily indebted from the aforementioned acquisitions. A normal company might hunker down, repair its balance sheet, and wait for external conditions to improve. Instead Rosneft has done the exact opposite and expanded its international business aggressively. As part of the 2014 U.S.-led sanction efforts, Igor Sechin, as the leading figure of Russia’s largest petroleum company and his having “shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin,” was directly sanctioned. Further Russian sanctions enacted by Congress in 2017 called on the U.S. Department of the Treasury to submit a detailed report on senior political figures, oligarchs, and parastatal entities as determined by their “closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.” While the unclassified version of the report released to Congress on January 29 included Igor Sechin, the report was poorly received and largely regarded as nothing more than a “rich list” by Russian experts. However, the report also contains classified annexes, including a list of parastatal entities and supporting analysis, which by definition would have included Rosneft. Although Rosneft’s rapid international expansion is too recent to assess definitely, this paper describes some of Rosneft’s overseas ventures and explores possible motivations, economic and political, behind them.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Oil, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, Gas, Transparency, and Private Sector
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Eastern Europe
1496. Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins?
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing new Russian nuclear systems—several of which are still developmental, may have key components that are untested, or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in asserting Russian national strength in a Russian election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or “toys” than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies. An analysis of the actual content of his speech, the changing nuclear and conventional balance between the superpowers—the U.S., Russia, and China, the global balance of deployed nuclear weapons, the shifts taking in US and Russian balance since the Cold War, and as a result of START, the full range of new U.S. and Russian nuclear programs, and of what Putin did and did not say about Russia's new programs, provides a very different picture from the one Putin portrayed in his speech. It shows that Putin focused on the "toy factor" in emphasize technology over any real world aspects of the balance, arms control, and war fighting.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia
1497. Contested Seas Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe
- Author:
- Kathleen H. Hicks
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities. Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it. Russia presents three challenges of particular concern to the MDA efforts in Northern Europe: maritime hybrid warfare, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, and long-range strike systems. Maritime Hybrid Warfare—The Russian military is experienced and effective in its use of hybrid warfare, seen in Syria, Crimea, and Northern Europe. The ambiguity possible in the maritime domain lends itself well to this strategy. Russia uses three specific approaches in this realm: deception through different types of vessels including civilian ships, deniable forces like the amphibious and light infantry that easily navigate the complex Baltic and Norwegian Seas, and the country’s well-developed and diverse force for seabed warfare. Cyber and Electronic Warfare—Russia’s advanced EW capabilities have the potential to hinder information gathering and dissemination methods, which are both vital functions of MDA. These capabilities are challenging for military personnel but potentially devastating in civilian contexts, especially as civilian networks and technology (like GPS) are far less secure. Long-Range Strike Capabilities—New challenges for NATO and Northern European partners have emerged with Russia’s development of a long-range precision strike complex. The weapons, now being mounted on new and existing Russian naval vessels, give these vessels the option to stay in the Barents or White Seas and strike targets across Northern Europe. This, combined with air force capabilities based on the Kola Peninsula and in Kaliningrad, presents threats unlike any seen by NATO before. These capabilities require NATO and its partners to use MDA frameworks to monitor launch platforms across the domain. The modern history of MDA begins in the United States, with Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) / National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41) issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush. The document lays out core interests for the United States to enhance security in the maritime domain and creates a cooperative framework to support MDA operations across different spheres. At the same time, the European concept of maritime security awareness was built upon the U.S. definition of the challenge, placed within the context of rising illicit traffic in the Mediterranean. A weakness of the original MDA and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) concepts is that many of the associated capabilities and frameworks are focused on civil maritime issues. Given the global proliferation of advanced military capabilities, like antiship cruise missiles, NATO and its partners require a holistic understanding of the maritime environment that focuses on everything from civil maritime actions to high-end military operations and even issues associated with the maritime environment. A key implication of the heightened maritime threat environment is the need to improve the integration of and attention to undersea aspects of MDA. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a traditional strength of Western naval intelligence and operations, has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. Today, Russian submarines with conventional long-range missiles pose a threat to NATO. ASW must be integrated with MDA to address these concerns. Comprehensive understanding of the undersea realm should extend beyond ASW. Russia’s amphibious special forces and combat swimmers threaten more than just military targets, including civilian vessels and undersea cables, which are an integral part of MDA. ASW technology can be useful in countering these and other threats. In the Norwegian Sea, the biggest challenge for NATO is detecting advanced ultra-quiet submarines. This issue is sharpened by dramatically depleted stockpiles of sonobuoys, a constant need for increasingly advanced sonobuoy technology, and an American unwillingness to share highly classified information about the undersea domain. NATO would benefit from an apparatus like the ASW Operations Centers (ASWOC), used most prominently during the Cold War to streamline ASW operations. Integration of platforms is a challenge in the Baltic Sea as well, largely because Sweden and Finland are not NATO states, making data sharing challenging. Frameworks like Sea Surveillance Co-Operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project facilitate the work of regional states to address these issues but more must be done. Additionally, NATO monitoring of the Baltic region is largely domain specific and suffers from not examining the maritime domain holistically. The alliance and its partners should also act to focus on resiliency to continue to operate in the face of jamming and nonkinetic attacks from Russia. The key to enhancing MDA capabilities in Northern Europe is the integration of frameworks across the maritime domain. Cooperation between NATO states and allies is vital to understanding the complex environment. The CSIS study team has identified seven recommendations of particular importance: Create a Baltic Sea MDA analytic center at the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC) at Rostock, Germany; Empower a small analytic team at the BMCC to focus on maritime hybrid issues; Develop a training course for military intelligence officers on best practices for Baltic Sea MDA analysis; Create a classified Baltic Sea data environment that can incorporate both NATO and partner states; Develop a multinational operational framework for the Baltic Sea; Integrate subsurface sensors and antisubmarine warfare into a comprehensive MDA framework; and Acquire significant stockpiles of advanced sonobuoys and associated acoustic processing systems. These priority recommendations are presented in detail in Chapter 4 of the report, along with others. Collectively, their implication would markedly enhance security in Northern Europe by closing identified gaps and ensuring capabilities for collection, analysis, and action in MDA.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, Western Europe, Baltic Sea, and Norwegian Seas
1498. Who’s Afraid of Russian Gas? Bridging the Transatlantic Divide
- Author:
- Nikos Tsafos
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The Issue Russian energy has divided the transatlantic alliance for over 60 years. Tensions normally just simmer, but they flare up when a new project is proposed, especially after a political crisis. In the 1960s, it was the prospect of increased Soviet oil exports following the Cuban missile crisis. In the 1980s, it was more Soviet gas for Western Europe after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and martial law had been declared in Poland. Today, it is the proposed Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its war against Ukraine (among other actions). Disagreements are natural in a broad alliance with diverse interests and perspectives. But it is now almost impossible to discuss Russian gas with any sense of calm (increasingly true for all things related to Russia). Russian initiatives are infused with perceptions and fears that range from the simple and legitimate to the obscure and far-fetched. In reality, arguments about Russian gas are rarely about Russian gas; they are about history, strategy, and geopolitics. Gas is just the spark. The end result is confusion and discord at a time when the transatlantic alliance has enough problems—without needing to add gas to the fire. It is time to separate Russian gas from the broader Russia agenda. Doing so will boost energy security, protect and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and allow us to focus where the West can resist Russian power more meaningfully. This argument rests on three propositions. First, that energy does not give Russia as much power as we usually assume; second, that an antagonistic strategy is unlikely to be sustained or succeed in bringing about change, whether in energy or geopolitics; and third, that the best response to Russian gas is a set of policies that Europe should pursue anyway and that are unrelated to Russia. In short, we need to radically rethink Russian gas; how much it matters; and what the United States and Europe should do about it.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
1499. Religion and Violence in Russia Context, Manifestations, and Policy
- Author:
- Olga Oliker
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Religious violence is surely as old as both faith and fighting themselves. In the Russian Federation, as elsewhere in the world, religious teachings and philosophies are used both to justify and combat violence. But what forms does this take, and with what implications for Russian society, Russian policy, and Russia's future? This volume examines the many ways in which religion and violence intersect in Russia, and offers recommendations for both policymakers and scholars as they chart paths forward. Presenting the results of original research by collaborative teams of Russian and western authors, it takes on topics from violent radical Islamic jihadism to religious propaganda employed by violent right-wing groups; from repression of religious communities to conflict within religious confessions. In each case, it offers not only new analysis, but prospective policy solutions to make Russia and Russians of all religions (and no religion) safer and more secure.
- Topic:
- Religion, Violent Extremism, Violence, Repression, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe
1500. Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference
- Author:
- Heather A Conley
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- On Friday, May 5, 2017—just two days before the second and final round of the French presidential elections—gigabytes of data hacked from Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign team were released online. Months earlier an orchestrated disinformation campaign against the Macron presidential campaign had already begun. The so-called Macron Leaks—a combination of real emails and forgeries—could have been yet another example of a long list of attempts by Russia to interfere in a high-stakes transatlantic election. But the 2017 French presidential election may be the exception that proves the rule: it is the most clearly failed attempt. The Kremlin neither succeeded in interfering with the presidential election nor in dividing French society. As the United States prepares to hold nationwide elections on November 6, 2018, the director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, has already warned in February of this year that “We expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.” Calling Russian influence “pervasive,” Director Coats further noted that “The Russians have a strategy that goes well beyond what is happening in the United States,” he said. “While they have historically tried to do these types of things, clearly in 2016 they upped their game. They took advantage, a sophisticated advantage of social media. They are doing that not only in the United States but . . . throughout Europe and perhaps elsewhere.” Because the United States is not well prepared for future elections, it is necessary to study the past. This is why the 2017 French presidential election is a particularly important election to study and why we highlight French scholar Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s groundbreaking report on the Macron Leaks.1 Drawing in part upon the work of CSIS visiting fellow Boris Toucas,2 Vilmer’s forthcoming report will examine what happened during the French presidential election; who orchestrated the affair; how it was successfully countered; and what lessons can be learned. This Brief, which is part of the forthcoming CSIS comprehensive report, sums up the main lessons learned. Myriad structural factors, luck, as well as effective anticipation and reaction by the Macron campaign staff, government and civil society, and especially the mainstream media, combined to successfully resist Russian malign influence.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, National Security, Elections, and Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and France