- CIAO Search Results

501. How non-state armed groups engage in environmental protection

Author:: Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputant
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Non-state Armed Groups have a mixed - and mostly negative - impact on the environment, but there are ways in which NSAG’s engagement can have positive effects on the environment during and after armed conflict. The adoption of the UN principles for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict can provide an avenue for constructive engagement.
Topic:: Environment, United Nations, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Global Focus

502. Climate change adaptation relevance of Tanzania’s national budget

Author:: Noah Pauline, Peter Rogers, Edmund Mabhuye, Beatrice Sumari, Lucas Katera, Jamal Msami, Per Tidemand, and Esbern Friis-Hansen
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In Tanzania, climate change adaptation is financed by international development assistance and by nationally generated revenue. While international development assistance is registered by OECD and climate change adaptation relevance tagged by donors, the proportion of the nationally generated revenue that is climate change adaptation relevant is unknown. This DIIS Working Paper analyses the climate change adaptation relevance of the national budget (from 2014 to 2022), using the same methodology applied in a previous study (Yanda et al., 2013). The study further assesses the degree to which climate change adaptation financed is devolved to local government. The study finds that a disproportionately high proportion of climate adaptation finance is used at central government levels due to priorities being established at the ministry level. Moreover, the study finds that local governments lack discretion over climate change adaptation finance due to the country’s highly centralised policies, practices and procedures. Qualitative fieldwork indicates that nearly all climate change adaptation finance accessed by local governments comes with a central government tag (directive) on how to use it.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Environment, Poverty, Budget, and Inequality
Political Geography:: Africa and Tanzania

503. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:: Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

504. Governing Outer Space – legal issues mounting at the final frontier

Author:: Hjalte Osborn Frandsen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In 2022, the private space firm SpaceX successfully launched 61 rockets, adding hundreds of satellites to its burgeoning, globe-spanning mega-constellation. SpaceX´s Starlink-project now comprises more than 3,000 satellites. For comparison, the European Space Agency launched six rockets in 2022 and operates less than 50 satellites in total. In the span of a few years, private space companies have dethroned nation states as the dominant actors in outer space. Today the vast majority of satellites are owned and controlled by commercial companies. During the first months of the Russian assault on Ukraine, several commercial space companies stepped in to provide vital satellite images and space-based Internet in support of the Ukrainian defense. This exemplifies the three currently dominant trends of human space activities: expansion, securitization and privatization. The global space industry is undergoing the most fundamental and swift changes since the original space race ended when Neil Armstrong placed the first boot marks on the moon in 1969. The rapid changes raise a number of serious governance issues in areas such as national security, environmental protection and the rule of law in outer space. Denmark, Europe and the international community at large all have an acute interest in insisting on space being a global commons in which conduct can and should be regulated to benefit all of humanity – not just a few profit-seeking billionaire-owned space companies. Developments in the space industry are fast and accelerating. As with other global governance issues, like climate and cyber issues, achieving global accord on new regulations for space activities will be difficult and time-consuming, so prudent policymakers should get started right away.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Law, and Space
Political Geography:: Global Focus

505. Inclusion and exclusion in Somali drought emergency assistance

Author:: Ahmed Musa
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: When drought or other emergencies strike in the Somali regions, the first responders are Somalis themselves, not the international humanitarian system. Based on family, kinship and more distant social ties, Somalis mobilise and deliver various forms of emergency assistance to the affected communities. Yet, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion vary significantly, pending on the closeness of social ties, the power relations between local and international actors, and the number and forms of intermediaries. In this new DIIS Working Paper, Ahmed M. Musa, examines such local and transnational humanitarian practices and the mechanisms of inclusion and inclusion that they entail. Focusing on instances of drought in Somaliland, Musa argues that emergency assistance based on close social ties observes the overall humanitarian principle of impartiality. There are challenges, however, particularly when the social ties are more distant, as in the case of government-led or international responses. This may be mitigated, Musa shows, by the social contract of reciprocity between givers and recipients of assistance, going hand in hand with social sanctions where people abstain from helping those in need. Familiarity is thus central for impartial and inclusive access to emergency assistance, rather than an obstacle. The paper is an output from the Diaspora Humanitarianism in Complex Crises (D-Hum) research project in which Musa was a postdoc between 2020 and 2022. D-Hum analyses how Somali diaspora actors and their local counterparts mobilise, channel and deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia and Somaliland during complex humanitarian crises. The project is funded by the Danish Consultative Research Committee for Development Research (FFU). Share on FacebookShare on TwitterShare on LinkedInSend link to page with mailPrint page
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Environment, Migration, Poverty, Natural Resources, Inequality, Conflict, Borders, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

506. Climate change actions in conflict affected contexts

Author:: Helene Maria Kyed and Justine Chambers
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Violent conflict and state oppression in Myanmar demonstrates the importance of placing conflict analysis and people-centred approaches at the centre of international programming on climate change and environmental protection. In 2021, the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that the impacts of the climate crisis will be particularly pronounced in poor and conflict-affected countries. Research also identifies climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that, in combination with socio-political factors like poverty, state incapacity and inequality, can intensify violent conflict. However, gaps remain in how to address the increase in climate change vulnerabilities in contexts with violent conflict and state oppression. This is evident in Myanmar, where a historically repressive military regime is threatening to cause longer-term ‘climate collapse’. Since a military coup in February 2021, extractive activities and war economies are destroying the natural environment and placing communities at further risk of displacement, violent persecution and food shortages. These effects of conflict are reducing local people’s capacity to adapt to climate change and threatening civil society’s efforts to protect the environment. Under such conditions, climate change programming needs to place conflict analysis at its centre stage and substitute state-centric and purely technical approaches with people-centred ones, in alignment with the localisation of aid agenda.
Topic:: Climate Change, Democratization, Environment, Natural Resources, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia and Myanmar

507. Most green funds do not have a sustainability impact

Author:: Jan Fichtner, Robin Jaspert, and Johannes Petry
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: ESG funds are growing rapidly. However, their impact on climate change mitigation and sustainability remains unclear. Recent research on the transmission mechanisms from sustainable finance to the real economy has identified key shortcomings that need to be addressed in order to reduce greenwashing and make these funds truly green.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Capitalism, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

508. What needs to change for green funds to be truly green

Author:: Jan Fichtner, Robin Jaspert, and Johannes Petry
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Green investment funds are growing rapidly. However, their impact on climate change mitigation and sustainability remains unclear. Recent research has identified key shortcomings that need to be addressed in order to reduce greenwashing and make these funds truly green. Green finance is playing an ever more prominent role in recent years. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) funds, which constitute a key pillar of green finance, saw record inflows of hundreds of billions of US-dollars in recent years, primarily by retail investors. Essentially, these ‘green’ funds are integrating environmental, social and governance criteria, such as greenhouse gas emissions, labour rights and gender diversity into their investment strategy. They claim to invest less in the stocks of firms that are highly polluting or have bad governance practices, and instead buy the shares of corporations that appear to be more sustainable. In industry and policy debates, ESG funds are often cited as advancing the promotion of sustainability and helping to address climate change. However, the ESG concept, its underlying criteria, and its potential effects are highly controversial. Many critics see ESG primarily as ‘window dressing’, with no significant positive impact – either for the environment or for investors and employees.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Oil, Gas, Capitalism, Sustainability, and Minerals
Political Geography:: Global Focus

509. Security professionals are changing how humanitarian organisations operate

Author:: Jethro Norman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) created the first position solely dedicated to security in 1991, but for the next decade it was rare for humanitarian organisations to embed security professionals. After the 2003 Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad in which the UN’s special representative in Iraq was killed, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) was established. However, attacks on aid workers increased throughout the 2000s in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Humanitarian organisations invested more in their security in response to these threats, as well as changing norms around humanitarian liability. In 2015, in a landmark ruling, an aid worker successfully sued the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) for gross negligence. In response, donors implemented increasingly stringent insurance protocols, and the demand for humanitarian security professionals continued to grow. Today, virtually every international humanitarian organisation operating in an insecure region employs an international security professional, typically from a western military, police or private security background. Insights from long-term fieldwork with security contractors and aid workers in Sub-Saharan Africa (including Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Tanzania) shows that this has resulted in friction between the two groups, especially in relation to access and liability. In recent years, several developments have streng- thened the authority of security professionals over humanitarian staff. First, digital technologies have been increasingly used for information gathering, monitoring of staff and remote management. Second, as humanitarian security has become more structured and coordinated, new international organisations have emerged whose sole purpose is to provide security services to humanitarian clients. Whilst sometimes registered as non-profits, their function is not dissimilar to commercial private security companies, raising important questions about how the information they gather may be used beyond humanitarian purposes.
Topic:: Security, Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Humanitarian Organizations
Political Geography:: Global Focus

510. What shall we do with the suspected pirates? Why piracy prosecution doesn't always work

Author:: Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In African waters, incidents of piracy still far outweigh apprehensions, leaving few suspects to prosecute. Those who are prosecuted may face either impunity or legal uncertainty, because the illegal act of piracy is difficult to prove in some cases. There are steps that the states involved in counter-piracy should take to address these challenges. Piracy has been a constant issue of concern since the early 2000s in the waters off East and West Africa, albeit with numbers of incidents fluctuating with seasons and geography. The international community has in both theatres developed a practice, where international navies patrol the waters and hand over suspects for prosecution in regional states. But bringing piracy suspects to justice faces many challenges. This policy brief points to the main issues and possible solutions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Water, Governance, Piracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Africa

511. Greenland in the mirror of Puerto Rico

Author:: Rafael Cox Alomar
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The quest for self-determination is as critical today as it was in the aftermath of the Second World War. As was the case during the heyday of decolonization, the path to political devolution remains entangled to realpolitik. It is the geopolitical calculus of the metropolitan centers that still defines the viability and feasibility of the decolonizing formulas available to their non-sovereign territories. The options available to Greenland and Puerto Rico will no doubt reflect the new global order emerging from the ashes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the United States and Denmark (along with their NATO partners) engage in the complex task of redrawing and redefining the boundaries and security priorities of their transatlantic alliance. It is precisely against this background that the present brief offers a succinct description of Puerto Rico’s politico-constitutional status. While bound to their respective metropoles within the context of contrasting constitutional arrangements, the political and legal issues besieging Greenland and Puerto Rico are not wholly dissimilar and deserve careful attention. More specifically, the definition of free association adopted by the US House of Representatives on December 15, 2022, upon approving the 2022 Puerto Rico Status Act bill, might prove informative to policymakers in Nuuk and Copenhagen.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, and Self-Determination
Political Geography:: North Atlantic, Denmark, Caribbean, Greenland, and Puerto Rico

512. Free Association and the United Nations

Author:: Rachael Johnstone
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Since 1945, most States, on achieving independence, seek admission to the United Nations. This is a shortcut to international recognition on the world stage and secures their statehood against future challenge. Although in theory States do not require formal recognition from other States to come into existence, it is desirable. Rather than seeking recognition and/or expensive diplomatic relations with dozens of other States, admission to the UN puts to bed any doubts about the nation’s existence as a State once and for all. Membership is available to States in Free Association (FA States). UN Members each hold a seat on the General Assembly with an equal vote (irrespective of population or economy). The General Assembly controls the UN budget and elects Member States to other major UN bodies (e.g., ECOSOC, Human Rights Council and Security Council). Membership of these bodies allows States to influence UN focus and policy. A small, new Member State may not desire or have the capacity to seek a seat on these bodies directly, but it can engage in “vote-trading” to promote its interests within the broader system. The General Assembly is also a crucial diplomatic forum in which Member States build trust and alliances with one another.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, United Nations, History, and Free Association
Political Geography:: Europe and Denmark

513. Climate resilience and Cook Islands' relationship of Free Association with Aotearoa / New Zealand

Author:: David J. Kilcullen
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: On 1 January 2020, the Cook Islands was removed from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s List of Official Development Assistance (ODA) Recipients. Having been assessed as a “high-income status country”, this re-classification rendered the Cook Islands ineligible for OECD development assistance. It was unfortunate timing. The Covid-19 pandemic hit a few months later and caused a significant contraction in the tourism sector on which the Cook Islands is economically dependent. The result was, by the government’s own description, a “severe recession” with a total contraction of -21.6% of GDP in 2020/ 2021. Thus, only months after being recognized as having a sufficiently high income as to no longer warrant OECD development-assistance, the Cook Islands lost nearly a quarter of its GDP. This was especially significant for a country that is particularly susceptible to climate change and weather-related hazards. The Cook Islands is made up of 15 coral atolls and volcanic islands. Over 90% of the residents of the 12 inhabited islands live within one kilometer of a coastline. In addition, its already modest population of just under 15,000 people is rapidly decreasing (down from approximately 17,500 in 2016), undermining social and economic resilience to shocks. Despite notable economic growth in the years preceding Covid-19, greater infrastructure and other investment remains essential to brace the country for future climate-related changes. A question thus arises as to the benefits of Free Association in circumstances where the former colony faces crises.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, History, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe, Denmark, New Zealand, and Cook Islands

514. The European Political Community: Putting politics first?

Author:: Fabrizio Tassinari
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The European Political Community (EPC) was launched in Prague on October 6th of 2022 in the presence of 44 European heads of state and government, including all 27 Member States of the EU, as well as governments of neighbouring European countries, most notably the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Turkey. The initiative came in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its stated aims was to address the shortcomings of the European institutional architecture. While the project is a direct emanation of the French government, its objectives, perspectives and potential as an intergovernmental forum for political and strategic discussions about the future of Europe remain unexplored. The gathering has already planned three future summits (in Chișinău, Moldova; Granada, Spain and the United Kingdom) but it is as yet unclear if and how the new format can contribute to the wider European security architecture in light of the war, ongoing NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden and the EU’s opt-out referendum in Denmark. This brief aims to spell out three questions surrounding the evolution of the EPC across three key dimensions that concerns its possible institutional, policy and power-related contribution to the wider European constellation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Denmark

515. Climate change, mobility and human trafficking in Ethiopia

Author:: Ninna Nyberg Sørensen
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Throughout history, demographic, economic, political, religious, and environmental developments have resulted in Ethiopian mobility, mainly within the country or neighbouring region, but also further afield. Although Ethiopia’s current migration rate is only about half of the sub-Saharan average of 2%, the combined effects of poverty, population growth, conflict, and climate change have led to a recent growth in international migration. Women make up half of these flows. Proximity to the Middle East has facilitated women’s migration for domestic work while simultaneously raised concern over human trafficking violations. International Human Rights and anti-trafficking organisations predict that the negative effects of climate change will increase the vulnerability to trafficking in persons, forced labour, sexual exploitation, and debt bondage. This policy brief draws on research carried out under the auspices of the collaborative ‘Governing Climate Migration’ (GCM) research programme to further explore how climate change, migration and human trafficking may interlink. It questions routine applications of the human trafficking label to irregular Ethiopian migrant domestic workers and suggests replacing it with a migration-trafficking continuum approach that takes life before, during and after migration into account.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Migration, Borders, Risk, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

516. Why adaptation projects do not stop climate-related migration

Author:: Lily Salloum Lindegaard, Nauja Kleist, Francis Jarawura, and Joseph Teye
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Climate change constitutes a critical challenge for subsistence rain-fed agriculture in the Global South. Increasing temperatures, irregular rainfall, and dry spells have negative, sometimes devastating, consequences for rural communities. Harvest yields diminish or fail, the planting season becomes unpredictable, and the dry season may be prolonged. While subsistence farming has always been demanding in such areas, climate change amplifies these challenges. As a result, local communities draw on a range of alternative farming methods and livelihood strategies, ranging from employing different crops to seasonal or long-term migration. Migration as an adaptation strategy, however, is widely rejected by international donors, national governments and sometimes local authorities. Rather, these actors often aim to enhance and promote local agriculture or other locally based livelihoods through in-situ adaptation projects, or adapting in place. This can be through providing (or selling) inputs to increase yields, e.g. drought resistant seeds, fertilizers or pest control; promoting new farming techniques, e.g. climate smart or conservation agriculture; or improving access to key resources, for instance water access through irrigation. Affected communities are supposed to stay where they are – in other words, deal with the challenges on the ground.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Migration, Natural Resources, and Adaptation
Political Geography:: Global Focus and Global South

517. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours

Author:: Yang Jiang
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

518. How to encourage private sector climate initiatives in Kenya

Author:: Judith Mulwa and Marie Ladekjær Gravesen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Climate change is a particularly pertinent issue in Kenya because the country’s economy is highly dependent on its natural resource base (such as agriculture and fisheries), which are sensitive to temperature and rainfall variabilities. As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kenya must work to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This requires significant financial resources. Per the UNFCCC framework, some national climate actions are not expected to receive financing from international financial sources. Therefore, the country must look for innovative ways of domestically sourcing finances for low-carbon development and climate resilience programmes. Kenya has, in this regard, set up and implemented a national climate fund for financing adaptation and mitigation projects, ideally from various sources, including the private sector. This policy brief explores the legal, price-based, property-based, and information-based incentives for private sector investment and engagement in climate adaptation and mitigation in Kenya. The analysis is based on desk research and 51 stakeholder interviews from identified private sector institutions and industries in Kenya.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Natural Resources, Investment, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

519. Power and path dependencies may weaken EU counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea

Author:: Jessica Larsen and Stephanie Schandorf
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In 2013, West African coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea region (extending from Senegal in the north to Angola in the south) signed the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to combat maritime crime. The code promoted a trend of increasing donor activity intended to sustain the resulting Yaoundé Architecture (which includes the code, a declaration and a memorandum of understanding between regional organisations), through capacity-building and counter-piracy operations (see Box 1). A decade later, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea grew increasingly urgent as the world’s hotspot of attacks, and questions remain about whether the Yaoundé Architecture (YA) is fit for purpose.
Topic:: Crime, Law Enforcement, Piracy, European Union, and Path Dependency
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, and Gulf of Guinea

520. A Brief History of Senior International Officers on U.S. Higher Education Campuses

Author:: Allan E. Goodman and Mirka Martel
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: A Brief History of Senior International Officers on U.S. Higher Education Campuses captures the diversity of SIO roles, their varied accomplishments and challenges, and the tools and strategies needed to make them most successful. Based on survey data and select interviews with 200 SIOs from across the United States, our findings reflect the complexities of SIO responsibilities and priorities. Collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, our research focuses on strategic factors and considerations for success as SIOs navigate the path forward. We hope that the findings from our research contribute to an important and wider discussion about the SIO role on U.S. higher education campuses and its need to continue to advocate for internationalization and academic exchange.
Topic:: Higher Education, Internationalization, and Academic Exchange
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

521. Leading with Resilience: COVID-19 Learnings

Author:: A. Sarah Ilchman and Mirka Martel
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: Leading With Resilience: COVID-19 Learnings from the Institute of International Education is based on interviews with IIE team members about their experiences navigating the COVID-19 pandemic. This unique publication highlights lessons learned and best practices from three years of managing IIE programs through the COVID-19 pandemic, and brings a personal lens to IIE’s work and leadership in the international education field. The paper focuses on three primary areas: Initial Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Program Learnings, and Organizational Perspectives. It highlights successes and opportunities for improvement across the Institute over the last three years, and brings to the forefront the creativity and flexibility of IIE’s teams in their approach to keeping programs running and participants safe as they navigated the constantly-changing landscape of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Topic:: Education, Leadership, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Management, and Work
Political Geography:: Global Focus

522. Spring 2023 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:: Julie Baer and Mirka Martel
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: The Spring 2023 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 527 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends in international students studying at U.S. institutions in spring 2023 and recruitment patterns for prospective students and (2) the realities of U.S. study abroad in summer 2023 and academic year 2023/24. Each section is supplemented by special analyses on underrepresented populations participating in international educational exchange. On inbound mobility, we present data on non-degree international students and refugees and displaced students. The study abroad section includes insights on data collection of underrepresented populations in study abroad, including students with high financial need, first generation students, and other populations.
Topic:: Education, Higher Education, Students, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

523. Responding to Netflix's Stateless Series: Misrecognition and Missed Opportunities

Author:: Lindsey N. Kingston
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Statelessness & Citizenship Review
Institution:: Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, Melbourne Law School
Abstract:: The six episode Netflix series, Stateless, represents a missed opportunity to engage in vital public framing of statelessness. Rather than focusing on the lack of legal nationality, the series falsely equates statelessness with other rights issues central to migration detention. In this collaborative work between a stateless activist and an academic researcher, the authors use Stateless as a starting point for a broader conversation about words, definitions and representation. First, statelessness has partially emerged on the international human rights agenda, yet film and television attention could further foster mainstream understanding of this oft-ignored issue. Second, a critical assessment of the Stateless series highlights how it does (and mostly does not) engage with the issue of statelessness. Third, reflections and recommendations relate to why the series’ title is so problematic, what the media can learn from stateless people and what this conversation means for advocacy.
Topic:: Mass Media, Social Media, Advocacy, and Stateless Population
Political Geography:: Global Focus

524. The Racialised Non-Being of Non-Citizens: Slaves, Migrants and the Stateless

Author:: Samuel Martinez
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Statelessness & Citizenship Review
Institution:: Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, Melbourne Law School
Abstract:: Proponents of barring the children of undocumented immigrants from birthright citizenship allege that the United States (‘US’) Constitution’s 14th Amendment was intended to give full citizenship to former slaves and their progeny, and not to benefit the children of foreign-born people. A real-world example that illustrates the dangers of so restricting birthright citizenship is the Dominican Republic, where legal measures have already excluded the children of out-of-status immigrants (who are mostly of Haitian ancestry) from eligibility for birthright citizenship. The effect of this has not been ethnically cleansing Haitian descendants from the Dominican Republic so much as confining them within the country as a stateless underclass of people. The Dominican case therefore shows that US opponents of birthright citizenship for the children of out-of-status non-citizens must answer to the danger that their proposal would create a legally approved hereditary underclass on US soil, more than a century after the abolition of chattel slavery.
Topic:: Migration, Slavery, Stateless Population, and Systemic Racism
Political Geography:: Global Focus

525. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Author:: Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and North America

526. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:: David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

527. Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Maryruth Belsey Priebe
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.
Topic:: Security, Women, Peace, Equity, and Gender
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

528. Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications

Author:: David Dorman and John Hemmings
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy. In the first installment of a three-part research project, Dr. Dorman and Dr. Hemmings lay out the rise of China’s overall digital grand strategy, Xi’s role in it, and how it has been organized to fulfil Party objectives. The report tracks the rise of the strategy over the past 10 years, the acceleration of that rise during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the current state of the strategy. In particular, it finds Digital China has been supported and designed by General Secretary Xi Jinping himself, and is a bid to make China more competitive vis a vis the West through the digital transformation of rules, institutions, and infrastructure at the national level. Over the past few years, the strategy has risen to become the “overall” strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, bigger than the Digital Silk Road, deeper than the Belt and Road Initiative, more far reaching than 5G or AI, more important than Made in China: 2025, and wider than Cyber Great Power. A renewed Digital China seeks to challenge a hegemonic global system anchored to a previous age. A successful Digital China has profound implications for China’s developmental path, great power competition, and for the norms that will undergird the international system for decades to come. The Party leadership has re-written Marxist economic theory in its bid to incorporate “data” as the basis of its digital economy and in order to foster a Chinese “Digital Marxism”. Digital China seeks to whet the “sharp weapon” of innovation to facilitate its great power rise and challenge to the West. Beijing is testing whether innovative thinking can be created through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning. The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

529. Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Carl W Baker
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

530. A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Rob York, Craig Kafura, Rick Umback, Rose Rodgers, and Thom Dixon
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power. The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response. Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

531. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

Author:: Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea

532. Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

Author:: Tom Connolly
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.
Topic:: National Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

533. ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:: Rob York, Chloe Clougher, Julian Gluck, Jaeeun Ha, and Lindsay Horikoshi
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire. This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface. All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: South Korea, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

534. Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

Author:: John Hemmings, Ariel Mota Alves, Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda, Fikry A. Rahman, Katrina Guanio, and Siu Tzyy Wei
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated. The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN. The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda. It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum. The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty. The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development. As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Brain Drain, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia

535. Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

Author:: David Santoro, Elrika Hamdi, Sabar Md. Hashim, Shwe Yee Oo, and Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first. It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.
Topic:: Climate Change, Nuclear Power, Energy Transition, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia

536. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:: Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

537. US-ASEAN Digital Economy Cooperation

Author:: Hanh Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Long criticized for its lackluster record in economic engagement with Southeast Asia, the US is now looking to bolster digital economy cooperation with the region as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Both sides have already engaged in several cooperation initiatives to strengthen Southeast Asia’s digital capacities. These actions/engagements aim to help the region capture the immense benefit and respond to potential socioeconomic disruptions brought by the digital economic boom. However, US-ASEAN cooperation will have to deal with two challenges. First, China has already established a comprehensive and prevalent presence in the region’s digital economy, from hard infrastructure and customer-facing businesses to developing digital standards. Second, Southeast Asia’s diversity in economic development leads to varied capacities among its members. These attributes carry certain security complications for Southeast Asia and the US in the long run. Addressing them will require both sides to further boost cooperation, particularly in shaping regional digital standards.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Digital Economy, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

538. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:: William Piekos
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

539. Great Power Politics: The Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Global South

Author:: Kei Koga
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 marks the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and there are expectations that their relationship will be upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Given the good diplomatic, security, and economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, ties are likely to be strengthened. However, Japan is now taking a more competitive strategy toward China, as indicated in the three security documents issued in December 2022, while Southeast Asian states generally continued the same strategic posture by which they have good relations with all great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, while Japan issued the “New Plan for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that emphasizes the “Global South,” it remained silent about ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific, and it was unclear what roles Japan expects ASEAN to play. Although both Japan and Southeast Asian states need to adjust their roles in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains to be seen whether the 50th anniversary becomes an opportunity for clarification.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Power Politics, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Japan, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

540. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

541. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

542. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

543. North Cranks up Nukes—and Slams Down the Phone

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

544. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

545. China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray China as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Economic Growth, Strategic Stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

546. Washington Zeroes in on Manila

Author:: Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: With an apparent renaissance in the US-Philippine alliance, spurred by rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Biden administration ramped up diplomatic activity with Manila as the two countries moved toward an official visit from President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., in May. At the same time, the 42nd iteration of Cobra Gold, which returned to full strength for the first time since the 2014 coup in Bangkok, suggested momentum in the US-Thailand alliance, albeit with a lower profile. While the international environment continued to be roiled by US-China rivalry, the Russian war in Ukraine, and high food and commodity prices, Southeast Asia’s own internal turmoil was evident. The junta in Myanmar extended the state of emergency and stepped up aerial bombing of areas held by the opposition and armed ethnic groups. As Indonesia takes up the ASEAN chair, prospects for implementing the Five-Point Consensus Plan are dim, if not dead. Vietnam and Thailand began leadership transitions—Hanoi with an anti-corruption purge and Bangkok with the launch of general elections—while Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continued to eviscerate the opposition ahead of his near-certain re-election in July. As Southeast Asian leaders work to grow their economies in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, competition among them to attract foreign domestic investment is intensifying, particularly in technology and electric vehicles. In the meantime, the region awaits the conclusion of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which will offer insight into Washington’s vision of an economic order for the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

547. An Even Larger Role in Everything

Author:: Akhil Ramesh and Michael Rubin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: On May 24, 2022, President Joe Biden met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Quad summit in Tokyo. According to the White House readout of the meeting, “The leaders reviewed the progress made in the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. They committed to deepen the Major Defense Partnership, encourage economic engagement that benefits both countries, and expand partnership on global health, pandemic preparedness, and critical and emerging technologies.” While such statements are often aspirational and lag in implementation, the first four months of 2023 show the renaissance in US-India ties to be real.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

548. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:: Mason Richey
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

549. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

550. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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