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7441. The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy During the Covid-19 Crisis

Author:
Philipp Heimberger
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the cyclicality of fiscal policy (discretionary versus automatic) for 28 advanced economies over 1995-2021 by paying special attention to the Covid-19 crisis. We find evidence that discretionary fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis (2020-2021) was significantly more countercyclical than before – in particular in the Eurozone. We do not find comparable evidence for more counter-cyclicality during the financial crisis or Euro crisis, which lends support to the argument that discretionary fiscal policy responded especially forceful to stabilise the economy during the Covid-19 crisis. Furthermore, automatic fiscal stabilisers contributed significantly to counter-cyclical stabilisation, although their performance over 2020-2021 was more in line with the past than for discretionary fiscal policy. Overall, fiscal policy in non-Eurozone advanced countries is more countercyclical than in the Eurozone. However, the cyclicality varies markedly across countries. Our findings shed light on how the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy varies across countries and time.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

7442. Achieving a Safer U.S. Nuclear Posture

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• U.S. nuclear posture is on a dangerous path that imperils national security and expends far too many resources. It is not a rational response to external threats but is driven primarily by domestic factors including a hubristic strategy of nuclear supremacy, partisan politics, and entrenched arms lobbies with formidable influence in the Pentagon and Congress. • A safer nuclear policy entails, among other steps, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third, to about 1,000, taking nuclear-armed missiles off hair-trigger alert, embracing no first use or sole purpose doctrines, and requiring an additional senior official to authorize launch. Pacts such as AUKUS that encourage the spread of nuclear weapons technology must also be rethought. • If implemented, these policies will greatly reduce risk while maintaining deterrence; they will also lead to significant savings in the national security budget. A majority of independent experts believe that U.S. national security objectives can be met at far lower levels and with a safer nuclear posture, saving hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades. • Many of these recommendations can be implemented even if the Biden administration’s upcoming Nuclear Posture Review proves disappointing. The president retains substantial policy and budgetary options for reducing the risk of nuclear war and the cost of nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7443. Beyond Deterrence: A Peace Game Exercise for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Frank Aum and Jessica J. Lee
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This report describes a virtual role-playing peace game exercise conducted in October 2021 that simulated diplomatic negotiations aimed at making tangible progress toward improving relations, enhancing security, and building confidence on the Korean Peninsula. The exercise, hosted by the United States Institute of Peace, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, and the Sejong Institute in Seoul, consisted of negotiating teams representing the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China. The U.S. and North Korean teams emerged as the principal actors in the exercise, determining whether negotiations remained static or moved forward. However, these teams perceived potential losses in negotiations more acutely than potential gains, which resulted in diplomatic inertia. Both teams seemed open to negotiations as long as the other side took the first conciliatory step, but presidential leadership and political will were necessary to overcome inaction. The U.S. team also seemed more driven by the risks of North Korean aggression and duplicity in negotiations than the South Korean team, which led to divergent policy approaches between allies. In addition, the U.S.-China rivalry fueled a zero-sum mentality that hindered opportunities for progress and heightened misunderstandings between the U.S. and South Korean teams. These observations lead to the following policy recommendations for the actors involved: Advancing peace and denuclearization will require the highest level of executive leadership and intervention from all parties to build support for a final agreement. For the United States, that means greater presidential prioritization and increased coordination with Congress. All parties should start with smaller, more reversible measures; mitigate the risk of failure; and highlight potential gains. The United States should consider confidence-building measures that jump-start negotiations but do not undermine its security interests. Washington should strengthen coordination with Seoul on North Korea policy and other key alliance matters to harmonize strategies. To achieve progress, all parties should separate issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula from the U.S.-China contestations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

7444. Pathways to Pentagon Spending Reductions: Removing the Obstacles

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Despite the changing security landscape, in which nonmilitary challenges ranging from pandemics to climate change are the gravest threats to the American people, United States security spending continues to focus on the Pentagon at the expense of other agencies and other policy tools. • In December 2021 Congress authorized $768 billion in spending on the Pentagon and related work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy — $25 billion more than the Pentagon asked for, and higher in real terms than peak budgets during the Korean and Vietnam wars and the Reagan buildup of the 1980s. An additional $10 billion in mandatory spending drove the final figure to $778 billion. There are press reports — yet to be officially confirmed by the administration — that the comparable proposal for spending on national defense in the fiscal year 2023 budget could exceed $800 billion.1 • The three main drivers of excessive spending on the Department of Defense are strategic overreach, pork-barrel politics, and corporate lobbying. • An overly ambitious, “cover-the-globe” strategy that favors military primacy and endless war must be replaced with a strategy of restraint that would provide a more-than-sufficient defense while increasing investments in diplomacy, foreign economic development, and other nonmilitary tools of statecraft. • Measures to weaken the influence of the military-industrial complex in the budget process should include prohibiting the armed services from submitting “wish lists” for items that are not in the Pentagon’s official budget request; slowing the “revolving door” between government departments and the weapons industry, and reducing the economic dependence of key communities on Pentagon spending, along with alternative government investments in areas such as infrastructure, green technology, and scientific and public health research.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Spending, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7445. The Yemen War in Numbers: Saudi Escalation and U.S. Complicity

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Yemen’s humanitarian crisis demonstrates the consequences and risks of the American decision to enable Saudi and Emirati military action against Yemen. This decision reflects a flawed calculus: the belief that by supporting Arab security partners, the U.S. can prevent them from moving into China’s or Russia’s orbit. As recent events have demonstrated, America’s partners in the Middle East are hedging despite the Biden administration’s extensive support: For example, when the U.N. Security Council voted in February to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UAE abstained. America’s Gulf partners hope to strengthen their relationships with Moscow and Beijing while continuing to reap the benefits of Washington’s largesse. • American involvement in supporting Saudi-led military action against the Houthis in Yemen, rather than helping to resolve the conflict as the Biden administration claims, is prolonging and escalating the violence. By continuing to support Saudi and Emirati aggression, the U.S. not only deepens its complicity in the slaughter of Yemen’s civilian population; it also risks getting dragged into more active participation in the war on behalf of these two Arab security partners. • Biden committed to ending support for offensive operations in Yemen. His administration alleges that the support America provides to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is merely defensive. Yet by selling weapons it designates as defensive, as well as servicing contracts for spare parts and maintenance for the Saudi air force, the U.S. actively helps the coalition wage its war. Further, this position ignores the billions of dollars in offensive weapons the U.S. previously sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which they continue to use on Yemen. The administration asserts that the U.S. must help Saudi Arabia and the UAE defend against transborder attacks; yet the data show that Houthi transborder attacks pose a minor threat to the Saudis and Emiratis, especially compared with the scale of their attacks on Yemen. • Instead of escalating U.S. involvement in defending the Saudis and Emiratis from the consequences of their aggression, the Biden administration should suspend all arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE until they end their military intervention in Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

7446. Avoiding the Dangers of a Protracted Conflict in Ukraine

Author:
Anatol Lieven, Sarang Shidore, and Marcus Stanley
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A protracted conflict in Ukraine looks increasingly plausible. Russia continues to launch attacks on military and civilian targets, and the United States and its partners are increasing shipments of arms to the Zelensky government. Washington is reportedly making plans to support long-term guerrilla warfare against Russian forces, should Kyiv fall. The current path toward a protracted war in Ukraine is highly undesirable and is laden with grave risks to the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and the international community. Such risks include: • a high cost in Ukrainian lives and suffering and the destruction of Ukraine — its infrastructure, institutions, and social fabric; • radicalization of Ukrainian society and a consequent civil war; • escalation to a great-power war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and pitting NATO against Russia, thereby threatening U.S. national security; • a weakening of NATO’s cohesion; • a prolonged global recession that strikes the U.S. as hard as it will any other nation. The United States and its allies should avoid these destructive outcomes by prioritizing support for the Ukrainian government to achieve a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement will result in a more secure outcome for Ukraine, the United States, the European allies, and the rest of the world. While the details of such a settlement lie beyond this brief’s scope, the progress of Ukrainian–Russian talks indicates that a settlement providing for meaningful sovereignty and independence for Ukraine is possible. Avoiding a protracted conflict also implies that the United States should not adopt maximalist objectives, such as regime change in Moscow or the complete and decisive defeat of Russia. It should instead deploy sanctions to build up Ukraine’s negotiating leverage.
Topic:
NATO, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

7447. Ending Primacy to End U.S. Wars

Author:
Daniel Bessner
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• If America’s decision-makers are to learn from the Iraq War (2003–11), they must recognize it not as an aberration or an isolated mistake, but as a direct consequence of the U.S. search for primacy in the Middle East. The Iraq War was overdetermined in that tensions between the U.S. and Iraq were rooted fundamentally in Iraq’s perceived challenge to U.S. regional dominance. Consequently, in the “unipolar moment,” a U.S. effort to change the regime in Baghdad was bound to occur after some spark, such as the September 11 attacks, set it in motion. • Today, a similar desire to sustain dominance in Asia places the U.S. on a collision course with China. To avoid war with China, policy elites must reconceive their commitment to primacy and recognize that the United States will not be able to dictate terms in its relations with others in an emergent multipolar world. • Some competition between the United States and China is probably inevitable. But this competition does not present an existential threat to the U.S. and therefore must not be allowed to prevent necessary cooperation to address the major threats of the 21st century: inequality, population movements, pandemics, and climate change.
Topic:
War, History, Hegemony, Military Intervention, and Gulf War
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

7448. The Folly of Pushing South Korea Toward a China Containment Strategy

Author:
Jessica J. Lee and Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The narrow victory of conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the recent South Korean presidential election comes against the backdrop of an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, now compounded by the Ukraine crisis. Washington would like South Korea to play a security role in its Indo-Pacific strategy — a strategy that effectively aims to contain China. However, South Korean elites (and the general public) are deeply ambivalent and internally divided on the question of containing China. Pushing South Korea — a robust democracy with major elite divisions — toward containing Beijing risks negative consequences for the United States. These include a reduction in U.S. influence in South Korea, erosion of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, a less-effective South Korean presence in the region, and, in the long run, the potential of South Korean neutrality with respect to China. To avoid these negative outcomes for the United States, Washington should: • Avoid pressuring South Korea to join its China-containment strategy, • Refrain from including Seoul in emerging, non-inclusive, bloc-like structures of U.S. allies in Asia, • Consider pulling back on its intended new Terminal High Altitude Area Defense deployments until a greater consensus is reached within South Korea on the issue, • See South Korea’s role as a bridge and an opportunity to stabilize Washington’s own relationship with Beijing. For example, both South Korea and China could be included in non-traditional security activities of the Quad such as infrastructure and climate change, and • More generally, demilitarize the Quad and open it to wider participation for strengthening U.S. influence in Asia, rather than see it as a zero-sum vehicle for containing China.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Containment, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

7449. The Lobbying Battle Before the War: Russian and Ukrainian Influence in the U.S.

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fateful decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine has united much of the world in condemnation of this unprovoked assault on a sovereign nation. In Ukraine, the war has already caused rampant destruction, the deaths of thousands of civilians, and the displacement of millions, while tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides of the conflict have been killed or wounded. The U.S. has imposed crippling sanctions on Russia’s energy and financial sectors while providing tens of billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine. • Behind the headlines of these U.S. foreign policy decisions lies a major, but little-discussed, factor in foreign policy: lobbying. Nearly every action the government has taken regarding Russia and Ukraine has been the object of considerable attempts at influence by U.S.-based lobbyists for Ukraine and Russia. Based on an exhaustive analysis of all Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) documents filed by organizations registered to work on behalf of Ukrainian and Russian clients in 2021, this brief offers a number of key findings, including: ° Nine organizations were registered under FARA to work on behalf of Russian clients in 2021, while 11 were working for Ukrainian clients. ° Those organizations reported making just 21 contacts on behalf of their Russian clients and 13,541 contacts on behalf of their Ukrainian clients. ° Russian clients paid over $42 million to firms representing them, (although $38 million of this went to Russian state media), while Ukrainian clients paid just over $2 million to the firms working on their behalf. ° Ukrainian lobbying efforts add up to more than four times the amount of work the Saudi lobby (among the largest foreign lobbies in Washington) and other prominent groups have reported in any year—due in large part to a notable gap in transparency. ° The pro-Ukraine lobby appears to have achieved far more contacts than the pro-Russia lobby with less money spent, an anomaly that could be explained by the pro-Russia lobby using a less transparent statute—the LDA—for reporting its lobbying efforts and the greater zeal shown by some pro-Ukraine lobbyists.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Influence, Lobbying, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

7450. The Humanitarian Paradox: Why Human Rights Require Restraint

Author:
Asli Bâli
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
For the United States to be “committed to a world in which human rights are protected, their defenders are celebrated, and those who commit human rights abuses are held accountable” requires more than rhetorical flourishes.1 To achieve the goal of protecting and promoting human rights, the United States must embrace a more restrained security posture together with a persistent diplomatic strategy that prioritizes engagement ahead of confrontation. Military force and economic coercion are the wrong tools for advancing human rights. As the cases of Iraq and Libya demonstrate, preventive or humanitarian wars have critically impaired human rights. Similarly, comprehensive sanctions regimes have imposed severe human rights costs while achieving few U.S. foreign policy goals, if any, in targeted countries. The United States should therefore incorporate the following policy approaches in the service of human rights: • Right-size its expectations of what American power can achieve to protect and advance human rights abroad. On balance, exaggerated and unrealistic confidence in American power has hurt rather than helped the cause of human rights. • Serve as a public advocate of human rights in multilateral settings, engaging with international institutions to pressure allies and adversaries alike on their human rights records. At the same time, the United States should raise human rights concerns directly in its bilateral dealings when abuses come to light, using private diplomacy to highlight specific issues or changes that are priorities. • Do much more to support the protection and promotion of human rights in areas under its direct control or influence. This would include, at a minimum, halting human rights abuses committed by the U.S. in its own counterterrorism operations, freezing military aid when U.S. arms are implicated in targeting civilians, building on the recent openness to Ukrainian refugees by strengthening and expanding U.S. asylum and refugee resettlement programs globally, and greatly increasing delivery of humanitarian aid, in the form of funding as well as medical and food assistance, to civilian populations deprived of their socioeconomic rights due to conflict, climate change, and the global food crisis.
Topic:
Human Rights, War, Humanitarian Intervention, and Coercion
Political Geography:
United States of America