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10661. The Local Roots of Chinese Engagement in Pakistan

Author:
Muhammad Tayyab Safdar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has deepened its economic engagement with Pakistan through elite-centered negotiations over the routes and projects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But elites are not the whole story: China has made inroads beyond Pakistan’s political elites with a broader array of local stakeholders in the country’s education, media, and energy sectors. Pull factors in each of these areas are giving local Pakistani actors incentives to develop closer relationships with Chinese actors. In education, China’s status as a rising global power and the promise of future economic returns have driven ever more Pakistanis to learn Mandarin and opt to study abroad in China. In the media sector, the financial pressures facing Pakistan’s private media houses have contributed to increasing domestic buy-in for news sharing agreements with Chinese media organizations. In the power sector, the lack of alternative sources of external funding for local Pakistani conglomerates has resulted in the emergence of joint ventures on electricity generation projects with large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the same time, Chinese government policies are serving as push factors to incentivize Chinese actors to expand their interactions in different segments of Pakistani society. For example, China has opened and sponsors Confucius Institutes and classrooms across Pakistan, while also offering scholarships to Pakistani students interested in studying in China. As Chinese firms have expanded their presence in Pakistan, they have worked with local universities to adapt to local customs and cultural and religious values. In media circles, stakeholders like China’s Xinhua News Agency have worked with local Pakistani media outlets to localize information dissemination and shape Pakistani public opinion on important international issues in ways that are in sync with Beijing’s worldview. And Chinese investment in Pakistan’s power sector is aligned with Chinese SOEs’ Go Global strategy and the expansion of these firms’ operations in overseas markets as part of the BRI. China’s engagement with Pakistani political, social, and economic institutions comes in response to local conditions. By adapting to these conditions and working through local institutions and actors, a host of Chinese actors are poised to continue deepening their interactions with different parts of Pakistani society.
Topic:
Education, Partnerships, Media, Economy, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

10662. Yemeni Border Markets: From Economic Incubator to Military Frontline

Author:
Ahmed Nagi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A string of border markets on Yemen’s northwestern border with Saudi Arabia turned the confluence of two countries’ peripheries into a center, gave rise to a distinct economic system, and bridged cross-border communities. The ongoing war in Yemen has either destroyed these markets or forced their closure. An end to the hostilities is unlikely to restore the status quo ante, owing to Saudi Arabia’s desire to establish a buffer zone. This would militarize the borderlands in perpetuity.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Borders, and Military
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

10663. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

10664. Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America

Author:
Federico Merke, Oliver Stuenkel, and Andreas Feldmann
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Latin America’s existing predicament stems from a complex set of interlinked social, economic, and political crises, which have been magnified by the advent of the coronavirus pandemic and a rising tide of isolationism and “antiglobalism.” These crises range from domestic polarization and economic travails, to ideological divergence, personal rivalries among the region’s leaders and U.S.-Chinese geopolitical competition, and all are hampering regional governance and negatively impacting the prospects of cooperation. Latin American governments urgently need to work together to address the manifold challenges they face as events in recent decades have shown that unless better regional mechanisms can be found, domestic and transnational challenges—from organized crime and environmental degradation to migration and anemic economic growth—will become even more difficult to address, with potentially devastating long-term consequences. Yet, despite the high stakes, traditional regional governance mechanisms seem paralyzed, lacking even the capacity to discuss the current untenable situation, let alone address it. The conventional wisdom is that regional cooperation across Latin America is practically nonexistent because its heads of states have insurmountable ideological differences and because the region’s dominant diplomatic institutions have failed to fulfill their purpose. All is not lost in the realm of regional governance, however. While cooperation is either dysfunctional or nonexistent in many dimensions, in others it persists with surprising resilience and vigor, although it is often overlooked or underappreciated. Existing cooperation is for the most part technical and based on the committed work by government officials who, even during the bleakest moments of the pandemic, have shown adherence to principled norms and driven by a refreshing degree of pragmatism. Effective regional governance and cooperation in Latin America is necessary for a broader conversation on the region’s role in a rapidly changing global order, shaped by technological transformation and genuinely global problems such as climate change, migratory pressures, and increasing security threats. As great power competition continues to shape the global order, Latin America often is regarded as a peripheral player. Yet far from being somehow apart or exempt from today’s rising geopolitical currents, Latin America, for better or for worse, is very much affected by them. Regional governance is a fundamental instrument to help Latin America overcome its numerous daunting challenges. Even when ideological differences make cooperation difficult at the high politics level, it is crucial to find avenues of progress at other levels and in informal or less visible ways.
Topic:
Politics, Regional Cooperation, Governance, Economy, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Latin America

10665. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

10666. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

10667. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

10668. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

10669. Fake Civil Society: The Rise of Pro-Government NGOs in Nigeria

Author:
Matthew T. Page
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nigeria’s dynamic and expansive civil society is one of its greatest strengths and is crucial to maintaining what democratic space still exists in the country. Yet its independence, outspokenness, and unwavering commitment to democracy, transparency, and human rights have long antagonized the kleptocratic, power-hungry—but also image-conscious—ruling elites. To help protect themselves from domestic pressure and outside scrutiny, Nigeria’s top powerbrokers have cultivated a new generation of pro-government non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Like the fake grassroots groups bankrolled by past military juntas, these surrogate organizations masquerade as authentic civil society groups, singing the praises of top officials and attacking their critics. A symptom of the country’s more fundamental political ills, Nigerian elites’ growing use of civil society surrogates should set off alarm bells both domestically and internationally. It is both corrupting and corruptive, compounding the country’s downward democratic trajectory. Like many countries in Africa—and, for that matter, elsewhere in the world—Nigeria has recently experienced democratic backsliding that threatens its long-term stability and prosperity. The rise of pro-government NGOs is both a cause and a consequence of this backsliding and must be addressed as part of any effort to arrest and reverse it.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Democracy, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

10670. A High-Tech Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Collaboration

Author:
James L. Schoff, Douglas E. Rake, and Joshua Levy
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In both Japan and the United States, there is a growing recognition that national security and alliance security involve more than just military concerns and extend to new technology areas and their economic effects. Looming over the two allies is a wide-ranging question of how to enable greater science and technology (S&T) research collaboration for commercial and defense purposes, involving such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science (QIS), cybersecurity, and space utilization. Competing domestic political and economic considerations in each country make this a particularly complex challenge for policymakers, who can be expected to treat the international sharing or sale of assorted technologies differently. Still, there is little doubt that it is in the mutual interest of Japan and the United States to harmonize their approaches and find acceptable ways to enable deeper and broader S&T collaboration—and to do so expeditiously.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America