Paper

French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa:

Current Status and Future Prospects

Eric G. Berman

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French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa:

Current Status and Future Prospects

Eric G. Berman

[Abstract] In May 1997, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced their joint “P-3 Initiative”, to harmonize their peacekeeping capacity-building programs in Africa and foster an open dialogue between donors and recipients. The capacity-building programs of France, the UK and the US have since undergone numerous transformations. The centerpiece of French policy, the Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) has had comparatively few changes to its basic structure, but has been scaled down. The UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has given way to a much larger and more ambitious initiative. The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) has evolved significantly and will undergo a more fundamental change in 2002, including shedding its name. Moreover, Washington initiated a new capacity-building policy in 2001, which dwarfed ACRI in terms of resources and introduced the provision of lethal equipment.

In November 2001, the “P-3” met in London to assess their programs. They could take satisfaction that progress had been made on a number of levels. Much more importantly, however, the three partners have created little in the way of synergy. A question that cuts to the core of the capacity-building programs is: Does the training or equipment offered make African recipients any more willing or able to undertake peacekeeping on their continent? The answer is far from clear. As for the enhanced capacity, much of what is being offered is of questionable value. To some extent, France, the UK, and the US have acknowledged some of their own programs’ limitations, and they are attempting to redress these weaknesses. Government officials are now much more receptive to criticism and suggestions for change.

Eric G. Berman E-mail: ericberman @ hotmail.com
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Preface

Starting in 1995, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs has run a Training for Peace (TfP) programme for Southern Africa together with the Institute for Strategic Studies in Pretoria and ACCORD. The programme has been cast in the framework of preparations for peace operations, mostly—but not only—training civilians for participation in such operations. Courses have been held in nearly all SADEC countries. It is financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes an overall responsibility for it.

The present report was commissioned in the framework of a feasibility study of Training for Peace in West Africa, to help clarify how a similar programme might look like in this region. An international evaluation of TfP Southern Africa recommended that such a programme be initiated, and the Foreign Ministry asked NUPI to explore what it might usefully contain.

Proceeding from the assumption that like TfP Southern Africa, a West African programme would also conduct training for peace operations, due note must be taken of the military training for such operations carried out under the auspices of the big powers, in casu by France, the UK and the USA. All of them have significant training programmes in the region. TfP West Africa must relate to these programmes in considerate fashion for two main reasons: to establish its own identity, and to find ways in which training for civilian and military functions might suitably be coordinated.

We asked Eric Berman to describe the P-3 programmes in some detail. In outlining the areas of separation and overlap among them, the report has been most useful in designing the structure and content of a TfP West Africa. We believe that many others who take an interest in West African affairs may benefit from it as well.

NUPI April 2002
Sverre Lodgaard
Director
I would like to thank the following people who went out of their way to assist me in this project. Lt-Col. Michael Bittrick, Scott Fisher, Lt-Col. Christophe Pitiot, and Paul Rimmer were particularly good humored when it came to answering that “one” additional small question – on more than one occasion. Dr. Alexandra Novoseloff, Babu Rahman, and Thierry Tardy provided many useful contacts. Col. Eric Bonnemaison, Dr. François Gaulme, and Roy Trivedy were not only generous with their time, but also shared written materials with me that were quite instructive. Cdr. Gilles Bonavita, Katie Sams, Elizabeth Umlas, and Tom Woodroffe all provided helpful comments on various parts of the text.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFT</td>
<td>Brigade Follow-on Training</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<td>BMLO</td>
<td>British Military Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMR</td>
<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Conflict Management Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-IMET</td>
<td>Expanded IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIPC</td>
<td>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENVR</td>
<td>École nationale à vocation régionale</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FICA</td>
<td>Forum de l’IHEDN pour le Continent Africain</td>
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<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Follow-on Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>field training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAFCSC</td>
<td>Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHEDN</td>
<td>Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint/Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAM</td>
<td>Kenya ACRI Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Mobile Education Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OFR</td>
<td>Operation Focus Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineers</td>
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<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SIAM</td>
<td>Session Internationale Africaine et Malagache</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Sustainment Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>STTT</td>
<td>Short-Term Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>US</td>
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* * *
01. Almost five years ago, in May 1997, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) announced their joint “P-3 Initiative,” whereby they sought to harmonize their peacekeeping capacity-building programs in Africa and foster an open dialogue between donors and recipients on how best to move forward. Following the withdrawal of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation from Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda, Paris, London, and Washington independently developed programs to strengthen African countries’ abilities to undertake peacekeeping. Concurrently, the UN Security Council drastically reduced the UN’s peacekeeping presence in Africa, although the need for peacekeeping arguably had not diminished. The UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, championed Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which sanctions the use of regional arrangements and agencies in promoting international peace and security. The Council began to show much interest in and support for the idea of having regional organizations assume the lead in undertaking peacekeeping operations.

02. Peacekeeping on the African continent has changed significantly since the P-3 Initiative was introduced. The UN peacekeeping presence in Africa had dwindled from a high of nearly 40,000 Blue Helmets in 1994 to fewer than 2,000 in 1999. By the end of 2001, however, the UN had re-asserted itself in Africa. The UN mission in Sierra Leone is the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, and more than 25,000 UN peacekeepers currently serve in Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU, and now the African Union), hitherto the most active African regional organizations in peacekeeping, had deployed a combined total of 28 peacekeepers at the end of 2001.

03. The capacity-building programs of France, the UK, and the US have also undergone numerous transformations. The centerpiece of French policy in this regard, the Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) program, has had comparatively few changes to its basic structure, but has been scaled down. The UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has given way to a much larger and more ambitious initiative known as the Conflict Prevention Pool. The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) has evolved significantly since it was first introduced as the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) in 1996, and will undergo a more fundamental change in 2002, including shedding its name. Moreover, Washington initiated a new capacity-building policy in 2001 called Operation Focus Relief.
(OFR), which dwarfed ACRI in terms of resources and introduced the provision of lethal equipment.

04. This study reports on these three countries’ peacekeeping policies toward Africa, with a focus on recently-implemented programs and future plans. It reviews each country separately: France in Part I, the United Kingdom in Part II, and the United States in Part III. A tour de horizon of the three countries’ various programs is provided. While smaller and lesser known initiatives are mentioned, the paper focuses on the largest specifically peacekeeping-related programs: RECAMP, British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) and similar initiatives, ACRI, and OFR. As each country provides classroom education, field training, and equipment, the paper devotes three separate sections to each of these types of assistance. A fourth section within each Part reviews that country’s direct assistance to African regional organizations. In this regard, specific attention is paid to ECOWAS given the concerns of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. A fifth section looks at the next 12 months. In conclusion, the study highlights themes and concerns common to the three countries, and raises a number of critical questions.

* * *
Part I

**French Policies**

05. It is ironic that when referring to recent military interventions to support a weak government in Africa the country being spoken of is not France, but rather the United Kingdom. Not including participation in UN peacekeeping operations, London had committed its own troops to support African governments or peace processes on only two occasions prior to 2000. Paris, however, intervened in Africa regularly, often propping up weak – and oppressive – governments. For example, between 1977 and 1986, French troops defended the governments of Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Togo, – some on more than one occasion. In 1999, however, French troops were conspicuous in their failure to intervene when the governments of the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger all succumbed to coup d’états. While France has scaled back its military presence on the African continent in recent years by some 40 percent, the decision not to intervene had nothing to do with available resources, but rather reflected a sea change in French policy toward Africa.

06. Paris emphasizes that its diminished military presence and growing reluctance to intervene in internal African conflicts does not signify a disengagement from Africa. According to French Minister for Cooperation and Francophony Charles Josselin, French security policy toward Africa is based on four principles: fidelity, opening up, non-interference, but not indifference. Of these four, the one that is perhaps most often spoken of by French officials when addressing France’s peacekeeping initiatives in Africa is “ouverture,” broadly defined as

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2 France also chose not to intervene when the democratically elected government in Guinea-Bissau fell to the military in 1999. Although Guinea-Bissau is not a former French colony, it is a member of the French-led Communauté financière africaine.


4 Josselin’s formula is: “fidelité et ouverture, non-ingérence mais non indifférence.” I would like to thank Col. Eric Bonnemaison for providing me with the quotation.
“opening up” or “widening,” signifying that France is interested in engaging not just francophone Africa. Ouverture also attests to France’s willingness to support other countries’ initiatives in Africa as well as its desire to have other countries participate in its programs. Paris stresses that its training is multilateral and open to all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, except those that are under UN embargoes. As further proof of its strong commitment, France highlights RECAMP’s budget, which it put at €30 million in 2000.

A. Classroom Education

07. France supports military schools throughout French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, many of which teach skills relevant to peacekeeping. In December 2001, there were 14 National Schools with Regional Vocations (Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale (ENVRs)) in seven francophone African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Togo. Under the ENVR-initiative, all the courses are open to foreign nationals. Specific skills are taught for personnel from the three major military services – air force, army, and navy – as well as specializations such as communications and medicine. There are also many courses designed for the gendarmerie. The first ENVR (the military administration school in Koulikoro, Mali), was inaugurated in July 1996. Many of the ENVR facilities represent totally new initiatives, such as the peacekeeping school described below. However, several existed as national schools prior to the ENVR-initiative, with some dating back to the 1980s. (The oldest, the gendarmerie school in Abidjan, was created in 1972.)

08. The Zambakro Peacekeeping School in Côte d’Ivoire opened with French support in June 1999. The school distinguishes itself from other ENVRs – and from other regional peacekeeping training centers in Africa – in that its courses are taught in both English and French. Training is geared for officers. Three courses are offered: military observer training, battalion-level training, and brigade-level training. Each course has around 20 places. As of November 2001, more than 400 officers from 33 African countries had graduated from these courses.

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8 According to the Zambakro Peacekeeping School, the breakdown is as follows: Angola (11), Benin (20), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (31), Cameroon (15), Cape Verde (1), CAR (14), Chad (24), Congo (Brazzaville) (14), Côte d’Ivoire (97), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1), Djibouti (5), Equatorial Guinea (2), Gabon (41), the Gambia (4), Guinea (4), Kenya (2), Madagascar (14), Malawi (1), Mali (20), Mauritius (2), Mozambique (1), Namibia (3), Niger (2), Nigeria (11), Senegal (34), the Seychelles (2), South Africa (5), Swaziland (1), Tanzania (1), Togo (20), Zambia (1), and Zimbabwe (5). Three French officers have also been trained (one from Djibouti and two from Réunion). See “422 (sic) trainees coming from 34 different countries,” available on the Internet at <www.emp.zambakro.org> accessed on 25 December 2001.
Historically, more African military officers have taken part in courses offered in France than in Africa. Various military schools in France have spots open for African officers, but none is specifically geared to developing peacekeeping skills, per se. Schools in Compiègne, Montpellier, and Tours provide staff, operational, and administrative training, respectively, for selected African participants in RECAMP exercises. The Institute for Higher Defense Studies (l’Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN)), in Paris hosts an annual two-week conference each June that specifically addresses peace and security concerns in Africa. The conference, known as the IHEDN Forum for the African Continent (Forum de l’IHEDN pour le Continent Africain (FICA)), convened for the first time in 2000, but dates back to 1980 when it was known as the African and Malagasy International Session (Session Internationale Africaine et Malagache (SIAM)). FICA is open to civilians and military personnel from all African countries. Although the course is geared toward an African audience, a small number of Europeans may also attend. The proceedings are held in English, French, and Portuguese. From 1980 to 2000, more than 356 participants from 36 African countries and three African regional organizations attended 14 SIAM and FICA conferences. At the first FICA in June 2000, 51 Africans participated from 28 countries, with an additional ten trainees coming from Europe. About 70 African civilian and military leaders from throughout Africa attended the second FICA seminar in June 2001.

**Augmenting African Militaries’ Logistical Capacities**

France is increasing its commitment in several African countries to strengthen their capacity to repair and maintain various military vehicles. The first program began in Cameroon some four years ago. It has proven so popular that it is now being replicated in most African countries with which France has military cooperation agreements. France provides spare parts, technicians, and funding. While this is not specifically a “peacekeeping capacity” program, it certainly has peacekeeping applications.

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9. Interview with Col. Eric Bonnemaison, Capstone Coordinator and Senior French Representative, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 18 December 2001, by telephone.


15. Interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001.
B. Field Training

10. The two completed field training exercises (FTXs) under RECAMP involved countries from the West and Central African regions. (See Chart on page 7.) The first, Guidimakha, occurred in Senegal and Mauritania in 1998. Mali, Mauritania and Senegal each provided contingents of at least battalion-strength and five other African countries provided formed units of platoon-strength or larger. The eight African countries contributed 2,600 of the roughly 3,500 troops in the exercise.16 Gabon 2000, the second RECAMP FTX, was considerably smaller than its predecessor. Only one of the eight African troop-contributors, Gabon, provided a formed unit larger than a 34-strong platoon. Some 1,600 troops took part in the January 2000 FTX – 1,120 of whom were African.17

11. The next RECAMP exercise, Tanzanite, to be held in February 2002 in Tanzania, will involve countries from Southern and East Africa and in many ways will represent France’s most ambitious undertaking yet. Sixteen African countries will participate in Tanzanite – all 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) plus Kenya and Madagascar18 – with about 1,000 troops.19 Besides doubling the number of African countries participating, logistical demands will be far greater than in the past because the closest RECAMP depot will be 2,000km away rather than at the training area as it was for the two preceding exercises.

12. France has supported other FTXs outside of RECAMP on an ad hoc basis. Assistance has included troops, logistical support, and money. The largest contributions have concerned exercises in West Africa. In March 1997, France participated in a FTX with three African countries that Togo hosted, called Nangbeto.20 In April 1998 – just two months after Guidimakha – France provided logistical support and communication equipment to a nine-nation

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18 Tanzania, as co-host, chose to invite Kenya. France invited Madagascar as the three other African members of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) were participating as members of SADC. Interview with Pitiot, 10 December 2001. The five IOC members are the Comoros, France, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles.

19 Written correspondence with Pitiot, 2 January 2002. Madagascar, South Africa, and Tanzania will provide aviation units, and those three countries as well as Kenya will contribute naval contingents. Ibid.

exercise in Burkina Faso called Kompienga. France also supported Blue Crane, which South Africa hosted in April 1999. Exercise Kozah, which took place in Togo in April 2001,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Name</th>
<th>Political-Military Seminar Location</th>
<th>Command Post Exercise Location</th>
<th>Field Training Exercise Location</th>
<th>African Countries Participating in the Field Training Exercise (FTX)</th>
<th>Non-African Countries Participating in the FTX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guidimakha</td>
<td>10.97 Senegal</td>
<td>na Senegal</td>
<td>02.98 Senegal &amp; Mauritania</td>
<td>8: Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal</td>
<td>4: Belgium, France, UK, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon 2000</td>
<td>06.99 Gabon</td>
<td>11.99 Gabon</td>
<td>01.00 Gabon</td>
<td>8: Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tome and Principe</td>
<td>8: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzanite</td>
<td>05.01 Tanzania</td>
<td>11.01 Tanzania*</td>
<td>02.02 Tanzania</td>
<td>16: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9+: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, US (incomplete list)</td>
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* = Planning meetings and courses were held earlier in November in Côte d’Ivoire at the Zambakro Peacekeeping School, and in Zimbabwe at the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre prior to the Command Post Exercise in Tanzania.


22 France contributed one million rand, a patrol boat and small naval contingent, as well as some additional officers. Interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001, by telephone. Twelve of the 14 SADC member states (i.e. all except Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Seychelles) contributed troops to the exercise. See Kwezi Mngqibisa, “Exercise Blue Crane,” in Lessons Learned from Exercise Blue Crane (Cedric de Coning and Kwezi Mngqibisa eds), Kwa-Zulu Natal: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts, 2000, p. 13.

23 The data for this chart come from four main sources: Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, pp. 304-06; Gaulme, “‘Gabon 2000’ et le maintien de la paix en Afrique centrale,” pp. 68-69; and interviews with Damien Loras, Desk Officer, UN Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 December 2001, Paris, and Cdr. Gilles Bonavita, Deputy Military Attaché, French Mission to the UN in New York, 28 December 2001, by telephone.
represents the latest such initiative to have received French support. Nine African countries participated in the roughly 1,500-strong exercise. France provided equipment and logistical support for the exercise, as well as bilateral pre-deployment training for many of the participants.

13. France also participates in routine military training exercises with African countries. Most of these are 1-2 weeks in duration and are undertaken on a bilateral basis every few years. Examples include exercises Amite and Deggo (in Senegal), Hippocampe (in Djibouti), Feso, Jacaranda, and Akio (in Madagascar), and Cateau Noir (in the Seychelles). Exercises Geranium and Tulipe are both multilateral FTXs. In May 1999, for example, exercise Tulipe was held in Madagascar with France and ten African countries contributing 1,700 troops. The most recent Geranium exercise was held in May and June 2000 in Réunion and included a seminar. Military detachments from nine African countries and France took part.

C. Equipping

14. The standard RECAMP package of forward-positioned matériel is intended to equip and support a 600-person infantry battalion. The personal firearm provided is the French-made 5.56mm FA MAS rifle. The only crew-served weapon supplied is a 7.62mm light machine gun, the model AA 52, also manufactured in France. Fifty AA 52s are standard issue for a “RECAMP” battalion. Each depot contains 100 vehicles: nine AML light armored cars, 18 jeeps, 35 two-axle 2.5-ton trucks, 32 three-axle 5.0-ton trucks, three ambulances, and three repair trucks. Other non-lethal equipment includes communication gear, uniforms, generators, tentage

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24 Interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001, by telephone. Eight countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo – each provided at least a platoon-sized contingent. Nigerian participation was limited to ten military personnel. Ibid.


27 The ten African countries were Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, p. 308.

and water purifiers. The depots in Dakar, Libreville, and Djibouti were established in February 1998, January 2000, and June 2001 respectively.

15. The depot in Dakar differs from those of Libreville and Djibouti in that it includes a 100-bed field hospital. The field hospital includes a dispensary, emergency medical unit, two pre-/post- surgical sections, one surgical section, laundry facilities, and sterilization equipment. Thirty more vehicles are also provided to support the medical facility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depot</th>
<th>Date Equipment First Arrived</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>(02.98)</td>
<td>• 9 armored cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 18 jeeps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 67 trucks (35 two-axle, 32 three-axle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 3 ambulances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 3 repair vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 600 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 50 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libreville</td>
<td>(01.00)</td>
<td>• 96 receiver-transmitters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>(06.01)</td>
<td>• uniforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• generators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• tentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• water purification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = The depot in Dakar also includes a 100-bed field hospital, with additional vehicles.

16. This equipment has been used to support several peacekeeping operations. Matériel from the depot in Dakar was used to support the African-led ad hoc peacekeeping operation in CAR, the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui) in 1997 and 1998. Stores were re-supplied from France and equipment was subsequently used for the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Guinea-Bissau in 1999.

29 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, pp. 308-09, and interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001.

30 Interview with Ellenbogen, 10 December 2001.

31 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, p. 309.

32 The data for this chart come from two main sources: Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, pp. 308-09; and an interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001.
17. *Matériel* from the depot in Gabon is currently being used to support the Senegalese companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The French have deployed a 30-person team in Libreville and a three-person team in Kinshasa to coordinate re-supply for the Senegalese contingent in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The logistics platform enables France to assist the Senegalese with just about everything except food (which is provided by the UN). A Transall C-160 cargo aircraft makes weekly flights to Kananga and Ilebo, where the two Senegalese companies are presently deployed. The logistics team in Libreville also occasionally assists Moroccan troops in MONUC.\(^{33}\)

**D. Support for African Subregional Organizations**

18. France underscores that its capacity-building program in Africa is inclusive and not bilateral, but that has not translated into meaningful support for the continent’s regional organizations when it comes to planning and implementing its RECAMP exercises. Col. Philippe-Alexandre Ellenbogen, Deputy Assistant Director of the Department for Regional Questions in the French Ministry of Defense, says that France theoretically wants to work at the subregional level in Africa and engage African regional organizations meaningfully and directly, but to date this has not been very practicable. In *Guidimakha*, ECOWAS was not meaningfully engaged, although it was invited to participate essentially as an observer. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat did not have the capacity or personnel at the time to participate more actively, Col. Ellenbogen explained. France made more of an effort to work with the Secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in preparation for *Gabon 2000*, but ECCAS was not able to contribute very much to the exercise. SADC has not been especially involved in planning *Tanzanite* because of the well known problems surrounding its Organ for Politics, Defense, and Security, but the subregional organization’s Secretary-General has been consulted throughout the planning process.\(^{34}\)

19. Greater French engagement with, if not outright support for, African subregional organizations may be in the offing. Paris is in the process of accrediting its defense attachés in Abuja, Djibouti, Gabarone, and Libreville to ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), SADC, and ECCAS respectively. Its defense attaché in Addis Ababa has been accredited to the OAU for about five years.\(^{35}\) Paris has contributed more than $600,000 to the OAU Peace Fund,\(^{36}\) and took part in the November 2000 British-led map exercise *Blue Pelican* at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat.

\(^{33}\) Interview with Bonavita, 28 December 2001.

\(^{34}\) Interview with Ellenbogen, 10 December 2001.

\(^{35}\) Interview with Pitiot, 10 December 2001.

\(^{36}\) Written correspondence with Sam B. Ibok, Director, Political Affairs Department, OAU Secretariat, 8 June 2001.
20. French support for African-led peacekeeping operations has not been limited to the provision of matériel. In both the six-country MISAB and the four-nation ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau, France gave extensive logistical support without which the missions would likely not have deployed. France also paid daily subsistence allowances for the troops participating in both the 712-strong MISAB and 796-strong ECOMOG force.\(^{37}\) In February 2001, France provided training for Senegalese troops that had been pledged to join an ECOMOG operation in Guinea,\(^{38}\) but that mission, although authorized, has yet to deploy – and probably will not be.

E. The Next 12 Months

21. Paris is committed to continuing its policy of holding multinational exercises every two years. Presently, France is focused on Tanzanite, which will be held in Tanzania in February. No decision has been taken on the location or even the region for the 2004 program. It is unlikely that the Horn of Africa will be selected even though Djibouti now has an equipment depot. As one French government official stated matter-of-factly, “it simply is not possible to work with IGAD.” Another official suggested that it was likely that RECAMP “IV” would return to West Africa.\(^{39}\)

22. The plan to create five regional RECAMP depots in Africa seems doubtful. Initially, France spoke of establishing stocks in Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, with two more likely in Côte d’Ivoire and perhaps Réunion,\(^{40}\) which while not in Africa could effectively service the continent. There are currently no plans to set up any additional sites beyond the three that have already been established, although the creation of more depots has not been ruled out.\(^{41}\)

23. There are discussions, however, to possibly augment the matériel at the existing depots. Paris desires to ensure that the equipment stored at its three sites meets UN standards and requirements. One of the larger and more significant items that is presently missing from the depots and which contingents often need in UN (and non-UN) peacekeeping operations is armored personnel carriers (APCs). France has identified its Renault VAB APC as a vehicle that could be used to fill this void. However, no decision has yet been taken, and other options are

\(^{37}\) For additional information on the two missions, see Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, pp. 128-38, and 222-28.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Bolot, 21 March 2001, courtesy of Katie E. Sams.


\(^{40}\) Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, p. 308.

\(^{41}\) Interview with Bonnemaison, 18 December 2001.
being considered such as providing VABs in disrepair, along with spare parts to African countries on a bilateral basis for the recipient to service and maintain for eventual deployment.\footnote{Interview with Pitiot, 3 January 2002.}

24. Two new ENVRs are expected to open in Africa during 2002. A staff college in Libreville plans to run its first course by the end of the year. The school was first envisaged in 1992, but a convention between Gabon and France was not signed until July 2000.\footnote{“Dossier ENVR,” p. 28.} In June 2001, it was announced that Benin and France have agreed to build an ENVR for demining and peacekeeping. The school is scheduled to open in June 2002.\footnote{“Benin: Peacekeeping training centre to be built,” \textit{Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)}, 14 June 2001, available on the Internet at <www.irinnews.org> accessed on 18 December 2001.} It is expected that in 2002, fully half of African military personnel receiving training with French assistance, will be taught at ENVRs (the other half in France).\footnote{Written correspondence with Pitiot, 2 January 2002.}

25. As for the upcoming national elections, the outcome is not expected to have a significant effect on France’s policy toward Africa. As one French political analyst noted, Africa is, to an increasingly large segment of the French population, an embarrassment to France because of previous policies, scandals, and failures. The genocide in Rwanda is still a source of much unease and disquiet. The potential for scandal and failure was seen by both President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin as likely outweighing any perceived benefits from a significantly enhanced engagement.\footnote{Interview with Dr. François Gaulme, Editor-in-Chief, \textit{Afrique contemporaine}, 6 December 2001, Paris.}
26. The rather modest UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme\textsuperscript{47} has been subsumed within a very large, ambitious and multidimensional Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP). The genesis of the CPP, which came into effect in 2001, is British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s idea of “joined-up government” – a belief that more can be achieved when ministries and departments work closely together.\textsuperscript{48} As a result, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Department for International Development (DFID) pooled their program money for projects promoting conflict prevention. To encourage cooperation, the Treasury supplemented their contributions.\textsuperscript{49}

27. The CPP may have a significant positive impact on promoting stability, and peacekeeping, in Africa. Programs in Africa will receive a far greater share of the than any other region. The CPP is divided into two funds: the Global Pool and the Africa Pool. (See Chart on page 14.) Moreover, money from the Global Pool can be used to support programs in Africa where these contribute to overarching thematic objectives.\textsuperscript{50} The FCO chairs the Global Pool,

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\textsuperscript{47} Since 1996, the Programme’s budget was roughly $4 million a year. Roy Trivedy, “Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management: Improving Coordination for More Effective Action,” \textit{IDS Bulletin}, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 2001, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{48} During 1999-2000, the UK government carried out a review of UK policy and conflict prevention, which concluded that there was scope for improvement through a concerted inter-departmental approach. Written correspondence with Roy Trivedy, Conflict Adviser, Africa Policy and Economics Department, UK Department for International Development, 3 January 2002.

\textsuperscript{49} For example, DFID initially put £23.5m into the Africa Pool portion of the CPP, FCO £5.0m, and MOD £1.5m for a total of £30.0m. The Treasury then added another £20m for a total of £50m. Interview with Trivedy, 5 December 2001, London. The additional money is not so much a “sweetener” as indicative of the importance that the UK government attributes to the initiative. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Tom Porteous, Conflict Management Adviser, Pan-Africa Policy Office, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 3 December 2001, London. Two prominent examples include support for implementing the Brahimi Report on strengthening UN peacekeeping, and initiatives to reduce the threat of small arms and light weapons. Ibid.
and DFID chairs the Africa Pool. The CPP places a high priority on supporting programs aimed at developing the capacities of African (and non-African) countries and regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping operations.

28. As of this writing, however, there is very little of a concrete nature to report. The CPP has been operational for only eight months. The three partners to the CPP are to a significant degree still in the process of discussing and evaluating future joint programs, although joint expenditure is widening in some areas. Previous commitments are still being honored. This partly explains why there have been relatively few significant developments in educating, training and equipping over the last year as discussed below. The other explanation—and exception—is the UK’s continued substantial support to Sierra Leone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE UK CONFLICT PREVENTION POOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Pool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Projected

A. Classroom Education

29. Unlike France, the United Kingdom now trains more African military in Africa than at its own military staff colleges. The principal asset in providing this instruction is the British Military Advisory and Training Teams. Initially, BMATTs were purely bilateral initiatives that did not focus on imparting peacekeeping techniques. The first, BMATT Ghana, was established in 1976. BMATT Zimbabwe followed in 1980 and BMATT South Africa in 1994. BMATT

51 The chairs of the Pools convene sub-committees of the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. The sub-committees were established in July 2000. Trivedy, “Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management: Improving Coordination for More Effective Action,” p. 84.

52 The UK fiscal year begins on 1 April.

53 Written correspondence with Tom Woodroffe, Desk Officer, ECOSOC Section, UN Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 December 2001.

54 The data for this chart come from three main sources: interviews with Trivedy, 5 December 2001 (regarding the Africa Pool), and Vic Wallis, Conflict Prevention Officer, Conflict Prevention Section, UN Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 3 December 2001, London (regarding the program section of the Global Pool), as well as written correspondence with Woodroffe, 28 December 2001 (regarding the peacekeeping section of the Global Pool).
Ghana and BMATT Zimbabwe were subsequently transformed and renamed in the 1990s with mandates to provide peacekeeping training to officers from countries other than Ghana and Zimbabwe. BMATT South Africa remains a bilateral initiative. It has recently begun to assist South Africa in peacekeeping matters, but has not provided specialized training. In 2000, the UK deployed additional training teams in Sierra Leone and Kenya.  

BMATT Southern Africa instructors provided training throughout the subregion before it was withdrawn early last year. The team was based at the Zimbabwe Staff College in Harare, where it routinely participated in the annual four-week peacekeeping module during the senior staff course, which was open to officers from countries outside Zimbabwe. 

The BMATT staff also undertook one-off peace support training courses in countries throughout the region, including Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland. The 11-member team withdrew from Zimbabwe in March 2001. The intention was to continue its work from the UK, but this did not prove feasible.

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Current Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMATT South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT Southern Africa</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Closed in 2001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT West Africa</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMATT</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPST</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = BMATT = British Military Advisory and Training Team; BPST = British Peace Support Team; and IMATT = International Military Advisory and Training Team

** = Seventeen of the staff were from countries other than the UK.

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BMATT West Africa, with a relatively small staff, largely limits its instruction to courses in Ghana. It helps run the annual peacekeeping training module for the senior staff course at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), and ad hoc peace support operation courses. While Ghanaian officers comprise the largest single group of participants, military personnel from throughout the subregion and elsewhere in Africa have also taken part. BMATT has also run a Command and Staff Course at the GAFCSC in May-July 2000 for 40 Sierra Leone Army (SLA) officers.

Plans for a third regional BMATT – BMATT East Africa – never materialized, but a new initiative is underway. In 1998, the UK had intended to field a team of peacekeeping instructors with a regional remit to Kampala. Uganda’s decision to send troops to DRC, however, effectively scuttled the program. Last year the British Advisory and Training Team Kenya (known as BATT(Ken)) deployed in Nairobi, where the Kenyan government had just established its Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). BATT(Ken), whose name was changed to the British Peace Support Team (BPST) in July 2001, has so far provided infrastructure support, and is currently working on a three-year program designed to assist Kenyan participation in UN peace support operations.

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58 Interview with Rimmer, 4 December 2001; and written correspondence with Rimmer, 14 December 2001.

59 Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, p. 322. Countries represented outside of ECOWAS have included Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. Ibid.


UK Policy toward Sierra Leone: IMATT and Arms

UK policy toward Sierra Leone includes the provision of military education, training, and equipment. Any discussion of this support would benefit from a fuller review of the UK security sector reform policy, which includes support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, training of the police, and reform of the judiciary, to name some of the more prominent undertakings, but that is not possible in this study.

UK initial training of the new Sierra Leone Army (SLA) is now complete. In mid-2000, UK Short-Term Training Teams (STTTs) began training groups of roughly 1,000 troops for six-week periods in basic infantry skills. Human rights education was part of the instruction. The ninth STTT completed its work in September 2001. About 10,000 troops went through the process. The recruits received boots, uniforms, and rifles. Communication gear and crew-served weapons were also provided.63

The UK, aware of the SLA’s previous shortcomings, has instituted numerous checks and balances. Chief among them is the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). IMATT officers serve alongside officials at the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense and Army Headquarters, and will also serve in a liaison capacity to SLA battalions in the field. The maximum strength of IMATT is 126 persons: 100 British staff and the rest from other countries.64 As of December 2001, the entire UK contingent was in the field as well as 11 Canadians, 3 Americans, 2 Australians, and 1 Bermudan.65

Significantly, UK officials report that they are not aware of any instance whereby SLA troops have lost or sold their UK-supplied weapons. For each rifle the UK provides, the serial number is registered along with the name of the recipient. This policy is communicated clearly to the soldier, who is made to understand that he is personally responsible for the gun.66

Oversight is particularly important given the amount of matériel the UK is providing to the SLA. Even before the UK began retraining the SLA, it had started to ship weapons:

“In October 1999 the UK announced it would provide the government of Sierra Leone with 132 light machine guns with two million rounds of ammunition, 7,500 rifles, 800,000 rounds of “training” ammunition, 24 81mm mortars with 2,000 rounds of ammunition, and various gear including uniforms and boots for 3,000 troops. In May 2000 London provided 10,000 self-loading rifles. In June it added 5 million rounds of ammunition and 4,000 mortars. In July it announced yet another shipment of 5 million rounds of ammunition.”67

UK Ministers have since decided, through a £21m Equipment Programme announced in October 2000, to provide further small arms, light weapons, ammunition, vehicles, maritime, engineer, medical, communications, and personal equipment, and general stores to the government of Sierra Leone.68

63 Interview with Rimmer, 4 December 2001, London.  
64 Ibid.  
66 Interview with Rimmer, 4 December 2001.  
B. Field Training

33. Unlike France and the US, the UK does not initiate sizeable field training exercises in Africa as part of its capacity-building program, although it has contributed to several such efforts. Its largest undertaking concerned exercise *Blue Hungwe*, which took place in April 1997 in Zimbabwe. The UK substantially funded and helped administer the ten-country (all members of SADC), 1,500-strong multinational exercise (MNX).\(^{69}\) UK involvement in subsequent MNXs includes 61 troops and a C-130 aircraft for *Guidimakha* in February 1998, a financial contribution and a small group of trainers and advisers for the South African-led exercise *Blue Crane* in April 1999,\(^{70}\) as well as instructors and a C-130 for *Gabon 2000* in January 2000.\(^{71}\)

C. Equipping

34. Apart from the direct and continuing support for the Sierra Leone Army, the UK generally does not provide significant military equipment in support of peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. The major exception to this policy concerned ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone before 2000. The UK provided spare parts for vehicles in service with ECOMOG contingents in Liberia as well as generators and funding for communication equipment. It provided substantially greater communication equipment, vehicles and personal gear for ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone.\(^{72}\)

D. Support for African Subregional Organizations

35. The enhanced levels of military support that ECOMOG received from the UK do not signify that London is particularly pre-disposed to support ECOWAS peace and security initiatives. UK support for ECOMOG in 1999 can best be understood as a desperate attempt to stop ECOMOG from failing rather than an affirmation that ECOMOG was worthy of assistance. When the July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement continued to place the UN in a limited and subservient role to that of ECOMOG, the UK was largely taken by surprise.\(^{73}\) The UK set out to rectify the situation, which it achieved when the UN Security Council decided in October 1999 to replace its small observer mission with a much larger peacekeeping force (which has since

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\(^{68}\) Written correspondence with Andrews, 4 January 2002.

\(^{69}\) See Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, pp. 169-70.

\(^{70}\) Ibid, p. 324.

\(^{71}\) Gaulme, “‘Gabon 2000’ et le maintien de la paix en Afrique centrale,” p. 69.


\(^{73}\) Interview with UK government official, December 2001, London.
grown to nearly three times its originally authorized strength). The last ECOMOG troops departed Sierra Leone in May 2000.

36. Even though the UK remains wary of ECOMOG, it is willing to consider supporting ECOWAS security-related reforms. A British government official said the UK is interested in supporting the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. London is willing to consider funding staff and providing further training. However, the Executive Secretariat and its member states must first exhibit a serious commitment to making the Mechanism work. Nothing has been ruled out, but nothing has been decided either, the official cautioned. The official added that the UK was looking at ways to better coordinate support for the Zambakro Peacekeeping School, and that at present there were no plans to support the fledgling Kofi Annan peacekeeping center in Accra. UK officials in London and at African posts are actively considering the organization of further map exercises with ECOWAS member states, similar to that held at ECOWAS headquarters in November 2000, though no firm plans have yet been set.

37. The UK has shown the greatest commitment to developing the conflict resolution mechanism of the Organization of African Unity. Indeed, its commitment has been large enough to warrant the creation of the post of “British Military Liaison Officer (BMLO)” at the UK Embassy to Ethiopia whose role is to advise the OAU/African Union’s Conflict Management Centre (CMC) on military issues and to monitor its progress in becoming fully operational. In January 1999, FCO sent a Needs Assessment Team to devise a plan to assist the OAU, which resulted in the UK agreeing to fund certain posts within the CMC.

38. Future UK support for the OAU’s Conflict Management Centre is not assured, however. The UK has worked out a plan of action with the OAU for making the CMC’s work more effective. If agreed-upon goals are not met, then it is likely that current funding levels will be reduced. While the current restructuring from the OAU to the African Union has complicated matters, it does not explain the delays that the CMC has encountered in staffing posts critical to its success. One UK official lamented that while the CMC staff themselves were of a high caliber, the horrendous OAU bureaucracy undermined the best of intentions.

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74 Interview with UK government official, December 2001, London.
75 Written correspondence with Andrews, 4 January 2002.
76 Interview with Lt-Col. Charles Comyn, British Military Liaison Officer, UK Embassy to Ethiopia, 18 December 2001, by telephone.
77 Interview with Trivedy, 21 December 2001.
78 Written correspondence with Lt-Col. Richard Illingworth, former British Military Liaison Officer, UK Embassy to Ethiopia, 30 December 2001.
E. The Next 12 Months

39. UK government officials are reluctant to comment on the CPP’s future direction regarding its priorities in Africa. In June 2001, the geographical priorities for the Africa Pool were primarily Sierra Leone, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. The DRC/Great Lakes region, Angola and the Sudan were also highlighted as geographical priorities but below that of the four countries mentioned above. However, by December 2001 “some changes” had been made to this list.80

40. The growth of UN and other peacekeeping operations and the events of 11 September 2001 may adversely affect the CPP’s programs. While “peacekeeping” and “program” monies are differentiated, in reality they come from the same account. Where peacekeeping costs exceed what has been budgeted, the program money from the CPP could likely be tapped to cover the shortfall. Reserve funds of £13.5m and £10m for the Global and Africa Pools respectively will help dampen the impact should this occur. Given the prominence that Prime Minister Blair and Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short have given to the CPP, several government officials believed additional funds would likely be forthcoming should that prove necessary. Others were less sanguine, believing that a larger-than-expected UN operation in DRC, the unexpected operation in Macedonia, and the growing preoccupation with events in Afghanistan and terrorism all could help undermine CPP programs in the future.

41. In an important way, however, specific funding levels are less important than the process. Officials interviewed in DFID, FCO, and MOD all acknowledged that there were issues over what should count as “directly” conflict-related and therefore be put into the pool. For example, some programs to promote good governance and human rights in general could be seen as either “directly” or “indirectly” related. Gains have been made as a result of the CPP process as policymakers are no longer working in isolation or at cross purposes to one another.

42. Concerning the UK’s military training programs and assistance to subregional organizations, London is looking to support new initiatives. UK aid to the OAU is not likely to be augmented in 2002; indeed it is likely to be reduced. Support for the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the organization’s conflict Mechanism is tentative, although BMATT West Africa’s programs are not likely to be affected. UK support for the East African Community (EAC) may be on the rise. BPTC will likely provide instruction at the PSTC at a peace support operations course in March 2002, and the UK has offered to have one of its officers join the staff at the Centre starting in May. Should this transpire, which seems likely, it would take on added

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80 Written correspondence with Trivedy, 20 December 2001.

81 Written correspondence with Woodroffe, 28 December 2001.

significance if the PSTC were to be designated as the “official” EAC training centre. This too seems likely. According to MOD, the UK is planning to re-establish a BMATT-type presence in Southern Africa with a regional remit, and is looking at various options. It is hoped that a new team will begin to deploy by the end of 2002.  

43. In a significant departure from previous practice, the UK is actively considering to initiate joint field training exercises in Africa. A bilateral Command Post Exercise with Ghana planned for November-December 2002 is likely to be expanded somewhat to include regional representation. The upcoming three-week exercise will have a strong peacekeeping emphasis. The expectation is that future such exercises will be held throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and that they will be multinational in scope.  

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83 Interview with Andrews, 4 January 2002.  
84 Ibid.
Part III

US Policies

44. US peacekeeping policy toward Africa has come close to full circle since former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher first proposed an African Crisis Response Force in 1996. That summer, Burundi was thought to be on the brink of genocide, and the US heavy-handedly announced its intention to support a standing African peacekeeping force to respond to the crisis there, and other conflicts in Africa. ACRF, which generated little support either in Africa or among US allies in Europe, never materialized. It subsequently was reformulated into a less controversial and less ambitious “Initiative” and ACRI was born. ACRI provides classroom instruction, field training, command post as well as computer-assisted exercises, and a limited package of non-lethal equipment – all on a relatively small scale. Four years after launching ACRF, the US was faced with another potential humanitarian disaster in Sierra Leone, which prompted US policymakers to develop Operation Focus Relief. OFR essentially did what ACRF set out to do: it trained and equipped African troops to respond robustly to a crisis situation to help manage and resolve the conflict – and obviate the need for US troops to intervene.

45. ACRI and OFR, the two US policies designed specifically to develop African peacekeeping capacities, will be completed or be in the process of being phased out by the end of 2002. OFR training ended in December 2001. ACRI is undergoing a thorough review and will be transformed into a new program with a new name. The details of the new program have yet to be released, and full funding has yet to be secured.

A. Classroom Education

46. Numerous US programs that indirectly benefit African peacekeeping capabilities involve classroom education, both in the US and in Africa. The oldest program, dating back to the 1950s, is the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which permits military personnel from other countries to visit the United States to attend various courses.\(^5\)

\(^5\) IMET was formally established in 1976, but its antecedents go back to 1949 when the Military Assistance Program was authorized. In recent years, about 8,000 students from approximately 120 countries annually avail themselves of some 2,000 courses at about 150 military facilities in the US. Richard F. Grimmett.
some of which cover human rights, the rule of law, and civil-military relations – all important to peacekeeping. The Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program, launched in 1990, opened up US classroom training to foreign government officials and members of civil society. E-IMET also differed from IMET in that training is conducted overseas through Mobile Education Teams (METs). Participants from some 40 countries in Africa have taken advantage of IMET and E-IMET training. The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative, which began in 1996, initially supported only one African country – South Africa – and its future in 1999 was uncertain. Since then, EIPC has become institutionalized and is growing. Besides the biannual two-week EIPC course in the US, METs have provided civil-military relations training in several African countries. The newest educational initiative that has peacekeeping implications for Africa is the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). Created in 1999, ACSS promotes civil-military relations, national security strategy, and defense economics. It is similar to E-IMET as its fora are open to both military and civilian personnel, and that training is held outside the US. ACSS differs from EIPC in that its courses are designed solely for an African audience and are much larger.

47. The classroom training portion of ACRI has recently been expanded to include a seminar for civilian government officials. After the initial training, subsequent sessions begin with Command and Staff training varying in duration from 5-10 days. Participants engage in a combination of classroom discussions and practical exercises designed to hone existing military planning skills for effective application during peacekeeping operations. Using a military decision-making model as the training vehicle, participants address an array of topics including human rights, negotiation and mediation, command and control, orders preparation, and media relations. In 2001, ACRI developed a three-day Leadership Conference for senior government and military officials, ideally from the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, as well as others responsible for logistics and communications. The objective of the seminar is to promote discussion at the highest level possible on the necessity for a concerted national effort to


See Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, pp. 281-82.

Ibid., p. 283.


The largest ACSS seminars are convened for two weeks for an audience of approximately 130 high-level civilian and military officials from throughout the continent. Three have been held as of December 2001: in Senegal (November 1999), in Botswana (July 2000), and in Gabon (January-February 2001). Smaller Sub-Regional Seminars are also offered. The first, which had approximately 75 participants, was held in Ghana in August 2001. “ACSS Programs,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 June 2001, available on the Internet at <www.africacenter.org>, accessed on 2 January 2002.
successfully conduct peacekeeping and complex humanitarian operations. Two conferences were held in 2001 in conjunction with ACRI brigade-level exercises in Kenya and Senegal.  

B. Field Training

48. The US undertakes numerous field training exercises with African countries. Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) is a global program that many African countries have benefitted from. A typical exercise is short and small, lasting about a month and involving fewer than 150 troops, and does not involve “peacekeeping skills,” *per se*. More significant for the purposes of this study are exercises that the US regional commands undertake in Africa. Of these, the most ambitious one in sub-Saharan Africa has been *Natural Fire*, which has taken place in Kenya in June 1998 and April 2000. Roughly 1,700 troops from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda participated in each exercise.

49. ACRI set out to train 12,000 African troops to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Training was to be conducted bilaterally, initially at the battalion-level and somewhat later at the brigade-level. Roughly speaking, the standard ACRI package consists of six one-month training modules over a three-year period, culminating in a multinational exercise (MNX). Nine countries have concluded the necessary agreements to receive ACRI battalion-level training: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda. Three of these countries – Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Uganda – are presently barred from participating in the program, and a fourth, Ghana, essentially withdrew (although it has since indicated its desire to receive training). (See Chart on page 26.) As of December 2001, more than 8,000 African troops had been trained under the program.

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### Recipients of ACRI Battalion-Level Training

(as of 31 December 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>ST 1</th>
<th>ST 2</th>
<th>FT 1</th>
<th>FT 2</th>
<th>FT 3</th>
<th>FT 4</th>
<th>FT 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>08.99</td>
<td>11.99</td>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>04.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>06.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>08.98</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>04.98</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>03.99</td>
<td>09.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya*</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>05.01</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>06.02</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>09.97</td>
<td>04.98</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>09.99</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>01.00</td>
<td>06.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>02.98</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>05.99</td>
<td>02.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>05.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>07.97</td>
<td>03.98</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>04.99</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>04.00</td>
<td>02.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>07.97</td>
<td>03.98</td>
<td>09.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: 
- **planned**
- **postponed**
- **not offered**

* = Training offered to Kenya differs from other ACRI recipients and is known as the “Kenya ACRI Model” (KAM).

Many changes have been instituted to the battalion-level portion of ACRI since initial training began in July 1997. “Phase 1,” later known as “Initial” training, was succeeded by “Sustainment Training” (ST) modules when ACRI began. “Follow-on Training” (FT) modules replaced STs in 1999. While the period of training remained roughly 30 days, FTs were better tailored to the needs of the particular recipient. When Kenya, formerly a vocal critic of ACRI, joined the program in 2000, the US agreed to Kenya’s proposed changes, which resulted in the Kenya ACRI Model (KAM). KAM would be shorter than the normal training regimen, and would focus on training-the-trainer. Other changes include engaging more fully international and humanitarian organizations, and non-governmental organizations in the training exercise. Also, ACRI training now incorporates a briefing on the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The ACRI budget has remained more or less constant, however, at about $20 million a year.

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93 The data for this chart come from several interviews with Scott Fisher, Political-Military Adviser, African Crisis Response Initiative Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, most recently on 20 November 2001, and 19 December 2001, both by telephone.

94 The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, has participated in several training events.

51. Brigade-level ACRI training did not begin until September 2000. The war that erupted in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia largely explains the delay. Brigade-level training for Ethiopia was to begin shortly after battalion-level training commenced, which had been scheduled for September 1998. When it became clear that brigade-level training for Ethiopia would have to be postponed indefinitely, the US concluded agreements with Kenya and Senegal. As with battalion-level, the program would encompass an initial training exercise to be succeeded by follow-on training. It differed, however, in that only two brigade follow-on-training (BFT) modules would be offered. Brigade-level training began in September 2000 for Senegal and in April 2001 for Kenya. (See Chart below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>BFT-1</th>
<th>BFT-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>04.01</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>06.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>09.00</td>
<td>07.01</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: □ = planned | □ = postponed

52. ACRI training is now winding down. Malawi and Mali have completed their final FTs with a MNX as planned. Senegal is considered to have completed its FT-5 even though it did not participate in a MNX. The US views the training Senegal received as part of Operation Focus Relief (see below) as satisfying the requirements of ACRI FT-5 training with the understanding that the OFR-trained battalion will serve in a multinational peacekeeping force. Should that not transpire, then the US will reevaluate its decision. It is expected that Benin will complete its ACRI training next June in conjunction with BFT-2 for Kenya.

53. Like ACRI, OFR was quickly conceived in response to a crisis on the African continent. It has its roots in the immediate aftermath of the detention by the Revolutionary United Front

96 The data for this chart come from several interviews with Fisher, most recently on 20 November 2001, and 19 December 2001, both by telephone.

97 While this is technically correct, the “MNX” offered is not likely the type that had been originally envisaged. Unlike most FTXs or MNXs, which involve formed units from several countries operating jointly in the field, the ACRI MNX involves two recipients being trained separately in their respective countries along the same scenario. They interact via telecommunications and two liaison officers that the battalion provides to the brigade headquarters.

(RUF) of some 500 UN Blue Helmets in Sierra Leone in May 2000. The US correctly feared that if the UN peacekeeping force were to be seen a “failure,” future support for UN peacekeeping would be hard to garner. Washington supported an appeal by ECOWAS for assistance in training troops to augment the UN mission there.99 In very short order, the US committed up to $ 90 million100 to train seven battalions from ECOWAS member states with the understanding that the recipients would serve in Sierra Leone upon completing the program.

54. OFR training is now complete. As planned, seven West African battalions were selected: five from Nigeria, and one each from Ghana and Senegal. (See Chart on page 29.) Training lasted ten weeks, and was conducted in three phases. The first phase, beginning in October 2000, was for two battalions from Nigeria. It concluded on schedule, but one of the battalions had to make up missed classes as Nigeria did not provide a list of trainees in a timely manner, which delayed the vetting process. Training could not continue until the names had been checked to help ensure that no one who committed gross violations of human rights was taking part.101 The resentment some senior Nigerian military officials had for the US training program102 created other problems and largely explains why Nigeria did not receive training for an additional three battalions until September 2001. (See Chart on page 29.) Phases Two and Three reportedly went smoothly.

99 Interview with James A. Schear, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 22 May 2001, by telephone.

100 Up to $54 million was to come from Department of Defense “drawdown” money and $36 million for Department of State’s voluntary peacekeeping funds. Interview with Charles Ikins, Regional Director for Southern Africa, Office of African Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, US Department of Defense, 6 July 2001, by telephone.

101 Ibid.

Three OFR-trained battalions have been deployed as part of UNAMSIL, and three others are expected to join the peacekeeping force in the next few months. The two Nigerian battalions that completed Phase One became “Blue Helmeted” in January 2001. They are now completing their 12-month rotation and will be replaced in January 2002 by two of the three Nigerian battalions that completed Phase Three training. The fifth OFR-trained Nigerian battalion is supposed to deploy by April 2002 to replace one of the non-OFR trained Nigerian battalions currently in UNAMSIL. The Ghanaian OFR-trained battalion joined UNAMSIL in October. It is scheduled to serve for nine months – an increase from Ghana’s usual six-month rotation, but still not as long as the US would have liked. The OFR-trained Senegalese battalion is the only one of the seven that has no plans to join UNAMSIL at present. This has caused some distress in Washington, but has nothing to do with Dakar’s predisposition. The explanation lies in the fact that UNAMSIL has reached its maximum-authorized strength. Shy of changing the mission’s mandate, the US continues to try to have one of the weaker troop-contributing countries withdraw their battalion to make room for Senegal.

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103 The data for this chart come from two main sources: interviews with Ikins, 7 July 2001, by telephone, and Stacy Rabin, Project Support Manager, Pacific Architects and Engineers, 10 July 2001, by telephone.

C. Equipping

56. ACRI provides a modest package of equipment, none of which is lethal. The standard ACRI-issued equipment includes generators, mine detectors, water purifiers, night vision goggles, communication equipment, uniforms, and boots. Small arms ammunition is provided but only for target practice.

57. OFR represents a substantial evolution in US policy as it provides individual firearms as well as crew-served weapons. Under Operation Focus Relief, each soldier received a rifle. The US decided to provide firearms that were already being used by the armies receiving training. The Nigerians, therefore, received AK-47s. The US had to purchase these as they were not available through drawdown (i.e. surplus US stocks). The Ghanaians and Senegalese were furnished with M-16s through drawdown. Each battalion is to be provided with 12 60mm mortars, but there has been a delay in procuring the mortars. For example, the first two OFR-trained battalions did not receive them until ten months into their tour in Sierra Leone as part of the UN peacekeeping force. In addition, each battalion is to receive 24 7.62mm M60 machine guns. The US also provided various ammunition under OFR for target practice and training purposes. Whatever was not used during the training, however, was retained by the US. OFR also provides recipients with significant numbers of vehicles and medical equipment.

105 The Nigerian army also possesses a large number of FN-FAL rifles, but the US chose to procure the less-expensive and more forgiving AK-47.

Pacific Architects and Engineers: Victim of Political Ideology

The US company Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) played a critical role in providing key logistical support to both the subregional and UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, for example, it assisted ECOMOG with ground and air transportation, vehicle maintenance, contracting expertise, power generation, communication equipment, and even carpentry and plumbing services. The value of PAE’s contribution can be appreciated, in part, by the decision of countries other than the US to fund its work. PAE also supported UNAMSIL, and continued to do so after the last ECOMOG troops departed Sierra Leone in May 2000.

Despite PAE’s success, the US government ill-advisedly decided in 2001 to terminate its support. The decision was taken for purely ideological reasons and had nothing to do with financial considerations. Indeed, the US government recorded a slight profit from the contract with the United Nations for PAE’s services. The high-ranking official who championed the change in policy, a long-standing critic of the UN, believed the US should pay its dues and nothing more. The US should not finance supplemental programs – regardless of their merit. In November 2001, it was unclear which PAE service contracts the UN would pick up, if any, and some had already lapsed, such as the provision of water filtration systems to UN troops in the field, with possibly fatal results.

Discussions within the US government are ongoing over how best to proceed. It appears likely that some equipment PAE was operating in the country will be used to support IMATT’s work and the SLA. Interest has also been expressed in having a private contractor assist ECOWAS with the development of its proposed logistics depot. Both are worthy initiatives, especially the latter. Better still, however, would have been to support the continuation of the program.

D. Support for African Subregional Organizations

58. US assistance to African subregional organizations has centered on the OAU and ECOWAS. Washington was extremely generous toward the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution when it was first established in 1993. It provided $10 million to the OAU Peace Fund to help develop the Conflict Management Centre, which included a 1998 Command Post Exercise. Washington has not been impressed with the progress the OAU has made, and little additional institutional support has since been forthcoming. The US has, however, continued to help finance OAU peacekeeping operations, and recently provided money for the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea. As for ECOWAS, most of Washington’s efforts went toward aiding ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Logistical assistance to ECOMOG troops in Liberia alone cost some $80 million. Comparatively little effort has been made to assist the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat directly, however. This

107 Interview with Bruce Smart, Project Manager, Sierra Leone Office, Pacific Architects and Engineers, 1 June 2000, Freetown.


109 Ibid.
has begun to change. For example, in July 2001, two ECOWAS officials participated in ACRI brigade-level training in Senegal. In October, the US European Command (EUCOM) invited ECOWAS officials to visit its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, to discuss possible US support in developing ECOWAS’s communications capacities to improve command and control for ECOMOG operations. US interest in the EAC is also notable. Interestingly, when the US held its ACRI BFT-1 in Kenya in November, two EAC officials participated, but the OAU was not represented. US officials have also visited the Peace Support Training Centre, and expressed an interest to assist in its work.

E. The Next 12 Months

59. Some of the US military education programs will expand in 2002. At ACSS, the first workshop (on health and security) of the Topical Seminar series will meet in May, and another Topical Seminar is scheduled for later in the fall. The Center will hold its second Sub-Regional Seminar during the second half of the year, this time in Southern Africa. The Center for Civil-Military Relations in California, which hosts EIPC seminars, will run seven courses in African countries in 2002 – as many as were held in 2000 and 2001 combined. While the ACRI Senior Leadership seminars have been deemed successful and worthwhile, there are no plans at present to replicate them at the two brigade-level training exercises scheduled for 2002. However, they may be included as part of a post-ACRI training package, or as a stand-alone program.

60. As for US field training in Africa, Natural Fire may not occur in 2002, but Washington will undertake a new initiative in West Africa. EUCOM has approached Kenya to host the third Natural Fire exercise scheduled for 2002, but Nairobi has declined, although it has expressed an interest to participate in an exercise if either Tanzania or Uganda were to take the lead. Uganda cannot be considered for political reasons, and Tanzania has begged off given its commitment to RECAMP and Tanzanite. As of December 2001, no decision had been taken on whether the exercise would go ahead as originally planned. However, the US will undertake a bilateral training program in Guinea starting in the first quarter of 2002 to train up to four companies of

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110 Interview with Pamela Baker-Masso n, Director of Communications, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 3 January 2002, by telephone. (In a departure from previous practice, the ACSS Leadership Seminar will be convened in the US this year, with the meeting planned for Washington, DC in February.) Ibid.

111 In 2002, these seven courses, which are actually IMET-funded, are scheduled for Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. This compares to three that were held in 2000 (in Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), and four in 2001 (in Botswana, Chad, Lesotho, and South Africa). Written correspondence with Shemella, 3 January 2002.

112 Interview with Greg Engle, ACRI Special Coordinator, African Crisis Response Initiative Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 15 November 2001, Washington, DC.
Guinean troops. No lethal equipment will be provided as part of the program, which will last ten weeks.\textsuperscript{13}

61. ACRI training modules that were scheduled for 2002 will still take place, and other training sessions could be introduced. Benin still has an FT-5 and both brigade-level recipients must finish their BFT-2s. It is conceivable that any or all of the three countries that have concluded agreements with the US to receive ACRI training but are presently barred from the program could meet the necessary conditions for training to resume in 2002.\textsuperscript{14} With its war with Eritrea over, Ethiopia must now repay money it owes the US – or have its debt forgiven – to be considered eligible for ACRI training. Uganda must withdraw the remainder of its troops from DRC. Both of these conditions could be met in relatively short order. However, the process for Côte d’Ivoire to be considered favorably for ACRI training is likely to be considerably lengthier, given the breakdown in democracy and respect for human rights. The holding of free and fair elections will also likely be a pre-condition for resumption of training.

62. The well-known tensions between the Departments of Defense and State over the direction of ACRI have receded significantly and the two, together with other governmental actors, are re-evaluating the program. Internal processes have been revamped and Defense is now much more involved in the decision-making process, although State still manages it. It is foreseen that ACRI will move to a strict train-the-trainer model, much more than what is currently being tried under KAM. A second significant change afoot is that the training will not be limited to a Chapter VI-type operation.\textsuperscript{15}

63. While a robust mix of lethal equipment provided under OFR might not be replicated under a revamped ACRI program, the current thinking is to provide two sets of equipment. The first package would be used for training and would essentially represent a one-time delivery. (An exception might be made concerning the provision of boots, which the US might continue to provide to additional trainees. The US does not, however, envision providing uniforms as it has done before.) To make the proposal financially acceptable to Congress, the current thinking is that the US would repair and refurbish existing equipment in the recipients’ own stores rather than providing new US-supplied equipment. The US might provide non-reusable equipment such as ammunition. The communication package has yet to be decided, but there is general consensus that it needs to be significantly augmented from the current package provided under ACRI. A second set of equipment might be a pre-deployment package that would remain with the recipient country and which the US would help maintain and ideally would help train the recipient to maintain on its own. This package might resemble what the US has provided under OFR. The question of who would assume responsibility for storage of the matériel is still being

\textsuperscript{13} Interview with US government official, December 2001.

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Fisher, 19 December 2001.

discussed. It is likely that whatever is decided will be done on a bilateral basis with a state, and not with a regional organization.116

64. It is likely that the new incarnation of what is now ACRI will be offered to fewer countries. The present thought is to engage Ghana and Senegal. Other countries have been mentioned as likely candidates, including Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, but a decision to bring on others will not likely be made until after the pilot program is underway. The idea is that training would commence in the second half of 2002 after assessment teams and appropriate deliberations have occurred over the first half of the year.117

65. The US also aspires to foster a much more holistic approach to the training it offers. For example, countries chosen to receive the next phase of ACRI training would be encouraged to participate in other US programs. The idea would be to tailor programs, such as IMET, E-IMET, ACSS, and JCET, to the recipients’ needs.118

66. Lastly, a new initiative tentatively referred to as the “West Africa Stabilization Program,” is emerging. Funding for the program as envisioned had yet to be secured from Congress as of December 2001, when the first budget proposal for the program was to go to Congress for review.119 The program includes several small projects such as logistical support to IMATT, confidence-building measures along the “Parrot’s Beak” region of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and, possibly, matériels and other assistance to the proposed ECOWAS depot.120

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116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Interview with Bittrick, December 2001.
120 Interview with US government official, December 2001.
In November 2001, the “P-3” met in London to assess the progress they have made since unveiling their Initiative almost five years ago. They could take satisfaction that progress had been made on a number of levels. The dialogue between donors and Africans is better than it was in 1997. The hoped-for discussions at the United Nations have not materialized, but this has as much to do with tensions among the Africans themselves as it does with the Initiative’s merits. Significantly, some countries that were once antagonistic towards Western capacity-building programs are now enthusiastic recipients. Kenya and Nigeria – both vocal critics of US policy, for example – have now availed themselves of US programs. This may have more to do with a healthy dose of opportunism on the part of the recipients than with the efficacy of the programs being offered, however.

Officials from London, Paris, and Washington all speak of the importance of “cooperation” and provide numerous examples to underscore their commitment to working together. The UK sent a contingent to Guidimakha to support RECAMP. France joined the British-led Blue Pelican map exercise at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. The US seconded officers to IMATT. These are just a few examples. To a significant degree, France, the UK, and the US have succeeded in at least one of their objectives: transparency. As Col. Ellenbogen stressed repeatedly, France is not “paranoid” about the intentions of its two partners. Most UK and US policymakers would express similar sentiments about their P-3 colleagues.

Much more importantly, however, the three partners have created little in the way of synergy. Few countries are willing to cooperate with any enthusiasm if they do not get sufficient credit and have control of the situation. France, the UK, and the US are no exception. Perhaps this explains why, after two years, the UK is still only talking about “supporting” the Zambakro Peacekeeping School. Similarly, Paris showed little interest when EUCOM proposed to explore integrating Natural Fire with Tanzanite. Admittedly, this initiative was not made forcefully and it may have been put forth rather late in the planning cycle. Nevertheless, it would appear that without assigning blame, an opportunity to expand and improve both exercises was lost, and Natural Fire may not even be held. What is needed now is for each country to more fully buy into the others’ more worthwhile initiatives.

Interview with Ellenbogen, 10 December 2001.
French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects

**British-French “Joint” Policy toward Africa**

France and the UK have undertaken a number of tangible initiatives to cooperate in Africa since they issued their “St. Malo Declaration” in December 1998. Both countries’ Prime Ministers pledged to harmonize their policies toward Africa and to cooperate on the ground. Leaving aside development policies, which are not covered in this study, what has been achieved to date is less ambitious than one of the stated goals of possibly co-locating “French-British embassies” in Africa, but noteworthy nevertheless.

While clear differences of opinion remain, several tangible steps have been taken that would have been unheard of just ten years ago. Examples of areas in which Paris and London do not see eye-to-eye would include the Great Lakes region, the role and utility of sanctions in West Africa, and to a lesser extent the best way to end the war in Sierra Leone (with France promoting dialogue, and the UK seeking to apply military pressure to bear against the RUF). Yet to a far larger extent, France and the UK pursue policies that converge. Three years after St. Malo, British and French foreign service officials are seconded to the African departments at the Quai d’Orsay and the FCO. British political officers can spend up to six months at the French Foreign Ministry prior to their being posted in francophone Africa. Information is now shared among embassy personnel of the two countries in African capitals. In Abidjan, for example, representatives of the UK and French embassies are routinely represented in each other’s weekly meetings. 122 This joint approach to Africa, which was reaffirmed at a summit in Cahors in February 2001, suggests that fuller collaboration as far as peacekeeping is concerned may yet occur.

70. A question that cuts to the core of the capacity-building programs of France, the UK and the US is: Does the training or equipment offered make African recipients any more willing or able to undertake peacekeeping on their continent? The answer is far from clear. The willingness arguably already existed prior to the creation of the three countries’ programs. As for the enhanced capacity, much of what is being offered is of questionable value. To some extent, France, the UK, and the US have acknowledged some of their own programs’ limitations, and they are attempting to redress these weaknesses. Perhaps chief among them was an unwise pre-occupation with providing “Chapter VI-type” training and equipment. There is very little call for such expertise in Africa.

71. An analysis of the three countries’ programs suggests that there is much room for improvement. Cooperation among them is not particularly deep. Skepticism of some subregional initiatives is warranted, but others deserve greater support than they presently receive. Priorities need to be re-evaluated. This is especially true of donor support for ECOWAS. Moreover, several training programs need to be re-focused. France, the UK, and the US have recognized many of their respective programs’ shortcomings and have taken steps to overcome them. They have certainly moved beyond the stage when they spent an inordinate

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amount of time defending their policies against charges of “disengagement” and “indifference.” Government officials are now much more receptive to criticism and suggestions for change. The key now will be to spend their resources – which are significant – in a more intelligent manner.

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About the Author

Eric G. Berman is currently an independent consultant based in Arlington, Massachusetts. Since last leaving the UN in 1999, he has participated in brigade-level exercises as part of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) through Northrop Grumman Information Technology, and has also undertaken studies for the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey that have entailed field research in Sierra Leone and East Timor. His UN experience includes serving as the Political Affairs Officer for the UN International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), the Special Assistant to the Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, and the Assistant Spokesman for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. During a break from the UN in 1996-97, he was Executive Director of United Nations Watch, a non-governmental organization based in Geneva.

He has published widely on UN and security issues, including Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique; Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (with Katie E. Sams); Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement; and most recently, “The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations From the Field.” “The Peacekeeping Potential of African Regional Organizations,” (with Katie E. Sams), is expected to be published later this year in an edited book.

Mr. Berman received a Master’s degree in International Relations from Yale University and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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