Yemen

Politics:

• Analysis

  Yemen politics: President surprises again with military reshuffle

  In a potentially major milestone in Yemen's political transition, the president, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, announced on December 19th a radical overhaul of the Yemeni military, which in effect removes two powerful rival officers who helped bring the country to the brink of civil war in 2011. With his rivals accepting the changes (at least in public), the reshuffle should both buttress Mr Hadi's standing and provide a boost for the forthcoming, all-inclusive National Dialogue talks (designed to map out a process for drawing up a new constitution and organising elections).

  The long-mooted military restructure will see both the Republican Guard and the First Armoured Division dissolved. The significance of their disbanding stems from the prominence of the two leaders of these units: respectively, Brigadier-General Ahmed Ali Saleh, a son of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh; and Brigadier-General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a former Saleh ally and clansman who defected during the country's 2011 uprising. It was not clear at the time of writing what, if any, role either man would have within the military in the future. Meanwhile, the former president's nephew, Yahya Saleh, was removed from his post as the commander of the Central Security Forces (CSF), which falls under the remit of the Ministry of the Interior.

  The chain of military command now runs from the president, as supreme commander and chairman of Yemen's Defence Council, to the defence minister, to the general chief of staff. The chief of staff, who previously had a number of deputies, will now have only one, and for the first time it will be possible to nominate a defence minister from a civilian background. The military will be made up of four easily distinguishable units: land forces, air force, coastal guard and border guard, overseen by commanders in seven regions (Yemen's military previously operated across five regions).

  Strategic Reserve to take on special forces' role

  A separate unit, the Strategic Reserve, will come directly under the remit of the president, the defence minister and the chief of staff. Its key component will be the Special Operations Command, which will oversee the special forces, the mountain infantry and the country's counter-terrorism units. The Strategic Reserve will also oversee the country's long-range missiles and a special presidential protection force. The performance of this unit will be watched especially closely by the US, whose military has historically worked closely with Yahya Saleh's CSF in countering al-Qaida in the country.

  Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, remained calm following the announcement (a marked change from the aftermath of previous announcements). In an interview with al-Jazeera, a Doha-based TV network, following the announcement, General Ahmar accepted the changes, while Mohammed al-Basha, the Yemeni government's spokesman in Washington DC, stated that Yahya Saleh had not only accepted his removal, but also described Mr Hadi's actions as "courageous". There was no response from Ahmed Saleh, who was in Rome. According to local reports, Ahmed Saleh has been inspecting Italian hospitals on his father's behalf. The former president was severely injured by an explosion at the presidential mosque in June 2011, and has required medical treatment not available in Yemen. Following the attack, he was flown to Saudi Arabia, and he has also sought treatment in the US (although this has not been forthcoming as yet).

  The dismissals may well reflect the ongoing threat of sanctions: Mr Saleh's decision to step down as president in November 2011 was made in the face of the threat of economic sanctions and travel bans, and it is notable that the US in May imposed a range of financial sanctions on individuals "disrupting the political transition"-a stipulation widely viewed as targeting the Saleh family. More recently, the UN secretary-general's special representative to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, visiting Yemen on December 19th, also brought up the possibility of imposing sanctions once again, although his office said that his presence in Yemen at the time of the announcement was coincidental; he is at present focused on the getting the National Dialogue off the ground.

  Easier said than done

  Certainly, for many delegates, the announcement will be a major boost for those seeking assurances that reform of structures built up over the course of Mr Saleh's 33-year regime is possible, although the former ruling General People's Congress (which has the single largest allocation of seats at the National Dialogue conference) is probably less pleased. Whatever the case, implementation of Mr Hadi's directive could prove difficult. Mr Hadi's earlier efforts to replace Saleh-era appointees have had a tough time. For example, in April the president dismissed Mr Saleh's nephew and head of the third division of the Republican Guard, General Tareq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh. However, General Saleh refused to relinquish his post for a month, and, even when he did, troops loyal to him deployed tanks around the brigade's headquarters and refused to let the newly appointed commander gain access (the troops eventually backed down).

  Nevertheless, assuming the changes go through (and the comments from Yahya Saleh and General Ahmar are encouraging), Mr Hadi's position should be considerably strengthened. Expectations were low when he became president after a single-candidate election in February, which was locally seen as more of a referendum on Mr Saleh than a reflection of any genuine enthusiasm for Mr Hadi (who had been vice-president under Mr Saleh for 18 years). Yet, with his latest move, Mr Hadi has once again proven his vigour and political nous, and, although he has yet to make a comment on his future, he is increasingly well set should he choose to participate in the presidential election expected in 2014.

  December 21, 2012

• Background

  Yemen: Key figures

  Ali Abdullah Saleh

  Mr Saleh is president and head of the General People's Congress (GPC). His victory in the 2006 presidential election will keep him in power until 2013, when, according to the constitution, he must stand down. As field marshal of the armed forces, he bases much of his power on the unchallenged support of the army and security forces, although a deteriorating security climate throughout the country is testing his military strength and seemingly sapping his political support.

  Ali Mohammed Mujawer

  Appointed as prime minister in March 2007, Mr Mujawer had previously earned a reputation as an effective opponent of corruption in his post as electricity minister. Under his premiership, a much clearer division of labour within the government has emerged. Mr Mujawer, who trained as an economist in France, has assumed responsibility for economic management, whereas Mr Saleh retains control over security matters. Importantly, the new prime minister is from southern Yemen, continuing Mr Saleh's long-standing policy of placing southerners in prominent positions in government.

  Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh

  The son of the president, he is commander of Yemen's special forces, the Republican Guard. The president is seemingly keen to groom him for eventual succession, and he has increasingly been representing his father on overseas visits. Although he is not well regarded within the establishment and has little political experience, he remains a strong contender to become president in the future.

  Hamid Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar

  Mr Ahmar, son of the late Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, the founder of Islah, has overt political ambitions, recently strengthened by his management of the presidential campaign of Faisal bin Shamlan in the previous election. Before entering parliament, he forged a successful business career. This, and his modern outlook, makes him popular with the urban youth, although it sets him slightly at odds with conservative tribal figures.

  The judiciary

  The judiciary is generally poorly trained, inefficient and perceived to be corrupt, a belief that recent moves to overhaul the system have done little to change. In early 2005, in the latest of several reshuffles since the government launched its judicial reform programme in 1997, some 160 judges and 120 prosecutors in provincial courts of appeal, and around 70 judges and over 180 prosecutors in district assizes, were reassigned to different posts. The measure was designed to address concerns over rampant corruption in the system, but none of the reshuffles are perceived to have resulted in substantial improvements to the functioning of the judicial system.

  The legislature

  The primary formal legislative organ is parliament, which currently has 301 members. However, parliament has long been dominated by the ruling party, the GPC, and is largely ineffective as a check on executive power. Its powers are further circumscribed by the executive-appointed Consultative Council, which currently has 111 members. The Council initially played a purely advisory role, but this role has been expanded to include some limited legislative powers. Officially, 22 political parties contested the general election in April 2003. In practice, Yemen's political scene is dominated by three parties: the GPC, Islah and the YSP. Parliamentary elections are held every six years.

  Media services

  Ostensibly, Yemen has a vibrant press, with numerous privately-owned newspapers and magazines. However, the Ministry of Information retains considerable control over the media, and all broadcast media is controlled by the government. The press has come under particular attack by officialdom in recent years, with the harassment of journalists increasing and state interference in the publication and dissemination of news more in evidence. The highest-profile victim of the government's recent backlash is Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani, who was sentenced to six years in prison in 2007 for reporting government brutality in the conflict against Zaydi rebels.

  Democracy index (for methodology, see Appendix)

  The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2008 democracy index ranks Yemen 140th out of 167 countries, putting it among those countries considered to have authoritarian regimes. Despite its lowly position, however, Yemen is in fact ranked higher than several of its neighbours, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the UAE. This reflects its higher scores for political participation and political culture, a result in large part of the September 2006 presidential election, which an EU election observer mission described as an "open and genuine contest"—a rarity in the Arab Middle East.

  Since that time, however, the government has stepped up considerably its repression of the media, and protests, especially in the south, over low living standards have been forcibly repressed at times. As a result, the country scores poorly for civil liberties. The state security forces are now stretched on multiple fronts, facing al-Qaida attacks, an insurgency in the north and an apparent rise in secessionist feeling in the south. The government has, however, taken a haphazard approach to dealing with these challenges: adopting an apparently conciliatory approach to jihadis, while simultaneously violently suppressing peaceful protest rallies. In the past, the government would have often resorted to bribery to co-opt opposition elements. However, with the country's oil reserves declining, it appears to have resorted to one of the few tools still available to it—force—to weaken its opponents.

  Democracy index
  	Overall score	Overall rank	Electoral process	Government functioning	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Regime type
  Yemen	2.95	140	2.17	2.50	3.33	5.00	1.76	Authoritarian
  Overall and component scores are on a scale of 0 to 10; overall rank is out of 167 countries.

  Download text file (csv format)

  July 02, 2008

• Structure

  Yemen: Political structure

  Official name

  Republic of Yemen

  Form of state

  Republic, unified on May 22nd 1990

  Legal system

  Under the constitution of May 1991, sharia (Islamic law) is the principal source of law

  Legislature

  Unicameral assembly directly elected for a six-year term

  National elections

  February 21st 2012 (presidential); April 2003 (parliamentary). Next parliamentary election had been scheduled for April 2009 but was postponed. Under the transitional agreement, signed in November 2011, a presidential election was held in February 2012, albeit with just one candidate, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi (who had previously been vice-president). The next parliamentary election will have to await the conclusion of the drawing-up of a new constitution, but is expected to take place in 2014

  Head of state

  President (directly elected for a two-year term): Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Mr Hadi will in effect act as a caretaker president until a multi-candidate election takes place in 2014

  Executive

  Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister. In December 2011 a new cabinet was announced, roughly split between the General People's Congress (GPC, the former ruling party) and the opposition

  Political parties

  There are 22 legal parties, five of which are represented in parliament: the GPC; the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah, a religious-based party with tribal and Islamist wings); the Arab Socialist Baath Party; the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP); and the Nasserist Unionist Party (NUP). These, together with two opposition groups without parliamentary representation, the Union of Public Forces and al-Haq, form a loose parliamentary coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)

  Government

  Prime minister: Mohammed Salem Basindwa (JMP)

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & irrigation: Farid Ahmed Mujawar (GPC)

  Defence: Mohammed Nasser Ahmed Ali (GPC)

  Education: Abdul-Razzaq Yahya al-Ashwal (JMP)

  Electricity: Saleh Hasan Sumai (JMP)

  Endowment & Islamic affairs: Hamoud Ubad (GPC)

  Finance: Sakhr Ahmed al-Wajih (JMP)

  Foreign affairs & immigration: Abu Bakr Abdullah al-Qirbi (GPC)

  Human rights: Houriah Ahmed Mashhour (JMP)

  Information: Ali Ahmed al-Amrani (JMP)

  Interior: Abdul-Qader Qahtan (JMP)

  Justice: Murshed Ali al-Arashani (JMP)

  Labour & social affairs: Armat al-Razzaq Hummad (GPC)

  Local administration: Ali Mohammed al-Yazidi (JMP)

  Oil & minerals: Hisham Sharaf (GPC)

  Planning & international co-operation: Mohammed al-Saadi (JMP)

  Public health & population: Ahmed Qassim al-Ansi (GPC)

  Public works & roads: Omar Abdullah al-Qurshumi (GPC)

  Trade & industry: Saad al-Din Ali bin Talib (JMP)

  Transport: Waid Abdullah Bathib (JMP)

  Water & environment: Abdo Razzaz Saleh Khaled (JMP)

  Central Bank governor

  Mohammed Awadh bin Hamam

  December 07, 2012

• Outlook

  Yemen: Key developments

  Outlook for 2013-17

  • Despite weak central control and his lack of a natural support base, the new president, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, has proven surprisingly forceful in imposing his authority since taking office.
  • Mr Hadi and the recently formed government of national unity will embark on plans for a new constitution and competitive elections. However, violence is likely to persist, and the risk of Yemen splitting apart remains high.
  • The Gulf Co-operation Council will step up its economic support to Yemen, in order to shore up the country's political transition. However, Western countries' concern will continue to be focused on al-Qaida.
  • The new transitional government's main economic priority will be improving Yemenis' quality of life. As a result, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect the government to reimpose fiscal austerity until 2014 at the earliest.
  • After contracting by an estimated 10.5% in 2011, the economy will continue the gradual recovery seen in 2012, growing by an average of 2.6% in the forecast period, as private-sector activity revives and donor aid pushes up investment.
  • With the worst of the food and fuel shortages over, and with global commodity prices falling, we expect inflation to return to its trend rate in 2013-14, before rising again as import costs surge on the back of a depreciating riyal.
  • The current-account deficit is expected to remain wide in 2013-17, as oil exports are depressed by falling production.

  Review

  • A government spokesman has disclosed that several exiled former leaders of South Yemen-which merged with the north in 1990-have agreed to participate in the National Dialogue (designed to plot Yemen's political transition).
  • A large car bomb in the capital, Sanaa, planted by al-Qaida, killed 13 people in September, but missed its apparent intended target, the defence minister, Mohammed Nasser Ahmed Ali.
  • Yemen accrued another US$1.46bn in development aid at a "Friends of Yemen" donor event in New York, bringing the total pledged this year to US$7.9bn.
  • Dubai's DP World has pulled out of Aden, just four years after signing up as leaseholder and operator at the port. The move may be a pre-emptive strike to avoid the embarrassment of the Yemeni government cancelling the deal.
  • The latest data from the Central Bank of Yemen show that year-on-year consumer price growth continued to soften in June and July, but that food costs have begun to rise once again.

  December 07, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Yemen: Economic background

  Real gross domestic product by sector
  (% share of GDP)
  	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
  Agriculture	13.6	12.9	13.3	12.4	12.4
  Industry	42.0	43.9	44.4	42.3	40.8
  Services	44.3	45.3	48.1	45.4	46.7
  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

  Download text file (csv format)

  Oil and agriculture are the two mainstays of Yemen's economy. In 2007 oil accounted for 85% of export earnings and an estimated 71% of government revenue. This leaves the external and fiscal accounts highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. Yemen's oil reserves are relatively small, by Gulf standards, and output is declining: production at the end of 2007 was just 339,000 barrels/day (b/d), some way below the peak average of 465,000 b/d recorded in 2003. On current trends, Yemen is expected to have depleted its oil reserves within 12 years, although prospects for the gas sector look better. The oil sector dominates the overall economy, but agriculture has traditionally been the mainstay of the domestic economy. Depending on rainfall patterns, agriculture generally constitutes around 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the economically active population. The sector is under threat, though, as aquifers have been seriously depleted in recent years.

  Yemen has a small economy in comparison with its Gulf neighbours, and the country is poor. Average annual income per head in Yemen is around US$900, compared with over US$12,500 in Saudi Arabia and over US$52,000 in Qatar. Private consumption accounts for about 66% of the country's nominal GDP, and government consumption for around 12%. The share of fixed investment has remained relatively constant at around 15%.

  July 02, 2008

• Structure

  Yemen: Economic structure

  Data and charts: Annual trends charts

  
  

  

  December 07, 2012

• Outlook

  Yemen: Country outlook

  Yemen: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  POLITICAL STABILITY: On February 21st Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi was elected as the new president of Yemen (although his was the only name on the ballot paper). It is intended that Mr Hadi will in effect act as a caretaker, overseeing a two-year interim process during which a new constitution and plans for competitive elections will be drawn up. The carefully choreographed election, which was preceded by the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh after more than 33 years in power, was a key step in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)-backed transition plan. As part of the plan, and in return for departing the presidency, Mr Saleh has been granted legal immunity. However, despite considerable international backing the new interim government, with cabinet posts evenly split between the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and the General People's Congress (GPC), will struggle to impose its authority over Yemen's more remote and often self-governing areas. In addition, relations between the JMP (which includes Islah, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) and the GPC will become increasingly tense, with an emboldened JMP seeking to impose its will on the embattled former ruling party. The future of the Saleh family (several members of which retain senior military positions) will be a key aspect of this internecine struggle, although Mr Hadi has shown surprising boldness thus far in seeking to sideline the family.

  ELECTION WATCH: The presidential election in February took place within 90 days of the GCC-backed agreement coming into force (a stipulation in line with the current constitution). Despite the fact that Mr Hadi ran unopposed, the turnout was relatively high, including in the south, where southern separatists had called for a boycott. At the end of the national dialogue process new parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled to be held, probably in 2014, with both likely to be elected for four-year terms. Given the previous dominance of the GPC, the outcome of the polls is extremely uncertain (and Mr Hadi's intentions are particularly opaque). Nevertheless, considerable international attention at least will be focused on Islah (the main party within the JMP), which will be looking to replicate the recent electoral success of other fellow Muslim Brotherhood offshoots in the Middle East.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The worsening security situation in Yemen and the continued tussle for power have attracted increased attention from the country's neighbours and several Western powers. The initial refusal of Mr Saleh to sign up to the GCC's transition proposal frustrated the international community and prompted the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for the Yemeni president to transfer power immediately. Eventually, faced with growing international opprobrium and with his military's grip on the country slipping, Mr Saleh signed the GCC proposal in late November 2011 in the Saudi capital, Riyadh--highlighting the central role the Saudis have played in Yemen's political maelstrom recently. With Mr Saleh's departure, the GCC states have focused on attempting to shore up Yemen's transition by stepping up economic development support and using their influence behind the scenes to shape the behaviour of the key players. As part of this process, at a Friends of Yemen event in late May Saudi Arabia pledged US$3.25bn in development aid; the UAE subsequently pledged US$136m in food aid, and following a donor conference in September in New York total international aid pledges have risen to US$7.9bn. Although Western countries will also retain an active diplomatic role in Yemen, they will remain predominately focused on security concerns (in particular AQAP), as demonstrated by the increased use of US drone strikes on AQAP targets.

  POLICY TRENDS: The new government faces a daunting task in reviving the economy. Despite the urgent need to reduce the fiscal deficit, the new government has said that it will prioritise stability over austerity. In keeping with this bias, it has passed an expansionary budget for 2012, which includes 80,000 new jobs in the public sector and higher outlays for fuel subsidies. However, with domestic resources to achieve these goals sorely lacking, it will redouble its efforts not only to attract pledges of foreign aid but, more crucially, for these to be disbursed (a repeated problem in the past). The government and the international community alike will seek to earmark donor funds for specific capital projects, with the power sector likely to be the main beneficiary. However, arguably, at present humanitarian aid should be viewed as a far more urgent priority (some 10m people, or over 40% of the population, are classified by the UN as "being either hungry or on the edge of hunger"). Yemen has also managed to secure an emergency loan from the IMF, which will be used to support its balance of payments; however, renewing the multifaceted IMF support programme agreed in August 2010, which is currently suspended, may have to await the formation of the next government, given the difficulty the current governing coalition would have in meeting the Fund's conditions.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: Our economic forecast is based on the assumption that the political transition will not descend into a violent contest for power. With that in mind, we estimate that, after contacting by over 10% in 2011 (the government has struggled to come up with a precise figure), the economy will build on the slow recovery seen in 2012, growing by an annual average of some 2.6% over the forecast period, as private-sector activity revives and donor aid pushes up investment. However, even though the Marib pipeline finally reopened in July, it was disrupted again in November, and oil production is not expected to bounce back. In addition, a number of investment projects (including government-funded schemes) have been delayed in the wake of the worsening security situation, but would be restarted if sufficient stability returned. The outlook for the agricultural sector is more uncertain, however. Although it should recover from the disruption caused by population displacement, worsening groundwater shortages are likely to depress output growth.

  INFLATION: In the wake of the unrest that began in early 2011 the riyal came under severe downward pressure, forcing the CBY to run down its reserves to protect the currency. In response, the CBY kept the official rate steady at YR213.8:US$1, leading to a wide gap with the unofficial, black-market rate. However, this gap has narrowed recently, and the Central Bank has begun to allow a small weakening of the official rate--seemingly a signal of confidence, given that foreign reserves have recovered of late (after Saudi Arabia said that it would deposit US$1bn at the Central Bank) and the IMF has stepped in to provide financial support. However, with the external account set to return widening deficits over the forecast period, we expect Yemen to be forced to run down its foreign reserves to alarmingly low levels, reaching the equivalent of just 1.3 months of import cover by the end of the forecast period. As a result, the CBY will be less able to protect the riyal, resulting in an accelerated depreciation of the currency to an average of YR336:US$1 in 2017. However, a free float of the currency is also a possibility, if the CBY chooses to protect its foreign-currency reserves at the expense of the riyal.

  EXCHANGE RATES: In the wake of the unrest that began in early 2011 the riyal came under severe downward pressure, forcing the CBY to run down its reserves to protect the currency. In response, the CBY kept the official rate steady at YR213.8:US$1, leading to a wide gap with the unofficial, black-market rate. However, this gap has narrowed recently, and the Central Bank has begun to allow a small weakening of the official rate--seemingly a signal of confidence, given that foreign reserves have recovered of late (after Saudi Arabia said that it would deposit US$1bn at the Central Bank) and the IMF has stepped in to provide financial support. However, with the external account set to return widening deficits over the forecast period, we expect Yemen to be forced to run down its foreign reserves to alarmingly low levels, reaching the equivalent of just 1.3 months of import cover by the end of the forecast period. As a result, the CBY will be less able to protect the riyal, resulting in an accelerated depreciation of the currency to an average of YR336:US$1 in 2017. However, a free float of the currency is also a possibility, if the CBY chooses to protect its foreign-currency reserves at the expense of the riyal.

  EXTERNAL SECTOR: The current account is expected to return widening deficits in 2013-17. Export earnings remained surprisingly resilient in 2011-12, as oil production outages were almost entirely restricted to domestic supplies (rather than exports). However, after a modest rebound in 2013 (as oil production recovers slightly), export earnings are set to resume their downward trend as oil production continues its long-term decline. As a result, the trade deficit is forecast to widen to US$6.3bn (9.8% of GDP) in 2017. With Yemen facing a potentially urgent balance-of-payments crisis, we expect foreign donors to step up their support (and GCC states to allow more Yemenis into their labour forces), which will push up inflows of current transfers and move the non-merchandise account into surplus from 2014. However, this will be insufficient to offset the widening trade deficit, and thus we expect the current-account shortfall to widen substantially from an estimated US$2.2bn (5.2% of GDP) in 2012 to US$5bn (7.7% of GDP) in 2017.

  December 07, 2012

• Forecast

  Yemen: 5-year forecast summary

  Outlook for 2012-16: Forecast summary

  Forecast summary
  (% unless otherwise indicated)
  	2011a	2012b	2013b	2014b	2015b	2016b
  Real GDP growth	-10.5c	3.6	4.1	2.1	1.9	2.3
  Oil production ('000 b/d)	198c	191	206	178	152	129
  Crude oil exports (US$ m)	6,071c	4,889	4,588	3,376	2,175	1,286
  Consumer price inflation (av)	19.5	11.4	10.8	11.7	12.6	13.3
  Deposit rate	20.0	20.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.5
  Government balance (% of GDP)	-6.3c	-10.2	-9.9	-10.3	-10.2	-9.5
  Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)	8.7	8.0	8.1	7.2	6.3	5.8
  Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)	8.2	8.9	9.4	9.9	10.5	11.2
  Current-account balance (US$ bn)	-1.7	-2.2	-2.0	-2.5	-3.3	-4.1
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-4.4c	-5.1	-4.4	-5.2	-6.3	-7.1
  External debt (end-period; US$ bn)	6.3c	6.7	7.2	7.7	8.1	8.4
  Exchange rate YR:US$ (av)	213.8	215.6	239.8	258.3	281.3	306.4
  Exchange rate YR:US$ (end-period)	213.8	225.0	247.0	270.0	290.0	322.0
  Exchange rate YR:¥100 (av)	267.9	269.1	286.8	297.6	316.1	332.2
  Exchange rate YR:€ (av)	297.5	274.6	302.7	323.6	348.2	386.1
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. c Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  September 07, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

527,968 sq km

Population

24.3m (IMF, mid-2010 estimate)

Main towns and provinces

Population in '000 (2004 census)

Taiz: 2,403

Hajjah: 1,481

Ibb: 2,138

Dhamar: 1,339

Hodeida: 2,161

Hadramawt: 1,029

Sanaa city (capital): 1,748

Sanaa (province): 918

Climate

Northern and central highlands: warm in summer but cold in winter; Tihama and southern coast including Aden: hot; eastern plains and desert: hot, arid and harsh

Languages

Arabic (official); English is also used in official and business circles

Measures

Predominantly metric in the northern provinces and UK (imperial) in the south; local measures are also in use

Currency

Yemeni riyal (YR) = 100 fils. The riyal was floated on the open market in July 1996

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

The dates of Islamic holidays are based on the lunar calendar and are therefore approximate. New Year's Day (January 1st); Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet; February 4th 2012); Labour Day (May 1st); Unity Day (May 22nd); Revolution Day (September 26th); Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan; August 19th 2012); National Day (October 14th); Independence Day (November 30th); Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice; October 26th 2012); Islamic New Year (November 15th 2012)

March 02, 2012