Turkey

Politics:

• Analysis

  Turkey politics: Turkey-US relations: managing foreign-policy divergences

  During the ten years that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government led by the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been in power, Turkey's relations with the US have fluctuated, largely depending on their relative positions regarding developments in Turkey's complex and volatile neighbourhood. The two countries' positions diverge significantly on several issues that are crucial to domestic and foreign policy for both sides, and it is possible that future negative developments in any one of these areas could lead to a renewed deterioration in Turkish-US relations. However, both governments appear to recognise the need to co-operate more closely where their interests converge and not allow divergences in one area to undermine positive developments in another.

  The administration of the re-elected US president, Barack Obama, has increasingly recognised Turkey's growing economic strength and its potential to play a stabilising leadership role in the region. This recognition has helped prevent tension from escalating between the two countries on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey's soured relations with Israel and Turkey's efforts to maintain good relations with Iran in the face of US-led sanctions against Iran's nuclear programme. At the same time, there have been areas of close co-operation: Turkey's continued commitment to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, its decision to host NATO missile defence radars in Turkey and US intelligence sharing to help Turkey combat the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

  Managing differences over Israel-Palestine conflict

  On the Israel-Palestine issue, Turkey and the US have sharply different stances. Once positioned between the two sides, Turkey under the AKP government is now firmly on the side of the Palestinians. Turkey has repeatedly condemned as disproportionate Israel's use of force against the Palestinians and has all but suspended diplomatic relations with Israel since the killing by Israeli forces of nine Turkish aid workers on board a ship that attempted to break the Gaza blockade in 2010.

  Turkey has also been a long-time supporter of the Palestinians' efforts to obtain 'observer state' status in the UN, which they were finally granted on November 29th 2012. Believing that UN recognition would weaken the cause for permanent and peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict, the US voted against the resolution in the UN general assembly. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, declared that Turkey was "saddened" by the US' vote. But reflecting the US' willingness to accept Turkey's divergence, the US ambassador to Turkey, Francis Ricciardone, indicated after the UN vote that although Turkish and US policy towards the Middle East conflict differed, both countries would still work together to find a settlement.

  Turkey unhappy with US reluctance on Syria

  Although there has been some co-operation between Turkey and the US on the crisis in Syria, the Turkish government is unhappy with the US' refusal to play a more active role as the conflict has escalated. The security situation along Turkey's border with Syria has deteriorated steadily since mid-2012 and the Turkish government is struggling with a humanitarian crisis arising from the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. Turkey has repeatedly called for a UN-mandated/NATO-patrolled buffer zone to be created inside Syria to protect those fleeing the violence in their country. But after intervening in Libya in 2011, Turkey's Western allies do not want to risk being drawn into another conflict. However, the US has been strongly supportive of Turkey's request for NATO support in the form of air defence missiles. Although not yet agreed by NATO, it seems likely that they will be deployed, and probably before the end of 2012. According to Mr Ricciardone, the deployment would be a clear signal that "Turkey is not alone". Indeed, the deployment of NATO air defence missiles could be the first step towards greater Western involvement.

  Turkish-US strategic goals have diverged in Iraq

  Turkey and the US have long shared the strategic goal of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity. Following the withdrawal of US forces from the country at the end of 2011, the US continued to co-ordinate policy with Turkey to achieve that goal. However, from the Turkish perspective, providing support for the de facto autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a growing priority. Turkey will protect its relationship with the KRG, even at the expense of relations with the Iraqi central government, because it needs the KRG to help to contain the PKK and prevent the group from getting a foothold in northern Syria.

  Maintaining positive relations between Turkey and the US is likely to prove challenging for both governments at times. However, it appears that the Obama administration has come to accept that Turkish foreign policy will differ from its own on certain issues, but this should not preclude an ongoing collaborative relationship between the two countries.

  December 03, 2012

• Background

  Turkey: Key figures

  Recep Tayyip Erdogan

  As mayor of Istanbul in 1994-98, Mr Erdogan won the approval of many voters who did not support his Islamist political attachments. After a brief period in prison, he broke with the leader of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, and launched the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won the general elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011. His judgment has been questionable on a few issues and he does not take criticism well, which has led to numerous lawsuits against writers and journalists. Overall, however, his governments have had some notable achievements, including the stabilisation of the economy, the start of EU membership negotiations and the gradual removal of the military from politics. Unlikely to be able to run for a fourth parliamentary term, he is expected to seek election as president in 2014, but with enhanced powers, which would allow him to continue to dominate the political scene.

  Abdullah Gul

  As deputy leader of the AKP, Mr Gul served as prime minister while Mr Erdogan was excluded from parliament between November 2002 and March 2003, after which he became deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. In August 2007 he was elected by parliament as president. Secularists strongly resisted his election because of his pro-Islamist past. But he has performed well as president, especially on foreign-policy issues. He is strongly in favour of Turkey's EU membership bid and respected in EU circles. Mr Gul has long been a close ally and friend of Mr Erdogan, but they are also political rivals. He could run against Mr Erdogan at the next presidential election, although the Economist Intelligence Unit believes that to be unlikely. As president, Mr Gul may challenge the prime minister if the latter seeks to introduce a presidency with executive powers.

  Kemal Kilicdaroglu

  Mr Kilicdaroglu replaced the long-standing chairman of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), Deniz Baykal, in May 2010. He is a relatively inexperienced but respected politician with a reputation for taking a tough line on corruption. As a career bureaucrat who has served in numerous government agencies, he was only elected to parliament on the CHP ticket in 2007. A less divisive figure than Mr Baykal, he has managed to attract some liberal left-wing politicians back to the CHP by overhauling party policy on key issues such as the Kurdish problem and the role of the military. However, he lacks charisma and failed to pose a real threat to Mr Erdogan at the June 2011 election.

  Devlet Bahceli

  Mr Bahceli has been leader of the opposition Nationalist Action Party (MHP) since 1997 after the death of its founder, Colonel Alparslan Turkes. While a junior partner in a broad left-right coalition government between 1999 and 2002, Mr Bahceli showed willingness to compromise on some sensitive issues as he tried to move the party from the extreme right to the right-of-centre. The transition appears to have been reversed since the party went back into opposition in 2002, especially on the Kurdish issue. Mr Bahceli and his party are strongly opposed to legislation that they consider to be a political concession to the Kurds.

  General Necdet Ozel

  General Necdet Ozel was appointed chief of the general staff at the beginning of August 2011, two years earlier than originally planned, following the unexpected resignation of his predecessor, General Isik Kosaner, and other top commanders over the prosecution of about 40 generals and admirals on charges of plotting to bring down the government. During his career, General Ozel has eschewed involvement in political wranglings between the military and the civilian authorities. His dealings with the government have been much less confrontational than those of some of his predecessors and under his command the military has generally maintained a lower public profile, in keeping with reforms that have brought the Turkish Armed Forces increasingly under civilian control.

  September 11, 2012

• Structure

  Turkey: Political structure

  Official name

  Republic of Turkey

  Form of state

  Parliamentary republic

  Legal system

  Based on European models and constitution of 1982

  National legislature

  Unicameral Meclis (parliament) of 550 members directly elected for a four-year term

  Electoral system

  Universal direct suffrage over the age of 18. Only parties with more than 10% of the national vote are eligible for seats in parliament. Individuals may run as independents

  National elections

  June 12th 2011; next election by June 2015

  Head of state

  The current president, Abdullah Gul, was elected by parliament for a single seven-year term in August 2007; the next election in August 2014 for the first time by universal direct suffrage; the next president will serve a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms

  National government

  The present government is formed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

  Main political parties

  Islamist-liberal: Justice and Development Party (AKP); Islamist: Prosperity Party (Saadet, SP); centre-left: Republican People's Party (CHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP); nationalist right: Nationalist Action Party (MHP); pro-Kurdish: Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). In the 2011 election the AKP, CHP and MHP exceeded the 10% national vote threshold. Members of the BDP were elected as independents

  Council of Ministers

  Prime minister: Recep Tayyip Erdogan

  Deputy prime ministers:

   Bulent Arinc

   Besir Atalay

   Ali Babacan

   Bekir Bozdag

  Key ministers

  Agriculture, food & animal resources: Mehmet Mehdi Eker

  Culture & tourism: Ertugrul Gunay

  Defence: Ismet Yilmaz

  Development: Cevdet Yilmaz

  Economy: Zafer Caglayan

  Education: Omer Dincer

  Employment & social security: Faruk Celik

  Energy & natural resources: Taner Yildiz

  Environment & urban planning: Erdogan Bayraktar

  EU affairs: Egemen Bagis

  Family & social policy: Fatma Sahin

  Finance: Mehmet Simsek

  Foreign affairs: Ahmet Davutoglu

  Forestry & water: Veysel Eroglu

  Health: Recep Akdag

  Interior: Idris Naim Sahin

  Justice: Sadullah Ergin

  Science, technology & industry: Nihat Ergun

  Sport & youth: Suat Kilic

  Tourism & culture: Ertugrul Gunay

  Trade & customs: Hayati Yazici

  Transport: Binali Yildirim

  Central Bank governor

  Erdem Basci

  November 06, 2012

• Outlook

  Turkey: Key developments

  Outlook for 2013-17

  • The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to continue in office until the next general election in 2015, and probably beyond. The political scene is likely to remain highly polarised.
  • We expect the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to become Turkey's first directly elected president in 2014.
  • The main challenges facing the government are introducing a new civilian-friendly constitution, resolving the Kurdish issue and responding to the escalation of attacks by the secessionist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
  • Tensions between Turkey and war-torn Syria will keep the risk of major military conflict between the two countries high. Instability on its south-eastern border will serve to reinforce Turkey's traditional Western alliances.
  • The budget deficit is forecast to rise from 1.3% of GDP in 2011 to 2.6% a year in 2012-14, easing to about 2% a year in 2015-17 as growth recovers momentum.
  • We expect the Central Bank of Turkey to keep its main interest rate, the one-week repo (repurchase) lending rate, low at 5.75%. However, it will also keep the flexibility to alter the level and cost of its funding to the banking system.
  • Annual GDP growth is expected to slow from 8.6% in 2011 to 3.2% in 2012, before picking up to 3.8% in 2013 and just over 5% a year in 2014-17.
  • The current-account deficit is easing, but it will remain worryingly large, reflecting Turkey's heavy dependence on imported oil and intermediates.

  Review

  • Egemen Bagis, Turkey's minister for EU affairs, described the EU's annual Progress Report on Turkey "disappointing", overshadowing the positive agenda launched in May 2012 to try to revive stuttering EU-Turkey relations.
  • In its Medium-Term Programme (MTP) for 2013-15 published on October 9th the government cut its 2012 projections for growth, inflation and the public finances, but it envisages a return to steady GDP growth from 2014.
  • On October 18th, the Central Bank left its official policy rate, the one-week repo lending rate, at 5.75%, but loosened policy further by cutting its overnight lending rate-the interest-rate corridor ceiling-by 50 basis points, to 9.5%.
  • In October the Central Bank revised up its end-2012 consumer price inflation projection, to a mid-point rate of 7.4%, from 6.2% previously. The end-2013 projection was raised from a mid-point rate of 5.1% to 5.3%.
  • The lagged effect on employment of the economic rebound in 2010-11 has started to wane. The number of people out of work rose by 2% month on month, to 2.5m, in July, pushing the seasonally adjusted jobless rate to 9.1%.

  November 06, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Turkey: Country fact sheet

  Fact sheet

  Annual data	2011a	Historical averages (%)	2007-11
  Population (m)	74.0	Population growth	1.0
  GDP (US$ bn; market exchange rate)	775b	Real GDP growth	3.5
  GDP (US$ bn; purchasing power parity)	1,075	Real domestic demand growth	3.8
  GDP per head (US$; market exchange rate)	10,464	Inflation	8.1
  GDP per head (US$; purchasing power parity)	14,520	Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-6.0
  Exchange rate (av) TL:US$	1.67b	FDI inflows (% of GDP)	2.4
  a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Actual.

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  Background: The Turkish Republic was formed in 1923. Nationalist resistance forces led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) defeated the occupying allies after the first world war to establish the country's current borders. Turkey oriented its political and economic structure towards the West, becoming a member of NATO (1952) and the Council of Europe (1949) and signing an association agreement with the then European Community (1963). A customs union with the EU took effect in 1996. EU accession negotiations were opened in October 2005, but have made slow progress.

  Political structure: Turkey is a secular democratic state governed under the 1982 constitution. There have been three periods of military rule in 1960-61, 1971-73 and 1980-83. The military's role in Turkish politics has been gradually curtailed. Parties need at least 10% of the national vote to win any seats, but candidates can run as independents. The parliamentary term was cut from five years to four in October 2007. Parliament elected the current president, Abdullah Gul, in August 2007; his successor will be directly elected, but the timing is uncertain. Executive power will remain with the prime minister. The religiously conservative, pro-EU Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, won a third term in office at the general election in June 2011.

  Policy issues: IMF-backed reforms after the 2001 crisis reduced macroeconomic instability. Without an IMF stand-by accord since May 2008, Turkey's fiscal policy has remained prudent. Large external financing needs leave the economy vulnerable to sharp changes in investor sentiment. Increasing employment and reducing income inequality are key policy concerns. Resolving the Kurdish problem, which has blocked economic development in the south-east of the country, is arguably the most pressing political issue, but nationalist resistance to improving minority rights is still strong.

  Taxation: The basic rate of corporation tax is 20%. Personal income tax rates range between 15% and 35%. Tax reform to reduce tax evasion was one of the main elements of previous IMF reform programmes, but tax compliance remains weak.

  Foreign trade: In 2011 exports (fob) amounted to US$143.4bn, while imports (fob) were US$232.9bn, leaving a trade deficit of US$89.5bn compared with US$56.4bn in 2010. The export figures include estimates of earnings from so-called "suitcase trade".

  Major exports 2011	% of total	Major imports 2011	% of total
  Textiles & clothing	18.2	Fuel	14.3
  Iron & steel	12.7	Chemicals	13.8
  Transport equipment	12.6	Machinery	8.8
  Agro-industry	10.4	Transport equipment	8.3
  Leading markets 2011	% of total	Leading suppliers 2011	% of total
  Germany	10.3	Russia	9.9
  Iraq	6.2	Germany	9.5
  UK	6.0	China	9.0
  Italy	5.8	US	6.7

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  November 07, 2012

• Structure

  Turkey: Economic structure

  Data and charts: Annual trends charts

  
  

  

  November 06, 2012

• Outlook

  Turkey: Country outlook

  Turkey: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  POLITICAL STABILITY: The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) to remain in government until the next general election in 2015, and probably beyond. The opposition in parliament is fragmented and largely ineffective and the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has a strong hold on his party and the government, which has succeeded in reducing the influence of hardline secularist/nationalist forces in the military and the judiciary. The concentration of power in Mr Erdogan's hands and the suspicion with which his political opponents view him have led to high levels of polarisation in the political system. We expect Mr Erdogan to stand down as leader of the AKP and prime minister in order to run for president in 2014 (see Election watch). The current president, Abdullah Gul, a co-founder of the AKP and deputy prime minister before rising to the presidency, would probably return as party leader. However, much of this scenario will depend on whether Turkey adopts a new constitution, as promised, and whether it will enhance the powers of the president, as Mr Erdogan and his supporters hope.

  ELECTION WATCH: The next general election is not due until mid-2015, but currently the AKP appears to have no serious challengers. Before then, local elections will take place no later than March 2014, and the first direct election of the head of state in August 2014. A referendum on a new constitution could take place as early as 2013, although this would depend on a draft constitution having the support of at least three-fifths of the members of parliament. Under the AKP's current byelaws, Mr Erdogan cannot stand for election to parliament for a fourth term, so unless the byelaws are changed, he would have to hand over the leadership of the AKP ahead of the next general election in 2015. Consequently, he is expected to contest and win the 2014 presidential election. If Mr Erdogan stands, it is unlikely that the incumbent, Mr Gul, would seek a second term, as the contest could potentially split the AKP vote and cause a rift in the party.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Developments in the Arab world and particularly the civil war in Syria have made formulating foreign policy difficult for the Erdogan government. Having previously enjoyed positive relations with Syria, the Erdogan government has repeatedly called for Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, to leave power. It has also provided logistical support for the Syrian opposition and a safe haven for it and for the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing the violence in their own country. As a result, the risk of major military confrontation between Turkey and Syria has risen to the extent that Turkey has officially asked NATO, of which it is a member, to deploy air defence missiles on its territory against a possible attack from Syria. We believe that a war will be avoided. It would be in neither Turkey's nor Syria's interests and would risk drawing into the conflict Turkey's Western allies, who have no appetite for another military intervention after their involvement in Libya. The civil war in Syria will continue to frustrate Turkey's efforts to clamp down on the secessionist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as Syrian Kurdish groups affiliated with the PKK have taken control of towns in northern Syria, close to the border with Turkey. Turkish efforts to maintain positive ties with Syria's close allies, Iran and Russia, which are two of Turkey's main energy suppliers, will also suffer.

  POLICY TRENDS: Macroeconomic stability is likely to remain vulnerable to sudden shifts in international sentiment, given Turkey's large external financing needs and the debt crisis in the euro zone, Turkey's main goods export market and a major source of capital. Although a series of elections between 2013 and 2015 could result in a drift towards more populist economic polices, we expect them to be tailored to maintaining an open, largely market-driven economy with adequately prudent management of the public finances, a floating exchange rate, inflation targeting (albeit less stringent than in the past) and a well-regulated financial sector. Some progress is also expected over the medium term on reducing labour-market rigidities and new measures to support job creation. Efforts to increase the proportion of revenue from direct taxes rather than indirect taxation are likely to make slow progress, however, given widespread evasion. The large current-account deficit will remain a problem as plans to tackle it, such as reforms designed to raise the domestic savings rate and promote domestic production of intermediate goods and alternative energy, are unlikely to have an impact in the short term. With a successful secondary offering of just under 24% of shares in Halkbank on November 19th 2012, the government hopes to revive its privatisation programme, but continued progress is likely to depend on market conditions, which have been negatively affected by the euro area crisis. An ambitious agenda of infrastructure work may be carried out partly through public-private partnerships.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: A sharp slowdown in real GDP growth has been seen since mid-2011, reflecting the high baseline in 2010 and early 2011; weaker global economic conditions, especially in the crisis-hit euro area, Turkey's main export market; and monetary policy tightening to reverse a sharp fall in the value of the lira in late 2011-early 2012. Assuming that a measure of monetary loosening by the Central Bank of Turkey revives domestic credit growth and that global financial and economic conditions improve slightly from next year, growth is forecast to pick up from 3.2% in 2012 to 3.8% in 2013 and just over 5% a year during 2014-17.

  INFLATION: Turkey's inflation outlook deteriorated recently after the government introduced sharp increases in indirect taxes and administered prices to shore up the public finances. However, the October consumer price inflation rate of 7.8% was lower than expected, so we now expect consumer price inflation to be an estimated (downwardly revised) 7.3% at end-2012 and 7.5% at end-2013, compared with a Central Bank target ((2 percentage points) of 5% for both years. During 2014-17 we expect inflation to ease towards 4% as we expect the inflationary effects of higher global oil prices and stronger aggregate demand to be offset by the impact of higher domestic interest rates and a stable lira.

  EXCHANGE RATES: Strong downward pressure towards the end of 2011 and in early 2012 was met with determined action from the Central Bank, which partly reversed the currency's slide. Our revised baseline forecast is that the Central Bank will keep the lira broadly stable in real terms in 2013-17, which means that the currency will depreciate gradually in nominal terms against the US dollar from an estimated average of about TL1.80:US$1 in 2012 to about TL2:US$1 in 2017, supported by relatively tight monetary policy, a narrower current-account deficit and capital inflows that will cover Turkey's external financing needs. However, substantial upside and downside risks arise from uncertainty over the outlook for the euro zone in particular. Against the euro, the lira is forecast to appreciate, from an estimated average of about TL2.30:EUR1 in 2011 to TL2.45-2.50 in 2016-17.

  EXTERNAL SECTOR: Rapid growth in the current-account deficit in 2010-11 raised serious concern about its sustainability. Driven by a credit-fuelled rise in import demand and higher oil prices, it reached 10% of GDP in 2011. It is expected to remain large but should ease for most of 2012-17, owing to slower domestic demand and a weaker lira. The effects of prolonged fiscal tightening in the EU, Turkey's largest market, are expected to continue to curb demand growth for exports of goods and services. However, export growth to non-EU countries has been strong since the start of 2012, boosted by a more competitive lira.

  December 01, 2012

• Forecast

  Turkey: Country forecast summary

  Country forecast overview: Highlights

  • The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to remain in office until the next general election in 2015 and probably beyond. Having led the AKP to a third consecutive victory in the 2011 election, winning almost 50% of the votes cast, Mr Erdogan has strengthened his hold on his party and the government. Tension with the secularist/nationalist camp, including the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), will remain high.
  • Mr Erdogan is seeking to enhance the powers of the presidency, and is then expected to run for the post, in 2014. The AKP's majority falls just short of the minimum required to change the constitution (a three-fifths majority plus a referendum) and the opposition parties appear suspicious of such radical change. But support from one party or a group of defectors cannot be ruled out.
  • The Kurdish issue will continue to be a major source of instability and, along with the division of Cyprus, an obstacle to progress in Turkey's EU accession talks. The rising death toll as a result of attacks by Kurdish terror groups, and the state's military response, leave little room for hope of a democratic solution. The government's agreement to co-operate with the CHP on this issue is unlikely to produce results without broader public and political participation. The risk of major military confrontation with war-torn Syria has increased, but we believe a further escalation will be avoided by both sides.
  • We expect the budget deficit/GDP ratio to rise from 1.3% in 2011 to 2.6% in 2012-13 owing to weaker economic growth and diminishing one-off revenue streams. GDP growth is forecast to slow from 8.6% in 2011 to 3.2% in 2012, owing to weak global conditions and the high baseline in 2011. We expect a pick-up to more balanced growth of 3.8% in 2013 and about 5% a year in 2014-17.
  • A weaker lira and increases in indirect taxes and administered prices have put upward pressure on consumer prices and this will persist for most of 2013. But more moderate economic growth, a more stable lira and moderately tighter monetary policy from late-2013/early 2014 should gradually help to bring inflation down towards the Central Bank of Turkey's year-end target, which is 5% (+/-2 percentage points) for end-2012 and end-2013.
  • The current-account deficit rose to 10% of GDP in 2011 owing to strong domestic demand and high global commodity prices. Although we expect it to decline from this level, it will remain large, leaving the Turkish economy vulnerable if global financial conditions deteriorate further.

  Country forecast overview: Key indicators

  Key indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
  Real GDP growth (%)	3.2	3.8	5.1	5.0	5.2	5.1
  Consumer price inflation (%)	9.2	7.8	7.2	6.6	5.1	4.5
  Budget balance (% of GDP)	-2.6	-2.6	-2.6	-2.0	-2.0	-2.1
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-7.7	-6.8	-6.3	-6.0	-6.3	-6.7
  3-month interbank money market interest rate (av; %)	5.0	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.0	6.0
  Exchange rate TL:US$ (av)	1.80	1.79	1.79	1.79	1.79	1.79
  Exchange rate US$:€ (av)	1.28	1.26	1.25	1.24	1.26	1.26

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  November 07, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

783,562 sq km (including lakes and islands), of which 30% arable, 3% orchards, olive groves and vineyards, 26% classified as forest

Population

71,158,000 (mid-year estimate, US Census Bureau)

Main towns

Population (2007 census)

Istanbul: 11,174,257

Ankara (capital): 4,140,890

Izmir: 3,175,133

Bursa: 1,979,999

Adana: 1,611,262

Climate

Mediterranean on the south coast, continental inland

Weather in Ankara (altitude 861 metres)

Hottest month, August, 15-31°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, –4-4°C; driest month, August, 10 mm average rainfall; wettest month, December, 48 mm average rainfall

Language

Turkish

Measures

Metric system

Currency

Turkish lira

Time

2 hours ahead of GMT; 3 hours ahead in summer

Fiscal year

Calendar year

Public holidays

January 1st; April 23rd; May 19th; three days for Ramadan and four days for Kurban or Eid (dates vary according to the Muslim calendar); August 30th; October 28th (half-day); October 29th

March 07, 2012