Togo

Politics:

• Analysis

  Togo politics: Quick View - Constitutional Court strikes down new curbs on

  Event

  On March 20th the Constitutional Court reversed a recent tightening of the country's media laws, declaring that the changes were inconsistent with the constitution.

  Analysis

  In February 2013 the National Assembly imposed new, stricter controls on the media that gave the sector regulator, the Haute autorité de l'audiovisuel et de la communication (HAAC), greater powers. In particular, the HAAC was empowered to suspend media outlets, impose fines and seize equipment without recourse to the courts. Given that the HAAC is closely linked to the ruling regime, with four of its nine members (including the chairman) being appointed by the president, Faure Gnassingbé-and the other five by the National Assembly-the changes represented a threat to media freedom. They were seen as an attempt to muzzle the media in the run-up to the next legislative election, the date of which has not been fixed yet, but which we do not expect to take place before mid-2013. As a result, the amendments sparked a new wave of protests, leading to clashes between police and journalists, and provoked a three-day media strike in mid-March that was widely observed by private newspapers and radio stations, although not by state-owned media outlets.

  However, in a rare legal defeat for the government, the Constitutional Court deemed the amendments to be incompatible with the country's basic law, primarily because they removed judicial oversight. Under the constitution, the HAAC must seek court approval before suspending a publication. Media freedom advocates, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, have welcomed the Constitutional Court ruling, although the original media law remains comparatively strict, even without the imposition of further amendments. Highlighting this, Togo fell by four places to 83rd (out of 179 countries) in the 2013 edition of the Press Freedom Index, a global ranking of media freedoms compiled by a Paris-based advocacy group, Reporters Without Borders. (It dropped 19 places the previous year.) Had the new amendments been retained, Togo would most likely have suffered a further downgrade in the next index.

  March 26, 2013

• Background

  Togo: Key figures

  Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe

  Faure Gnassingbe, the son of the former president, Gnassingbe Eyadema, was elected president in April 2005 in a flawed ballot. Educated in France and the US, he obtained a degree in business administration from Yale University before entering parliament in 1998 and the cabinet in 2003. His moves towards democratising Togolese politics since becoming president are opposed by hardliners in his party, Rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT), and by members of the armed forces, who had expected him to defend their political ascendancy.

  Gilchrist Olympio

  The son of the assassinated first president, Sylvanus Olympio, and leader of the opposition Union des forces de changement (UFC), Mr Olympio left Togo in 1992 after an attempt on his life. He claims to have won the 1998 presidential election, but was barred from standing in 2003 and 2005, when he failed a newly introduced residency qualification for candidates. He has already been chosen as the UFC's candidate for the presidential election in 2010, when he will be 73.

  Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo

  Appointed prime minister in September 2008, Mr Houngbo, who is 47, is an accountant by training, educated in Lome and Quebec. He became director of the UN Development Programme's Africa bureau in December 2005. A competent administrator without party affiliation, he is well placed to consolidate the improvement in relations with donors that has taken place over the past year, and adds credibility to the government's reformist credentials in the run-up to the presidential election in 2010.

  Yawovi Agboyibo

  The leader of Comite d'action pour le renouveau (CAR), Mr Agboyibo was prime minister of the transitional government from September 2006 to December 2007. A veteran politician, lawyer and human rights campaigner, he has been imprisoned by the regime in the past. He came third in the 2003 presidential election, with 5% of the vote, but supported the UFC candidate, Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, in 2005. He resigned as leader of the CAR in October 2008 in favour of a younger man—a lesson in humility and democracy, according to party officials (a remark aimed at Mr Olympio)—but has said that this would not rule out his standing as the party's presidential candidate in 2010, when he will be 66.

  Emmanuel Bob-Akitani

  A veteran UFC leader, he ran for president in 2003 and again in 2005, standing in for Mr Olympio. He won 38% of the official vote in 2005, slightly more than in 2003, but claimed that there had been electoral fraud and declared himself the true winner. The UFC still considers him the rightful president of the country, although it is unlikely that he will stand again if Mr Olympio is again disallowed, as he will turn 80 in 2010.

  Kpatcha Gnassingbe

  The half-brother of Faure Gnassingbe, he has become the standard-bearer of the traditionalist wing of the RPT, which opposes the president's moves towards democracy. He was sacked as minister of defence in December 2007, but is still considered a potential threat to the president.

  November 03, 2008

• Structure

  Togo: Political structure

  Official name

  République togolaise

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on the Napoleonic Code and the constitution of the Fourth Republic promulgated in September 1992 (and amended in December 2002)

  National legislature

  National Assembly, composed of 81 deputies

  National elections

  March 4th 2010 (presidential election); October 14th 2007 (legislative election); next elections due in 2015 (presidential election) and mid-2013 (legislative election initially due in October 2012)

  Head of state

  President, elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term; the two-term limit was dropped in 2002; Faure Gnassingbé was elected president in April 2005 and re-elected in March 2010

  National government

  A 31-member government was formed in May 2010; it is dominated by the Union pour la république (UNIR), which replaced the Rassemblement pour le peuple togolais (RPT), but also includes representatives from the Union des forces de changement (UFC)

  Main political parties

  The RPT ruled from 1969 until it was replaced by the newly created UNIR in April 2012; two opposition parties have seats in parliament-the UFC and the smaller Comité d'action pour le renouveau (CAR); there are several other opposition parties, but none is represented in parliament

  President & minister of defence: Faure Gnassingbé (UNIR)

  Prime minister: Kwessi Ahoomey-Zunu (UNIR)

  Ministers of state

  Foreign affairs & regional integration: Elliot Ohin (UFC)

  Primary & secondary education: Solitoki Magnim Esso (UNIR)

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & fishing: Colonel Ouro Joura Agadazi (UNIR)

  Basic development, craft industry, youth: Victoire Tomegah-Dogbé (UNIR)

  Commerce & promotion of the private sector: Bernadette Léguezim-Balouki (UNIR)

  Economy & finance: Adji Otèth Ayassor (UNIR)

  Environment & forest resources: Dédé Ahoéfa Ekoué (UNIR)

  Health: Charles Kondi Agba (UNIR)

  Higher education & research: Octave Nicoué Broohm (UNIR)

  Human rights, consolidation of democracy: Leonardina Wilson-de Souza (UFC)

  Industry, freezone & technological innovation: François Galley (UFC)

  Justice, relations with parliament: Tchitchao Tchalim (UNIR)

  Labour & social security: Yacoubou Hamadou (UNIR)

  Mines & energy: Taïrou Bagbiégué (UNIR)

  Postal services and telecommunication: Cina Lawson (UNIR)

  President's office (planning & development): Kokou Sémondji (UNIR)

  Promotion of women: Patricia Zonvidé (UNIR)

  Public works: Ninsao Gnofam (UNIR)

  Security & civil protection: Colonel Yark Damehane (UNIR)

  Technical education & training: Hamadou Bouraïma-Diabacté (UFC)

  Territorial administration: Gilbert Bawara (UNIR)

  Tourism: Charles Kpadéhekou (UNIR)

  Transport: Dammipi Noupokou (UNIR)

  Governor of regional central bank (BCEAO)

  Koné Tiémoko Meyliet

  January 09, 2013

Economy:

• Background

  Togo: Economic background

  Gross domestic product by sector
  (% of GDP)
  	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
  Agriculture, forestry & fishing	41.1	39.0	39.7	43.1	40.9
  Industry	19.6	20.1	18.8	18.9	17.7
  Services	39.4	40.9	41.5	37.9	41.4
  Source: IMF, Togo: Statistical Appendix.

  Download text file (csv format)

  November 03, 2008

• Structure

  Togo: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010b	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)	1,419b	1,493b	1,566	1,627	1,599
  GDP (US$ bn)	3.17b	3.16b	3.16	3.45	3.13
  Real GDP growth (%)	1.8b	3.2b	3.7	3.9	4.4
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	8.7	2.0	1.8a	3.6a	2.6
  Population (m)	5.8	5.9b	6.0a	6.2	6.3
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	853	903	879	929	889
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	-1,307	-1,315	-1,371	-1,452	-1,485
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-219	-177	-252	-300	-412
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	582	703	715a	774a	675
  Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:US$	447.81	472.19	495.28a	471.87a	510.97
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total
  Primary sector	40.7	Private consumption	84.9
  Secondary sector	16.6	Government consumption	12.1
  Tertiary sector	42.7	Gross fixed capital formation	18.8
  		Exports of goods & services	38.6
  		Imports of goods & services	-54.3
  Main exports fob 2011a	% of total	Main imports fob 2011a	% of total
  Cement & clinker	6.6	Capital goods	21.8
  Phosphates	7.5	Food	10.1
  Re-exports	22.9	Petroleum products	15.8
  Destination of exports 2010b	% of total	Origin of imports 2010b	% of total
  Benin	13.9	France	17.8
  Burkina Faso	12.1	China	16.5
  Ghana	10.0	Belgium	7.5
  China	8.7	India	5.1
  a Banque de France, La Zone franc: Rapport annuel. b Derived from partners' trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  January 09, 2013

• Outlook

  Togo: Country outlook

  Togo: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The president, Faure Gnassingbé, will remain secure in office over the 2013-14 outlook period, although social unrest, led by dissenting groups such as Collectif sauvons le Togo (CST), will become more frequent. Legislative elections in 2013 will gauge support for the government and the Union des forces de changement (UFC), the historic opposition party that is now in the coalition, vis-à-vis smaller, more hardline opposition groups. Policy will remain focused on reform, backed by a new IMF programme expected to replace an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) that ended in mid-2011. Real GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 4.7% in 2013 and 5% in 2014, underpinned by high levels of foreign assistance, investment in infrastructure and the government's programme of structural reform. The fiscal deficit will widen from 4.5% of GDP in 2012 to 4.7% of GDP in 2013 on the back of growing investments in infrastructure, before rolling back to 4.3% of GDP in 2014, owing to improved revenue collection. The current-account deficit will fall from 13.2% of GDP in 2012 to 12.5% of GDP in 2014, helped by recovering cotton production and prices, as well as steady incoming transfers.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Mr Gnassingbé's re-election in 2010 consolidated both his position and that of the Gnassingbé family, which has ruled Togo since the 1960s. The election also heralded a major shift in Togolese politics, when Gilchrist Olympio, the leader of the main opposition party, the UFC, and an opponent of the Gnassingbé family for nearly 50 years, agreed to join a government of national unity. The unity agreement and a broad (domestic and international) endorsement of his policies for economic reform have bolstered Mr Gnassingbé's credibility as a national leader. After having dissolved the long-time ruling party, Rassemblement pour le peuple togolais (RPT), and set up a new grouping, Union pour la république (UNIR) in 2012, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to strengthen his control over the army and his new party, sidelining hardline former elements of the RPT. The 20-year prison sentence handed down in September 2011 to Kpatcha Gnassingbé, the president's half-brother, who was convicted of plotting a coup, will further weaken the reactionary cause. The UNIR-UFC alliance will allow the government to move forward with institutional and constitutional reforms to complement the progress being made on the economic front. Provided that the agreement holds, which seems relatively likely, the political division between the north (where the ruling party, and the Kabye and related tribes are dominant) and the south, including the capital, Lomé (where the UFC and the Ewe tribe form the majority), could diminish, thereby eroding a persistent source of instability. Against this backdrop, a major challenge for Togo's opposition parties is to gain political significance-apart from the Comité d'action pour le renouveau, none are represented in parliament. Therefore, the strongest opposition and the major threat to stability are likely to come from civil society. New opposition movements, the most visible of which is the CST, were set up following controversial changes to electoral constituencies in 2012. Since its creation, the CST, a grouping of human rights organisations and opposition parties, has spearheaded a series of demonstrations in Lomé, some of which were suppressed violently by the police. Amid rising tensions, the government resigned and the legislative election, originally due in October 2012 concomitantly with long-delayed local elections, was postponed until at least early 2013. Although the actual date has not been set, a new electoral commission is in charge of organising the poll and we expect it to take place around the middle of 2013. Despite the uproar, the CST will not achieve its goal of pushing Mr Gnassingbé out of office. A more probable outcome is that the heterogeneous CST, which refused to join negotiations with the government in September 2012, will gradually become less united (or even split) and lose momentum as it becomes radicalised and rejects formal participation in the political process. The elections will be a major test of public opinion for both the coalition government and the opposition, which has gained visibility by joining forces within the CST umbrella grouping. It will be the first major poll for the Alliance nationale pour le changement (ANC), a new party created by former UFC members who rejected Mr Olympio's "betrayal" and led by Jean-Pierre Fabre, the UFC's defeated candidate in the 2010 presidential election. Depending on how the ANC and other opposition parties manage to build on the CST's popularity, the opposition could either fade into insignificance or unite and start to weigh in as a mid-tier player. A split in the opposition ranks will mostly benefit UNIR, possibly enabling the party to gain seats and dominate the next National Assembly. We believe that the coalition government will survive the legislative election, but should the UFC be punished for having entered the government coalition and lose much of its support to the ANC, UNIR will have to deal with a resurgent opposition.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Togo's relations with key partners have improved since the 2010 presidential election, which international observers judged to be broadly free and fair, and the formation of the coalition government with the UFC. Financial support from major donors, including the EU, the Fund and the World Bank, has gradually resumed and is set to continue, as illustrated by the EU's approval of a new three-year funding package in November 2012. Nonetheless, donors will remain wary of any shifts toward authoritarianism. Indeed, concerns expressed by the EU and France over rising tensions and violent police repression of demonstrators are a reminder of the fragility of Togo's relations with donors, and we expect some friction in the run-up to and aftermath of the legislative election. Togo's relations with fellow members of the regional economic grouping, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine, and the Economic Community of West African States will deepen during the forecast period, helped by the improved political situation. Togo will remain a significant contributor to peacekeeping operations on the continent, including in a possible regional military intervention in Mali, and will maintain close relations with France, the former colonial power. Togo's international profile will rise following the country's election to serve a two-year term on the UN Security Council, starting on January 1st 2013.

  POLICY TRENDS: After completing a three-year reform programme in mid-2011, backed by the ECF, Togo is expected to embark on a successor programme, probably in mid-2013. Togo achieved several key targets under this ECF, and has initiated important reforms in public financial management, including the setting up of an independent revenue authority, which will prove instrumental in negotiations owing to a new programme. Togo nonetheless failed to complete several vital structural reforms during the 2008-11 ECF, especially the privatisation of loss-making state-owned banks and other planned improvements to the business environment, because of technical capacity constraints, and lengthy legal and consultative processes. Although Benin-based Orabank has reportedly won the bid for a state-owned bank, Banque togolaise pour le développement, its bid for the Union togolaise des banques (UTB) was rejected for a failure to conform to procurement rules. UTB's privatisation was postponed in September 2012, suggesting that the entire bank privatisation process may not be completed before end-2014. Other reforms, such as the introduction of a recovery mechanism for non-performing loans, can be expected in 2013. Deeper reforms are also pending in the cotton and phosphate sectors. The launch of several major Bank projects in 2011-12, covering infrastructure rehabilitation, public administration and private-sector development, will support structural reforms during the forecast period. However, political tensions and uncertainties about the legislative election could hinder the reform process and make it more difficult to attract private investors into parastatal enterprises. Togo's budget deficit is estimated to have climbed to 4.5% of GDP in 2012, as a result of slower revenue growth, higher capital spending and high oil prices (which weigh on the budget through fuel price subsidies). We forecast that the budget deficit will widen moderately in 2013, to 4.7% of GDP. Stronger donor support and better revenue collection, helped by tax reforms implemented as part of a new Fund programme (including broadening the tax base and cutting exemptions), will lead to growth in revenue, but this will be outpaced by the rise in investment expenditure. The fiscal deficit will fall back to 4.3% of GDP in 2014, when further spending on infrastructure and poverty alleviation will be offset by a gradual reduction in the fuel subsidy and when the impact of Togo's new independent revenues authority on revenue collection will be tangible. High deficits in 2013-14 will pose a degree of macroeconomic risk, but improvements in spending management, which will reduce wastage, coupled with high levels of donor support (exceeding 4% of GDP throughout 2013-14), will limit the danger and help to keep debt under control.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: We now estimate that Togo's economic growth rate accelerated to 4.4% in 2012, helped by satisfactory rainfall, new investment and aid projects, a modest fiscal stimulus, increased port activity and Fund-backed reforms. Economic performance will remain relatively buoyant during 2013-14, despite long-standing structural constraints and renewed weakness in European markets. We expect growth to accelerate further to 4.7% in 2013, spurred by new investment in infrastructure, the recent connection to the global fibre-optic network, higher government spending (helped by lower debt-servicing costs following debt relief) and continuing structural reforms, including the overhaul and privatisation of inefficient state-owned enterprises, especially in the banking, phosphate and cotton sectors. Nonetheless, growth in Europe-a key market-will remain weak owing to the euro zone debt crisis. Moreover, the benefits of reform and increased donor funding will take time to materialise following a long period of mismanagement and underinvestment. Provided that Togo stays on track with reforms, our core forecast sees growth accelerating to 5% in 2014-the highest rate for several years. However, risks to this forecast are on the downside: growth during the forecast period will continue to be weather-dependent (because of the importance of agriculture, which accounts for more than one-third of GDP), and will remain vulnerable to further financial and economic disturbance in Europe, as well as a deterioration of the domestic political situation, which could raise uncertainty and curtail donor funding.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: Togo's current-account deficit will remain large in 2013-14, as demand for foreign goods and services will outstrip the country's earning potential. In 2012 cotton prices fell by more than 40% from their 2011 peak, leading to a decline in Togo's export value despite a rise in production. Cotton exports are set to increase in 2013-14 on the back of growing production and will be further supported by gently recovering prices in 2014. Earnings from phosphates will increase in 2013-14 as a result of planned new investment, while re-exports (which account for nearly one-fifth of total exports) will benefit from investments in the port infrastructure and from regional integration. Import demand, after rising strongly in 2011-12, will remain robust in 2013-14, which will maintain the pressure on the trade deficit. The goods import bill will grow to US$1.6bn and US$1.7bn in 2013 and 2014 respectively, spurred by faster economic growth and donor-funded capital projects. Earnings from remittances and servicing regional trade will remain a vital part of the balance of payments, as will donor grants, while tourism has medium-term potential. Overall, we forecast that the deficit, which is estimated to have widened to 13.2% of GDP in 2012, will narrow to 12.7% of GDP in 2013 before falling further, to 12.5% of GDP, in 2014. The majority of the financing will come from concessional loans from donors, and the remainder from foreign direct investment.

  January 11, 2013

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Country Briefing

Land area

56,785 sq km

Population

6.03m (2012, World Gazetteer estimates)

Main towns

Population ('000; 2012 World Gazetteer estimates):

Lomé (capital): 1,755

Sokodé: 116

Kara: 111

Atakpamé: 85

Kpalimé: 82

Climate

Tropical, drier in the north

Weather in Lomé

Average temperature 27°C; average monthly rainfall 65 mm

Languages

French, Ewe, Kabye and others

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr; CFA stands for Communauté financière africaine)-the common currency of the West African Franc Zone, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA); tied to the euro at a fixed exchange rate of CFAfr655.957:EUR1

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st; January 13th (National Liberation Day); January 24th (Victory Day); April 27th (Independence Day); May 1st (Labour Day); August 15th (Assumption); September 24th (anniversary of a failed attack by Togolese dissidents on Lomé in 1986); November 1st (All Saints' Day); December 25th

Variable (according to the Christian and Muslim calendars): Id al-Fitr; Id al-Adha; Prophet's Birthday; Easter Monday; Ascension Day; Whit Monday

January 09, 2013