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Togo

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Politics:

  • Analysis

    Togo politics: Quick View - National assembly appoints contested electoral

    Event

    The Togolese National Assembly has appointed a new electoral commission ahead of the legislative election, the date of which has not been confirmed yet.

    Analysis

    According to the electoral code adopted in May of this year, Togo's national electoral commission, the Commission electorale nationale independante (CENI) consists of 17 members, five of which are chosen by the ruling party, five by the parliamentary opposition, three by extra-parliamentary opposition parties, three by civil society and one by the administration. On October 15th-17th, the Togolese national assembly appointed 15 out of 17 members of the new CENI, leaving two spaces open for members still to be nominated by opposition parties.

    The appointments were contested by the Collectif sauvons le Togo (CST) and the Arc-en-ciel coalition, two umbrella groupings of civil society organisations and opposition parties, on the grounds that three of five members supposedly chosen by the opposition stem from the Union des forces de changement (UFC), which joined a coalition government in 2010 and, therefore, cannot be considered as an opposition party. Opponents also claim that some of the civil society appointees are linked to the ruling Union pour la republique (UNIR), party. The CST and the Arc-en-ciel coalition refuse to accept that the polls should be held at all until their demands are met and have called for new demonstrations in Lome on October 26th-27th, which we expect to go ahead in a tense climate.

    In this tense context and considering that the voting date has not been confirmed yet, we do not expect Togo's legislative elections to be organised within the time frame prescribed by the constitution-between October 12th and November 11th. That said, the government is unlikely to give in to the opposition's requests and will go ahead with the elections, probably before the end of this year or at the beginning of 2013. Despite their continued pressure, the current opposition protest movements only represent a minority of public opinion and lack both the means and the popular base needed to shake the UNIR's grip on power.

    October 25, 2012

  • Background

    Togo: Key figures

    Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe

    Faure Gnassingbe, the son of the former president, Gnassingbe Eyadema, was elected president in April 2005 in a flawed ballot. Educated in France and the US, he obtained a degree in business administration from Yale University before entering parliament in 1998 and the cabinet in 2003. His moves towards democratising Togolese politics since becoming president are opposed by hardliners in his party, Rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT), and by members of the armed forces, who had expected him to defend their political ascendancy.

    Gilchrist Olympio

    The son of the assassinated first president, Sylvanus Olympio, and leader of the opposition Union des forces de changement (UFC), Mr Olympio left Togo in 1992 after an attempt on his life. He claims to have won the 1998 presidential election, but was barred from standing in 2003 and 2005, when he failed a newly introduced residency qualification for candidates. He has already been chosen as the UFC's candidate for the presidential election in 2010, when he will be 73.

    Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo

    Appointed prime minister in September 2008, Mr Houngbo, who is 47, is an accountant by training, educated in Lome and Quebec. He became director of the UN Development Programme's Africa bureau in December 2005. A competent administrator without party affiliation, he is well placed to consolidate the improvement in relations with donors that has taken place over the past year, and adds credibility to the government's reformist credentials in the run-up to the presidential election in 2010.

    Yawovi Agboyibo

    The leader of Comite d'action pour le renouveau (CAR), Mr Agboyibo was prime minister of the transitional government from September 2006 to December 2007. A veteran politician, lawyer and human rights campaigner, he has been imprisoned by the regime in the past. He came third in the 2003 presidential election, with 5% of the vote, but supported the UFC candidate, Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, in 2005. He resigned as leader of the CAR in October 2008 in favour of a younger man—a lesson in humility and democracy, according to party officials (a remark aimed at Mr Olympio)—but has said that this would not rule out his standing as the party's presidential candidate in 2010, when he will be 66.

    Emmanuel Bob-Akitani

    A veteran UFC leader, he ran for president in 2003 and again in 2005, standing in for Mr Olympio. He won 38% of the official vote in 2005, slightly more than in 2003, but claimed that there had been electoral fraud and declared himself the true winner. The UFC still considers him the rightful president of the country, although it is unlikely that he will stand again if Mr Olympio is again disallowed, as he will turn 80 in 2010.

    Kpatcha Gnassingbe

    The half-brother of Faure Gnassingbe, he has become the standard-bearer of the traditionalist wing of the RPT, which opposes the president's moves towards democracy. He was sacked as minister of defence in December 2007, but is still considered a potential threat to the president.

    November 03, 2008

  • Structure

    Togo: Political structure

    Official name

    République togolaise

    Form of state

    Unitary republic

    Legal system

    Based on the Napoleonic Code and the constitution of the Fourth Republic promulgated in September 1992 (and amended in December 2002)

    National legislature

    National Assembly, composed of 81 deputies

    National elections

    March 4th 2010 (presidential election); October 14th 2007 (legislative election); next elections due in 2015 (presidential election) and October 2012 (legislative election)

    Head of state

    President, elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term; the two-term limit was dropped in 2002; Faure Gnassingbé was elected president in April 2005 and re-elected in March 2010

    National government

    A 31-member government was formed in May 2010; it is dominated by the Union pour la république (UNIR), which replaced the Rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT), but also includes representatives from the Union des forces de changement (UFC)

    Main political parties

    The RPT ruled from 1969 until it was replaced by the newly created UNIR in April 2012; two opposition parties have seats in parliament-the UFC and the smaller Comité d'action pour le renouveau (CAR); there are several other opposition parties, but none is represented in parliament

    President & minister of defence: Faure Gnassingbé (UNIR)

    Prime minister: Kwessi Ahoomey-Zunu (UNIR)

    Ministers of state

    Primary & secondary education: Solitoki Magnim Esso (UNIR)

    Foreign affairs & regional integration: Elliot Ohin (UFC)

    Key ministers

    Agriculture & fishing: Colonel Ouro Joura Agadazi (UNIR)

    Basic development, craft industry, youth: Victoire Tomegah-Dogbé (UNIR)

    Commerce & promotion of the private sector: Bernadette Léguezim-Balouki (UNIR)

    Economy & finance: Adji Otèth Ayassor (UNIR)

    Environment & forest resources: Dédé Ahoéfa Ekoué (UNIR)

    Health: Charles Kondi Agba (UNIR)

    Higher education & research: Octave Nicoué Broohm (UNIR)

    Human rights, consolidation of democracy: Leonardina Wilson-de Souza (UFC)

    Industry, freezone & technological innovation: François Galley (UFC)

    Justice, relations with parliament: Tchitchao Tchalim (UNIR)

    Labour & social security: Yacoubou Hamadou (UNIR)

    Mines & energy: Taïrou Bagbiégué (UNIR)

    Postal services and telecommunication: Cina Lawson (UNIR)

    President's office (planning & development): Kokou Sémondji (UNIR)

    Promotion of women: Patricia Zonvidé (UNIR)

    Public works: Ninsao Gnofam (UNIR)

    Security & civil protection: Colonel Yark Damehane (UNIR)

    Social action & national solidarity: Afi Noutifa Amegnon (UNIR)

    Sport & leisure: Bakalawa Fofana (UFC)

    Technical education & training: Hamadou Bouraïma-Diabacté (UFC)

    Territorial administration: Gilbert Bawara (UNIR)

    Tourism: Charles Kpadéhekou (UNIR)

    Transport: Dammipi Noupokou (UNIR)

    Governor of regional central bank (BCEAO)

    Koné Tiémoko Meyliet

    October 12, 2012

Economy:

  • Background

    Togo: Economic background

    Gross domestic product by sector
    (% of GDP)
     20022003200420052006
    Agriculture, forestry & fishing41.139.039.743.140.9
    Industry19.620.118.818.917.7
    Services39.440.941.537.941.4
    Source: IMF, Togo: Statistical Appendix.

    Download text file (csv format)

    November 03, 2008

  • Structure

    Togo: Economic structure

    Economic structure: Annual indicators

     2008a2009a2010b2011b2012b
    GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)1,419b1,493b1,5661,6271,599
    GDP (US$ bn)3.17b3.16b3.163.453.11
    Real GDP growth (%)1.8b3.2b3.73.94.2
    Consumer price inflation (av; %)8.72.01.8a3.6a2.8
    Population (m)5.85.9b6.0a6.26.3
    Exports of goods fob (US$ m)853903879929894
    Imports of goods fob (US$ m)-1,307-1,315-1,374-1,455-1,492
    Current-account balance (US$ m)-219-177-254-303-418
    Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)582703715a774a678
    Exchange rate CFAfr:US$ (av)447.81472.19495.28a471.87a514.12
    a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

    Download the numbers in Excel

    Origins of gross domestic product 2010a% of totalComponents of gross domestic product 2010a% of total
    Primary sector40.7Private consumption84.9
    Secondary sector16.6Government consumption12.1
    Tertiary sector42.7Gross fixed capital formation18.8
      Exports of goods & services38.6
      Imports of goods & services-54.3
        
    Main exports fob 2011a% of totalMain imports fob 2011a% of total
    Cement & clinker6.6Capital goods21.8
    Phosphates7.5Food10.1
    Re-exports22.9Petroleum products15.8
        
    Destination of exports 2010b% of totalOrigin of imports 2010b% of total
    Benin13.9France17.8
    Burkina Faso12.1China16.5
    Ghana10.0Belgium7.5
    China8.7India5.1
    a Banque de France, La Zone franc: Rapport annuel. b Derived from partners' trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

    Download the numbers in Excel

    Download text file (csv format)

    October 12, 2012

  • Outlook

    Togo: Country outlook

    Togo: Country outlook

    FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

    OVERVIEW: The president, Faure Gnassingbé, will remain secure in office over the 2013-14 outlook period, although social unrest, led by dissenting groups such as Collectif sauvons le Togo (CST), will become more frequent. Legislative elections, delayed to late 2012 or 2013, will gauge support for Union des forces de changement (UFC), the historic opposition party that is now in the coalition, vis-à-vis smaller, more hardline opposition groups. Policy will remain focused on reform, backed by a new IMF programme expected to replace an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) that ended in mid-2011. Real GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 4.5% in 2013 and 4.8% in 2014, underpinned by high levels of foreign assistance, investment in infrastructure and the government's programme of structural reform. The fiscal deficit will average 5% of GDP in 2013-14 on the back of growing investments in infrastructure and growth-enhancing sectors. The current-account deficit will fall from 13.5% of GDP in 2012 to 13% of GDP in 2014, helped by recovering cotton prices and steady incoming transfers.

    DOMESTIC POLITICS: Mr Gnassingbé will remain in office over the next two years after winning a second five-year term-by a comfortable margin-in March 2010. This consolidated both his position and that of the Gnassingbé family, which has ruled Togo since the 1960s, and endorsed his policies of economic reform and sociopolitical liberalisation. The election heralded a major shift in politics, when Gilchrist Olympio, the leader of the UFC, and an opponent of the Gnassingbé family, agreed to join a government of national unity. This split the UFC: die-hard oppositionists in the party accused Mr Olympio of betrayal and several leading members left to form a new party, Alliance nationale pour le changement (ANC), led by Jean-Pierre Fabre, the UFC's defeated candidate in the 2010 presidential election. The unity agreement bolstered Mr Gnassingbé's credibility as a national leader, allowing him to dissolve the long-time ruling party, Rassemblement pour le people togolais (RPT), and to set up a new grouping, Union pour la république (UNIR). The Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to strengthen his control over the army and his new party, sidelining hardline former elements of the RPT. The UNIR-UFC alliance will allow the government to move forward with institutional and constitutional reforms to complement the progress being made on the economic front. Provided that the agreement holds, which seems relatively likely, the political division between the north (where the ruling party, and the Kabye and related tribes are dominant) and the south, including the capital, Lomé (where the UFC and the Ewe tribe form the majority), could diminish, thereby eroding a persistent source of instability. Nonetheless, other sources of instability will arise, mostly within civil society. New opposition movements, the most visible of which is the CST, were set up following controversial changes to electoral constituencies in 2012. Since its creation, the CST, a grouping of human rights organisations and opposition parties (including the ANC), has spearheaded a series of demonstrations in Lomé, some of which were suppressed violently by the police. Amid rising tensions, Kwessi Ahoomey-Zunu replaced Gilbert Fousson Houngbo as prime minister, following the latter's resignation in July. Hence, the legislative election, initially due in October 2012, was postponed. Despite the uproar, the CST will not achieve its goal of pushing Mr Gnassingbé out of office. A more probable outcome is that the very heterogeneous CST, which refused to join negotiations with the government in September 2012, will gradually become less united and lose momentum as it becomes radicalised and rejects formal participation in the political process. Although the actual date has not been set for the parliamentary election, we expect the vote to take place by the end of 2012 or early 2013. The elections will be a major test of public opinion for both the coalition government and the recently revived opposition, which has gained visibility by joining forces within the CST umbrella grouping. Depending on how the ANC and other opposition parties manage to build on this new platform, the opposition is likely either to fade into insignificance or to unite and start to weigh in as a mid-tier player. A split in the opposition ranks will mostly benefit UNIR, possibly enabling the party to gain seats in the 2012-13 election and to dominate the next National Assembly. We believe that the coalition government will survive the legislative election, but should the UFC be punished for having entered the government coalition and lose much of its support to the ANC, UNIR will have to deal with a resurgent opposition.

    INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The judgment of international observers that the presidential election in 2010 was free and fair, despite some irregularities, combined with the absence of serious violence and the restraint shown by the security forces, has facilitated relations with key partners and donors, as did the formation of the coalition government between the RPT and the UFC. Financial support from key donors, including the EU, the Fund and the World Bank, which resumed in 2008 after a 15-year hiatus, will continue, although donors will be wary of any shifts toward authoritarianism. Indeed, concerns expressed by the EU and France over rising tensions and violent police repression of demonstrators are reminders of the fragility of Togo's relations with donors, and we expect these relations to become increasingly tense in the run-up to and aftermath of the legislative election. Relations with fellow members of the regional economic grouping, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), and the Economic Community of West African States will widen and deepen during 2013-14, helped by the improved political situation. The country will remain a significant contributor to peacekeeping operations on the continent and will maintain close relations with France, the former colonial power. Its international profile will rise since the country was elected to serve a two-year term on the UN Security Council.

    POLICY TRENDS: After completing a three-year reform programme in mid-2011, backed by a Fund ECF, Togo is expected to embark on a successor programme, probably in early 2013. The country achieved several key targets in 2008-11, according to the Fund's sixth and final review of the ECF in July 2011, including a significant improvement in fiscal management and reaching completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in December 2010, which allowed a massive write-off of bilateral and multilateral debt. External debt fell from US$2.2bn (82% of GDP) in 2007 to an estimated US$550m (17% of GDP) in 2011, and all arrears have now been cleared. Debt-servicing costs will fall sharply during 2013-14, freeing resources for more productive uses, although there is a risk that debt will rise again unless Togo maintains strict prudential controls. The country failed to complete several vital structural reforms during the first ECF, especially the privatisation of lossmaking state-owned banks and other planned improvements to the business environment, because of technical capacity constraints, and lengthy legal and consultative processes. The privatisation of Togo's state-owned banks has moved forward with the selection of the Benin-based Orabank as the winning bidder for Banque togolaise pour le développement, in a deal reportedly worth US$38m. Other reforms, such as the introduction of a recovery mechanism for non-performing loans and a rationalisation of revenue collection structures, can be expected in 2013. Deeper reforms are also pending in the cotton and phosphate sectors. The launch of several major projects by the Bank in 2011-12, covering infrastructure rehabilitation, public administration and private-sector development, will support structural reforms during 2013-14. However, political tensions and uncertainties about the legislative election could hinder the reform process and make it more difficult to attract private investors into parastatal enterprises.

    ECONOMIC GROWTH: Real GDP growth is estimated to have accelerated to 4.2% in 2012, helped by satisfactory rainfall, new investment and aid projects, a modest fiscal stimulus, increased port activity and Fund-backed reforms. Economic performance will remain relatively buoyant during 2013-14, despite long-standing structural constraints and renewed weakness in European markets. We expect growth to accelerate further to 4.5% in 2013, spurred by new investment in infrastructure, the recent connection to the global fibre-optic network, higher government spending (helped by lower debt-servicing costs following debt relief) and continuing structural reforms, including the overhaul and privatisation of inefficient state-owned enterprises, especially in the banking, phosphate and cotton sectors. Nonetheless, growth in Europe-a key market-will remain weak owing to the euro zone debt crisis. Moreover, the benefits of reform and increased donor funding will take time to materialise after a long period of mismanagement and underinvestment. Provided that Togo stays on track with reforms, our core forecast sees growth accelerating to 4.8% in 2014-the highest rate for several years. However, risks to this forecast are on the downside: growth will continue to be weather-dependent (because of the importance of agriculture, which accounts for more than one third of GDP) and will remain vulnerable to further financial and economic disturbance in Europe, as well as a deterioration of the domestic political context, which could raise uncertainty and curtail donor funding. Monetary policy is managed by the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'ouest (BCEAO), the main remit of which is to control inflation and maintain the CFA franc's peg to the euro. Policy is, therefore, heavily influenced by that of the European Central Bank (ECB). In June 2012, amid a relatively benign inflation outlook and slightly lower than expected growth in the Franc Zone, the BCEAO cut its benchmark discount rate by 25 basis points (bps), to 4%-its first loosening since mid-2009. Amid continued fragility in the euro zone, the ECB cut its financing rate by 25 bps to 0.75% in July 2012. We expect the ECB to bring it down by another 25 bps and to keep it at 0.5% in 2013, before raising it to 1% in 2014. If inflation and real GDP growth continue to slow in the UEMOA, the BCEAO might follow the ECB with another cut in 2013, before starting to raise rates again in 2014 as the global economy recovers.

    EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: Togo's current-account deficit will remain large during 2013-14, as demand for foreign goods and services will outstrip the country's earning potential. In 2012 cotton prices fell by more than 40% from their 2011 peak, leading to a decline in export value despite a rise in production. Cotton exports are set to increase in 2013-14 on the back of growing production and gently recovering prices. Earnings from phosphates will increase as a result of planned new investment, while re-exports (which account for nearly one-fifth of total exports) will benefit from investments in the port infrastructure and from regional integration. Import demand, after rising strongly in 2011-12, will remain robust in 2013-14, which will maintain the pressure on the trade deficit. The goods import bill will grow to US$1.6bn and US$1.7bn in 2013 and 2014 respectively, spurred by faster economic growth and donor-funded capital projects. Earnings from remittances and servicing regional trade will remain a vital part of the balance of payments, as will donor grants, while tourism has medium-term potential. Overall, we forecast that the deficit, which is estimated to have widened to 13.5% of GDP in 2012, will narrow to 13.4% of GDP in 2013 before falling further to 13% of GDP in 2014, with the majority of the financing coming from concessional loans from donors, and the remainder from foreign direct investment.

    October 12, 2012

Country Briefing

Land area

56,785 sq km

Population

6.03m (2012, World Gazetteer estimates)

Main towns

Population ('000; 2012 World Gazetteer estimates):

Lomé (capital): 1,755

Sokodé: 116

Kara: 111

Atakpamé: 85

Kpalimé: 82

Climate

Tropical, drier in the north

Weather in Lomé

Average temperature 27°C; average monthly rainfall 65 mm

Languages

French, Ewe, Kabye and others

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr; CFA stands for Communauté financière africaine)-the common currency of the West African Franc Zone, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA); tied to the euro at a fixed exchange rate of CFAfr655.957:EUR1

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st; January 13th (National Liberation Day); January 24th (Victory Day); April 27th (Independence Day); May 1st (Labour Day); August 15th (Assumption); September 24th (anniversary of a failed attack by Togolese dissidents on Lomé in 1986); November 1st (All Saints' Day); December 25th

Variable (according to the Christian and Muslim calendars): Id al-Fitr; Id al-Adha; Prophet's Birthday; Easter Monday; Ascension Day; Whit Monday


July 11, 2012

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