Sudan

Politics:

• Analysis

  Sudan politics: Quick View - NCP remains guarded about a successor to Bashi

  Event

  In an interview with a Qatari newspaper on March 20th, the president, Omar al-Bashir, said that he would step down in 2015.

  Analysis

  Although it is not the first time that Mr Bashir has said that he will not stand at the next presidential election (due in 2015), his statements of this intent are becoming more frequent and consistent. In the interview with the Al-Sharq newspaper, Mr Bashir said that the two decades he had spent in power was "more than enough", and that the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) had enough time before elections in 2015 to select a new candidate. At least twice before, in 2010 and 2011, Mr Bashir has indicated that he might not seek re-election, although party officials subsequently played down his remarks.

  One concern for Mr Bashir may be his health; in November 2012 he had to go to Saudi Arabia for a minor operation on his throat, and he returned there in March 2013 for a check-up. However, perhaps of greater concern for him is the fact that he has now been in office for almost 24 years, and-as the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 showed-the longer he remains president, the more likely it is that he may eventually be violently ousted from power.

  In the days following Mr Bashir's latest remarks, some members of the NCP reportedly launched a petition to persuade him to stay on. By contrast, on March 25th an official in the opposition Popular Congress Party called for Mr Bashir to hand over power to a transitional government-an option for which the Umma Party has also called. However, at the moment the NCP is far from under pressure to pursue such an option, and it has the advantage that almost none of Sudan's neighbours would currently welcome a revolution and change of regime in the country.

  March 26, 2013

• Background

  Sudan: Key figures

  Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir

  Mr Bashir has dominated Sudan as president since 1989, sidelining his rivals, appointing allies to sensitive national and regional posts, and establishing control of parliament. The army and security forces are his main power base, but his position has also been strengthened by Sudan's rapid economic growth in the past five years.

  Salva Kiir

  As John Garang's deputy, Mr Kiir was appointed leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), president of Southern Sudan and first vice-president in the Government of National Unity (GNU) following Mr Garang's death in July 2005. Lacking the charisma of his predecessor and with more military than political experience, Mr Kiir has struggled to impose his authority. However, the fact that he is not directly associated with the factional fighting that took place under Mr Garang has helped him to smooth relations between the Dinka (which dominates the SPLM) and the Nuer, two southern tribes.

  Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha

  Mr Taha led the government delegation in the final rounds of north-south peace talks and was rewarded with the post of second vice-president in the new GNU. Despite previous distrust between him and the president, Mr Taha—a key architect of the 1989 coup—is widely regarded as the number two in the National Congress Party (NCP).

  Sadiq al-Mahdi

  The great-grandson of the Mahdi who defeated the British in the 1880s, Mr Mahdi is the hereditary leader of the Ansar sect, the backbone of the Umma Party. He has twice been prime minister, and presided over the unstable period of democracy in 1985-89. He left the National Democratic Alliance, an exiled umbrella organisation for opposition groups, in 2000 after secret talks with the government, but did not to accept the ministerial positions that were offered to him and boycotted the elections in 2000. Similarly, he has refused to participate in the GNU, as his party was not included in the process that led to its formation.

  Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani

  Mr Mirghani is the hereditary head of the Khatmiyya Sufi order and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, a traditionally pro-Egyptian party that was in a coalition government with the Umma Party before the 1989 coup. After a period in exile, he returned to Khartoum in 2005, following an agreement with the government, and now participates in the GNU.

  Hassan al-Turabi

  As a student activist in the 1960s, Mr Turabi founded the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned movement that evolved into the NCP. He was centrally involved in planning the 1989 coup and vied for dominance with Mr Bashir during the 1990s. After losing the power struggle with Mr Bashir, he was imprisoned for much of 2001-05 on conspiracy charges. After a period of freedom, he was imprisoned again in January 2009 after calling on Mr Bashir to surrender himself to the International Criminal Court. It has been alleged that Mr Turabi has links to a Darfuri rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement.

  March 04, 2009

• Structure

  Sudan: Political structure

  Sudan

  Official name

  Republic of Sudan

  Legal system

  Sharia (Islamic law) applies in both civil and criminal cases in the north—although there are some special provisions for non-Muslims

  National legislature

  Sudan has a bicameral parliament, consisting of a 450-member National Assembly (with 60% of seats elected by majority voting in geographical constituencies and 40% by proportional representation, including 25% reserved for women) and a Council of States composed of two representatives elected by each state assembly

  National elections

  April 2010 (presidential and parliamentary); next elections due 2015

  Head of state

  Omar al-Bashir, who took office following a 1989 coup and was sworn in as president in October 1993, was most recently re-elected in April 2010

  National government

  The government is dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP). Until July 2011 it was in a coalition with its former adversary in the north-south civil war, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and a few minor parties such as the Eastern Front. In December 2011 there was a cabinet reshuffle, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) being brought into government

  Main political parties

  The main northern opposition parties include the DUP, the Umma Party and the Popular Congress Party (PCP). In Darfur the main political-military groups are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the fragmented Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)

  The presidency

  President: Omar al-Bashir (NCP)

  First vice-president: Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha (NCP)

  Second vice-president: Al-Haj Adam Yousif (NCP)

  Assistants to the president:

   Nafie Ali Nafie (NCP)

   Musa Mohammed Ahmed (EF)

   Al-Sadiq al-Mirghani (DUP)

   Abdel Rahman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi

  Key ministers

  Council of ministers: Ahmed Omer Sa'ad (DUP)

  Commerce: Osman Omer al-Sharif (DUP)

  Defence: Abdel-Rahim Mohammed Hussein (NCP)

  Electricity & dams: Osama Abdullah Mohammed al-Hassan (NCP)

  Environment & forestry: Hassan Hilal (DUP)

  Finance & national economy: Ali Mahmoud Abdel-Rasool (NCP)

  Foreign affairs: Ali Ahmed Karti (NCP)

  Human resources: Abdeen Mohammed (DUP)

  International co-operation: Ishraqa Sayed (DUP)

  Interior: Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamed (NCP)

  Justice: Mohammed Bushara Dosa (NCP)

  Mining: Kamal Abdel-Latif (NCP)

  Oil: Awad Ahmed al-Jaz (NCP)

  Social welfare & insurance: Amira al-Fadil Mohammed al-Fadil (NCP)

  Youth & sports: Al-Fatih Taj al-Sir (DUP)

  Central Bank governor

  Mohammed Khair al-Zubair

  South Sudan

  Official name

  The Republic of South Sudan

  Legal system

  The south has a non-Islamic legal system

  National legislature

  South Sudan has a bicameral parliament. The lower house, the National Legislative Assembly, is made up of the members of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement era Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly and the former southern members of Sudan's National Assembly prior to South Sudan's independence. The upper house, the Council of States, is made up of the former southern members of Sudan's Council of States prior to South Sudan's independence, plus 20 members appointed by the president. An interim constitution was passed by parliament days before independence in July 2011 and is expected to serve for four years before a permanent constitution is approved at a national conference

  National elections

  The term of the National Legislative Assembly is four years from July 9th 2011

  Head of state

  Salva Kiir Mayaardit

  National government

  The government is dominated by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

  Main political parties

  The main opposition party is the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), a faction with alleged ties to the north that broke away in 2009. Other opposition parties have limited influence, including the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF)

  The presidency

  President: Salva Kiir Mayaardit

  Vice-president: Riek Machar

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & forestry: Betty Achan Ogwaro

  Cabinet affairs: Deng Alor Kuol

  Commerce, industry & investment: Garang Diing Akuong

  Culture, youth & sports: Cirino Hiteng Ofuho

  Defence & veteran affairs: John Kong Nyuon

  Environment: Alfred Lado Gore

  Finance & economic planning: Kosti Manibe Ngai

  Foreign affairs & international co-operation: Nhial Deng Nhial

  Gender, child & social welfare: Agnes Kwaje Lasuba

  General education & instruction: Ustaz Joseph Ukel Abango

  Health: Michael Milly Hussein

  Housing & physical planning: Jemma Nunu Kumba

  Information & broadcasting: Barnaba Marial Benjamin

  Interior: Alison Manani Magaya

  Justice: John Luk Jok

  Labour & public service: Awut Deng Acuil

  National security: Oyay Deng Ajak

  Parliamentary affairs: Michael Makwei Lueth

  Petroleum & mining: Stephen Dhieu Dau

  Roads & bridges: Gier Chuang Aluong

  Telecommunication & postal services: Madut Biar Yel

  Transport: Agnes Poni Lokudu

  Water resources & irrigation: Paul Mayom Akec

  Central bank governor

  Kornelio Koryom Mayiik

  March 14, 2013

• Outlook

  Sudan: Key developments

  Outlook for 2013-17

  • The National Congress Party, headed by the president, Omar al-Bashir, will maintain control in Sudan, provided that Mr Bashir's health does not deteriorate significantly.
  • The Sudan People's Liberation Movement will continue to enjoy near-total control in South Sudan, notwithstanding regular rumours of attempted coups. It will, however, face rebel movements and inter-tribal conflicts.
  • Although South Sudan and Sudan have in theory reached agreement on oil transit fees, implementation is proving difficult, and a resolution of disputes over debt and the border is unlikely until the latter part of the forecast period.
  • Sudan will suffer economically because of the loss of southern oil-75% of its reserves. Although it has announced additional budget cuts, we expect the fiscal account to return an average deficit of 3.6% of GDP in 2013-17.
  • South Sudanese oil production is likely to come back on stream from the second quarter of 2013, but the economic impact of the protracted shutdown will continue to be felt in both Sudan and South Sudan for some time.
  • Sudan's real GDP is expected to grow by 2.8% in 2013, with the rate improving to 5.3% in 2017 as domestic oil production increases and the agricultural and gold sectors perform solidly.
  • We forecast that Sudanese inflation will moderate to a still-high 24.3% in 2013 and decline more substantially in 2014-15, following the resumption of South Sudanese oil exports (a key source of foreign exchange for Sudan).

  Review

  • Inter-tribal fighting has resumed in North Darfur. However, internal armed conflicts in Sudan do not threaten the government's overall control.
  • The South Sudanese government has adopted a new policy on land ownership. Details are scant, but the policy does not appear to involve any radical new strategies and is unlikely to deal with existing, violent disputes.
  • Sudan has announced plans to build a paved road to Chad. However, the ambitious plans are likely to make only slow progress, because of poor management and financing constraints.
  • Annualised inflation remained above 40% in the last five months of 2012, according to the Central Bank of Sudan, while foreign-exchange reserves remain low, at less than one month's import cover.
  • South Sudan has announced plans to issue new oil licences this year. However, licensing rounds are likely to be delayed because of legal issues and investor nervousness.

  March 14, 2013

Economy:

• Background

  Sudan: Economic background

  Real gross domestic product by sector
  (% share of GDP)
  	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
  Agriculture	35.4	33.7	31.9	30.6	31.0
  Industry	26.6	29.7	33.2	36.8	34.7
  Services	38.0	36.6	34.9	32.5	34.2
  Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit.

  Download text file (csv format)

  March 04, 2009

• Structure

  Sudan: Economic structure

  Data and charts: Annual trends charts

  
  

  

  March 14, 2013

• Outlook

  Sudan: Country outlook

  Sudan: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  POLITICAL STABILITY: Disagreements over many aspects of the July 2011 division of Sudan and South Sudan, notably border delineation, look set to continue. Relations between the two states deteriorated substantially in 2012, following the stoppage by South Sudan of most of its oil production in retaliation over Sudan's unilateral seizure of South Sudanese oil transported by pipeline across Sudanese territory. The fiscal pressures arising from this prolonged stoppage have forced both sides back to the negotiating table, and the two countries have agreed a series of deals, notably on the export of South Sudanese oil through Sudan and the definition of the demilitarised border zone (patrolled by the 4,000-strong UN Interim Security Force for Abyei). However, notwithstanding further high-level pledges on co-operation in January 2012, implementation of these deals is proving more difficult, and other issues-including the delineation of other border areas, the future of the disputed Abyei area and whether South Sudan will take on any of Sudan's external debt-are also yet to be settled definitively. Agreement on these issues is likely to involve further delays and tensions, and is unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Opposition groups in Sudan will continue to make cautious efforts to increase co operation, in order to present a concerted challenge to the president, Omar al Bashir, and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). In January 2013, for example, an agreement for "political action against the government" was signed by the member parties of the National Consensus Forces (NCF) alliance, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, an alliance of rebel groups) and some youth and civil society groups. According to the NCF, the so-called New Dawn Charter agreement has narrowed the gap between the armed groups and the opposition parties, and could eventually enable the opposition to take a uniform position in collective talks with the government. At this stage, however, there are no signs that this agreement is stronger than any of the many opposition deals made in the past, and the preconditions for a rigorous challenge-including dynamic and cohesive opposition leadership and mass protest-seem unlikely to emerge, at least in the initial part of the forecast period. South Sudan's immediate future will be dominated by its president, Salva Kiir, and his party, the SPLM, despite rumoured tensions within the government and army, arising from tribal factors. Such factors have already prompted a number of rumours regarding coup plots, most recently in January 2013, when Mr Kiir replaced a number of high-ranking military personnel. Although the military presents a potential threat to stability in the longer term (it is likely that unrest in the army will increase as the incumbent leadership ages and younger contenders become impatient to take their place), support around Mr Kiir has seemed solid thus far. The SPLM will try to promote unity in South Sudan, but internal conflict has already erupted in parts of the country between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and disgruntled rebel militia, encouraged in some cases by the north. Although the government's efforts to woo rebel groups-by offering amnesties, for example-continue to notch up some successes, conflict may escalate further. Despite the announcement of another peace plan for the area, and the mooted launch of a peace and reconciliation initiative this year, ethnic violence is likely to persist in Jonglei-a state in eastern South Sudan-and could even deteriorate given the government's heavy-handed disarmament campaign; an international non-governmental organisation, Amnesty International, has accused the SPLA and the police auxiliary force of extensive human rights violations in such campaigns, including unlawful killings and torture.

  ELECTION WATCH: Sudan may be tempted to hold presidential and parliamentary elections before the south, which is due to vote in 2015. Mr Bashir has said that he will not stand again, but he may reverse this position closer to the poll, although much will depend on the health of the president, who received (apparently minor) medical treatment in Saudi Arabia in late 2012. Mr Bashir would seem well-positioned to win again should he renege on this pledge, particularly as there is little to suggest that opposition groups would be able to agree on a single candidate. Equally, opposition groups might boycott the poll, citing concerns about the fairness of the vote. In South Sudan, Mr Kiir broadened the representation of the country's ethnic groups when he reshuffled his cabinet in August 2011. Preparation for elections in 2015 will raise tensions within the SPLM, although the party is unlikely to split. In addition, there is little sign as yet of a viable opposition group or candidate, suggesting that Mr Kiir is likely to win if, as expected, he runs again for the presidency.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Despite Mr Bashir's hopes that he would be rewarded for allowing the south to secede, US sanctions on Sudan were renewed in November 2011, partly because of US concerns about Sudan's aggression in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The US remains a strong supporter of South Sudan, and is unlikely to lift its sanctions on Sudan in the short-to-medium term. Relations with EU countries have been made more difficult by the International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against Mr Bashir on charges of genocide in Darfur. (The EU states are members of the court, unlike the US.) Western countries are focused primarily on entrenching the peaceful secession of South Sudan and preventing any return to a north-south war. However, Sudan's internal politics also remains a source of concern, and in March 2013 a UN panel stated that Sudan had breached UN sanctions by using warplanes and rockets bought from Belarus and Russia against Darfuri opponents; the panel called for a tightened arms embargo. In this situation-and with implementation of the oil and border agreements with South Sudan proving extremely slow-relations with Western states will remain tense. On gaining independence, South Sudan was recognised by most of the world's major states, and recognition has been followed by a slow increase in international aid, particularly from the US and the EU. However, donors remain concerned about corruption and waste in South Sudan, and this has acted as a constraint on increased direct assistance. An ongoing deterioration in South Sudan's political environment could add to donor doubts in the longer term, at least. South Sudan can expect favourable relations with its southern neighbours. Uganda and Kenya in particular have led investment in the southern capital, Juba.

  POLICY TRENDS: As a result of the secession of the south, Sudan has lost around 75% of its productive oilfields-formerly its principal source of export income. Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), oil profits were split 50-50 between north and south, and the north sought to extract compensation for its loss of revenue by charging South Sudan US$32/barrel to use its oil pipeline-currently the only export route available to the landlocked country. An agreement reached in August 2012 appears to allow for an average payment of US$9.48/b, as well as a one-off compensation payment by South Sudan of just over US$3bn in "transitional financial assistance". However, implementation of the oil agreement has stalled repeatedly amid disputes over the removal of troops from the border area-a precondition for the resumption of exports-and substantial exports will thus not resume until the second quarter of 2013 at the earliest. According to the Sudanese finance minister, Ali Mahmood, the government will not factor earnings from South Sudanese oil into its revenue projections until exportation actually resumes and figures can be calculated "with a degree of certainty". Tackling corruption would improve the business environment for private firms considerably: Sudan was ranked 173rd out of 176 countries in Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, released in December 2012. However, this will remain little more than a publicly stated policy goal. South Sudan will make progress on developing the legal and regulatory frameworks for the economy and will have some limited success in attracting foreign investment. In addition, some companies will be tempted by the opportunity to gain a first-mover advantage in Africa's newest state. South Sudan may also benefit from new international loans and grants; the IMF's announcement in September 2012 that South Sudan was eligible for concessional lending is an encouraging development in this respect, although no such loans have yet been granted. However, there are ongoing concerns about the inexperience of the civil service, as well as mismanagement and corruption, and these could complicate access to funding. Improvements in monetary and fiscal policy will depend heavily on technical assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: We estimate that real GDP contracted by 9.7% in 2012, reflecting both the full economic cost of the south's secession and the prolonged stoppage of South Sudanese oil exports. We forecast that the economy, having absorbed the shock of the loss of oil and an estimated 20% of its population following secession, will grow by an annual average of 2.7% in 2013-14, before picking up to an average of 4.8% in 2016-17, as the disruption of southern secession fades and government consumption and investment spending return following the end of the three-year austerity programme. Although South Sudan produced its first-ever GDP data in mid-2012-showing that the economy grew by 25.9% in fiscal year 2010/11 (July-June)-accurate GDP figures remain difficult to ascertain, owing to the country's large informal sector, the lack of data covering trade with Sudan (traditionally one of its largest trading partners) and poor data-collection capacity. However, it is clear that South Sudan's economic growth is inextricably linked to the oil sector, and the shutdown of production from early 2012 has had a serious impact: we estimate that South Sudan's real GDP fell by 55% in 2012 as a result. However, it should bounce back in 2013 to expand by 60%, provided that oil exports resume in the second quarter (and increase reasonably rapidly), before growth moderates in the rest of the forecast period. The economy will be boosted by increased grants and foreign investment, although donors' ongoing concerns about corruption could act as a constraint, and any return to outright conflict would lead to a sharp fall in such flows. Regional companies, mostly from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, will lead investment in construction, manufacturing, consumer goods, power and telecommunications, centred almost entirely on Juba, far from any conflict areas. However, a durable peace with Sudan is crucial if South Sudan is to realise its economic potential.

  INFLATION: Inflationary pressure in Sudan remains strong, in part reflecting the impact of a weakening Sudanese pound on the import bill and high energy costs. In addition, food price inflation has tended to spike in response to concerns about political risk, with consumers seeking to stock up on staples when tensions with the south are particularly high. According to the Central Bank of Sudan (CBS), annualised inflation eased to 43.5% in January 2013 from 44.4% the previous month-the second successive monthly decline after almost a year of increases. Nonetheless, rates remain far above the Central Bank's normal target inflation rate of around 10%. Inflation is likely to remain elevated in 2013, at 24.3%, but should average around 12.3% a year in 2014 17, provided that the government allows the Central Bank to take steps to contain and subsequently reduce the monetisation of the fiscal deficit. South Sudan's government released its first consumer price figures in October 2011. Price growth reached a reported 80% year on year in May 2012 but subsequently moderated, falling to 25.2% in December, according to official data, because of slowing growth in food prices. However, the rate accelerated again in January 2013, to 35%, reflecting a renewed rise in food prices. Even this may be an underestimate: there is speculation that the official figures understate the true level of price increases, with inflationary pressures proving particularly intense in northern border areas such as Malakal, where traditional supply routes from Sudan have been seriously disrupted. The upsurge in inflation is being partly driven by exchange-rate weakness, reflecting in turn the ongoing stoppage of oil production, as well as concerns about increased political risk. With oil supplies due to rise from the second quarter of 2013, inflation should decline to 22% in 2013 as global food commodity prices soften; the ongoing downward movement in global food prices, which are expected to decline by an annual average of 2.5% in 2014-15, should help to sustain this trend.

  EXCHANGE RATES: In mid-2012 the CBS announced that exchange bureaus would be able to set their own rates, in effect allowing the commercial rate to float and accepting a de facto devaluation of the Sudanese pound after months of mounting pressure on the currency. Four main exchange rates are currently in operation: a "central" rate of SDG4.42:US$1 that applies chiefly to the importation of fuel products and the payment of government obligations; a subsidised rate of SDG2.9:US$1, used for wheat; a gold exchange rate used by the CBS in its gold transactions; and a commercial bank rate. Having previously used the subsidised and central rates, we are now using the commercial rate. US dollars continue to be scarce, and the local currency remains under pressure amid concerns that the resumption of South Sudanese oil exports-and, thus, oil export fees for Sudan-will be delayed yet further. The fact that revenue from the export of oil has not been built into the 2013 budget has underscored such concerns and suggests that the currency will remain under pressure for the time being, although the resumption of large-scale South Sudanese oil exports should help to bolster the pound during the second half of the year. As of mid-January, the commercial rate was around SDG5.54:US$1, suggesting that the depreciation of the currency has slowed but not stopped. Overall, we expect the commercial rate to depreciate to an average of SDG5.78:US$1 in 2013, and to around SDG6.31:US$1 by the end of the forecast period. The Central Bank of South Sudan operates a managed float of the South Sudanese pound, which was initially intended to have parity with the Sudanese pound. The Central Bank's ability to defend the currency is questionable, and options for harmonising the official and parallel-market exchange rates are to be discussed. If followed through, this is also likely to involve some form of devaluation. The prolonged shutdown of oil production has had a negative effect on the currency, and this is likely to persist into the early part of the forecast period. Thus the market rate of the South Sudanese pound is likely to remain around SSP4 5:US$1 in 2013 (it has averaged around SSP4.35:US$1 since October 2012, according to data from South Sudan's National Bureau of Statistics), although the subsidised rate (currently SSP2.7:US$1) will continue to be maintained for many transactions.

  EXTERNAL SECTOR: In Sudan, we expect demand for imports to tick back up after a sharp drop in 2012 owing to the post-secession fall in population and declines in government spending and private consumption. However, this will be gradual: thus the import bill is expected to rise from an annual average of US$6.8bn in 2013-14 to US$7.7bn in 2017, as the strengthening economy draws in increased capital inputs and consumer goods. With exports having been pushed down by the loss of southern oilfields, and with measures to broaden the country's export base taking time to implement, we expect the trade balance to remain in deficit for the whole of the forecast period, reaching US$3bn in 2017 (compared with a surplus of US$1.5bn in 2011). However, the current account will benefit from reduced repatriation of profits by foreign oil companies, as well as lower services debits. Assuming that the agreement reached between Sudan and South Sudan on transit fees for southern oil leads to a durable resumption of exports, providing a boost to services credits as well as allowing a steady pick-up in imports financed by transit fees, we expect the current-account deficit to widen from US$2.3bn in 2013 to US$2.8bn in 2017. Although South Sudan's domestic demand for oil is modest (providing more for export), the shutdown of oil production had a dramatic effect on the trade balance, taking it and the current account into deficit in 2012. However, in 2013, with oil exports recovering, current transfers credits rising (on the back of higher aid inflows) and the agricultural sector beginning to realise its potential (which will reduce dependence on food imports), we expect the current account to move back into surplus.

  March 03, 2013

• Forecast

  Sudan: 5-year forecast summary

  Outlook for 2013-17: Forecast summary

  Forecast summary
  (% unless otherwise indicated)
  	2012a	2013b	2014b	2015b	2016b	2017b
  Real GDP growth	-9.7	2.8	2.5	3.8	4.3	5.3
  Oil production ('000 b/d)	115.0	135.0	140.0	145.0	150.0	160.0
  Crude oil exports (US$ m)	1,904	1,776	1,628	1,590	1,552	1,609
  Consumer price inflation (av)	31.9	24.3	11.4	11.1	11.9	14.9
  Government balance (% of GDP)	-7.2	-4.7	-2.9	-3.2	-3.5	-3.8
  Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.7
  Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)	6.6	6.8	6.9	7.1	7.4	7.7
  Current-account balance (US$ bn)	-3.5	-2.3	-2.3	-2.3	-2.4	-2.8
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-6.7	-4.9	-4.4	-4.0	-3.7	-3.6
  External debt (year-end; US$ bn)	39.7	41.1	42.6	44.1	45.6	47.5
  Exchange rate SDG:US$ (av)	4.09	5.78	5.03	6.04	6.09	6.31
  Exchange rate SDG:¥100 (av)	3.35	5.11	6.24	6.17	6.25	6.54
  Exchange rate SDG:€ (av)	7.46	7.69	6.59	7.67	7.67	7.95
  Exchange rate SDG:SDR (av)	4.26	6.31	8.81	8.82	9.05	9.39
  Note. Data up to June 2011 are for the united country (Sudan and South Sudan); those from July 2011 onwards are for Sudan only. Sudan lost 20% of its population and 75% of its oil after the secession of South Sudan in July 2011.
  a The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  South Sudan: forecast summary
  		2012a	2013b	2014b
  Oil production ('000 b/d)		20.0	200.0	328.0
  Consumer price inflation (av)		60.0	22.0	15.0
  Crude oil exports (US$ m)		1,102	10,131	10,362
  Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)		1.3	10.2	10.5
  Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)		2.1	2.8	3.7
  a The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  March 14, 2013

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Sudan

Land area

1.9m sq km

Population

32.2m (2012, World Gazetteer estimate)

Main towns

Population in '000; 2012 calculations from World Gazetteer:

 Khartoum (capital): 2,682

 Omdurman: 2,805

 Kassala: 510

 El Obeid: 408

 Wad Medani: 370

 Gedaref: 355

Climate

Hot and dry in September-May; rainy season from April/May to September/October depending on late (average annual rainfall 100 mm)

Weather in Khartoum (altitude 390 metres)

Hottest month, May, 26-42°C; coldest month, January, 16-32°C; driest months, January-April, usually no rainfall; wettest month, August, 72 mm average rainfall (average annual rainfall 200 mm)

Languages

Arabic and English are official languages. There are also over 70 tribal languages, of which several are each spoken by more than 100,000 people

Measures

Metric system. Some local measures are also used:

1 diraa = 58 cm; 1 feddan = 0.39 ha; 12 keilas = 1 arde = 1.98 hl

Currency

In 2007 the Sudanese pound replaced the Sudanese dinar as the national currency at a value of SDG1=SD100. The pound is made up of 100 qirush/piaster

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Independence Day (January 1st); Coptic Christmas (January 7th); Peace Agreement Day (January 9th); the Prophet's birthday (January 24th 2012); Coptic Easter (May 5th 2012); Labour Day (May 5th); Revolution Day (June 30th); Eid al-Fitr (August 8th 2012); Eid al-Adha (October 15th 2012); Islamic New Year (November 4th 2012); Christmas Day (December 25th)

The dates of the Islamic festivals are uncertain because they depend on the actual sighting of the moon

South Sudan

Land area

644,329 sq km

Population

10.1m (2012 estimate, World Gazetteer)

Capital

Juba (population: 509000, 2012 estimate, World Gazetteer)

States

Population in '000 (2008 census):

 Jonglei: 1,359

 Central Equatoria: 1,104

 Warap: 973

 Upper Nile: 964

 Eastern Equatoria: 906

 Northern Bahr el-Ghazal: 721

 Lakes: 696

 Western Equatoria: 619

 Unity: 586

 Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 333

Climate

Rainy season from April to October (average annual rainfall 1,000 mm)

Weather in Juba (altitude 550 metres)

Hottest month, March, 24-38°C; coldest month, July, 21-31°C; driest months, December-February, 8mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 145 mm average rainfall (average annual rainfall 954 mm)

Languages

The official languages are English and Arabic. There are an estimated 200 different ethnic groups, many with their own tribal languages. The most widely spoken of these are Dinka (spoken by 2-3m), Nuer, Shilluk, Zande, Bari, Ubangian and Otuho

Measures

Metric system. Some local measures are also used:

1 diraa = 58 cm; 1 feddan = 0.39 ha; 12 keilas = 1 arde = 1.98 hl

Currency

A new currency, the South Sudanese pound was launched in July 2011. The South Sudanese pound was to be fixed to the Sudanese pound, but it has since depegged

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Independence Day (July 9th); Martyrs Day (30th July); Constitution Anniversary (December 5th); Christmas Day (December 25th)

January 21, 2013