Sudan

Politics:

• Analysis

  Sudan politics: Challenging South Sudan's government can be dangerous

  During protests in Wau on December 8th-9th, the South Sudanese army killed at least ten protesters. Although the shooting of the protesters is not the harbinger of escalating protests against the government of South Sudan, it does illustrate the potential dangers of challenging or criticising the administration, since South Sudan's security forces can adopt a heavy-handed approach, whether handling protests or the population more widely.

  The protests in Wau were prompted not by a national issue, such as unemployment and economic hardship, but by local anger about the regional government's decision to move some county administrative offices out of the city. It is not entirely clear how the protests came to end so violently. However, local administrative issues with implications for local borders, perceived land rights and distribution of government jobs are often contentious in South Sudan. Clan, sub-tribal or tribal divisions often coincide with and exacerbate tensions about administrative boundaries and divisions.

  Freedom of speech challenged?

  The shootings in Wau came only a few days after the death of a journalist in Juba. In the early hours of December 5th, Isaiah Ding Abraham Awuol-a civil servant working in the Employees Justice Chamber who also wrote occasional comment articles for a local newspaper called Destiny and for the Sudan Tribune, an Internet newspaper about the two Sudans-was taken from his house in the capital and shot dead. On November 21st Mr Abraham reported that security officials had confronted him about an article in which he had called for the resignation of the president. The shooting appears to have been the latest in a trickle of attacks on reporters and activists who have drawn attention to corruption and malfeasance in government, and Mr Abraham was evidently not protected by his background as a former member of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the former guerrilla army that is now South Sudan's national army and is barely separated from the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

  Numerous other incidents contribute to the wider picture of a state in which at least some officials want to stifle criticism. In October, for example, the government expelled from the country a human rights official working with the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan; in 2011 another UN human rights official was beaten by policemen. In August an US citizen who had been a long-standing advocate for the SPLM in the US and who was advising the president, Salva Kiir, on how to tackle corruption, apparently fled the country, fearing for his safety after he launched an initiative from the president's office to tackle corruption and recoup stolen public funds. There have been attacks on civil society activists, while in 2011 a newspaper editor was detained in prison for nearly three weeks after his paper ran an article criticising the president for allowing his daughter to marry an Ethiopian. When the editor was released he was taken for dinner with the president and the matter was subsequently dropped.

  Rule of law

  Overall, progress on respect for human rights and the rule of law since South Sudan became independent in 2011 has not been good. Indeed, even Mabior Garang-a son of the former SPLA leader, John Garang-has faced threats and been physically attacked for criticising the direction in which the country is heading. Mr Garang had generally maintained a low profile until a Kenyan woman teaching at a school he established in Juba (the city's first "international" school) was shot dead by soldiers when the car in which she was travelling failed to stop when passing the John Garang mausoleum in Juba at the moment when the national flag was being lowered. An investigation was launched, but in an interview in October, Mabior Garang said that the incident showed a "disregard" for life in South Sudan, and added that people were being shot and harassed every day. He also criticised the SPLM (of which he is still a member), saying that its transition from a liberation movement to a government had been "completely mismanaged".

  In principle the authorities in South Sudan are trying to improve the rule of law, and investigations into particular cases are sometimes announced. International donors too have been keen to support improvements in the rule of law, and have been putting money into projects under the mantras of "justice reform" and "security sector reform". However, so far there has been precious little progress on accountability for abuses and extra-judicial killings. As in Sudan and other neighbouring or poor countries, press censorship and intimidation of and violence against journalists and activists are easy temptations for a poorly disciplined and minimally accountable government, while there is little sign as yet that sporadic attacks on critics are making donors rethink their broad support of South Sudan.

  December 11, 2012

• Background

  Sudan: Key figures

  Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir

  Mr Bashir has dominated Sudan as president since 1989, sidelining his rivals, appointing allies to sensitive national and regional posts, and establishing control of parliament. The army and security forces are his main power base, but his position has also been strengthened by Sudan's rapid economic growth in the past five years.

  Salva Kiir

  As John Garang's deputy, Mr Kiir was appointed leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), president of Southern Sudan and first vice-president in the Government of National Unity (GNU) following Mr Garang's death in July 2005. Lacking the charisma of his predecessor and with more military than political experience, Mr Kiir has struggled to impose his authority. However, the fact that he is not directly associated with the factional fighting that took place under Mr Garang has helped him to smooth relations between the Dinka (which dominates the SPLM) and the Nuer, two southern tribes.

  Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha

  Mr Taha led the government delegation in the final rounds of north-south peace talks and was rewarded with the post of second vice-president in the new GNU. Despite previous distrust between him and the president, Mr Taha—a key architect of the 1989 coup—is widely regarded as the number two in the National Congress Party (NCP).

  Sadiq al-Mahdi

  The great-grandson of the Mahdi who defeated the British in the 1880s, Mr Mahdi is the hereditary leader of the Ansar sect, the backbone of the Umma Party. He has twice been prime minister, and presided over the unstable period of democracy in 1985-89. He left the National Democratic Alliance, an exiled umbrella organisation for opposition groups, in 2000 after secret talks with the government, but did not to accept the ministerial positions that were offered to him and boycotted the elections in 2000. Similarly, he has refused to participate in the GNU, as his party was not included in the process that led to its formation.

  Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani

  Mr Mirghani is the hereditary head of the Khatmiyya Sufi order and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, a traditionally pro-Egyptian party that was in a coalition government with the Umma Party before the 1989 coup. After a period in exile, he returned to Khartoum in 2005, following an agreement with the government, and now participates in the GNU.

  Hassan al-Turabi

  As a student activist in the 1960s, Mr Turabi founded the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned movement that evolved into the NCP. He was centrally involved in planning the 1989 coup and vied for dominance with Mr Bashir during the 1990s. After losing the power struggle with Mr Bashir, he was imprisoned for much of 2001-05 on conspiracy charges. After a period of freedom, he was imprisoned again in January 2009 after calling on Mr Bashir to surrender himself to the International Criminal Court. It has been alleged that Mr Turabi has links to a Darfuri rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement.

  March 04, 2009

• Structure

  Sudan: Political structure

  Sudan

  Official name

  Republic of Sudan

  Legal system

  Sharia (Islamic law) applies in both civil and criminal cases in the north—although there are some special provisions for non-Muslims

  National legislature

  Sudan has a bicameral parliament, consisting of a 450-member National Assembly (with 60% of seats elected by majority voting in geographical constituencies and 40% by proportional representation, including 25% reserved for women) and a Council of States composed of two representatives elected by each state assembly

  National elections

  April 2010 (presidential and parliamentary); next elections due 2015

  Head of state

  Omar al-Bashir, who took office following a 1989 coup and was sworn in as president in October 1993, was most recently re-elected in April 2010

  National government

  The government is dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP). Until July 2011 it was in a coalition with its former adversary in the north-south civil war, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and a few minor parties such as the Eastern Front. In December 2011 there was a cabinet reshuffle, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) being brought into government

  Main political parties

  The main northern opposition parties include the DUP, the Umma Party and the Popular Congress Party (PCP). In Darfur the main political-military groups are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the fragmented Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)

  The presidency

  President: Omar al-Bashir (NCP)

  First vice-president: Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha (NCP)

  Second vice-president: Al-Haj Adam Yousif (NCP)

  Assistants to the president:

   Nafie Ali Nafie (NCP)

   Musa Mohammed Ahmed (EF)

   Al-Sadiq al-Mirghani (DUP)

   Abdel Rahman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi

  Key ministers

  Council of ministers: Ahmed Omer Sa'ad (DUP)

  Commerce: Osman Omer al-Sharif (DUP)

  Defence: Abdel-Rahim Mohammed Hussein (NCP)

  Electricity & dams: Osama Abdullah Mohammed al-Hassan (NCP)

  Environment & forestry: Hassan Hilal (DUP)

  Finance & national economy: Ali Mahmoud Abdel-Rasool (NCP)

  Foreign affairs: Ali Ahmed Karti (NCP)

  Human resources: Abdeen Mohammed (DUP)

  International co-operation: Ishraqa Sayed (DUP)

  Interior: Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamed (NCP)

  Justice: Mohammed Bushara Dosa (NCP)

  Mining: Kamal Abdel-Latif (NCP)

  Oil: Awad Ahmed al-Jaz (NCP)

  Social welfare & insurance: Amira al-Fadil Mohammed al-Fadil (NCP)

  Youth & sports: Al-Fatih Taj al-Sir (DUP)

  Central Bank governor

  Mohammed Khair al-Zubair

  South Sudan

  Official name

  The Republic of South Sudan

  Legal system

  The south has a non-Islamic legal system

  National legislature

  South Sudan has a bicameral parliament. The lower house, the National Legislative Assembly, is made up of the members of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement era Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly and the former southern members of Sudan's National Assembly prior to South Sudan's independence. The upper house, the Council of States, is made up of the former southern members of Sudan's Council of States prior to South Sudan's independence, plus 20 members appointed by the president. An interim constitution was passed by parliament days before independence in July 2011 and is expected to serve for four years before a permanent constitution is approved at a national conference

  National elections

  The term of the National Legislative Assembly is four years from July 9th 2011

  Head of state

  Salva Kiir Mayaardit

  National government

  The government is dominated by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

  Main political parties

  The main opposition party is the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), a faction with alleged ties to the north that broke away in 2009. Other opposition parties have limited influence, including the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF)

  The presidency

  President: Salva Kiir Mayaardit

  Vice-president: Riek Machar

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & forestry: Betty Achan Ogwaro

  Cabinet affairs: Deng Alor Kuol

  Commerce, industry & investment: Garang Diing Akuong

  Culture, youth & sports: Cirino Hiteng Ofuho

  Defence & veteran affairs: John Kong Nyuon

  Environment: Alfred Lado Gore

  Finance & economic planning: Kosti Manibe Ngai

  Foreign affairs & international co-operation: Nhial Deng Nhial

  Gender, child & social welfare: Agnes Kwaje Lasuba

  General education & instruction: Ustaz Joseph Ukel Abango

  Health: Michael Milly Hussein

  Housing & physical planning: Jemma Nunu Kumba

  Information & broadcasting: Barnaba Marial Benjamin

  Interior: Alison Manani Magaya

  Justice: John Luk Jok

  Labour & public service: Awut Deng Acuil

  National security: Oyay Deng Ajak

  Parliamentary affairs: Michael Makwei Lueth

  Petroleum & mining: Stephen Dhieu Dau

  Roads & bridges: Gier Chuang Aluong

  Telecommunication & postal services: Madut Biar Yel

  Transport: Agnes Poni Lokudu

  Water resources & irrigation: Paul Mayom Akec

  Central bank governor

  Kornelio Koryom Mayiik

  December 10, 2012

• Outlook

  Sudan: Key developments

  Outlook for 2013-17

  • The National Congress Party, headed by the president, Omar al-Bashir, will maintain control in Sudan, provided that Mr Bashir's health does not deteriorate significantly.
  • The Sudan People's Liberation Movement will continue to enjoy near-total control in South Sudan, notwithstanding rumours of attempted coups. It will, however, face rebel movements and inter-tribal conflicts.
  • Although South Sudan and Sudan have reached agreement on oil transit fees, implementation is proving difficult, and a resolution of disputes over debt and the shared border is unlikely in the early part of the forecast period.
  • Sudan will suffer economically because of the loss of southern oil-75% of its reserves. Although it has announced additional budget cuts, we expect the fiscal account to return an average deficit of 3.8% of GDP in 2013-17.
  • Oil production is likely to ramp up from the first quarter of 2013, but the economic impact of the protracted shutdown will continue to be felt in both Sudan and South Sudan for some time.
  • Having absorbed the shock of the loss of both oil and population, Sudan's real GDP is expected to grow by 2.7% in 2013, with the rate improving to 5.7% in 2017.
  • We forecast that Sudanese inflation will moderate to a still high 25.6% in 2013, and decline more substantially in 2014-15, following the resumption of South Sudanese oil exports (a key source of foreign exchange for Sudan).

  Review

  • The Sudanese authorities have announced that they have foiled a "sabotage" plot and arrested a number of alleged conspirators. The government insists that a coup was not being planned.
  • Qatar has renewed its mediation efforts in Darfur, but there is little sign of rebel groups signing up to a peace deal.
  • South Sudan's president suggested that oil output was set to resume in November, but continued disputes over border areas has delayed the resumption of oil exports.
  • The IMF has renewed calls in its Article IV consultation on Sudan for increased exchange-rate flexibility and improved tax-collection efforts, although rapid progress is not guaranteed.
  • According to data from the Central Bank of Sudan, average inflation was running at 42%-double its end-2011 levels-between July and September 2012, driven by currency weakness and subsidy reductions.

  December 10, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Sudan: Economic background

  Real gross domestic product by sector
  (% share of GDP)
  	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
  Agriculture	35.4	33.7	31.9	30.6	31.0
  Industry	26.6	29.7	33.2	36.8	34.7
  Services	38.0	36.6	34.9	32.5	34.2
  Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit.

  Download text file (csv format)

  March 04, 2009

• Structure

  Sudan: Economic structure

  Data and charts: Annual trends charts

  
  

  

  December 10, 2012

• Outlook

  Sudan: Country outlook

  Sudan: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  POLITICAL STABILITY: Disagreements over many aspects of the July 2011 division of Sudan and South Sudan, notably border delineation, look set to continue. Relations between the two states deteriorated substantially in 2012, following the stoppage by South Sudan of most of its oil production in retaliation over Sudan's unilateral seizures of South Sudanese oil transported by pipeline across Sudanese territory. The fiscal pressures arising from this prolonged stoppage have forced both sides back to the negotiating table, and the two countries have agreed a series of deals, notably on the export of South Sudanese oil through Sudan and the definition of the demilitarised border zone (patrolled by the 4,000-strong UN Interim Security Force for Abyei). However, implementation of these deals is proving more difficult, with the South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir, accusing Sudan of imposing "impossible" preconditions that the south disarm the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) before oil exports resume. Other issues have also yet to be settled, including the delineation of other border areas, the future of the disputed Abyei area and whether South Sudan will take on any of Sudan's external debt. Agreement on these issues is likely to involve further delays and tensions, and is unlikely to be achieved in the short term.

  ELECTION WATCH: Sudan may be tempted to hold presidential and parliamentary elections before the south, which is also due to vote in 2015. Although Omar al-Bashir has said that he will not stand again, he may reverse this position closer to the poll, and would seem well-positioned to win again should he renege on this pledge. However, this situation could change should the health of the president-who received apparently minor medical treatment in Saudi Arabia in late 2012-deteriorate. He has responded to public protests about economic conditions by announcing that he will reshuffle the cabinet and restructure the government (by abolishing a number of ministries and merging others). Although there is little sign of this happening as yet, the pledge demonstrates the president's continued tight grip on the party that he has exercised since taking total control in 1999. In South Sudan, Mr Kiir broadened the representation of the country's ethnic groups when he reshuffled his cabinet in August 2011. Preparation for elections in 2015 will raise tensions within the SPLM, although the party is unlikely to split, and there is little sign as yet of a viable opposition group or candidate, suggesting that Mr Kiir is likely to win if, as expected, he runs again for president.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Despite Mr Bashir's hopes that he would be rewarded for allowing the south to secede, US sanctions on Sudan were renewed in November 2011, partly because of US concerns about Sudan's aggression in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The US remains a strong supporter of South Sudan, and is unlikely to lift its sanctions in the short to medium term. Relations with EU countries have been made more difficult by the International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against Mr Bashir on charges of genocide in Darfur (the EU states are members of the court, unlike the US). Western countries are primarily focused on entrenching the peaceful secession of South Sudan and preventing any return to a north-south war. However, although relations have improved to an extent following the signing of agreements on oil transport and the demilitarised border area, Sudan and South Sudan will continue the pattern of mutual destabilisation-with each government supporting the other's domestic enemies-and periodically reverting to more overt violence and direct confrontation.

  On gaining independence, South Sudan was recognised by most of the world's major states, and recognition has been followed by a slow ramping-up of international aid, particularly from the US and the EU. However, donors remain concerned about corruption and waste in South Sudan, and this has acted as a constraint on increased direct assistance. South Sudan can expect favourable relations with its southern neighbours. Uganda and Kenya, in particular, have led investment in the southern capital, Juba.

  POLICY TRENDS: As a result of the secession of the south, Sudan has lost around 75% of its productive oilfields-formerly its principal source of export income. Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), oil profits were split 50-50 between north and south, and the north sought to extract compensation for its loss of revenue by charging South Sudan US$32/barrel to use its oil pipeline, the only export route currently available to the landlocked country. An agreement reached in August appears to allow for an average payment of US$9.48/barrel, as well as a one-off compensation payment by South Sudan of just over US$3bn in "transitional financial assistance". Implementation of the oil agreement has stalled amid disputes over deals on the removal of troops from the border area-a precondition for the resumption of exports-and substantial exports are unlikely to resume until early 2013. Indeed, according to the Sudanese finance minister, Ali Mahmood, the 2013 budget will not include earnings from South Sudanese oil until its exportation actually resumes and figures can be calculated "with a degree of certainty".

  Weakened by years of violence and underinvestment, South Sudan's economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue, which traditionally accounts for 98% of government income (excluding aid) and 71% of GDP, according to the draft budget for fiscal year 2012/13 (July-June). The protracted suspension of oil production-initial output of 180,000 barrels/day is likely by early 2013-is thus having an increasingly serious impact, and the government is planning to cut expenditure on areas including civil-service funding, while seeking to secure loans (including a fresh US$200m credit line from Qatar National Bank) and to sell oil and mining concessions. Nonetheless, resumed trade with the north will also be essential. The new state will make progress in developing the legal and regulatory frameworks for the economy and will have some limited success in attracting foreign investment, while some companies will be tempted by the opportunity to gain a first-mover advantage in Africa's newest state. South Sudan may also benefit from new international loans and grants; the IMF's announcement in September 2012 that South Sudan was eligible for concessional lending is an encouraging development in this respect. However, there are ongoing concerns about the inexperience of the civil service, as well as mismanagement and corruption, and these could complicate access to funding. Improvements in monetary and fiscal policy will depend heavily on technical assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that real GDP will have contracted by 7.6% in 2012, reflecting both the full economic cost of the south's secession and the prolonged stoppage of South Sudanese oil exports. With oil production dropping to around 135,000 barrels/day (b/d), government consumption will have declined, with a knock-on effect on private consumption, given the size of the public-sector workforce (which is in any event under potential threat given the stated aim of reducing the size of the state by 45%). Private investment could also be affected by a lack of financing and concerns over the political risks facing Mr Bashir's regime. Having absorbed the shock of the loss of oil and an estimated 20% of its population following secession, the economy is expected to grow by an annual average of 2.7% in 2013-14, before picking up to an average of 5.2% in 2016-17, as the disruption of southern secession fades and government consumption and investment spending return following the end of the three-year austerity programme.

  Although South Sudan produced its first ever GDP data in mid-2012-showing that the economy grew by 25.9% in 2010/11-accurate GDP figures remain difficult to ascertain, owing to the country's large informal sector, the lack of data covering trade with Sudan (traditionally one of its largest trading partners) and poor data-collection capacity. However, it is clear that South Sudan's economic growth is inextricably linked to the oil sector, and the prolonged shutdown of production is likely to have had a serious impact in 2012. Thus we estimate that South Sudan's real GDP will have fallen by 55% in 2012, because of the cessation of oil production. In 2013, however, it should bounce back, expanding by more than 65% as oil exports resume. The economy will be boosted by increased grants and foreign investment, although donors' ongoing concerns about corruption could act as a constraint, and any return to outright conflict would lead to a sharp fall in such flows. Regional companies, mostly from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, will lead investment in construction, manufacturing, consumer goods, power and telecommunications, centred almost entirely on Juba, far from any conflict areas. However, a durable peace with Sudan is crucial if South Sudan is to realise its economic potential.

  INFLATION: Inflationary pressure in Sudan remains strong, in part reflecting the impact of a weakening Sudanese pound on the import bill and high energy costs. In addition, food price inflation has tended to spike in response to concerns about political risk, with consumers seeking to stock up on staples when tensions with the south are particularly strong. According to the CBS, annualised inflation averaged 42% between July and September-more than double the end-2011 level, and far above the bank's normal target inflation rate of around 10%-and we estimate that these factors will have pushed average annual inflation up to 32.1% in 2012, exceeding by a significant margin the CBS's target for the year of 17%. Inflation is likely to remain elevated in 2013, at 25.6%, but should average around 12% a year in 2014-17, provided that the Central Bank is allowed to take steps to contain and subsequently reduce the monetisation of the fiscal deficit.

  South Sudan's government released its first consumer price figures in October 2011. Price rises reached a reported 80% year on year in May, but subsequently moderated, falling to 21.5% in October, according to official data. However, there is speculation that the official figures are understating the true level of price increases, with price pressures proving particularly intense in northern border areas such as Malakal, where traditional supply routes from Sudan have been seriously disrupted. The upsurge in inflation is being partly driven by exchange-rate weakness, reflecting in turn the ongoing stoppage of oil production as well as concerns about increased political risk. With oil supplies due to ramp up from early 2013, inflation should decline to 25% in 2013 as global food commodity prices soften, and the ongoing downward movement in global food prices should help to sustain this trend in 2014-15.

  EXCHANGE RATES: In mid-2012 the Central Bank of Sudan (CBS) announced that exchange bureaus would be able to set their own rates-in effect allowing the commercial rate to float and accepting a de facto devaluation of the Sudanese pound after months of mounting pressure on the currency. Four main exchange rates are currently in operation: a "central" rate of SDG4.42:US$1 that applies chiefly to the importation of fuel products and the payment of government obligations; a subsidised rate of SDG2.9:US$1, used for wheat; a gold exchange rate used by the CBS in its gold transactions; and a commercial bank rate. Having previously used the subsidised and central rates, we are now using the commercial rate. US dollars have remained scarce, and the local currency remains under pressure amid concerns that a rapid resumption of South Sudanese oil exports, and thus a resumption of oil export fees for Sudan, is unlikely. The fact that revenue from the export of oil has not been built in to the 2013 budget has underscored this and suggests that the currency will remain under pressure in the first half of 2013 at least, although the resumption of large-scale South Sudanese oil exports should help to bolster the pound in the second half of the year. Overall we expect the commercial rate to depreciate to an average of SDG5.78:US$1 in 2013, and to around SDG6.31:US$1 by the end of the forecast period.

  The Central Bank of Southern Sudan operates a managed float of its currency, the South Sudanese pound, which was initially intended to have parity to the Sudanese pound. The Central Bank's ability to defend the currency is questionable, and "options" for harmonising the official and parallel-market exchange rates are to be discussed. If followed through, this is also likely to involve some form of devaluation. The prolonged shutdown of oil production has had a negative effect, and this is likely to persist into the early part of the forecast period. Thus the market rate of the South Sudanese pound is likely to remain around SSP4-5:US$1 in 2013, although the subsidised rate will continue to be maintained for many transactions. The official rate is currently SSP2.7:US$1.

  EXTERNAL SECTOR: In Sudan, we expect demand for imports to tick back up after a sharp drop in 2012 owing to the post-secession fall in population and declines in government spending and private consumption. However, this will be gradual: thus the import bill is expected to rise from an annual average of US$7bn in 2013-14 to US$7.8bn in 2017, as the strengthening economy draws in increased capital inputs and consumer goods. With exports having been pushed down by the loss of southern oilfields, and with measures to broaden the country's export base taking time to implement, we expect the trade balance to remain in deficit for the whole of the forecast period, reaching US$2.9bn in 2017 (compared with a surplus of US$1.5bn in 2011). We estimate that the current account, having recorded an estimated surplus of US$208m in 2011, will have registered a shortfall of US$3.5bn (8.3% of GDP) in 2012. However, the current account will benefit from lower repatriation of profits by foreign oil companies, as well as a reduction in services debits. Assuming that the agreement reached between north and south on transit fees for southern oil is durable, providing a boost to services credits, as well as a steady pick-up in imports financed by transit fees, the current-account deficit is expected to widen from US$2.2bn in 2013 to US$2.6bn in 2017.

  Although South Sudan's domestic demand for oil is modest (providing more for export), the shutdown of oil production had a dramatic effect on the trade balance, taking it and the current account into deficit in 2012. However, in 2013, with oil exports recovering, current transfers credits rising (on the back of higher aid inflows) and the agricultural sector beginning to realise its potential (which will reduce dependence on food imports), we expect the current account to move back into surplus.

  December 01, 2012

• Forecast

  Sudan: 5-year forecast summary

  Outlook for 2013-17: Forecast summary

  Forecast summary
  (% unless otherwise indicated)
  	2012a	2013b	2014b	2015b	2016b	2017b
  Real GDP growth	-7.6	2.7	2.7	4.1	4.7	5.7
  Oil production ('000 b/d)	135.0	142.0	143.0	145.0	146.0	147.0
  Crude oil exports (US$ m)	1,887	1,756	1,624	1,590	1,552	1,609
  Consumer price inflation (av)	32.1	25.6	11.4	11.1	12.0	14.9
  Government balance (% of GDP)	-8.7	-4.0	-2.9	-3.2	-3.5	-3.7
  Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.9
  Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)	6.6	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.5	7.8
  Current-account balance (US$ bn)	-3.6	-2.2	-2.2	-2.3	-2.4	-2.6
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-8.4	-5.9	-5.2	-4.7	-4.3	-4.0
  External debt (year-end; US$ bn)	39.7	41.1	42.6	44.1	45.6	47.5
  Exchange rate SDG:US$ (av)	4.09	5.78	5.83	6.04	6.09	6.31
  Exchange rate SDG:¥100 (av)	4.66	7.25	7.35	7.28	6.61	6.90
  Exchange rate SDG:€ (av)	5.43	8.05	7.45	7.63	7.67	7.94
  Exchange rate SDG:SDR (av)	6.27	9.20	8.97	9.18	9.14	9.47
  Note. Data up to June 2011 are for the united country (Sudan and South Sudan); those from July 2011 onwards are for Sudan only. Sudan lost 20% of its population and 75% of its oil after the secession of South Sudan in July 2011.
  a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  South Sudan: forecast summary
  		2012a	2013b	2014b
  Oil production ('000 b/d)		40.0	300.0	328.0
  Consumer price inflation (av)		65.0	25.0	15.0
  Crude oil exports (US$ m)		1,102	10,280	10,362
  Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)		1.3	10.3	10.5
  Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)		2.1	2.8	3.7
  a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  November 21, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Sudan

Land area

1.9m sq km

Population

35m (mid-2011, Economist Intelligence Unit estimate)

Main towns

Population in '000; 2012 calculations from World Gazetteer

Khartoum (capital): 2,682

El Obeid: 408

Omdurman: 2,805

Wad Medani: 370

Kassala: 510

Gedaref: 355

Climate

Hot and dry in September-May; rainy season from April/May to September/October depending on latitude (average annual rainfall 100 mm)

Weather in Khartoum (altitude 390 metres)

Hottest month, May, 26-42°C; coldest month, January, 16-32°C; driest months, January-April, usually no rainfall; wettest month, August, 72 mm average rainfall (average annual rainfall 200 mm)

Languages

Arabic and English are official languages. There are also over 70 tribal languages, of which several are each spoken by more than 100,000 people

Measures

Metric system. Some local measures are also used:

1 diraa = 58 cm; 1 feddan = 0.39 ha; 12 keilas = 1 arde = 1.98 hl

Currency

In 2007 the Sudanese pound replaced the Sudanese dinar as the national currency at a value of SDG1=SD100. The pound is made up of 100 qirush/piaster

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Independence Day (January 1st); Coptic Christmas (January 7th); Peace Agreement Day (January 9th); the Prophet's birthday (February 4th 2012); Coptic Easter (April 15th 2012); Labour Day (May 5th); Revolution Day (June 30th); Eid al-Fitr (August 19th 2012); Eid al-Adha (October 26th 2012); Islamic New Year (November 15th 2012); Christmas Day (December 25th)

The dates of the Islamic festivals are uncertain because they depend on the actual sighting of the moon

South Sudan

Land area

644,329 sq km

Population

8.26m (2008 census)

Capital

Juba (population 250,000, UN estimate 2006)

States

Population in '000; 2008 census

Jonglei: 1,359

Northern Bahr el-Ghazal: 721

Central Equatoria: 1,104

Lakes: 696

Warap: 973

Western Equatoria: 619

Upper Nile: 964

Unity: 586

Eastern Equatoria: 906

Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 333

Climate

Rainy season from April to October (average annual rainfall 1,000 mm)

Weather in Juba (altitude 550 metres)

Hottest month, March, 24-38°C; coldest month, July, 21-31°C; driest months, December-February, 8mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 145 mm average rainfall (average annual rainfall 954 mm)

Languages

The official languages are English and Arabic. There are an estimated 200 different ethnic groups, many with their own tribal languages. The most widely spoken of these are Dinka (spoken by 2-3m), Nuer, Shilluk, Zande, Bari, Ubangian and Otuho

Measures

Metric system. Some local measures are also used:

1 diraa = 58 cm; 1 feddan = 0.39 ha; 12 keilas = 1 arde = 1.98 hl

Currency

A new currency, the South Sudanese pound was launched in July 2011. The South Sudanese pound was to be fixed to the Sudanese pound, but it has since depegged

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Independence Day (July 9th); Martyrs Day (30th July); Constitution Anniversary (December 5th); Christmas Day (December 25th)

March 23, 2012