Mali

Politics:

• Analysis

  Mali politics: Quick View - MNLA sets up checkpoints in Kidal

  Event

  The Tuareg separatist Mouvement national de liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA) appears to be attempting to exert a level of autonomy by setting up a system of security passes around Kidal.

  Analysis

  Having renounced claims for independence for the north of Mali in mid-2012, the MNLA's reported move to issue security documents stamped in the name of the Azawad Republic is a de facto assertion of autonomy. It could furthermore complicate-if not undermine-its working relationship with both France and the Malian government, as well as stoking ethnic tension in the region.

  Moussa Ag Assarid, the rebels' representative in Europe, has stated that in light of recent suicide bombings, the documents will aid the identification of potential terrorists, drug-traffickers and ordinary drivers. In order not to upset the delicate arrangement with the MNLA, Malian troops have not entered Kidal since expelling the Islamists, leaving a vacuum that the MNLA has filled. The latter has promised to take responsibility for the region's security until negotiations establish the region's status.

  The interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, wary of the military alliance with the MNLA, has ruled out the option of creating a federal state. With the MNLA refusing to lay down arms ahead of any talks, the latest action is particularly provocative. Despite the MNLA having played the political alliance carefully so far, the latest move could see it overplaying its hand. While the MNLA commands greater regional support than did the Islamist groups, premature acts to assert autonomy will only antagonise the non-Tuareg peoples of the region. (It is not even clear to what extent it represents and has the support of the wider Tuareg community.) Alternatively, this could simply be a strategy to establish a stronger bargaining position ahead of eventual negotiations.

  The MNLA led the seizure of northern Mali in April 2012, but was sidelined by its erstwhile Islamist allies before renouncing claims for independence. As initial plans for a foreign-led force took shape in late 2012, the MNLA distanced itself further from the Islamist camp by declaring its willingness to support such a campaign. Indeed, the MNLA has fought alongside the French since their forced intervention in January, albeit to the consternation of the authorities in the capital, Bamako.

  March 18, 2013

• Background

  Mali: Key figures

  Amadou Toumani Toure

  Re-elected president in April 2007, he has been a popular figure since he headed the 1991-92 transitional government that ushered in the era of multiparty politics. He is respected internationally for his mediation role in regional conflicts. A strong proponent of a consensual approach to politics, he has been criticised for his failure to consult parliament on important issues and for appointing allies to major cabinet positions.

  Modibo Sidibe

  Prime minister since a cabinet reshuffle in September 2007, Mr Sidibe has held several ministerial posts as well as being Mr Toure's secretary of the presidency since 2002. His main role will be to ensure that Mr Toure's economic development programme is efficiently implemented. If successful, it could strengthen his position as a future presidential candidate.

  Dioncounda Traore

  Elected speaker of the National Assembly in September 2007, he became president of Mali's leading party, Adema, in 2000. His support is crucial for the passing of legislation.

  Ibrahim Boubacar Keita

  A former prime minister, he left Adema in 2001 to form the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM). He came third in the 2002 presidential election and was runner-up in the 2007 poll. Although he remains the leading figure in the opposition, his position has been damaged by his party's poor showing in the 2007 legislative election.

  Soumaila Cisse

  Adema's candidate in the 2002 presidential election, he lost in the second round to Mr Toure. He left Adema in 2003 to create a new party, Union pour la Republique et la democratie (URD). His position has become more prominent as the URD emerged as the second-largest political force in the 2007 legislative election.

  Ibrahim Ag Bahanga

  A Tuareg, he has re-ignited the rebellion in the Kidal region and can count on the support of at least 300 well-armed men. It is widely believed that his demand to reduce the army presence in the region is driven by the benefits he derives from controlling large-scale smuggling operations across the Sahara Desert.

  The judiciary

  The Malian constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and a Constitutional Court came into operation in 1994. Political interference in the work of judiciary is not as rife as in other Sub-Saharan African countries, although corruption is widespread in the courts. The sector suffers from a lack of trained judges and lawyers, which significantly constrains the capacity of the judiciary to act as an effective upholder of the law.

  The legislature

  The system is semi-presidential, in that the prime minister, who is the head of government, is accountable to the 147-member National Assembly (parliament). The president, who is elected every five years and is restricted to two consecutive terms, nominates the prime minister and can dissolve parliament. Although the National Assembly could play a strong role in monitoring the work of the executive, the consensual nature of politics in Mali acts against this.

  The media

  The advent of multiparty democracy was followed by a proliferation of print media. However, most of the country's newspapers and magazines are highly partisan and their quality is variable. Newspapers have relatively high cover prices and suffer from poor distribution outside Bamako. The Office de radiodiffusion et television du Mali (ORTM), the former state broadcasting monopoly, now has autonomous status, but its television broadcasts have been accused of pro-government bias. Several independent FM radio stations have substantial audiences. According to Freedom of the Press 2006, a report published by a US non-governmental organisation, Freedom House, Mali is ranked 56th of 195 countries, the second-highest African ranking, and its press is considered free.

  Democracy index (for methodology, see Appendix)

  The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2008 democracy index ranks Mali 83rd of 167 countries, putting it among those considered “flawed democracies”. This is significantly better than most other countries in West Africa, which have either a lower score or are considered authoritarian regimes. Mali's strong regional position is supported by an open electoral process and a moderate respect for civil liberties. However, the country's democratisation process is constrained by a very low political participation—electoral turnouts are barely above 35%—mostly reflecting high illiteracy levels.

  Democracy index
  	Overall score	Overall rank	Electoral process	Government functioning	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Regime type
  Mali	5.87	83	8.25	5.71	3.89	5.63	5.88	Flawed democracy
  Overall and component scores are on a scale of 0 to 10; overall rank is out of 167 countries.

  Download text file (csv format)

  June 03, 2008

• Structure

  Mali: Political structure

  Official name

  République du Mali

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  A new constitution was approved by referendum in January 1992

  National legislature

  National Assembly; 147 members elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term

  Head of state

  President, ordinarily elected by universal suffrage; interim head of state has been appointed

  National elections

  April 2007 (presidential) and July 2007 (legislative); following a coup, the interim administration was to have held presidential and legislative elections by May 2012, but this did not happen; the AU has now set out plans for them to be held by April 2013

  National government

  The president appoints the prime minister, who appoints the rest of the Council of Ministers; the interim prime minister, appointed in April 2012, named a new cabinet composed mainly of technocrats, plus three junta officers

  Main political parties

  The following parties are some of those represented in parliament: Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali Parti pan-africain pour la liberté, la solidarité et la justice (Adema-PASJ); Union pour la République et la démocratie (URD); Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM); Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau (MPR); Congrès national d'initiative démocratique (CNID); Parti pour la renaissance nationale (Parena; opposition); Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance (SADI; opposition); Union pour la démocratie et le développement (UDD); Mouvement pour l'indépendance, le renouveau et l'intégration africaine (MIRIA); Parti soudanais progressiste (PSP); Bloc des alternances pour la renaissance, l'intégration et la coopération africaine (BARICA); Parti pour le développement économique et social (PDES)

  Key ministers

  Interim president: Dioncounda Traoré

  Prime minister: Cheikh Modibo Diarra

  Agriculture, livestock, fisheries: Moussa Léo Sidibé

  Communication, post, & new technologies: Hamoudoun Touré

  Crafts, culture & tourism: Fadima Touré Diallo

  Defence & veterans' affairs: Colonel-Major Yamoussa Camara

  Economy, finance & budget : Tiéna Coulibaly

  Education, literacy & national languages: Adama Ouane

  Energy, water & environment: Ali Bocar Nafo

  Foreign affairs & international co-operation: Sadio Lamine Sow

  Health: Soumana Makadji

  Humanitarian action, solidarity & the elderly: Mamadou Sidibé

  Infrastructure, transport, housing, & urban affairs: Mamadou Coulibaly

  Internal security & civil protection: General Tiéfing Konaté

  Justice: Malick Coulibaly

  Public service, governance, administrative & political reform: Mamoudou Namory Traoré

  Regional administration, decentralisation & regional development: Colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly

  Trade, mines & industry: Ahmadou Touré

  Youth, labour, employment & training: Mamadou Diakité

  Governor of the regional central bank (BCEAO)

  Koné Tiémoko Meyliet

  November 07, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Mali: Economic background

  Economic structure: GDP by sector
  (% share of GDP)
  	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
  Primary sector	35.0	29.9	35.3	34.2	34.8
  Secondary sector	25.6	37.7	33.0	26.0	27.2
  Tertiary sector	39.4	32.3	31.7	39.8	38.1
  Source: Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'ouest, Perspectives economiques des Etats de l'UEMOA en 2007.

  Download text file (csv format)

  June 03, 2008

• Structure

  Mali: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)	3,906.0	4,248.0	4,582.0b	5,338.5	5,747.6
  GDP (US$ bn)	8.7	9.0	9.3b	11.3	11.2
  Real GDP growth (%)	4.9	4.3	5.8b	2.7	-3.0
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	9.2	2.2	1.1	2.9a	7.0
  Population (m)	14.5	14.9	15.4	15.8a	16.3
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	2,097.2	1,773.7	2,055.6	2,454.7	2,716.7
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	2,732.9	1,986.3	2,730.7	3,026.0	2,931.6
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-1,063.4	-654.9	-1,190.0	-1,310.7	-870.1
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	1,071.6	1,604.5	1,344.4	1,378.6a	1,983.4
  Exchange rate CFAfr:US$ (av)	447.8	472.2	495.3	471.9a	511.0
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2007a	% of total
  Agriculture	36.6	Private consumption	76.8
  Industry	23.2	Government consumption	10.3
  Services	10.2	Gross domestic investment	22.4
  		Exports of goods & services	26.2
  		Imports of goods & services	-35.6
  Principal exports 2010a	US$ m	Principal imports 2010a	US$ m
  Gold	1,488.7	Capital goods	616.4
  Cotton	150.6	Petroleum products	712.1
  Livestock	89.24	Food	399.2
  Main destinations of exports 2011b	% of total	Main origins of imports 2011b	% of total
  China	31.0	Senegal	19.7
  South Korea	14.5	France	15.4
  Indonesia	12.2	China	10.8
  Thailand	6.3	Côte d'Ivoire	8.4
  Bangladesh	5.0	South Africa	4.0
  a Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale official estimates. b Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  November 07, 2012

• Outlook

  Mali: Country outlook

  Mali: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: Following the loss of the north to rebel Tuareg and Islamist groups and a coup on March 22nd, restoring security, retaking the lost territory and holding elections within a year will dominate Malian politics. A military option is under discussion but the politics in Bamako (the capital) will remain fractious, undermining its effectiveness and that of the transition process. Real GDP will rebound modestly in 2013 after contracting in 2012. Mining will remain largely unaffected, but public spending has been slashed. With better harvests and security, the Economist Intelligence Unit sees growth accelerating to 5.9% in 2014. The interim government has slashed revenue and spending projections given the security context. The deficit should narrow to an average of 0.8% of GDP in the 2013-14 forecast period. As a result of elevated gold prices and higher output, as well as weak consumer import demand, the current-account deficit will narrow to 4.7% of GDP in 2013, before higher import prices widen it to 6.3% of GDP in 2014.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Significant uncertainty still hangs over Mali's political and economic future after the dramatic events of March-April 2012, which saw Tuareg and jihadi Islamist rebels take control of the northern half of the country, following the deposition of the president, Amadou Toumani Touré, by mutinous soldiers. After mediation by Burkina Faso's president, Blaise Compaoré-acting under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-the soldiers relinquished formal authority to an interim administration headed by the speaker of parliament, Dioncounda Traoré. The rebels have halted their advance and some humanitarian aid has now reached the north, where 268,000 people have fled their homes. Economic activity has been severely disrupted, and the country's credibility with foreign investors and appeal to tourists have been profoundly undermined. On April 30th an attempted counter-coup by troops loyal to Mr Touré was repelled, and following an attack on Mr Traoré in May, day-to-day leadership briefly passed to the prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, a respected scientist. That said, the putschist soldiers, headed by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, continue to flex their muscles, staging arrests and retaining control of the national radio and television station. The interim government is not well placed to exert pressure on the military to accept a more limited role and submit fully to civilian government authority. Indeed, the junta's Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l'Etat (CNRDRE) lives on despite the military's formal handover of power, and political allies of the junta have now established a political movement, Mouvement national pour le soutien au CNRDRE, which aims to maintain popular support for the soldiers and even an entry into politics by Captain Sanogo. The agreement restoring constitutional rule, brokered by ECOWAS, provided for a 40-day interim administration, but the deadline has been extended to April 2013. This also gives time to pursue both a military campaign in the north and negotiations with the Tuareg rebels of Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and the jihadis of Ansar Dine. Restoring national unity and a measure of stability will depend as much on political progress in Bamako as it will on reaching agreements with the MNLA and Ansar Dine. Although both groups are well armed, the government's position has been strengthened by the fact that the erstwhile allies have turned on each other, with Ansar Dine displacing the MNLA from Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. Ousted by Ansar Dine and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and with the possibility of a military campaign taking shape, the MNLA has offered to join the government against the Islamists. The chances of jihadi elements simply dissolving or leaving the country seem remote given the harder line taken by neighbouring Mauritania, Algeria and Niger. A foreign military intervention-long blocked by the putchists in Bamako-has now been approved by the African Union (AU) and the UN, and plans are being drawn up, with France, the US and the EU to provide logistical and intelligence support to an ECOWAS/Malian force. Should the return to full constitutional rule stay on course, the former presidential front-runner, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta of Rassemblement pour le Mali, is a strong presidential contender, as Mr Traoré, Mr Diarra and Captain Sanogo are expected to adhere to their constitutional ban on contesting the race.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: External partners will have a critical role to play, and not only in providing practical support. France, the EU and the US have now promised logistical and intelligence support for a government/ECOWAS military operation. Maintaining good relations with Algeria and Libya has been crucial for the consolidation of security in the north-eastern regions, as both have influence over different Tuareg factions. Mali's government will also continue to court Libya's National Transitional Council in order not to lose the investment that came with good relations with the deposed Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. The Islamist threat will also lead to increased collaboration with Mauritania and Niger in the fight against AQIM in the region, although the junta's initial refusal to countenance a non-Malian military campaign upset regional neighbours and delayed the drawing-up of plans. The struggle against AQIM will reinforce Mali's relations with the US, which no longer denies its military presence in the country and has given its support to a new regional task-force. Mali will remain a key element in the US government's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and the country will continue to rely on US assistance to monitor and counter the armed Islamist threat in the north. Taking full advantage of new mining opportunities in Mali will depend on the maintenance of good relations with Senegal, given the importance of Dakar port to exports. Mali was re-admitted into the AU in October.

  POLICY TRENDS: The new interim government will focus on addressing the security situation in the north, while also tending to growth and macroeconomic stability. The administration is unlikely to deviate from the policy of its predecessor, focusing on the immediate challenge of restoring basic fiscal stability to the state accounts and freeing up extra funds to ensure that the military are better resourced and paid on time; the administration will also need to ensure the reliable payment of other public-sector salaries and the continuation of core public services. The second major challenge will be the delivery of humanitarian relief to rebel-controlled areas. Much of the domestic economy, and the resulting collection of state revenue, could function to a degree as envisaged in the original IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme, as the north represents only a minor part of the total economy. Given the current situation, privatisation and attracting foreign investment are highly unlikely at present. Despite fiscal pressures, the campaign to boost further the production of cereals through input subsidies will be maintained, with the government talking ambitiously of a 30% rise in output over just two or three years. The focus on grain production may appear to be a narrow, specific goal but it has a potentially broad impact, as the government hopes to make Mali self-sufficient in basic food supply, shielding the population from future world food price volatility. Mali's US$46m ECF was approved in December 2011 and will run until the end of 2014, but progress is likely to be severely disrupted. The new ECF includes some significant innovations, most notably a focus on mobilising resources for infrastructure improvements, in an attempt to stimulate higher rates of growth and job creation, as well as an agreement that the country could seek to raise a limited amount of non-concessional finance for infrastructure projects that can deliver a clear economic return. Furthermore, the interim and possibly future permanent administration will have to continue reforms of the revenue system to ensure that it makes the most of its domestic resource potential first. Infrastructure investment will continue to be donor-funded.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: After already posting weak growth in 2011 (estimated at 2.7%), real GDP is expected to have contracted by 3% in 2012 because of the upheaval in the country destroying the tourism industry and causing public spending to be slashed. Tourism will remain weak in 2013-14, but public spending is expected to rise and other drivers of the economy will improve, given that they are largely in the secure south. High international prices will support rising gold output, as well as the development of new mining projects and the extension of activity in existing mines (even if such operations remain in long-term decline). New iron ore and other non-gold mining projects could still come on stream, although new oil exploration activity in the unstable north has been halted. However, the agricultural sector (accounting for more than one-third of GDP), which was a further drag on growth in 2012 as a result of the failed rains in 2011, will improve in 2013-14-provided there are more favourable weather conditions. Construction, one of the main drivers of growth as increased donor funds help the government to step up public infrastructure investment, will pause because of cuts to capital expenditure. Given the negative impact of the security situation on the tourism sector, public spending and Mali's reputation as a stable destination for foreign investors, we expect only a modest rebound in real GDP growth in 2013, despite mining remaining largely unaffected. This will accelerate in 2014 to 5.9%, assuming an improvement in the security situation and agricultural output. Downside risks stem from the possibility of a recession in the euro zone, as well as protracted insecurity in Mali's main tourism areas. As a result of the disastrously poor rains on the 2011/12 harvest (October-September), severe disruption due to the security situation and a weaker euro-pegged CFA franc, average inflation is estimated to have risen from 2.9% in 2011 to 7% in 2012. Ongoing agricultural uncertainty and lower output due to less planting this year will see inflation remaining elevated in 2013, albeit slightly lower at 6%. It should ease further in 2014 to 4.6%. These forecasts assume favourable growing conditions and normal food production-the main factor determining inflation-as well as a break-up of the euro zone being averted.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: With gold production and prices rising, exports-dominated by the metal-are forecast to continue to rise, from an estimated US$2.7bn in 2012 to US$3.2bn in 2013, supported by new iron ore exports. The 2011/12 cotton season was very successful, but the positive impact has been undermined by the sharp retraction in global cotton prices and the government transferring resources to the security situation. Output will continue to rise in 2013-14, along with global prices. Increased gold production will be boosted by higher prices in 2013, but will then be undermined in 2014 as prices fall, with total goods exports remaining broadly stagnant. Imports will rise much more slowly than exports, as global commodity prices ease, domestic demand contracts (especially as the government has slashed its budgets) and agricultural output rebounds, despite the upward pressure from greater humanitarian and defence spending. The trade balance is expected to post a surplus of US$171m in 2013, tipping back into a small deficit of US$19m in 2014. Service imports will remain broadly unchanged because of stagnant imports, mainly reflecting transport costs for imports and mining-related services; however, receipts will be decimated by the collapse in tourism as a result of instability. As profits increase for foreign-owned mining companies, income repatriation will follow suit to widen the income deficit. The transfers surplus, however, will widen in 2013-14, despite pressure on remittances, as donors maintain high levels of financial support. Overall, we forecast that the current-account deficit, having fallen to an estimated 7.7% of GDP in 2012, will narrow further in 2013, to 4.7% of GDP, before widening again in 2014, to 6.3% of GDP.

  November 07, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

1,240,190 sq km

Population

15.8m (2011 IMF estimates)

Main towns

Population in 2012 (World Gazetteer estimates):

Bamako (capital): 1,926,748

Sikasso: 213,977

Kayes: 148,053

Mopti: 105,646

Ségou: 104,992

Climate

Mostly hot and dry; semi-tropical in the far south

Weather in Bamako (altitude 340 metres)

Hottest month, April, 34-39°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, 16-33°C; driest months, December-January, zero rainfall; wettest month, August, 220 mm average rainfall

Languages

French, Bambara, Fulfuldé, Songhai and Tamasheq

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr); CFAfr100:FFr1; since January 1st 1999 the CFA franc has been fixed to the euro at CFAfr656:EUR1

Financial year

January-December

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed holidays: New Year's Day (January 1st), Army Day (January 20th), Martyrs' Day (March 26th), Labour Day (May 1st), African Freedom Day (May 25th), Republic Day (September 22nd), Christmas (December 25th)

Moveable holidays (according to Christian and Muslim calendars): Easter Monday (April 1st), Prophet's birthday (January 24th), Eid al-Fitr (August 8th), Tabaski (Eid al-Adha, October 15th)

February 01, 2013