North Korea

Politics:

• Analysis

  North Korea politics: Beaming

  North Korea politics: Beaming

  Kim Jong Un's pyrotechnics, although alarming for the world, are driven chiefly by domestic considerations

  THE boyish dictator of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, is showing a liking for publicity stunts, albeit defiant and dangerous ones. On December 12th his regime caught most people off-guard by firing a rocket into space and apparently putting a rudimentary satellite into orbit. For the tinpot state, it was a first.

  The launch came less than a week before the first anniversary of the death of his rocket-loving father, Kim Jong Il. The timing suggests that the chief aim was to solidify the young Mr Kim's leadership clique within the regime, as well as his popularity among an oppressed citizenry. But as is the habit with North Korea, the launch also reverberated internationally.

  Sending a satellite into orbit requires much of the same technology as firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with an equivalent payload at, say, America--once re-entry expertise and accuracy have been mastered. So the success represents big progress in North Korea's missile programme. It also raises the stakes in dealings with the recalcitrant regime, at a time of new administrations in America and China and just before elections in Japan (December 16th) and South Korea (December 19th). In South Korea's presidential election, both main candidates had been talking of engaging with the North after a prolonged and tense stand-off under the outgoing president, Lee Myung-bak. Mr Kim's provocative behaviour undermines the goodwill. In Japan, regional security is already a campaign issue. The rocket will reinforce a hawkish mood.

  Both South Korea and Japan swiftly condemned the launch. America called it "a highly provocative act" that violated United Nations resolutions barring the nuclear-armed regime from carrying out ballistic-missile activities. The three countries had put pressure on North Korea beforehand to abandon its plans. Even China, the regime's strongest backer, had expressed concern about the violation of UN obligations. It maintains that the North has the right to a "space programme". But afterwards it expressed its "regret" over the rocket launch.

  As The Economist went to press, it was unclear how strongly the UN would react. In April, when the new Kim regime conducted a failed rocket launch in defiance of international opposition, the UN Security Council issued a "presidential statement" condemning the action, strengthening sanctions on the regime and warning of further measures if another launch were conducted. However, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, appears concerned that too much pressure on the North Koreans might provoke them into staging a third nuclear test. China's priority is stability: it would rather have a nuclear North Korea than an imploding one. Possibly, it sees the North's denuclearisation as unrealisable. For all that, a significant, if minority, group of Chinese experts believes that the North Koreans are troublemakers and that China should ditch them.

  Some analysts think that the timing of the launch, just before the end-of-the-year holidays, may soften some of its negative international impact. A new South Korean government next year may still look for ways to re-engage the North and wave before it inducements to pursue reforms. "This is good timing for North Korea. There are two weeks for governments to make a fuss, and then the new year provides everyone with a chance to move on, both psychologically and politically," says Narushige Michishita of the Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.

  Beforehand, news of the proposed launch was kept from North Koreans (though not the world), possibly because of the embarrassment that ensued in April, when a much-heralded rocket launch flopped. This time, success was broadcast with fanfare. A presenter dressed in pink robes triumphantly barked out the news of the rocket's mission.

  In Pyongyang, Kyodo, a Japanese news agency, reported elation tinged with surprise. Certainly the people were ecstatic. "I just don't know how to express my joy about the news," a waitress gushed. "I cannot imagine how happy [the late] General Secretary Kim Jong Il will be after hearing this wonderful news." Even if this were genuinely felt, it is hard to imagine any other response.

  Although North Korea had announced its space plans to the outside world, the actual news of the launch was unexpected when it came. Only days before, North Korea had extended the time frame for the rocket's take-off because of unexplained glitches. On December 11th what now look like erroneous reports from South Korea had said that the Unha-3 rocket was being dismantled at the Sohae space station north-west of the capital. There may have been some wishful thinking involved. Tacitly, the rival countries have engaged in a space race ever since the North unsuccessfully sought to launch its first rocket in 1998. Only last month, tech-savvy South Korea failed in its third attempt to put a satellite into orbit, partly because of faulty Russian technology.

  Yet North Korea's crowing should be put into perspective. Even with a satellite in space, experts say it is likely to be able to send only the grainiest of video images back to Pyongyang. Those pictures may simply confirm what much of the outside world already knows: that the country is so deprived of electricity that from space it is pitch-black at night, compared with the brilliant glow across South Korea, Japan and much of China.

  December 15, 2012

• Background

  North Korea: Key figures

  Kim Jong-il

  Kim Il-sung's son and heir, he is general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC) and commander-in-chief of the Korean People's Army (KPA, the armed forces).

  Kim Yong-nam

  As president of the Supreme People's Assembly presidium and a former foreign minister, he is seen in public more often than Kim Jong-il and is the titular head of state.

  Cho Myong-rok

  Vice-marshal, army political director and first vice-chairman of the NDC, Cho Myong-rok is the most powerful military figure in North Korea. He may be seriously ill.

  Chang Song-taek

  Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and his principal confidant until reportedly purged in late 2003. He re-emerged in late 2005.

  Kim Yong-il

  Replaced Pak Pong-ju as prime minister in April 2007. Previously a long-serving minister for transport, with a bureaucratic and military background.

  Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-chul and Kim Jong-woon

  Kim Jong-il's three known sons, by two different mothers (both now deceased), are believed to be fierce rivals for the eventual succession of their father. No successor has been named.

  Ro Tu-chol

  A vice-premier, Ro Tu-chol is a rising technocrat. He gave the budget speech every year in 2006-08, and in 2005 signed an agreement with China for joint offshore oil exploration.

  The judiciary

  As in other Stalinist regimes, the judiciary functions as an instrument of the state. Courts have no independence.

  The legislature

  Formally, North Korea is governed by the constitution of December 1972, as revised in 1992 and 1998. In some ways, this is typically communist. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK as North Korea is officially known) is defined as socialist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist, and organised on the basis of “democratic centralism”. The WPK is explicitly recognised as the party of government. The Supreme People's Assembly (SPA, parliament), which is described in the constitution as “the highest organ of power”, is in reality merely a rubber stamp. It did not meet, for example, for four years after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. Its most recent meeting, in April 2008, was for only one day.

  Other aspects of the constitution are peculiar to North Korea. In 1992 Marxism-Leninism disappeared and juche (self-reliance) became the sole ideology. In 1998 the State Administration Council was renamed as the cabinet, and the number of ministers was cut. It now ranks below the NDC, in keeping with a professed Songun or “army first” policy.

  Media services

  Mass media are all government-controlled and heavily ideological. The flavour can be sampled at www.kcna.co.jp, North Korea's official news agency, which uses a Japanese site run by pro-North ethnic Koreans living in Japan. The allocated country suffix, .kp, has yet to be taken up. A limited e-mail service is available through Chinese providers, such as www.silibank.com. There is a government intranet, but foreigners cannot gain access to it. In May 2002 a South Korean entrepreneur opened Pyongyang's first Internet cafe; there are now six or seven, but who is allowed access to the Internet is unclear. Only the top elite have some access to foreign media; even radios have fixed  dials. Videotapes and DVDs of popular South Korean television shows circulate surreptitiously.

  Democracy index (for methodology, see Appendix)

  The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2008 democracy index ranks North Korea at the bottom, 167th out of 167 countries, putting it among the 50 countries considered authoritarian. This designation includes states such as the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe, as well as a number of other Asian states such as Myanmar and Laos.

  Given that the country is a de facto hereditary monarchy with the current leader, Kim Jong-il, firmly in control, positions of political power in North Korea are filled through Kim Jong-il's trusted cronies. No effective opposition exists, and it is highly unlikely that Kim Jong-il's administration will be turned out of office through elections. Kim Jong-il's military-first policy ensures that all matters defer to the military, the Korean People's Army (KPA). Given the secretive and closed nature of the country and the lack of an independent media, the human rights record of North Korea is difficult to assess. However, the anecdotal accounts, mostly from defectors and refugees, suggest a lack of protection of and respect for basic human rights, including the freedom of speech and the right to due judicial process. All these factors give North Korea zero scores for electoral process and civil liberties.

  In the government functioning category, however, North Korea scores relatively high and outscores some countries that fall into our designation of hybrid regimes, such as Iraq and Georgia. This owes much to the fact that Kim Jong-il's authority extends over the full territory of the country, and that the doctrine of juche (self-reliance) ensures that foreign powers have no influence over state functions or policies.

  Democracy index
  	Overall score	Overall rank	Electoral process	Government functioning	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Regime type
  North Korea	0.86	167	0.00	2.50	0.56	1.25	0.00	Authoritarian
  Overall and component scores are on a scale of 0 to 10; overall rank is out of 167 countries.

  Download text file (csv format)

  June 24, 2008

• Structure

  North Korea: Political structure

  Official name

  Democratic People's Republic of Korea

  Form of government

  One-party rule, based on the ideology of juche (self-reliance) and songun (military-first)

  The executive

  On the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 his son, Kim Jong-un, was hailed as the new supreme leader. In April 2012 Kim Jong-un was formally appointed to the topmost state and party positions as first chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC) and first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Under the constitution the NDC is the highest state body, although it is nominally under the control of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA, the legislature)

  Head of state

  The president of the SPA presidium performs the formal duties of the head of state, but ultimate executive power lies with the chairman of the NDC

  National legislature

  The unicameral 687-member SPA, which is directly elected for five-year terms. The SPA usually meets for only one day each year. Its presidium (formally the standing committee of the SPA) substitutes for the legislature when the SPA is not in session

  Regional legislatures

  Each province, city, county and district elects people's assemblies or committees. These committees elect local officials to carry out centrally decided policies

  National elections

  The 12th SPA was elected in 2009. These are communist-style elections, with a single list of candidates; their claimed turnout and "yes" votes approach 100%

  National government

  The WPK controls all arms of the state. Since the death of North Korea's founder, Kim Il-sung, in 1994, military figures have grown in influence

  Main political parties

  Government: the WPK is nominally in coalition with the Social Democratic Party and the Chondoist Chongu Party

  Key occupants of state and party positions

  National Defence Commission first chairman: Kim Jong-un

  Vice-chairmen:

   Kim Yong-chun

   Ri Yong-mu

   Jang Song-taek

   O Kuk-ryol

  SPA presidium president: Kim Yong-nam

  Vice-presidents:

   Yang Hyong-sop

   Kim Yong-dae

  Premier: Choe Yong-rim

  Vice-premiers:

   Ri Sung-ho

   Kim In-sik

   Ri Chol-man

   Kang Sok-ju

   Ro Tu-chol :

  WPK first secretary: Kim Jong-un

  WPK politburo presidium members:

   Kim Yong-nam

   Choe Yong-rim

   Choe Ryong-hae

  Central bank president

  Paek Ryong-chon

  November 20, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  North Korea: Economic background

  Gross domestic product by sector
  (% share of GDP)
  	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
  Agriculture, forestry & fishing	30.2	27.2	26.7	25.0	23.3
  Mining	7.8	8.3	8.7	9.9	10.2
  Manufacturing	18.0	18.5	18.5	19.0	19.5
  Light industry	7.0	7.0	6.7	6.7	6.7
  Heavy industry	11.0	11.5	11.8	12.4	12.8
  Electricity, gas & water	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.5
  Construction	8.0	8.7	9.3	9.6	9.0
  Services	31.6	32.8	32.3	32.2	33.6
  Government	22.0	22.9	22.6	22.6	23.7
  Others	9.6	9.8	9.7	9.6	9.8
  Source: Bank of Korea, Seoul.

  Download text file (csv format)

  North Korea's economic structure used to resemble that of former communist Eastern Europe, but a halting transition has begun. A lack of published data hinders economic analysis. Overall, rapid growth and industrialisation until 1970 created a mainly urban industrial society, but gave way to two decades of stagnation and one of disastrous decline and famine. Typically, there is an exaggerated emphasis on heavy industry, partly for military reasons, although much of it is currently inoperative. The military runs its own extensive secret economy, taking the bulk of scarce resources.

  Industry mostly comprises the old Stalinist stalwarts: coal, steel, chemicals and machine tools. Much is on the east coast, owing to the proximity of minerals, which are also exported. Light industry is located mainly around the capital, Pyongyang, although each province is meant to be self-sufficient, which creates severe inequalities.

  Farming has become a disaster. Only a few plains in the south and west are suited to agriculture. A drive for food self-sufficiency in hilly terrain, with an excessive bias to rice and maize, led to unwise terracing and soil exhaustion. Floods in 1995 and 1996, and then drought in 1997, plunged North Korea into a severe famine. For the past decade the population has survived on food aid, but in 2005 the government said it no longer needed this aid. This proved premature; after severe floods in 2007 food deficits remain acute. In April 2008 a South Korean non-governmental organisation claimed that famine had returned.

  June 24, 2008

• Structure

  North Korea: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011a	2012b
  GDP at market prices (Won bn)	1,853.8b	1,672.9b	1,677.1b	–b	–
  GDP (US$ bn)	13.3b	12.0b	12.3b	–b	–
  Real GDP growth (%)	3.1b	-0.9b	0.7b	1.9b	2.7
  Exchange rate (av) Won:US$c	139.0	139.0	136.6	140.0	137.0
  Exports (US$ m)	2,062	1,994	2,554	–	–
  Imports (US$ m)	-3,578	-3,095	-3,528	–	–
  Trade balance (US$ m)d	-1,516	-1,101	-974	–	–
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Official rate; variable black-market rates also exist, under which the won is worth a tiny fraction of the official rate. The currency was redenominated in November 2009 at the rate of 100 old won to 1 new won. d Converted to US dollars based on official exchange rates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2010	% of total
  Agriculture, forestry & fishing	21.2
  Mining	14.2
  Manufacturing	21.3
  Construction	7.4
  Electricity, gas & water	3.1
  Services	32.8
  Principal exports 2006	US$ m	Principal imports 2006	US$ m
  Electronic goods	386	Mineral fuels & oils	975
  Minerals & metals	284	Machinery & electronic goods	430
  Textiles	214	Cereals & meats	334
  Machinery	188	Fertiliser	156
  Main destinations of exports 2010	% of total	Main origins of imports 2010	% of total
  South Korea	40.9	China	64.5
  China	46.8	South Korea	24.6
  India	5.7	India	7
  Germany	1.3	Russia	2.3

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  November 20, 2012

• Outlook

  North Korea: Country outlook

  North Korea: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The political outlook remains uncertain following the death in December 2011 of North Korea's leader for 17 years, Kim Jong-il. Most signs suggest that the succession to the leadership of his third son, Kim Jong-un, is secure. Although the new leader is unlikely to face any open challenge, power struggles will continue behind the scenes as he consolidates his position. North Korea will remain internationally isolated as the regime pursues a nuclear-weapons capability. There is little chance that the six-sided talks on North Korean denuclearisation will resume in the near future. The economy will gain momentum in the 2013-14 forecast period after expanding by an estimated 1.9% in 2011. Exports to China will continue to boom. The market exchange rate for the North Korean won will remain weak, reflecting the increased dollarisation of the economy.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: In the months following the sudden death on December 17th 2011 of the country's leader for 17 years, Kim Jong-il, North Korea has been in relatively unfamiliar territory. The regime immediately decided to anoint Kim Jong-il's third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as the "great successor" and "supreme leader." An immediate hereditary transfer of power was not inevitable, especially given the limited period of training that Kim Jong-un had undergone, but his prompt elevation was an attempt to emphasise continuity and minimise instability in the country. The process was reinforced in 2012 by Kim Jong-un's formal appointment to the top positions in both the state hierarchy and the nominally ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)-posts that were held by his father before his death. The transfer of power appears to be proceeding smoothly so far, but the transition is still at an early stage. The sudden ouster of the most senior figure on the WPK politburo, vice-marshal Ri Yong-ho, in July underscored the possibility that configurations of power will change. For now, the country's elite appears to have rallied around Kim Jong-un and an informal regency seems to have been created to assist the new leader. North Korea-watchers believe that the officials who accompanied Kim Jong-il's hearse at his funeral procession are likely to make up his son's inner circle of advisers. Although the elite appear to have rallied round Kim Jong-un for now, the abrupt dismissal of Ri Yong-ho underscored the fact that fissures within the regime could open up. Although unlikely, direct challenges to Kim Jong-un should not be ruled out: if the new leader fails to prove himself as an able leader, or if he ruffles the feathers of the older generation of officials surrounding him (a number of whom are believed to have opposed a third-generation hereditary succession), they may attempt to wrest power from him and form a collective leadership. However, nearly a year into Kim Jong-un's rule all outward appearances suggest that he is successfully consolidating his power base. What seems more likely than a direct challenge to Kim Jong-un is that rivalries will emerge among the young heir's various sponsors in the regime. The new leader is ill-prepared to deal with such problems. Several recent developments suggest that Kim Jong-un and his sponsors are attempting to bring the military more fully under the control of the party. These include personnel changes made at the April 2012 party and parliamentary meetings, as well as Ri Yong-ho's removal from his post in July. Public support for the new regime is difficult to gauge. Despite scenes of mass grieving following Kim Jong-il's death, life for most ordinary North Koreans remains difficult, with even the privileged in Pyongyang, the capital, affected by frequent power cuts and food shortages. To mitigate these hardships, many North Koreans of all classes are now involved in market (including black-market) activity. Efforts by the regime in 2009 to crack down on private economic initiatives backfired, and subsequently restrictions were relaxed to a degree. Since then, as North Korea's trade and investment ties (mainly with China) have expanded, opportunities to engage in trading have increased and North Koreans have come to depend even more on such activities to sustain themselves. Channels of information to the outside world have also opened up, expanding North Koreans' perceptions of how their lot compares with that of other countries' residents, and particularly with the living standards of South Koreans. Another positive sign is that a number of Kim Jong-un's top advisers are believed to be reform-minded. One such is Choe Thae-bok, who has extensive experience outside North Korea. Another is Jang Song-taek, who is said to have an interest in market economics and has made numerous trips to China to secure investment and gain a greater understanding of China's economy by touring industrial sites there.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: North Korea's foreign relations in the first year of Kim Jong-un's rule have been dominated by the fall-out from its satellite launch in mid-April 2012. The launch, which was widely seen as a barely disguised missile test, was a failure, but it breached North Korea's (now suspended) agreement with the US that would have seen that country provide nutritional assistance in return for North Korea's promised suspension of all nuclear activities. There was general international condemnation of the rocket launch, including from China. However, the Chinese government's fear of destabilising North Korea limited moves to punish Kim Jong-un to the imposition of UN sanctions on an additional three state-owned enterprises, and China's half-hearted implementation of sanctions has undermined their effectiveness. North Korea has yet to extend an olive branch in one of its familiar policy reversals. If it does it will be treated with due caution, but is unlikely to be rebuffed, given the risk of creating instability in North Korea during its delicate transition period. Assuming that the country carries out no further missile or nuclear tests, international pressure on the regime may consequently be moderate. The US election period has passed, with the president, Barack Obama, winning another term in office, but the US is facing many more pressing foreign policy challenges, as well as domestic fiscal and economic difficulties. As a result, the North Korean issue will be treated as dormant rather than as an immediate danger unless Kim Jong-un decides to make his mark with a fresh provocation. Assuming South Korea's impending election period passes without any serious rise in tensions, inter-Korean relations may be set to improve. All three main presidential candidates in South Korea-not only the rival liberals Moon Jae-in and Ahn Cheol-soo, but also the conservative Park Geun-hye-have recently reiterated their desire to pursue an engagement policy with North Korea. Renewed South Korean overtures to the North also have wider regional implications. China could see its current near-monopoly of sway in the North challenged, while the US may find the South's new olive branch a hindrance to pressing hard on the nuclear issue.

  POLICY TRENDS: It remains too early to predict with any certainty the direction of the new North Korean leadership's economic policy. The focus of the regime will remain on cementing the political transition, rather than on policy. The country's economy remains in a dire state, largely owing to a long tradition of prioritising politics and ideology over economic aims. In real terms North Korea's GDP is smaller now than in 1989, and malnutrition is endemic. Indications of possible reform under the new leadership have been elusive. The first budget of Kim Jong-un's reign, reported at the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA, the legislature) session in April, as usual contained no hard figures. The second SPA, in September, produced no significant economic reform announcements. However, there appears to have been an increased emphasis on economic issues in official pronouncements, and engagement with China has been stepped up. Chinese officials have portrayed recent bilateral deals, including co-operation on the development of special economic zones, as evidence of reduced hostility in North Korea to economic reform. Economic policy could become a source of conflict within the new regime. Conservatives insist that a strong military is the bedrock of national development, whereas reformers argue that economic development is the only sure and lasting basis for national strength. Although the change of leadership appears to be giving the reforming group more influence, in practice the Korean People's Army will oppose any attempts to cut its budget, while Kim Jong-un's political need to cultivate the army may check any reformist impulses that he may harbour. Since 2002 North Korean budgets have not included any hard figures, making it impossible to forecast fiscal policy. According to the latest budget, announced in April, spending will grow by 10.1% in 2012, with expenditure on capital construction, "power coal and metal industries and railway transport", and science and technology to expand by over 10% each. Revenue will meanwhile grow by 8.7%, with a significant proportion of the increase coming from state enterprises.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: In principle North Korea has great potential for economic growth, which is sorely needed. Although no official figures are published, output levels are thought to be lower now than in the late 1980s. Data from the Bank of Korea (BOK, South Korea's central bank) suggest that the North's GDP has contracted in four of the past six years. The BOK estimates that the North Korean economy grew by 0.8% in 2011 after having shrunk by 0.5% in 2010. Based on different data, from the UN Statistics Division, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that GDP grew by 1.9% last year, up from 0.7% in 2010. The North Korean government puts industrial output growth at 2% in 2011, although no further information was provided. Owing to growing trade and investment with China, we expect North Korea's rate of economic growth to pick up modestly in the coming years. In sectoral terms, the best prospects are in minerals and manufacturing for export: neither of these sectors has seen significant development so far. If Chinese investment pours into these sectors, as well as into infrastructure (most of which is decrepit in North Korea), the country could return to the stronger rates of economic expansion recorded in its early years. A crucial precondition for such an improvement would be a lasting commitment on the part of the new leadership to prioritise economic growth instead of military strength or ideological purity.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: Despite the regime's avowed doctrine of juche (self-reliance), North Korea's foreign trade has grown in recent years, if from a very low base and with overall volumes remaining small by regional standards. Trade with China and South Korea is responsible for almost 90% of the North's total trade. This trend will persist in 2013-14. Foreign-exchange earnings will continue to be dominated by exports from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC, a zone in the North where many Southern manufacturing firms operate), and by sales of minerals to China. Illegal sales of weapons will bring in further earnings, but these are likely to be less lucrative. Exports of goods to China should continue to boom in 2013-14, and exports from the KIC will probably expand if relations with South Korea improve from 2013 under a new president in the South. North Korea's imports, of which petroleum products form the main component, are likely to expand strongly in the next two years, as foreign exchange will be more readily available owing to the expected rise in exports. China is currently North Korea's only significant source of foreign investment. Its investment in the North is growing rapidly (if from a low base), notably in mining, roads and railways, and other infrastructure.

  November 22, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

122,762 sq km (official figure)

Population

24.1m (2008 census)

Main towns

Population in '000, 1993

Pyongyang (capital): 3,255 (2008 census)

Nampo: 731

Hamhung: 710

Chongjin: 582

Kaesong: 334

Sinuiju: 326

Wonsan: 300

Climate

Continental, with extremes of temperature

Weather in Wonsan (altitude 37 metres)

Hottest month, August, 20-27°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, minus 8-1°C; driest month, January, 30 mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 317 mm average rainfall

Language

Korean

Measures

Metric system; also Korean measures

Currency

North Korean won (Won). Won1 = 100 chon. Official exchange rate in 2009: Won145:US$1 but black-market rates are vastly higher. The currency was redenominated in November 2009 at the rate of 100 old won for 1 new won

Time

9 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

January 1st (New Year); February 3rd-5th (Seollal, Lunar New Year); February 16th, 17th (Kim Jong-il's birthday); April 15th-16th (birthday of the “eternal president”, the late Kim Il-sung); April 25th (founding of the Korean People's Army); May 1st (Labour Day); June 6th (Surinal); July 27th (Victory Day); August 15th (Liberation Day); September 9th (National Day); September 12th-14th (Han'gawi, Harvest Moon Festival); October 10th (foundation of the Workers' Party of Korea); December 27th (Constitution Day)

August 17, 2011